NERC CIP-004-7, "Cyber Security — Personnel & Training," is the mandatory, FERC-approved Reliability Standard that governs who may access Bulk Electric System (BES) Cyber Systems and how utilities and grid operators vet, train and offboard those individuals. Per its own Purpose clause it exists "to minimize the risk against compromise that could lead to misoperation or instability in the Bulk Electric System (BES) from individuals accessing BES Cyber Systems by requiring an appropriate level of personnel risk assessment, training, security awareness, and access management in support of protecting BES Cyber Systems." CIP-004-7 originated from NERC Project 2019-02 and was approved by FERC on 7 December 2021 via a Designated Letter Order in Docket No. RD21-6-000; it became effective and enforceable on 1 January 2024, per NERC's own 2023 CMEP and ORCP Annual Report. It remains the enforceable version today, even though a virtualization-focused successor, CIP-004-8, is already FERC-approved for a 2028 compliance date (see below).
Key takeaways
- Contractors and vendor staff are "personnel" for this standard whenever the utility grants them authorized electronic or unescorted physical access.
- Part 2.2's sequencing and Part 2.3's recency are separate obligations.
- Part 3.1: a process to confirm identity.
- Part 6.1: before provisioning, authorize electronic access to electronic BCSI and physical access to physical BCSI based on need.
Who must comply, and which systems are in scope?
Section 4.1 names seven "Responsible Entity" functional types: Balancing Authority, a Distribution Provider that owns specific load-shedding, Remedial Action Scheme or protection facilities, Generator Operator, Generator Owner, Reliability Coordinator, Transmission Operator and Transmission Owner. The requirements apply to BES Cyber Systems categorized as high or medium impact under CIP-002. Requirement R1 covers all high and medium impact systems; most Parts of R2 to R6 cover high impact systems and medium impact systems with External Routable Connectivity, plus their associated EACMS and PACS. Parts 5.3 and 5.4 apply only to high impact systems and their EACMS.
Five exemption categories (Section 4.2.3) take Cyber Assets out of scope: facilities regulated by the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission; communication links between discrete Electronic Security Perimeters (see CIP-005); systems regulated by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission under 10 C.F.R. § 73.54; Distribution Provider equipment outside Section 4.2.1; and entities with no high- or medium-impact BES Cyber Systems.
Contractors and vendor staff are "personnel" for this standard whenever the utility grants them authorized electronic or unescorted physical access. That is why a device vendor's field engineers meet CIP-004 even though the vendor itself is never a Responsible Entity.
What do R1 and R2 require for awareness and training?
Requirement R1 (Security Awareness Program, Lower VRF) has one Part: security awareness that "at least once each calendar quarter, reinforces cyber security practices" for personnel with authorized electronic or unescorted physical access. The Measures accept emails, posters, intranet pages or briefings, as long as the quarterly cadence is documented.
Requirement R2 (Cyber Security Training Program, Lower VRF) is far more prescriptive:
| Part | Core obligation |
|---|---|
| 2.1 | Training content on nine topics: cyber security policies; physical access controls; electronic access controls; the visitor control program; handling of BES Cyber System Information (BCSI) and its storage; identification of a Cyber Security Incident and initial notifications; recovery plans; response to Cyber Security Incidents; and risks from electronic interconnectivity, including Transient Cyber Assets and Removable Media |
| 2.2 | Training completed before authorized electronic or unescorted physical access is granted, except during CIP Exceptional Circumstances |
| 2.3 | Training completed again "at least once every 15 calendar months" |
Part 2.2's sequencing and Part 2.3's recency are separate obligations. For vendor staff, both depend on the utility receiving dated training records for each named person.
What does the seven-year personnel risk assessment in R3 require?
Requirement R3 (Medium VRF) requires a documented personnel risk assessment (PRA) program to attain and retain access:
- Part 3.1: a process to confirm identity.
- Part 3.2: a "seven year criminal history records check" covering the current residence regardless of duration, and other locations where the person lived for six consecutive months or more during the prior seven years. If the full check is impossible, the entity does as much as possible and documents why.
- Part 3.3: criteria or a process to evaluate criminal history records checks for authorizing access.
- Part 3.4: criteria or a process for verifying that PRAs performed for contractors or service vendors "are conducted according to Parts 3.1 through 3.3." The vendor may run the check, but the utility must be able to verify it meets the same standard. NERC CIP-013 addresses the same vendor boundary from the procurement side.
- Part 3.5: a process to ensure everyone with access has had a PRA "within the last seven years."
The "seven year" figure appears twice: as the lookback window of the records check (3.2) and as the renewal cadence (3.5). A renewal still needs a fresh seven-year lookback from its own date.
How do R4 and R5 control access and revocation?
Requirement R4 (Access Management Program, Medium VRF) requires a process to authorize electronic access and unescorted physical access into a Physical Security Perimeter based on need (Part 4.1); verification "at least once each calendar quarter" that individuals with active access have authorization records (Part 4.2); and, for electronic access, verification "at least once every 15 calendar months" that user accounts, account groups or role categories and their privileges are correct and necessary (Part 4.3).
Requirement R5 (Access Revocation, Medium VRF) sets the standard's tightest deadlines, each tied to a trigger:
| Part | Trigger | Deadline |
|---|---|---|
| 5.1 | Termination action | Initiate removal of the ability for unescorted physical access and Interactive Remote Access, and complete it within 24 hours |
| 5.2 | Reassignment or transfer | Revoke electronic access to individual accounts and unescorted physical access no longer needed, by the end of the next calendar day after the determination |
| 5.3 | Termination action | Revoke non-shared user accounts within 30 calendar days (high impact and EACMS) |
| 5.4 | Termination, reassignment or transfer | Change passwords of shared accounts known to the user within 30 calendar days, or within 10 calendar days after documented extenuating operating circumstances end |
Part 5.1 says "removal of the ability for access may be different than deletion, disabling, revocation, or removal of all access rights": revoking a badge and the remote-access path meets the 24-hour clock, and account clean-up follows under 5.3. Evidence for every requirement is retained for three calendar years.
What changed for BCSI in CIP-004-7?
CIP-004-7 moved access control for BES Cyber System Information out of R4 and R5 into a new Requirement R6; its version history says it was revised "to enhance BES reliability for entities to manage their BCSI." R6 defines access as having "both the ability to obtain and use BCSI", and provisioned access as the means to do so, which "may include physical keys or access cards, user accounts and associated rights and privileges, encryption keys."
- Part 6.1: before provisioning, authorize electronic access to electronic BCSI and physical access to physical BCSI based on need.
- Part 6.2: at least once every 15 calendar months, verify that everyone with provisioned access has an authorization record and still needs it.
- Part 6.3: on a termination action, remove the ability to use provisioned BCSI access by the end of the next calendar day.
NERC's Implementation Guidance on cloud solutions for BCSI (21 June 2023) explains that a cloud provider's staff have access when they can see BCSI in clear text or hold both the encrypted BCSI and the keys. It also states that cloud roles "do not suggest or imply transference of compliance responsibilities" from the utility. The same logic applies to a vendor support portal that stores a customer's configuration exports. See NERC CIP-011 for the protection side.
What does CIP-004 mean for a device vendor's staff and products?
A vendor supports its customers' CIP-004 programs in two ways: through the people it sends and through the access controls its products offer.
| Vendor situation | CIP-004 Part | What the vendor supplies |
|---|---|---|
| Field engineer needs unescorted access to a substation | 2.1-2.2, 3.1-3.4 | Named staff list, dated training records, PRA attestation that states the identity check and seven-year records check |
| Engineer keeps access for years | 2.3, 3.5 | Renewal dates the utility can track; refresher evidence every 15 months |
| Engineer leaves or changes role | 5.1, 5.2 | Same-day notice to every utility customer, which CIP-013-2 Part 1.2.3 asks vendors to give |
| Remote support session | 4.1, 5.1 | Support through the utility's remote access path only, never a separate vendor tunnel |
| Support portal holds customer configuration files | 6.1-6.3 | Named-user access, per-customer authorization records, revocation on request by the next calendar day |
| Product account model | 4.3, 5.3, 5.4 | Individual named accounts, roles that can be listed and reviewed, documented shared and default accounts, passwords that can be changed without a firmware update |
The last row is a design issue. A relay or gateway with one hard-coded maintenance password makes Part 5.4 impossible to meet; see how to fix hard-coded credentials in embedded firmware. Account and logging features also feed CIP-007 R5.
Is CIP-004-8 approved, and what changes in 2028?
Yes. On 19 March 2026 FERC issued Order No. 919 (Docket No. RM24-8-000), approving "CIP-004-8 (Cyber Security—Personnel & Training)" with ten other modified CIP standards from NERC's Project 2016-02 virtualization package, and four new and 18 modified NERC Glossary definitions (see NERC CIP-010). The order states "This final action is effective May 26, 2026."
NERC's CIP-004-8 standard page gives the effective date as 1 July 2028, and the CIP-004-7 page lists 30 June 2028 as its inactive date. Entities may adopt early at six, 12 or 18 months after the order's effective date.
CIP-004-8 keeps the R5 deadlines: 24 hours, next calendar day, 30 days and 10 days. It changes scope. Most Parts of R2 to R6 add "Medium impact BCS with IRA" (Interactive Remote Access) and "SCI supporting an Applicable System" (Shared Cyber Infrastructure), and physical-access wording excludes medium impact systems without External Routable Connectivity. For vendors, the IRA addition means that remote support staff for medium impact sites fall under training, PRA and revocation even where the site has no other routable connectivity.
Worked example: how is a vendor service engineer offboarded?
Synthetic example. Names and times are invented for illustration.
A fictional vendor engineer, "J. Rivera", has unescorted access and Interactive Remote Access at two high impact substations of one utility and a named account on the vendor's support portal, which holds that utility's relay configuration exports (BCSI).
Monday 09:00The vendor ends Rivera's employment. Its HR system notifies the vendor's PSIRT and account team. Monday 10:30The vendor emails the utility's access desk, meeting the CIP-013 Part 1.2.3 commitment in the contract. Monday 14:00The utility revokes Rivera's badge and remote access account. Part 5.1's 24-hour clock started at 09:00 and is met. Monday 16:00The vendor disables Rivera's portal account; the utility records it under Part 6.3, which allowed until the end of Tuesday. Within 30 daysThe utility removes Rivera's local accounts on relays and EACMS (Part 5.3) and changes the shared engineering password Rivera knew (Part 5.4). Next quarterThe Part 4.2 review shows no active access without an authorization record.
The weak link in practice is step 2: a vendor without a staff-change trigger leaves the utility's clock running without its knowledge.
What are the common pitfalls?
- Treating Part 3.4 as "trust the vendor". The utility needs criteria to verify vendor PRAs against Parts 3.1-3.3, not a bare statement that screening happened.
- One offboarding SLA for every case. Terminations, transfers and BCSI access run on different clocks.
- Forgetting BCSI in vendor systems. Support tickets with configuration exports and cloud file shares are R6 territory.
- Shared engineering accounts on devices. Every departure forces a password change on every device that uses them.
- Planning only for CIP-004-7. From 1 July 2028, remote access alone brings medium impact sites into scope.
What is a workable starting point?
Build R5 around triggersA termination (24 hours for access removal, 30 days for accounts) and a reassignment (next calendar day) are different events. Track training before access and the 15-month refresher separately Write Part 3.4 criteria for vendor PRAsand ask vendors for attestations that name each check. Inventory BCSI locations, including vendor and cloud services,before mapping R6 authorizations. Ask vendors for a staff-change noticein every contract, tied to CIP-013 Part 1.2.3. Assess CIP-004-8 scope nowfor medium impact sites with Interactive Remote Access, ahead of 1 July 2028.
SoftWSP does not manage accounts, training or personnel risk assessments. The OT Snapshot builds an asset inventory from captured traffic and flags ssh, telnet, RDP and VNC sessions that cross the site boundary, which helps a utility check that a revoked vendor's remote sessions really stopped.
This guide quotes NERC's published text of CIP-004-7, CIP-004-8 and CIP-013-2, NERC's Implementation Guidance on cloud solutions for BCSI, and the Federal Register text of FERC Order No. 919; it is not a substitute for the full standards, NERC's Implementation Plan, or compliance or legal advice.
Put this guide to work
Frequently asked questions
What is NERC CIP-004-7, and who must comply?
CIP-004, "Cyber Security — Personnel & Training," is the mandatory, FERC-approved NERC Reliability Standard governing who may access Bulk Electric System (BES) Cyber Systems and how utilities vet, train and offboard those people. Per its own Purpose clause it exists "to minimize the risk against compromise that could lead to misoperation or instability in the Bulk Electric System (BES) from individuals accessing BES Cyber Systems by requiring an appropriate level of personnel risk assessment, training, security awareness, and access management in support of protecting BES Cyber Systems." The currently enforceable version, CIP-004-7, originated from NERC Project 2019-02 (BES Cyber System Information Access Management) and was approved by FERC on 7 December 2021 via a Designated Letter Order in Docket No. RD21-6-000; per NERC's own 2023 CMEP and ORCP Annual Report, "CIP-004-7 and CIP-011-3 became effective" on 1 January 2024. Section 4.1 names seven "Responsible Entity" functional types — Balancing Authority, certain Distribution Providers, Generator Operator, Generator Owner, Reliability Coordinator, Transmission Operator and Transmission Owner — and the requirements apply to each entity's BES Cyber Systems categorized as high or medium impact under the separate CIP-002 process.
What do Requirements R1 and R2 (awareness and training) require?
R1 (Security Awareness Program, Lower VRF) has a single table part: Part 1.1 requires reinforcing cyber security practices for personnel with authorized electronic or unescorted physical access to applicable BES Cyber Systems "at least once each calendar quarter," through any means (not just formal training). R2 (Cyber Security Training Program, Lower VRF) is more prescriptive: Part 2.1 requires training content covering nine enumerated topics — including cyber security policies, physical and electronic access controls, visitor control programs, handling of BES Cyber System Information, identification of a Cyber Security Incident, recovery plans, incident response, and risks from electronic interconnectivity. Part 2.2 requires completing that training **before** granting authorized access, except under documented CIP Exceptional Circumstances. Part 2.3 requires retraining personnel with existing access "at least once every 15 calendar months."
What does Requirement R3 (personnel risk assessment) require, and how far back does the background check reach?
R3 (Medium VRF) requires a personnel risk assessment (PRA) before granting authorized electronic or unescorted physical access. Part 3.1 requires confirming identity. Part 3.2 is the headline numeric requirement: a "seven year criminal history records check" covering the individual's current residence for any duration of residency, and prior residences of seven years where the individual resided for six consecutive months or more. Part 3.4 requires criteria or a process for verifying that personnel risk assessments performed for contractors or service vendors are conducted according to Parts 3.1 through 3.3 — the standard's own provision for the third-party staffing arrangements common at utilities and their vendors (see our guide to [NERC CIP-013 supply chain risk management](/guides/nerc-cip-013-supply-chain-risk-management/) for the parallel vendor-risk obligations). Part 3.5 requires renewing the PRA for personnel with existing authorized access "within the last seven years" — the same seven-year figure used for the records-check window itself, not a shorter re-screening cadence.
What do Requirements R4 and R5 (access management and revocation) require, and what are the exact revocation deadlines?
R4 (Access Management Program, Medium VRF) requires authorizing electronic access and unescorted physical access into a Physical Security Perimeter based on need (Part 4.1; since CIP-004-7, access to BES Cyber System Information is handled separately in Requirement R6), verifying "at least once each calendar quarter" that individuals with active access have authorization records (Part 4.2), and verifying that user accounts, user account groups and role categories, and their privileges, are correct and necessary "at least once every 15 calendar months" (Part 4.3). R5 (Access Revocation, Medium VRF) sets the standard's most citation-critical numeric deadlines, scoped to specific triggers: Part 5.1 requires initiating removal of a terminated individual's ability for unescorted physical access and Interactive Remote Access, completing the removals **within 24 hours** of the termination action. Part 5.2 requires revoking the individual authorizations an entity determines are no longer necessary following a **reassignment or transfer**, by the end of the **next calendar day** following the determination. Part 5.3 requires revoking the individual user accounts of a terminated individual (except shared accounts) **within 30 calendar days** of the termination action. Part 5.4 requires changing passwords for shared accounts known to the terminated individual **within 30 calendar days**, or, where extenuating operating circumstances are documented, within 10 calendar days following the end of those circumstances. Evidence for all R1-R6 requirements must be retained for **three calendar years**.
Is CIP-004-7 already being replaced, and by when do entities need to comply?
Yes — a successor, CIP-004-8, is already FERC-approved, though CIP-004-7 remains the enforceable standard today. On 19 March 2026 the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission issued Order No. 919 (Docket No. RM24-8-000), which states it "seeks Commission approval of the following 11 modified CIP Reliability Standards," explicitly naming "CIP-004-8 (Cyber Security—Personnel & Training)" alongside CIP-002-7, CIP-003-10, CIP-005-8, CIP-006-7.1, CIP-007-7.1, CIP-008-7.1, CIP-009-7.1, CIP-010-5, CIP-011-4.1 and CIP-013-3 as part of NERC's Project 2016-02 virtualization package — published in the Federal Register on 24 March 2026 (91 FR 13957-13965), with the order itself stating "this final action is effective May 26, 2026." Per NERC's implementation plan for that package, the revised standards take effect on the later of 1 April 2026 or the first day of the first calendar quarter 24 months after the order's effective date — which computes to **1 July 2028**. CIP-004-8's R5 table preserves the same 24-hour/next-day/30-day/10-day timelines; the revision mainly adds Shared Cyber Infrastructure (SCI) scoping language to accommodate virtualized environments. For the exact wording changes to every redlined Part of the final CIP-004-8 text, consult NERC's and FERC's own published text before compliance planning.
Sources
- NERC: CIP-004-7 — Cyber Security – Personnel & Training (currently effective standard, full text: Purpose, Applicability, Requirements R1-R5 with Tables, Compliance, Evidence Retention, Violation Severity Levels)
- NERC: 2023 CMEP and ORCP Annual Report — confirms "On January 1, 2024, CIP-004-7 and CIP-011-3 became effective and enforceable"
- Federal Register: Order No. 919; Virtualization Reliability Standards, 91 FR 13957-13965 (FERC, Docket No. RM24-8-000, issued 2026-03-19, published 2026-03-24, effective 2026-05-26) — lists CIP-004-8 among the 11 approved standards, with NERC's implementation plan formula
- NERC: CIP-004-8 — Project 2016-02 virtualization text (final FERC-approved revision; SCI/virtualization scoping additions to CIP-004-7)
- NERC: CIP-004-7 standard page — status "Mandatory Subject to Enforcement", FERC order 12/07/2021, effective 01/01/2024, inactive 06/30/2028 (read 2026-11-13)
- NERC: CIP-004-8 standard page — status "Subject to Future Enforcement", FERC order 03/19/2026, regulatory order effective 05/26/2026, effective 07/01/2028 (read 2026-11-13)
- NERC RSTC: Implementation Guidance — Usage of Cloud Solutions for BES Cyber System Information, CIP-004-7 R6 and CIP-011-3 R1 (21 June 2023)
- NERC: Reliability Standard CIP-013-2 — Supply Chain Risk Management (Part 1.2.3 vendor notice when access should end)
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