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Cyber Resilience Act

IEC 62443 and the Machinery Regulation: using 62443-3-3 and 4-2 as working evidence for Annex III

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IEC 62443 can serve as working evidence for the Machinery Regulation's Annex III cybersecurity clauses, but not, as of writing, as an automatic pass: a machine builder reading Annex III sections 1.1.9 and 1.2.1 finds two short, plain-language cybersecurity clauses with no technical detail underneath them, while a control-system engineer who already works with IEC 62443 has a seven-category, clause-by-clause requirement set sitting on the shelf. The two were written independently, for different legal purposes, and the Regulation itself does not name IEC 62443 anywhere. This guide lines up what actually overlaps, and where the evidence stops short.

Key takeaways

  • Most of Annex III's cybersecurity language has a counterpart among the seven FRs, with two gaps.
  • EN 50742, "Safety of machinery – Protection against corruption," is the European standard written for 1.1.9 and 1.2.1, and it offers IEC 62443 as one of two routes.
  • Because neither presumption route in the Regulation runs through IEC 62443 alone.
  • They cover the parts of the picture that 3-3 and 4-2 leave out: functional safety and the people around the machine.

What does the Machinery Regulation's own text require?

Two Annex III clauses carry the cybersecurity duties, and they apply to machinery placed on the EU market from 20 January 2027, the date the European Commission's machinery page gives after a corrigendum fixed the application dates of Regulation (EU) 2023/1230. Machinery placed on the market before that date stays under Directive 2006/42/EC. The Regulation text sets:

  • Section 1.1.9 (protection against corruption): connecting another device "via any feature of the connected device itself or via any remote device" must not lead to a hazardous situation; hardware components relevant for access to safety-critical software must be "adequately protected against accidental or intentional corruption," with evidence of "a legitimate or illegitimate intervention"; safety-critical software and data must be "identified as such" and protected; the machine must identify the software "necessary for it to operate safely" and provide that information "at all times in an easily accessible form"; and it must collect evidence of changes to installed software or its configuration.
  • Section 1.2.1 (safety and reliability of control systems): point (a) requires control systems to withstand "reasonably foreseeable malicious attempts from third parties leading to a hazardous situation," and point (f) requires a tracing log of intervention data and of safety-software versions uploaded after placing on the market, "enabled for five years after such upload, exclusively to demonstrate the conformity" on a reasoned request from a national authority.

One further duty sits outside Annex III: Article 10(3) requires that, "where relevant, the source code or the programming logic" in the technical documentation be made available to national authorities on a reasoned request. Full background on these clauses and their relationship to the CRA is in our Machinery Regulation cybersecurity guide.

What do IEC 62443-3-3 and 4-2 actually specify?

IEC 62443-3-3 sets system requirements (SRs) for a control system as a whole, organised under seven foundational requirements (FRs): identification and authentication control, use control, system integrity, data confidentiality, restricted data flow, timely response to events, and resource availability. IEC 62443-4-2 takes the same seven foundational requirements down to the level of a single component requirement (CR) — a PLC, HMI, gateway or embedded device — which is closer to where Annex III 1.1.9's hardware-interface and software-identification language actually operates. Full detail on each is in our IEC 62443-3-3 and IEC 62443-4-2 guides.

Where do the two line up?

Most of Annex III's cybersecurity language has a counterpart among the seven FRs, with two gaps.

Machinery Regulation clause What it asks for Closest IEC 62443-3-3/4-2 foundational requirement
1.1.9 — safe connections Connecting another device must not cause a hazard FR2 Use control, FR5 Restricted data flow
1.1.9 — protected hardware interfaces, evidence of intervention Tamper-evidence on interfaces carrying safety-relevant signals FR3 System integrity, FR6 Timely response to events
1.1.9 — identify the software, at all times Machine-readable inventory of safety-relevant software No direct FR equivalent; closer to an SBOM-style control than a 62443 requirement
1.1.9 — evidence of changes Log of legitimate/illegitimate software or configuration changes FR3 System integrity, FR6 Timely response to events (audit logging)
1.2.1(a) — withstand malicious attempts Control system resists third-party attack attempts that could cause a hazard All seven FRs, collectively — this is the broadest clause on either side
1.2.1(f) — five-year tracing log Retained log of interventions and safety-software uploads, for authority requests FR6 Timely response to events (partial — retention period and purpose are Machinery Regulation-specific, not in 62443)

Two gaps are worth calling out directly: the "identify the software at all times" duty in 1.1.9 reads more like a software-inventory or SBOM obligation than a classic 62443 technical control, and the five-year retention period in 1.2.1(f) is a Machinery Regulation-specific duty that IEC 62443's audit-logging requirements do not themselves define. Treat IEC 62443 as covering the technical mechanism (logging, access control, integrity checking); the retention period and inventory format are separate design decisions a machine builder still has to make. Our firmware SBOM guide covers the inventory side.

What is EN 50742, and where does IEC 62443 fit in it?

EN 50742, "Safety of machinery – Protection against corruption," is the European standard written for 1.1.9 and 1.2.1, and it offers IEC 62443 as one of two routes. The public enquiry draft, prEN 50742:2025 (CLC/TC 44X, December 2025, enquiry deadline 2026-02-27), says in its preview pages that it was prepared under a standardisation request from the European Commission and that its Annex ZZ sets out the relationship with EU legislation. Its introduction describes two approaches:

Approach A Approach B
Clauses 5 (process) and 7 (product) 6 (process) and 8 (product)
Intended for "machinery developed without references to EN IEC 62443" "machinery developed in the context of" EN IEC 62443-3-3:2019, EN IEC 62443-4-1:2018 and EN IEC 62443-4-2:2019
What a 62443 user brings Risk assessment per EN ISO 12100, own measures Existing 62443 process and component evidence, applied to the machine

The draft applies to hardware interfaces, software and data "if they could influence the safety of the machinery," across development, manufacturing, commissioning, operation, maintenance and decommissioning. It "does not address the role of the user," does not apply to machinery installed before its publication, and notes that its topics "can overlap with the domain of cybersecurity but are not necessarily identical in their coverage."

Status, as read on 11 November 2026: the catalogue entry for EN 50742:2026 lists it under Regulation 2023/1230 and mandate M/605 at stage 5060 (formal-approval voting results sent to the committee), with a publication date of 19 November 2026. Presumption of conformity under Article 20(1) only follows once the Commission publishes the reference in the Official Journal.

Why is this evidence, not certification?

Because neither presumption route in the Regulation runs through IEC 62443 alone. Article 20(1) gives presumption of conformity for harmonised standards "the references of which have been published in the Official Journal" — EN 50742 can become that route, with IEC 62443 as Approach B inside it. Article 20(9) gives a presumption for sections 1.1.9 and 1.2.1 only for machinery certified, or covered by a statement of conformity, under a cybersecurity certification scheme adopted under the Cybersecurity Act (Regulation (EU) 2019/881) whose reference is in the Official Journal. As of 11 November 2026 no EN 50742 reference and no such scheme reference had been published for these sections. IEC 62443 is a voluntary IEC/ISA industrial-automation standard, developed independently of the EU's standardisation process — using it does not, by itself, satisfy Article 20(9).

What it does give a machine builder is structured, testable evidence for the risk assessment Annex III already requires: a documented set of requirements to test a control system or component against, test methods already defined by the standard, and a vocabulary (foundational requirements, security levels) that EN 50742's Approach B adopts directly. The same caution applies on the Cyber Resilience Act side of a machine's compliance picture — see IEC 62443-4-2 vs the CRA and EN 18031 for why that standard doesn't grant CRA presumption of conformity either.

Where do IEC TS 63074, 62443-2-1 and 62443-2-4 fit?

They cover the parts of the picture that 3-3 and 4-2 leave out: functional safety and the people around the machine. IEC TS 63074:2023, from IEC TC 44 (safety of machinery), "identifies the relevant aspects of the IEC 62443 series" for safety-related control systems; its Clause 6 covers "protection against corruption," and its Annex C shows information flows between device supplier, machine manufacturer, integrator and user, including one in the context of IEC 62443-2-4.

On site, the plant that runs the machine is the asset owner under IEC 62443-2-1, and a builder that commissions or remotely services the machine acts as a service provider under IEC 62443-2-4. Neither part is named in EN 50742's Approach B, but they govern how remote access, patches and accounts are handled after handover — which is where many 1.1.9 interventions happen.

Worked example: how would a builder file evidence for one cell?

Hypothetical example: a synthetic robotic palletising cell from "Builder P", not a real product or customer. The cell has a safety PLC, a standard PLC, an HMI and a remote-service router, and Builder P picks EN 50742 Approach B because its PLC supplier already provides IEC 62443-4-2 evidence.

Annex III item Evidence filed Source of the evidence
1.1.9 safe connections Zone and conduit drawing; router rule set allowing only the service VPN 62443-3-3 FR5 test, own design
1.1.9 hardware interfaces Locked cabinet, disabled USB ports on the HMI, port-state check in the commissioning record Own design; HMI supplier's 4-2 component evidence
1.1.9 software identification Machine-readable list of safety PLC firmware, PLC program version and HMI image, readable from the HMI service page Own design; SBOM for the HMI image
1.1.9 evidence of changes PLC change log and project checksum shown on the HMI PLC supplier's 4-2 evidence (FR3, FR6)
1.2.1(a) malicious attempts Threat analysis per the cell's risk assessment, tested against FR1–FR7 62443-3-3 test report
1.2.1(f) tracing log Log export to the plant historian, five-year retention stated in the instructions Own design; retention agreed with the plant
Article 10(3) source code Safety program archive held for authority requests Own engineering archive

Each line is filed against the Annex III item, not under a general "IEC 62443" heading, so the file still reads correctly if the route changes from Approach B to Approach A.

What are the common pitfalls?

  • Filing "IEC 62443 compliant" as the evidence. Authorities and notified bodies read the Annex III item; map each piece of evidence to it.
  • Forgetting the five-year log and software list. Neither is defined by 62443; both need a design decision and a line in the instructions.
  • Treating cybersecurity as separate from the risk assessment. EN 50742 starts from EN ISO 12100; corruption matters where it can cause a hazard.
  • Relying on supplier certificates for the whole machine. A 4-2 certificate covers one component; the cell-level conduits, routers and logs are the builder's.
  • Ignoring after-sales service. Remote access by the builder's own service team is an intervention path; design it to the same standard.

What should a machine builder do with this mapping?

  1. Run the Annex III risk assessment first, and use IEC 62443-3-3's seven FRs as a checklist for what to test, not as a document to attach instead of the risk assessment itself.
  2. File evidence against the specific clause it supports(1.1.9 vs 1.2.1), not as a generic "IEC 62443 compliant" statement — a notified body or auditor will expect to trace evidence back to the Regulation's own text.
  3. Design the software-identification and five-year log duties separately, since neither is a direct IEC 62443 requirement; treat them as machine-level SBOM and logging-retention design decisions.
  4. Choose your EN 50742 approach earlyIf your development process already follows IEC 62443-4-1 and your components carry 4-2 evidence, Approach B reuses that work; then check the Official Journal for the EN 50742 reference before claiming presumption.
  5. Keep component-level evidence (IEC 62443-4-2) and system-level evidence (62443-3-3) in separate files, since a machine typically integrates components from several suppliers, each with its own test evidence.

SoftWSP's service for machine builders supports the software-identification and supplier-evidence side: from a machine's component list or firmware images it builds a CycloneDX 1.6 SBOM, matches the components against NVD, CISA KEV, FIRST EPSS and CISA's CSAF ICS advisories, and delivers a cited report reviewed by an engineer. It does not perform conformity assessment.

This guide is general information, not legal advice.

Put this guide to work

Frequently asked questions

Does meeting IEC 62443 automatically satisfy the Machinery Regulation's cybersecurity requirements?

No, not automatically. Presumption of conformity with Annex III sections 1.1.9 and 1.2.1 comes from Article 20(9) of Regulation (EU) 2023/1230, which applies only to machinery certified under a cybersecurity certification scheme adopted under the Cybersecurity Act, Regulation (EU) 2019/881, and referenced in the Official Journal. IEC 62443 is not, as of writing, such a scheme, and no harmonised standard has yet been published against these two sections. IEC 62443-3-3 and 62443-4-2 are still useful as working technical evidence for a risk assessment, but they do not by themselves grant a presumption of conformity.

Which parts of IEC 62443 map most directly onto Annex III 1.1.9 and 1.2.1?

IEC 62443-3-3's seven foundational requirements (identification and authentication control, use control, system integrity, data confidentiality, restricted data flow, timely response to events, and resource availability) cover much of what 1.1.9's "protection against corruption" and 1.2.1's "withstand reasonably foreseeable malicious attempts" describe in plain language, at the control-system level. IEC 62443-4-2 breaks the same seven requirements down to individual components — a single PLC, HMI or gateway — which is the level Annex III 1.1.9's "identify the software" and "protect hardware interfaces" clauses actually bite at.

Does IEC 62443 cover the five-year tracing log the Machinery Regulation requires?

Not directly. Section 1.2.1(f) requires a tracing log of interventions and safety-software version uploads kept for five years after upload, solely to demonstrate conformity on a reasoned authority request. IEC 62443-3-3's System Requirement SR 6.1 (audit log accessibility) and the broader "timely response to events" foundational requirement cover logging as a security capability, but neither one is written around the Machinery Regulation's specific five-year retention period or its narrow purpose (demonstrating conformity to an authority), so a machine builder still needs to design that retention period in separately.

Does using IEC 62443-4-2 also help with the Cyber Resilience Act?

Partially, and in the same limited way. See our dedicated [IEC 62443-4-2 vs CRA guide](/guides/iec-62443-4-2-vs-cra/) for the full comparison; in short, 62443-4-2's technical component requirements overlap with CRA Annex I Part I's design requirements, but neither 62443-4-2 nor the Machinery Regulation mapping in this guide covers the CRA's own process duties — SBOM, coordinated vulnerability disclosure, and 24-hour reporting — which come from a different part of the CRA entirely.

What should a machine builder actually do with this mapping today?

Use IEC 62443-3-3 and 4-2's structured requirement lists as a checklist when building the Machinery Regulation's required cybersecurity risk assessment, and keep the resulting evidence (test results, component security-level claims, design decisions) filed against the specific Annex III clause it supports, rather than filing it as generic "IEC 62443 compliance." That keeps the evidence usable even if, or when, a different scheme is eventually recognised under Article 20(9).

Sources

  1. Regulation (EU) 2023/1230 on machinery, EUR-Lex
  2. Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 (Cyber Resilience Act), recital 53, EUR-Lex
  3. IEC Webstore: IEC 62443-3-3:2013 — Industrial communication networks – Network and system security – Part 3-3
  4. IEC Webstore: IEC 62443-4-2:2019 — Security for industrial automation and control systems – Part 4-2
  5. ISA: The ISA/IEC 62443 Series of Standards
  6. European Commission: Machinery (Machinery Regulation (EU) 2023/1230 application date, corrigendum, partial application guide)
  7. prEN 50742:2025 Safety of machinery — Protection against corruption, enquiry draft preview pages (introduction, scope, normative references), iTeh Standards catalogue
  8. EN 50742:2026 catalogue entry (CLC/TC 44X, Regulation 2023/1230, M/605, stage and publication date), iTeh Standards catalogue
  9. IEC Webstore: IEC TS 63074:2023 — Safety of machinery – Security aspects related to functional safety of safety-related control systems
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IEC 62443 and the Machinery Regulation: using 62443-3-3 and 4-2 as working evidence for Annex III