IEC/TR 62443-3-1:2009, "Industrial communication networks – Network and system security – Part 3-1: Security technologies for industrial automation and control systems," is the part of the IEC 62443 series that takes stock of the cybersecurity technology landscape available to an industrial automation and control system (IACS) — not a requirements document, but a survey. Per its own Scope clause, it "provides a current assessment of various cybersecurity tools, mitigation counter-measures, and technologies that may effectively apply to the modern electronically based IACSs regulating and monitoring numerous industries and critical infrastructures." Published in July 2009 as a Technical Report, it predates most of the series' later, more specific parts — and, because it has never been revised, it is now the series' oldest and most dated snapshot of security-technology practice.
Key takeaways
- Rather than stating requirements, 3-1 surveys each individual technology the same way.
- For a device maker, that split is useful.
- For a current catalogue of OT countermeasures, NIST's SP 800-82 Rev.
- The 4-2 webstore record lists edition 1.0 from 2019, 192 pages, with the same 2027 stability date.
What does "IACS cybersecurity" mean in this document?
The Scope clause defines IACS "in the broadest possible sense, encompassing all types of components, plants, facilities, and systems in all industries and critical infrastructures," explicitly including "Distributed Control Systems (DCSs), Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs), Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems, networked electronic sensing systems," the connected IT devices and links around them (firewalls, servers, routers, switches, gateways, fieldbus systems, intrusion detection systems, intelligent electronic/end devices, remote terminal units, and wired/wireless remote modems), and the human, network and machine interfaces used for control, data logging, diagnostics, safety, monitoring, maintenance, quality assurance, regulatory compliance and auditing.
Against that broad definition of IACS, the Scope clause lists the cybersecurity technology categories the report covers: "authentication and authorization; filtering, blocking, and access control; encryption; data validation; auditing; measurement; monitoring and detection tools; operating systems." It adds one more, non-cyber category: "a non-cyber technology — physical security control — is an essential requirement for some aspects of cybersecurity and is discussed in this technical report."
How does 3-1 assess each technology?
Rather than stating requirements, 3-1 surveys each individual technology the same way. Its Scope clause states that "each technology in this technical report is discussed in terms of: security vulnerabilities addressed by the technology, tool, and/or countermeasure; typical deployment; known issues and weaknesses; assessment of use in the IACS environment; future directions; recommendations and guidance; information sources and reference material." That seven-point structure (an eighth item, "overview," opens most subsections) repeats dozens of times. The page numbers in the published contents list show where the weight sits:
| Clause | Category | Technologies covered | Pages |
|---|---|---|---|
| 5 | Authentication and authorization | Role-based authorization, password, challenge/response, physical/token, smart card, biometric, location-based, password distribution/management, device-to-device | 22–41 |
| 6 | Filtering/blocking/access control | Network firewalls, host-based firewalls, virtual networks | 41–49 |
| 7 | Encryption and data validation | Symmetric (secret) key encryption, public key encryption/key distribution, virtual private networks (VPNs) | 49–60 |
| 8 | Management, audit, measurement, monitoring, detection | Log auditing, virus/malicious code detection, intrusion detection systems (IDS), vulnerability scanners, forensics and analysis tools, host configuration management, automated software management | 60–78 |
| 9 | IACS computer software | Server/workstation operating systems, real-time and embedded operating systems, web technologies | 78–84 |
| 10 | Physical security controls | Physical protection, personnel security | 84–92 |
Authentication and monitoring tools together take about 37 of the roughly 70 pages of technology assessment. Annex A (informative) holds trade name declarations, and a bibliography closes the report. The intent, per the Introduction, is "to document the known state of the art of cybersecurity technologies, tools, and countermeasures applicable to the IACS environment, clearly define which technologies can reasonably be deployed today, and define areas where more research may be needed."
What does it deliberately not do?
The Introduction is explicit that 3-1 does not pick winners: "This technical report does not make recommendations of one cybersecurity technology or mitigation method over others, but provides suggestions and guidance for using the technologies and methods, as well as information to consider when developing a site or corporate cybersecurity policy, program and procedures for the IACS environment." It also sets expectations about outcomes rather than guarantees: "Following the recommended guidance given in this technical report will not necessarily ensure that optimized cybersecurity is attained for IACSs. It will, however, help to identify and address vulnerabilities, and to reduce the risk of undesired intrusions." The foreword notes the report "is closely related to ANSI/ISA-TR99.03.01-2007," the US predecessor document it was adapted from.
What does 3-1 say to manufacturers and vendors?
The Introduction names three audiences: it "provides guidance to manufacturers, vendors, and security practitioners at end-user companies, facilities, and industries on the technological options and countermeasures for securing automated IACSs." For the asset owner, it is clear about who decides: "selection and deployment of particular cybersecurity activities and practices for a given control system and its related industrial network is the responsibility of the system's owner."
For a device maker, that split is useful. The report's "known issues and weaknesses" and "assessment of use in the IACS environment" headings describe what an owner will worry about when your product arrives: whether a password scheme survives shift handovers, whether a host firewall breaks deterministic traffic, whether an embedded operating system can be patched at all. Clause 9.3, on real-time and embedded operating systems, is the section closest to firmware.
Why is this the series' most dated part?
The Introduction states that "the responsible standards development working group intends to update this technical report periodically to reflect new information, cybersecurity technologies, countermeasures, and cyberrisk mitigation methods." In practice, that update has not happened: the IEC webstore record lists edition 1.0, published 2009-07-30, 102 pages, as the current publication, with a stability date of 2027. A document written in 2009 — before, for example, modern EDR, cloud-delivered threat intelligence, or today's IDS and VPN product generations existed in their current form — is best read as a historical record of IACS security practice rather than live guidance. The full technology-by-technology assessments in Clauses 5 through 10 are in the purchased IEC text; the free preview covers the foreword, introduction, scope, definitions and contents.
For a current catalogue of OT countermeasures, NIST's SP 800-82 Rev. 3 (September 2023) "identifies common threats and vulnerabilities to these systems, and provides recommended security countermeasures"; see the NIST SP 800-82 guide.
How do the 3-1 technology categories map to IEC 62443-4-2 requirements?
IEC 62443-4-2:2019 turns many of 3-1's technology topics into testable component requirements, grouped under seven foundational requirements (FR 1 Identification and authentication control, FR 2 Use control, FR 3 System integrity, FR 4 Data confidentiality, FR 5 Restricted data flow, FR 6 Timely response to events, FR 7 Resource availability). The requirement titles below come from the 4-2 contents list; the pairing with 3-1 clauses is SoftWSP's reading, not part of either document.
| 3-1 clause | Technology | Closest 4-2 requirements |
|---|---|---|
| 5.2 | Role-based authorization | CR 2.1 Authorization enforcement |
| 5.3, 5.9 | Passwords and their management | CR 1.1 Human user identification and authentication; CR 1.5 Authenticator management; CR 1.7 Strength of password-based authentication |
| 5.10 | Device-to-device authentication | CR 1.2 Software process and device identification and authentication |
| 7.3 | Public key encryption and key distribution | CR 1.8 Public key infrastructure certificates; CR 1.9 Strength of public key-based authentication |
| 7.2, 7.4 | Symmetric encryption, VPNs | CR 4.1 Information confidentiality; CR 4.3 Use of cryptography; CR 3.1 Communication integrity; NDR 1.13 Access via untrusted networks |
| 6.2, 6.4 | Network firewalls, virtual networks | CR 5.1 Network segmentation; CR 5.2 / NDR 5.2 Zone boundary protection |
| 8.2 | Log auditing | CR 2.8 Auditable events; CR 6.1 Audit log accessibility |
| 8.3 | Malicious code detection | CR 3.2 / EDR 3.2 / HDR 3.2 Protection from malicious code |
| 8.4 | Intrusion detection | CR 6.2 Continuous monitoring |
| 8.8 | Automated software management | CR 3.10 Support for updates; CR 3.4 Software and information integrity |
| 9.3 | Real-time and embedded operating systems | EDR 3.14 Integrity of the boot process; CR 7.1 Denial of service protection |
The 4-2 webstore record lists edition 1.0 from 2019, 192 pages, with the same 2027 stability date. Details of each requirement are in the IEC 62443-4-2 guide.
How would a device maker apply the seven-point method today?
A worked example, using a synthetic product: a remote I/O module with a web configuration page protected by a single local password.
Vulnerabilities addressedThe password stops casual reconfiguration by anyone on the plant network. Typical deploymentOne shared account per device, set at commissioning by an integrator. Known issues and weaknessesShared credentials, factory defaults left in place, passwords sent over plain HTTP, no lockout. Assessment in the IACS environmentOperators need emergency access during an outage, so lockout must not block a safety action; shift crews share the device. Future directionsRole-based accounts and certificate-based device identity. Recommendations and guidanceUnique per-device initial credential, forced change at first login, TLS for the web page, separate operator and engineer roles. Information sourcesToday that means the 4-2 requirements CR 1.1, CR 1.5, CR 1.7 and CR 2.1 as the measurable target, and the product's own vulnerability history.
The method still works; the 2009 content under each heading is what needs replacing with current requirements and evidence.
Where does it sit in the IEC 62443 series?
3-1 is a Technical Report in the series' "System" (3-x) group, alongside IEC 62443-3-2 (security risk assessment for system design, 2020) and IEC 62443-3-3 (system security requirements and security levels, 2013). Unlike those two — both International Standards — 3-1 has stayed a single-edition survey since 2009. It has no normative references of its own (Clause 2 states "none"), meaning nothing else in the series formally depends on it the way, for example, 62443-3-2 and 62443-3-3 depend on IEC 62443-1-1's terminology. Its practical role today is background reading for teams new to IACS-specific security technology trade-offs, not a current conformance reference.
How should you use 3-1 today?
Use it for the vocabulary and trade-off framework, not for current product guidanceApply the seven-point structure to current technology choices rather than trusting 3-1's own 2009-era technology assessments. Cross-check anything specific against current standardsFor component-level security capabilities, use IEC 62443-4-2; for system-level requirements tied to a target security level, use IEC 62443-3-3; for the risk assessment that sets those targets in the first place, use IEC 62443-3-2. Don't cite 3-1 as evidence of current best practice in an audit or procurement documentIts own Introduction disclaims that following its guidance "will not necessarily ensure that optimized cybersecurity is attained" — and that caveat is stronger today than when it was written. Remember it sets no normative requirementsNothing in the 62443 series requires conformance to 3-1 the way IEC 62443-4-1 or 62443-4-2 require conformance to their own clauses; treat it as reference reading, not a compliance target.
What are the common mistakes when citing 3-1?
- Calling it a standard; it is a Technical Report with no conformance clauses.
- Quoting its 2009 assessments of specific IDS, VPN or antivirus practice as current.
- Listing it as a compliance target in a tender instead of 62443-3-3 or 4-2.
- Assuming a newer edition exists because the series around it has been revised.
- Reading only the asset-owner angle and missing what the "known issues" headings say to product makers.
Where does SoftWSP fit next to 3-1?
SoftWSP's OT Snapshot reads a passive network capture processed by Zeek: it lists the hosts seen and the ports and services each answered on, tags Modbus, S7comm, DNP3, EtherNet/IP and BACnet traffic, and notes SSH, Telnet, RDP and VNC sessions as remote-access observations, for an engineer to review. A capture alone does not reveal a device's make, model or firmware, so matching against CISA CSAF ICS advisories needs that identification from another source, such as an asset list. It does not identify which firewalls, authentication methods or monitoring tools are installed; that comparison against 3-1's categories or 4-2's requirements remains an engineering task. See OT Snapshot.
This guide quotes the free preview text of IEC/TR 62443-3-1:2009 and IEC 62443-4-2:2019 and the IEC webstore records, read on 2026-11-12; it is not a substitute for the purchased standards and does not constitute compliance or legal advice.
Put this guide to work
Frequently asked questions
What is IEC TR 62443-3-1?
IEC/TR 62443-3-1:2009, "Industrial communication networks – Network and system security – Part 3-1: Security technologies for industrial automation and control systems," is a Technical Report (not a normative International Standard) in the IEC 62443 series. Per its own Scope clause, it "provides a current assessment of various cybersecurity tools, mitigation counter-measures, and technologies that may effectively apply to the modern electronically based IACSs regulating and monitoring numerous industries and critical infrastructures." It was published in July 2009 as a first-edition Technical Report, 102 pages, prepared by IEC Technical Committee 65 (Industrial-process measurement, control and automation), carrying ISBN 978-2-88910-711-7 (printed on the publication itself as ISBN 9782889107117 without hyphens in the IEC webstore's catalogue record — the same number). The IEC webstore lists its stability date as 2027 and its status as current — it has not been withdrawn or revised since 2009. Its foreword states it "is closely related to ANSI/ISA-TR99.03.01-2007," the predecessor US document it was based on.
Why is it a Technical Report, and what does it actually survey?
The foreword explains that while IEC technical committees mainly prepare International Standards, a committee may instead publish a Technical Report when it has collected "data of a different kind from that which is normally published as an International Standard, for example 'state of the art'" — 3-1 surveys the cybersecurity-technology landscape rather than setting testable conformance requirements. Per its Scope clause, the concept of cybersecurity technologies and countermeasures it covers "includes, but is not limited to, the following technologies: authentication and authorization; filtering, blocking, and access control; encryption; data validation; auditing; measurement; monitoring and detection tools; operating systems," plus, as "a non-cyber technology," physical security control, which the report treats as "an essential requirement for some aspects of cybersecurity." Its own stated purpose is "to categorize and define cybersecurity technologies, countermeasures, and tools currently available to provide a common basis for later technical reports and standards to be produced by the ISA99 committee" — in other words, 3-1 was written as a reference survey other parts of the series could build on, not as a requirements document in its own right.
How does 3-1 structure its discussion of each technology?
Per its own Scope clause, "each technology in this technical report is discussed in terms of: security vulnerabilities addressed by the technology, tool, and/or countermeasure; typical deployment; known issues and weaknesses; assessment of use in the IACS environment; future directions; recommendations and guidance; information sources and reference material." This seven-point framework repeats for every individual technology covered — for example Clause 5 (Authentication and authorization technologies) applies it separately to role-based authorization tools, password authentication, challenge/response authentication, physical/token authentication, smart card authentication, biometric authentication, location-based authentication, password distribution and management, and device-to-device authentication; Clause 6 (Filtering/blocking/access control) applies it to network firewalls, host-based firewalls and virtual networks; Clause 7 (Encryption technologies and data validation) to symmetric-key encryption, public-key encryption/key distribution and VPNs; and Clause 8 (Management, audit, measurement, monitoring and detection tools) to log auditing, virus/malicious-code detection, intrusion detection systems, vulnerability scanners, forensics and analysis tools, host configuration management, and automated software management. Clause 9 covers IACS computer software (server/workstation OSs, real-time and embedded OSs, web technologies) and Clause 10 covers physical security controls (physical protection, personnel security).
Does 3-1 recommend specific products, and is it still current?
No — its own Introduction is explicit: "This technical report does not make recommendations of one cybersecurity technology or mitigation method over others, but provides suggestions and guidance for using the technologies and methods." It also cautions that "following the recommended guidance in this report will not necessarily ensure that optimized cybersecurity is attained" for a reader's IACS environment; it only helps identify and address vulnerabilities and reduce intrusion risk. On currency: the Introduction states the drafting working group "intends to update this technical report periodically to reflect new information, cybersecurity technologies, countermeasures, and cyberrisk mitigation methods," but the IEC webstore's own catalogue record shows edition 1.0 from July 2009 is still the current, unwithdrawn edition as of this guide's last check, with a stability date of 2027. That makes 3-1 the most dated technology survey in the series — a 2009 snapshot of (for example) intrusion detection, firewall and VPN practice that predates a decade and a half of subsequent change in those fields; readers should treat its technology assessments as historical context rather than current best practice, and look to newer, more specific parts of the series (such as [IEC 62443-4-2](/guides/iec-62443-4-2-component-requirements/) for component requirements or [IEC 62443-3-3](/guides/iec-62443-3-3-system-security-requirements/) for system security requirements) for anything that needs to hold up today.
Sources
- IEC: IEC/TR 62443-3-1:2009 — Industrial communication networks – Network and system security – Part 3-1: Security technologies for industrial automation and control systems (webstore record: edition 1.0, 102 pages, TC 65, stability date 2027)
- IEC/TR 62443-3-1:2009 — Document Preview (foreword, introduction, full scope clause, Clause 2 normative references, Clause 3.1 definitions, full table of contents through Clause 10 and Annex A/Bibliography; iTeh Standards sample PDF, reproduced here under IEC's short-quotation allowance)
- ISA: The ISA/IEC 62443 Series of Standards (series overview, including Part 3-1 "Security technologies for industrial automation and control systems")
- Wikipedia: IEC 62443 (series structure, part-by-part summary; cross-checked against the IEC and ISA pages above for this guide)
- IEC: IEC 62443-4-2:2019 — Technical security requirements for IACS components (webstore record: edition 1.0, 192 pages, stability date 2027)
- IEC 62443-4-2:2019 — Document Preview (contents list with FR 1-FR 7 and component requirement titles; iTeh Standards sample PDF)
- NIST: SP 800-82 Rev. 3, Guide to Operational Technology (OT) Security (September 2023)
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