NERC CIP-010-4, "Cyber Security — Configuration Change Management and Vulnerability Assessments," is the mandatory, FERC-approved Reliability Standard that tells utilities and grid operators how to control configuration changes to Bulk Electric System (BES) Cyber Systems and how often to test those systems for vulnerabilities. Per its own Purpose clause it exists "to prevent and detect unauthorized changes to BES Cyber Systems by specifying configuration change management and vulnerability assessment requirements in support of protecting BES Cyber Systems from compromise that could lead to misoperation or instability in the Bulk Electric System (BES)." CIP-010-4 was adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees on 5 November 2020 and approved by FERC on 18 March 2021 — and it remains the enforceable version today, even though a virtualization-focused successor, CIP-010-5, is already FERC-approved for a 2028 compliance date (see below).
Key takeaways
- Requirement R2 (Medium VRF) applies only to high impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated EACMS and PCA, not PACS and not medium impact systems.
- Part 3.1 — a paper or active vulnerability assessment "at least once every 15 calendar months," for high and medium impact systems and their associated EACMS, PACS and PCA.
- Section 3 (Removable Media): authorize users and locations, and detect and mitigate malicious code on the media using a Cyber Asset other than a BES Cyber System or PCA, before connecting it.
- CIP-010 binds the utility, but a utility can only build a baseline, verify software and plan assessments with facts from the manufacturer.
Who must comply?
Section 4.1 names seven "Responsible Entity" functional types: Balancing Authority, a Distribution Provider that owns specific load-shedding, Remedial Action Scheme, protection or blackstart facilities, Generator Operator, Generator Owner, Reliability Coordinator, Transmission Operator and Transmission Owner. Depending on the requirement part, the standard applies to BES Cyber Systems categorized as high or medium impact under CIP-002, together with their associated Electronic Access Control or Monitoring Systems (EACMS), Physical Access Control Systems (PACS) and Protected Cyber Assets (PCA). Low impact systems are handled separately, through the CIP-003 Attachment 1 plan.
Five exemption categories (Section 4.2.3) take Cyber Assets out of scope: facilities regulated by the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission; communication networks and data links between discrete Electronic Security Perimeters; systems regulated by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission under 10 C.F.R. § 73.54; for Distribution Providers, systems outside Section 4.2.1; and any Responsible Entity with no high or medium impact BES Cyber Systems. NERC's CIP-010-4 standard page lists the version as "Mandatory Subject to Enforcement" since 1 October 2022, with an inactive date of 30 June 2028.
What does R1's six-part change management process require?
Requirement R1 of CIP-010-4 (Violation Risk Factor: Medium) requires one or more documented processes covering six table parts:
| Part | Applies to | Core obligation |
|---|---|---|
| 1.1 | High/medium impact systems + EACMS, PACS, PCA | Develop a baseline configuration listing: OS/firmware version; installed commercial or open-source application software; any custom software; logical network-accessible ports; and applied security patches |
| 1.2 | Same | Authorize and document any change that deviates from the existing baseline |
| 1.3 | Same | Update the baseline "within 30 calendar days of completing the change" |
| 1.4 | Same | Before the change, determine which CIP-005/CIP-007 security controls it could affect; after the change, verify and document that those controls were not adversely affected |
| 1.5 | High impact only, where technically feasible | Test changes in a test environment (or a carefully managed production test) that models the baseline, before production deployment |
| 1.6 | High/medium impact + EACMS, PACS (for baseline items 1.1.1, 1.1.2, 1.1.5) | Verify the identity and integrity of software from its source before the change, when the software source provides a method to do so |
Part 1.6's own note confirms it doesn't require renegotiating existing vendor contracts, and excludes contract terms and vendor performance from its scope — the same carve-out the supply chain standard uses (see NERC CIP-013-2). The Violation Severity Levels grade Part 1.1 by how many of the five baseline items a process covers, from Lower (four of five) to Severe (one).
How does R2's 35-day monitoring work?
Requirement R2 (Medium VRF) applies only to high impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated EACMS and PCA, not PACS and not medium impact systems. Its single Part 2.1 requires monitoring "at least once every 35 calendar days for changes to the baseline configuration," with any detected unauthorized change documented and investigated. Where R1 governs changes made through the authorized process, R2 is the control meant to catch changes made outside it. The standard's example of evidence is "logs from a system that is monitoring the configuration," so in practice the 35 days is the maximum gap between automated or manual comparisons against the R1 baseline.
How strict are the R3 vulnerability assessment cadences?
Requirement R3 (Medium VRF) sets numeric cadences rather than a general "regularly" obligation:
- Part 3.1 — a paper or active vulnerability assessment "at least once every 15 calendar months," for high and medium impact systems and their associated EACMS, PACS and PCA.
- Part 3.2 — for high impact systems only, where technically feasible, an active vulnerability assessment "at least once every 36 calendar months," in a test environment (or a production test run in a way that minimizes adverse effects) that models the production baseline.
- Part 3.3 — for high impact systems and their EACMS and PCA, an active vulnerability assessment of a new Cyber Asset before it joins production, except for CIP Exceptional Circumstances and like replacements that model an existing baseline.
- Part 3.4 — documenting results and an action plan to remediate or mitigate identified vulnerabilities, with a target completion date and execution status.
The Violation Severity Levels show how closely these deadlines are enforced: a Part 3.1 assessment more than 15 but less than 18 months after the last one is a Lower violation; 18–21 months is Moderate; 21–24 months is High; beyond 24 months is Severe. Part 3.2 escalates on the same pattern at 36–39, 39–42, 42–45 and beyond 45 months.
What does R4 require for Transient Cyber Assets and Removable Media?
Requirement R4 (Medium VRF) requires a documented plan, built from Attachment 1, for Transient Cyber Assets and Removable Media used with high or medium impact BES Cyber Systems and associated PCA — laptops, diagnostic tools and USB media a vendor or technician brings on site:
- Section 1 (assets the Responsible Entity manages): manage them in an ongoing or on-demand manner; authorize users, locations and uses; mitigate software vulnerabilities (patching, read-only live operating system, hardening, or another method); mitigate malicious code (antivirus, application whitelisting, or another method); and mitigate unauthorized use (physical access restriction, full-disk encryption with authentication, multi-factor authentication, or another method).
- Section 2 (assets a third party manages): review the other party's patching and anti-malware practices rather than controlling the asset directly, then determine and implement any additional mitigation before connecting it.
- Section 3 (Removable Media): authorize users and locations, and detect and mitigate malicious code on the media using a Cyber Asset other than a BES Cyber System or PCA, before connecting it.
Evidence for every R1–R4 requirement must be retained for three calendar years, per the standard's Compliance section.
What must a device vendor deliver to help a utility meet CIP-010?
CIP-010 binds the utility, but a utility can only build a baseline, verify software and plan assessments with facts from the manufacturer. A relay, RTU, gateway or controller is easier to bring into a high or medium impact environment when each release ships with:
| CIP-010-4 Part | Utility's task | What the vendor can ship |
|---|---|---|
| 1.1.1 / 1.1.5 | Record firmware version and applied patches | A version string readable over the management interface, and release notes that name every security fix |
| 1.1.2 / 1.1.3 | Record installed software | A component list per release, for example a CycloneDX firmware SBOM |
| 1.1.4 | Record logical network-accessible ports | A port, protocol and service list per release, marking which can be disabled (CIP-007 Part 1.1 needs the same list) |
| 1.6 | Verify identity and integrity before installing | Signed firmware with a published signing certificate, or SHA-256 hashes on an authenticated download portal separate from the file itself |
| 2.1 | Detect unauthorized change every 35 days | A way to read configuration and version remotely (API, SNMP or a configuration export) so a tool can compare it with the baseline |
| 3.1–3.3 | Paper or active assessments | Published advisories, guidance on which scans are safe in production, and a test-environment image or configuration |
| R4, Section 2 | Review a vendor laptop before connection | A written statement of the field laptop's patching, antivirus and hardening practice |
Part 1.6 only applies "when the method to do so is available to the Responsible Entity from the software source," so a vendor that ships no signature or hash leaves the utility with nothing to verify; CIP-013 Part 1.2.5 asks for the same verification at procurement. Devices that check signatures at boot, as described in the secure boot guide, add a second layer, but the Part 1.6 check happens before installation.
What changes in CIP-010-5, and when does it apply?
On 19 March 2026 FERC issued Order No. 919 (Docket No. RM24-8-000), approving 11 virtualization-revised CIP standards, including CIP-010-5, with four new Glossary terms (Cyber System, Management Interface, Shared Cyber Infrastructure, Virtual Cyber Asset) and 18 revised definitions. The order is "effective May 26, 2026," and quotes NERC's plan that the standards take effect on "the later of April 1, 2026, or the first day of the first calendar quarter that is 24 months after the effective date" of the order. NERC's CIP-010-5 standard page confirms 1 July 2028. The order also approved replacing most "technical feasibility exception" language with a self-implementing "per system capability" standard.
The approved CIP-010-5 text changes more than the Applicability section:
| Topic | CIP-010-4 (today) | CIP-010-5 (from 1 Jul 2028) |
|---|---|---|
| Baseline configuration | Part 1.1, five items, update within 30 days | Removed; R1 Part 1.1 instead requires authorizing changes that "alter the behavior of one or more cyber security controls" serving CIP-005 or CIP-007 |
| Software identity and integrity | Part 1.6, tied to baseline items 1.1.1, 1.1.2, 1.1.5 | Part 1.3, "prior to the installation of operating systems, firmware, software, or software patches" |
| 35-day monitoring | Changes to the baseline | "Per system capability," at least one control for each of seven areas, from routable network accessibility to account enable/disable status |
| Active assessment every 36 months | "Where technically feasible" | "Per system capability" |
| Scope | Cyber Assets | Cyber Systems, plus Shared Cyber Infrastructure (SCI) supporting an applicable system |
The 15-month assessment, the Part 3.4 action plan and the R4 Transient Cyber Asset plan carry over, with SCI added to R4's scope.
Worked example: how does one firmware update pass through CIP-010?
Synthetic example. The utility, vendor, device and dates are invented for illustration.
"Ridgeway Electric" runs a medium impact substation with protection relays from "Kestrel Controls". Kestrel publishes firmware 4.2.1, which fixes a web-server flaw.
Part 1.2Ridgeway opens a change request for the relays; the deviation is the firmware version and one closed port. Part 1.6The engineer downloads the image from Kestrel's portal and checks its signature against Kestrel's published certificate; the change record stores the result. Part 1.4Before installing, the team lists the affected CIP-007 controls (ports and services, patching); afterwards it confirms that port 80 is closed and logging still reaches the collector. Part 1.3The baseline record is updated with 4.2.1 and the new port list 12 days after completion, inside the 30-day limit. Part 3.4The vulnerability assessment action plan entry for the web-server flaw is closed with the change record as evidence. From July 2028The same update falls under CIP-010-5 Part 1.1 because it alters ports and services, and the signature check moves to Part 1.3.
What are the common pitfalls?
- Letting the baseline lag the firmware. A baseline updated after 30 days is a Part 1.3 violation even if the change itself was authorized.
- Treating a vendor hash on the same download page as integrity verification. A hash served next to the file it describes protects against corruption, not substitution; prefer signatures or a separate authenticated channel.
- Scheduling assessments at exactly 15 months. The Violation Severity Levels start the day after; build in margin.
- Assuming the baseline survives 2028. CIP-010-5 replaces it with change authorization and seven monitoring areas, so tooling bought only to diff baselines may need rework.
What is a workable starting point?
Build the baseline before anything elsePart 1.1's five items are what every other R1 and R2 obligation measures a change against. Separate R1 change authorization from R2 monitoringR2 Part 2.1 (high impact systems only, every 35 days) is the independent check that catches changes made outside the process. Put R3's cadences on a calendar with margin, not a countdown. Treat vendor and contractor equipment as Transient Cyber Assets from day one, with the Section 2 review completed before connection. Ask each vendor for the deliverables table aboveat the next purchase, and map today's process to CIP-010-5's Parts 1.1–1.4 and 2.1.1–2.1.7 before 1 July 2028. The NIST SP 800-82 guide gives the wider OT program context.
SoftWSP's device firmware security assessment extracts an SBOM from a firmware image as CycloneDX 1.6 JSON, matches its components against NVD, CISA KEV, FIRST EPSS and CISA CSAF ICS advisories, and produces an AI-drafted report with a citation for each finding, reviewed by an engineer. That gives a component list for baseline items 1.1.2 and 1.1.3 and cited input to a Part 3.1 paper assessment; two release SBOMs can be compared in the SBOM diff tool. The OT Snapshot builds an inventory of hosts, ports, services and protocols seen in captured traffic, which helps check Part 1.1.4 port lists against what devices actually use. Neither verifies signatures, reads device configurations or monitors baselines.
This guide quotes NERC's published text of CIP-010-4 and CIP-010-5, NERC's standard pages and the Federal Register text of FERC Order No. 919; it is not compliance or legal advice. CIP-010-4 is the enforceable version on 13 November 2026; CIP-010-5 becomes mandatory on 1 July 2028.
Put this guide to work
Frequently asked questions
What is NERC CIP-010-4, and who must comply?
CIP-010, "Cyber Security — Configuration Change Management and Vulnerability Assessments," is a mandatory, FERC-approved Reliability Standard from the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC). Per its own Purpose statement, it exists "to prevent and detect unauthorized changes to BES Cyber Systems by specifying configuration change management and vulnerability assessment requirements in support of protecting BES Cyber Systems from compromise that could lead to misoperation or instability in the Bulk Electric System (BES)." The currently enforceable version, CIP-010-4, was adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees on 5 November 2020 and approved by FERC on 18 March 2021 (Docket No. RD21-2-000). Section 4.1 names seven "Responsible Entity" functional types — Balancing Authority, certain Distribution Providers, Generator Operator, Generator Owner, Reliability Coordinator, Transmission Operator and Transmission Owner — and the requirements apply to each entity's BES Cyber Systems categorized as high or medium impact under CIP-002, plus their associated Electronic Access Control or Monitoring Systems (EACMS), Physical Access Control Systems (PACS) and Protected Cyber Assets (PCA), depending on the specific requirement part.
What do Requirements R1 and R2 (configuration change management and monitoring) require?
R1 (Table R1 — Configuration Change Management, Violation Risk Factor Medium) has six parts: Part 1.1 requires a documented baseline configuration per Cyber Asset covering operating system/firmware version, installed commercial or open-source application software, custom software, logical network-accessible ports, and applied security patches. Part 1.2 requires authorizing and documenting any change that deviates from that baseline. Part 1.3 requires updating the baseline "within 30 calendar days of completing the change." Part 1.4 requires determining which CIP-005/CIP-007 security controls a change could affect, verifying after the change that those controls were not adversely affected, and documenting the verification. Part 1.5 (high-impact systems only, where technically feasible) requires testing changes in a test environment — or a production environment tested in a way that minimizes adverse effects — before deployment. Part 1.6 requires verifying the identity and integrity of software from its source before a baseline change, when the software source makes that verification method available. R2 (Table R2 — Configuration Monitoring, also Medium VRF) applies only to high-impact systems and their associated EACMS/PCA, and requires monitoring for unauthorized baseline changes "at least once every 35 calendar days," with any detected unauthorized change documented and investigated.
What do Requirements R3 (vulnerability assessments) and R4 (Transient Cyber Assets) require?
R3 (Table R3 — Vulnerability Assessments, Medium VRF) requires, per Part 3.1, a paper or active vulnerability assessment "at least once every 15 calendar months" for high- and medium-impact systems and their associated EACMS/PACS/PCA. Part 3.2 adds, for high-impact systems only and where technically feasible, an active vulnerability assessment "at least once every 36 calendar months" performed in a test environment (or a carefully managed production test) that models the production baseline. Part 3.3 requires an active vulnerability assessment of any new applicable Cyber Asset before it joins production, with exceptions for CIP Exceptional Circumstances and like-for-like replacements. Part 3.4 requires documenting assessment results and an action plan to remediate or mitigate identified vulnerabilities, including target completion dates and execution status. R4 (Medium VRF) requires a documented Transient Cyber Asset and Removable Media plan, per the standard's Attachment 1, covering management, authorization (users, locations, uses), software-vulnerability mitigation, malicious-code mitigation and unauthorized-use mitigation for transient assets the Responsible Entity manages, a parallel but lighter review-based set of controls for transient assets managed by other parties, and malicious-code detection/mitigation for removable media before it connects to a BES Cyber System.
Is CIP-010-4 already being replaced, and by when do entities need to comply with the next version?
Yes — a successor, CIP-010-5, is already FERC-approved, though CIP-010-4 remains the enforceable standard today. On 19 March 2026 the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission issued Order No. 919 (Docket No. RM24-8-000), stating it "approves 11 modified Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) Reliability Standards" that explicitly include "CIP-010-5 (Cyber Security — Configuration Change Management and Vulnerability Assessments)" as part of NERC's Project 2016-02 virtualization package — published in the Federal Register on 24 March 2026 (91 FR 13957-13965) with the order itself stating "this final rule is effective May 26, 2026." Per NERC's own implementation plan, quoted directly in the order, the revised standards "will become effective on the later of April 1, 2026, or the first day of the first calendar quarter that is 24 months after the effective date of the applicable governmental authority's order" — which computes to **1 July 2028** from the 26 May 2026 order effective date. Responsible entities may elect early adoption at six, 12 or 18 months after that date instead of waiting for the mandatory compliance date.
What does the CIP-010-5 revision change?
CIP-010-5 is part of the same NERC Project 2016-02 virtualization package behind CIP-005-8 and nine other revised CIP standards that Order No. 919 approved together, alongside four new NERC Glossary definitions (Cyber System, Management Interface, Shared Cyber Infrastructure and Virtual Cyber Asset) and 18 revised definitions. NERC's final draft of CIP-010-5 (April 2024) extends the standard's Applicability and exemption language to the new "Cyber Systems" concept rather than only discrete physical "Cyber Assets," to accommodate Shared Cyber Infrastructure (SCI) that hosts virtual machines for multiple BES Cyber Systems. Order No. 919 also approved replacing most "technical feasibility exception" language across the CIP suite with a self-implementing "per system capability" standard, which NERC said would ease the administrative burden of the prior exception-filing process. The approved CIP-010-5 text also removes the Part 1.1 baseline configuration: R1 instead requires authorizing changes that alter the behavior of CIP-005 or CIP-007 security controls, software identity and integrity verification moves from Part 1.6 to Part 1.3, and R2's 35-day monitoring covers seven listed control areas "per system capability."
Sources
- NERC: CIP-010-4 — Cyber Security – Configuration Change Management and Vulnerability Assessments (currently effective standard, full text: Purpose, Applicability, Requirements R1-R4 with Tables, Attachment 1, Compliance, Violation Severity Levels, Version History)
- NERC: CIP-010-5 — Final Draft (April 2024), Cyber Security – Configuration Change Management and Vulnerability Assessments (redline vs. CIP-010-4, Standard Development Timeline)
- Federal Register: Order No. 919; Virtualization Reliability Standards, 91 FR 13957-13965 (FERC, Docket No. RM24-8-000, issued 2026-03-19, published 2026-03-24, effective 2026-05-26) — lists CIP-010-5 among the 11 approved standards
- NERC: CIP-010-5 — Cyber Security – Configuration Change Management and Vulnerability Assessments (approved text: Tables R1-R3, R4 with SCI, Attachment 1)
- NERC standard page: CIP-010-4 (Mandatory Subject to Enforcement; effective 10/01/2022, inactive 06/30/2028)
- NERC standard page: CIP-010-5 (Subject to Future Enforcement; Board 05/09/2024, FERC 03/19/2026, effective 07/01/2028)
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