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IEC 61850 security: what GOOSE, Sampled Values and MMS do and don't protect

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IEC 61850 standardizes how substation devices — protection relays, bay controllers, merging units — talk to each other using three message types (GOOSE, Sampled Values and MMS), but the standard's two fastest message types, GOOSE and Sampled Values, carry no authentication or encryption in their own base specification, because they were designed in an era of isolated substation networks with sub-millisecond timing budgets that full cryptography would jeopardize. Security for IEC 61850 traffic is a separate standard, IEC 62351-6, and two CISA ICS advisories published in 2026 show the practical risk sits in vendor implementations of the stack, not in breaking any cryptography the base protocol never had.

Key takeaways

  • No, not in GOOSE and Sampled Values' base specification — and this is the gap a separate standard exists to close.
  • Clause 4.1 also states that the document "allows co-existence of secure and non-secure PDUs." That is useful for migration, but it means a subscriber has to be configured, per subscription, to reject unsecured frames.
  • The advisories below show where the practical risk actually sits: implementation bugs in vendor stacks, not a break of IEC 62351's authentication design.
  • Fuzz every parser that faces the process or station bus.

What is IEC 61850, and what do GOOSE, Sampled Values and MMS actually carry?

IEC 61850 is maintained by IEC Technical Committee 57 (TC 57) and, per IEC's own current bundled catalogue listing (IEC 61850:2026 SER), spans 53 separate publications — core parts, substation configuration language, data/function models and technical reports — covering communication inside a substation and, via later extensions, beyond it. Three message types matter most in practice:

Message type What it carries Transport Typical latency budget
GOOSE (Generic Object-Oriented Substation Event) Peer-to-peer protection/control events — a trip command, a breaker status change Layer 2 Ethernet multicast (EtherType 0x88B8) Low single-digit milliseconds
Sampled Values (SV) Continuous stream of time-synchronized current/voltage measurement samples, from a merging unit up to protection/bay-level IEDs Layer 2 Ethernet multicast Sub-millisecond, per sample
MMS (Manufacturing Message Specification) Client-server control, reporting and configuration traffic between station-level SCADA and bay-level IEDs TCP/IP — can cross routers and firewalls Not time-critical in the same way

GOOSE and SV are standardized in IEC 61850-8-1 and IEC 61850-9-2 respectively; per IEC's own catalogue text, IEC 61850-9-2:2011 "defines the specific communication service mapping for the transmission of sampled values" using the same Layer 2 mapping approach as 8-1. Because GOOSE and SV were built to replace hard-wired copper connections between protection devices with an Ethernet equivalent at the same speed, the design prioritized deterministic low latency over the cryptographic overhead that authentication or encryption would add.

Does IEC 61850 have built-in authentication or encryption?

No, not in GOOSE and Sampled Values' base specification — and this is the gap a separate standard exists to close. The IEC catalogue record for IEC 62351-6:2020 says it "specifies messages, procedures, and algorithms for securing the operation of all protocols based on or derived from the IEC 61850 series," and names its audience directly: "the developers of products that implement these protocols." The publisher's free preview of IEC 62351-6 explains the timing trade-off in clause 4.1: for Layer 2 GOOSE and Sampled Values "requiring 3 ms response times, multicast configurations and low CPU overhead, encryption is not recommended." Confidentiality instead comes from keeping those frames on the substation LAN, while the standard "does define a mechanism for allowing confidentiality for applications where the 3 ms delivery criterion is not a concern." Its normative references include RFC 2104 (HMAC) and NIST SP 800-38D (GCM and GMAC), which is the message-authentication approach the FAQ below describes. MMS traffic, which runs over ordinary TCP/IP and isn't bound by the same microsecond timing, can instead use the TLS profile IEC 62351-3 defines for any TC 57 protocol riding over TCP/IP.

A separate extension, IEC TR 61850-90-5, defines routable versions of these messages — R-GOOSE and R-SV — carried over UDP/IP so wide-area protection and synchrophasor applications can span more than one substation's LAN. IEC's record for IEC TR 61850-90-5 says it "also provides routable profiles for IEC 61850-8-1 GOOSE and IEC 61850-9-2 SV packets." Keys for these groups come from IEC 62351-9, which "utilizes GDOI as already IETF specified group-based key management protocol to manage the group security parameter and enhances this protocol to carry the security parameter for GOOSE, SV, and PTP." None of this is in the base IEC 61850-8-1/9-2 text itself — it is layered on by the separate IEC 62351 series, which our IEC 62351 guide covers part by part, including how it compares to NERC CIP-013 and IEC 62443.

What does IEC 62351-6 ask of the device firmware?

The contents list in the preview shows what an IED or merging-unit maker has to build, beyond the base protocol:

IEC 62351-6:2020 clause (preview contents) What the firmware has to do
6.2.1 GOOSE replay protection; 6.2.2 Sampled Value replay protection Track counters per publisher and drop replayed frames
8 Layer 2 security for 61850-8-1 GOOSE and 61850-9-2 Sampled Value; 8.2 Extended PDU Parse and build the extended PDU that carries the security fields
Figure 6, Calculated MAC Domain; Figure 7, AES-GCM on an L2 GOOSE/SV packet Compute and check the MAC over the right byte range, inside the 3 ms budget
9.2.3 Key Policy and Management Hold group keys from IEC 62351-9 / GDOI (RFC 8052) and roll them over
7 Security for SNTP Protect the time source the replay checks depend on

Clause 4.1 also states that the document "allows co-existence of secure and non-secure PDUs." That is useful for migration, but it means a subscriber has to be configured, per subscription, to reject unsecured frames. Otherwise an attacker can simply send the unsigned version. For MMS, IEC 62351-3:2023 profiles TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3 for TC 57 protocols over TCP/IP.

What have real CISA advisories against IEC 61850 products found in 2026?

The advisories below show where the practical risk actually sits: implementation bugs in vendor stacks, not a break of IEC 62351's authentication design. The facts come from CISA's machine-readable CSAF files, published in the cisagov CSAF repository.

Advisory Vendor / product CVE(s) CVSS What it actually allowed
ICSA-26-211-10 (30 July 2026) MZ Automation GmbH libiec61850 (open-source stack), versions < 1.6.2 8 CVEs, all CWE-125 (Out-of-Bounds Read) 6.5–7.5 (v3.1); up to 8.7 (v4.0, CVE-2026-66360, scored by CISA as CNA) Three CVEs: a single unauthenticated GOOSE Layer-2 multicast frame (e.g. an undersized timestamp field or an oversized inner-element length) triggers an out-of-bounds read that crashes the subscriber. Five CVEs: crafted MMS, ACSE or ISO presentation data over TCP port 102 crashes the MMS service; for CVE-2026-66360 this happens before an MMS session is established (denial of service)
ICSA-26-204-06 (23 July 2026) MZ Automation libIEC61850 v1.0.0–v1.6.1 CVE-2026-49035 (CWE-122), CVE-2026-50039, CVE-2026-50032, CVE-2026-50103 6.5–8.1 (v3.1, CISA) A crafted MMS Initiate request causes a heap overflow; CISA notes "Remote code execution (RCE) has been demonstrated when ASLR is disabled." A malformed TLV in a GOOSE frame crashes subscribers via "the L2 GOOSE and R-GOOSE shared parser"
ICSA-26-120-01 (30 April 2026, initial 13 April 2026) ABB System 800xA / Symphony Plus, IEC 61850 MMS-client stack (CI868/AC800M, CI850, PM 877, S+ Operations) CVE-2025-3756 (CWE-1284) 6.5 (v3.1) An attacker with IEC 61850 network access sends a specially crafted packet, forcing affected Communication Interfaces into fault mode or taking S+ Operations' 61850 connectivity offline (denial of service); ABB's advisory, republished by CISA, states GOOSE communication itself is not affected
ICSA-25-133-02 (Update C, 26 February 2026) Hitachi Energy Relion 670/650/SAM600-IO CVE-2023-4518 (CWE-1284) 6.5 (v3.1) Out-of-range values in received GOOSE messages "caused a reboot of the device"; exploitation needs "GOOSE receiving blocks" to be configured

All of these findings require network access to the IEC 61850 segment, and none breaks IEC 62351's authentication mechanism. The libiec61850 bugs are memory-safety flaws in parsing untrusted GOOSE frames (which GOOSE's lack of sender authentication lets any node on the segment send) and untrusted MMS-stack input on TCP port 102. The ABB finding is a malformed-packet handling bug in an MMS client stack, and the Hitachi Energy finding is input validation of GOOSE values. MZ Automation's own release notes show the fixes kept coming: v1.6.2.1 (24 September 2026) is described as an "Urgent update for release 1.6.2 to fix GOOSE subscriber," so "update to version 1.6.2," as the CSAF text reads, now means 1.6.2.1 or later.

What do these advisories mean for a device maker?

The four advisories share a pattern that a relay, merging-unit or gateway maker can act on before the next release:

  1. Fuzz every parser that faces the process or station busGOOSE, SV, MMS BER, ACSE and ISO presentation decoding all appear in the CVE list. A crafted frame needs no credentials, so these parsers are the attack surface. IEC 62443-4-2 component requirements expect this robustness (see our IEC 62443-4-2 guide).
  2. Treat the protocol stack as a third-party componentlibiec61850 is "an open-source (GPLv3) implementation" with commercial licences from MZ Automation, per its README. Record the exact version in a firmware SBOM per release, so an advisory such as ICSA-26-211-10 maps to your models in minutes.
  3. Fail closed when security is configuredThe v1.6.2 notes list an R-Session fix: "if user configures an unimplemented signature algorithm the signature check is skipped and no message authentication is done." Test that a misconfiguration rejects traffic instead of silently dropping authentication.
  4. Validate values, not only lengthsThe Hitachi Energy case was out-of-range values in well-formed GOOSE messages.

Worked example: a relay maker on libiec61850 1.6.1

Synthetic example; the product and company are invented. A maker ships a feeder relay whose firmware 3.0 embeds libiec61850 1.6.1 and subscribes to GOOSE from two neighbouring bays.

  1. MatchThe SBOM shows libiec61850 1.6.1. That version sits inside ICSA-26-204-06 (v1.0.0–v1.6.1) and ICSA-26-211-10 (before 1.6.2): 12 CVEs in total.
  2. ScopeThe relay runs the MMS server and the GOOSE subscriber, so both the TCP/102 and the Layer 2 CVEs apply. It does not use R-GOOSE, so the R-Session fix is noted but not exposed.
  3. FixEngineering moves to 1.6.2.1, re-runs its GOOSE/MMS fuzzing suite and adds the malformed-timestamp frame from CVE-2026-66720 as a regression test.
  4. Mitigate in the fieldUntil customers install firmware 3.1, the advisory tells them to keep TCP/102 reachable only from the station computer, and to keep the process bus physically separate.
  5. PublishThe maker issues a CSAF advisory listing firmware 3.0 as affected and 3.1 as fixed, naming both CISA advisory IDs.

What are the common pitfalls?

  • Assuming GOOSE authentication is on because the product datasheet lists IEC 62351-6. Mixed secure and non-secure PDUs are allowed by design.
  • Fixing only the GOOSE CVEs. Five of the eight ICSA-26-211-10 CVEs are on the MMS side.
  • Pinning to the version an advisory names after the vendor has shipped an urgent follow-up, as with 1.6.2 and 1.6.2.1.
  • Unprotected time sync. Replay protection depends on time, which is why IEC 62351-6 has a clause on SNTP.
  • Reading CVSS alone. A 6.5 "availability only" score on a protection relay can still mean a protection function is unavailable.

What should an asset owner check first?

  1. Inventory every IED, merging unit, bay controller and station computerspeaking GOOSE, Sampled Values or MMS, along with its exact firmware/software version — both advisories above affect specific version ranges only, and neither can be assessed without that detail.
  2. Confirm IEC 62351-6 authentication is actually configured, not just available in the product's documentation. A standard that supports message authentication is not the same claim as a substation where it is turned on.
  3. Patch against the specific CVEs aboveMZ Automation recommends updating libiec61850-based products to version 1.6.2 (1.6.2.1 is its urgent follow-up). ABB's fixes range from S+ Operations 3.4 (released January 2026) and AC 800M 7.0 for CI868 (released December 2025) to a Q2 2027 target for the AC 800M 6.1.1 track. Check the current CISA advisory for the latest status on your exact model.
  4. Segment IEC 61850 traffic away from business networks and the internetGOOSE and SV were designed for a trusted substation LAN, not public exposure; ABB's own advisory recommends firewalling with minimal exposed ports and requiring a VPN for any remote access.
  5. Re-check after any firmware updatewhether GOOSE/SV authentication settings and network segmentation survived the change — a patch that fixes one CVE is not a substitute for verifying the surrounding configuration is still as intended.

A passive pcap capture from a station-bus mirror port is a practical start for the inventory in step 1, without connecting anything to a live protection circuit. SoftWSP's OT Snapshot turns such a capture into a list of IP hosts, the ports and directions they talk on, and remote-access sessions such as SSH, RDP or VNC, with an engineer reviewing every finding. MMS sessions appear there as TCP/102 flows. GOOSE and Sampled Values are Layer 2 frames, so they are outside that view, and their authentication state is not decoded. Matching devices to CISA ICS advisories needs the make, model and firmware version from your own asset records. For a device maker, SoftWSP's firmware analysis extracts a CycloneDX SBOM from a firmware image and matches components such as an embedded IEC 61850 stack against NVD, CISA KEV, FIRST EPSS and CISA ICS advisories, for engineer review. The NIST SP 800-82 OT security guide covers segmentation and monitoring for the wider OT network; its Rev. 3 recalls that the December 2016 Industroyer attack on a substation outside Kyiv was "the first known malware specifically designed to attack the power grid."

This guide draws on IEC's own catalogue and scope text for the IEC 61850 and IEC 62351 series, the publisher's preview of IEC 62351-6:2020, four CISA ICS advisories read from their CSAF files (ICSA-26-211-10, ICSA-26-204-06, ICSA-26-120-01 and ICSA-25-133-02), the libiec61850 release notes, and NIST SP 800-82 Revision 3. The full paywalled text of IEC 61850's individual parts and IEC TR 61850-90-5 was not purchased or independently re-verified for this guide; granular cryptographic-mechanism claims here are general description, and the primary IEC text is the authoritative source for an implementation or compliance decision. This guide is general information, not a substitute for a current CISA ICS advisory search for your exact hardware and firmware version or for the purchased IEC standard text.

Put this guide to work

Frequently asked questions

What is IEC 61850, and does the standard itself include security?

IEC 61850, "Communication networks and systems for power utility automation," is the IEC Technical Committee 57 (TC 57) series that standardizes how intelligent electronic devices (IEDs) inside a substation — protection relays, bay controllers, merging units — exchange data with each other and with a station-level SCADA system. IEC's own bundled catalogue listing (IEC 61850:2026 SER) lists 53 publications spanning the core parts, functional data models, communication service mappings and technical reports, maintained by TC 57 and first published (as "Communication networks and systems in substations") in the mid-2000s. The standard was built for an era when substation networks were isolated and proprietary, and its two fastest, most time-critical message types — GOOSE and Sampled Values — carry no authentication or encryption of their own in their base specifications (IEC 61850-8-1 for GOOSE, IEC 61850-9-2 for Sampled Values). Security for IEC 61850 traffic is instead the job of a separate standard, IEC 62351-6, bolted on afterward rather than built in from the start.

Why aren't GOOSE and Sampled Values messages simply encrypted?

Timing. GOOSE carries protection and control events (like a circuit breaker trip command) and Sampled Values carry a continuous stream of time-synchronized current/voltage measurements, and both run as Layer 2 Ethernet multicast frames with delivery deadlines in the single-digit milliseconds — fast enough that full encryption's added processing latency can jeopardize the real-time guarantee the protocols exist to provide. Widely corroborated independent technical analysis of the published IEC 62351-6:2020 standard (whose full text sits behind IEC's paywall) describes the chosen tradeoff: instead of encrypting payload, Part 6 relies on message authentication — an HMAC or AES-GMAC computed over a pre-shared group key — to protect the integrity and authenticity of GOOSE and Sampled Values frames without adding full encryption's latency. A separate mechanism, IEC TR 61850-90-5, defines a routable variant (R-GOOSE and R-SV, carried over UDP/IP for wide-area protection and synchrophasor applications beyond a single substation LAN) with its own security options — none, signature, or signature-plus-encryption — keyed through the GDOI group-key protocol IEC 62351-9 extends for this purpose. The purchased IEC text remains the authoritative source for the specific cryptographic parameters for any implementation decision; our [IEC 62351 guide](/guides/iec-62351-power-systems-communications-security/) covers the full security series part by part.

What have real CISA ICS advisories against IEC 61850 products found in 2026?

Two unrelated vulnerability classes, both in vendor implementations rather than in the IEC 61850 base protocol or IEC 62351's security design. CISA's ICSA-26-211-10 (released 30 July 2026) covers MZ Automation GmbH's open-source libiec61850 stack, versions before 1.6.2: eight separate CVEs (CVE-2026-66720, -66369, -63550, -65421, -66364, -66349, -56758 and -66360), all classified CWE-125 Out-of-Bounds Read, with CVSS v3.1 scores of 6.5 or 7.5 and v4.0 scores up to 8.7. Three of the eight are GOOSE parser flaws, and the other five sit in the MMS, ACSE and ISO presentation layers reached over TCP port 102; per CISA's description, one GOOSE subscriber flaw is where "a specially crafted GOOSE frame containing an undersized timestamp field can trigger a heap out-of-bounds read during message processing, causing the process to crash" — a single unauthenticated Layer-2 multicast frame on the process bus is enough, since GOOSE has no sender authentication to prevent an untrusted frame from reaching the parser in the first place. CISA's ICSA-26-120-01 (released 30 April 2026, initial 13 April 2026) covers ABB System 800xA and Symphony Plus products' IEC 61850 MMS-client communication stack — CVE-2025-3756, CVSS v3.1 6.5 (CWE-1284, Improper Validation of Specified Quantity in Input) — where an attacker with IEC 61850 network access can send a specially crafted packet to force affected Communication Interfaces (CI868/AC800M, CI850, PM 877, S+ Operations) into fault mode, a denial-of-service condition; CISA's advisory is explicit that GOOSE communication itself is not impacted by this particular finding.

What should an asset owner running IEC 61850 substation equipment check first?

Inventory every IED, merging unit, bay controller and station computer that speaks GOOSE, Sampled Values or MMS, along with the exact firmware/software version of each — none of the findings above, or any future advisory, can be assessed without that detail, and the ABB and MZ Automation findings above each affect only specific version ranges. Confirm whether IEC 62351-6 message authentication is actually configured on your GOOSE/SV traffic rather than assuming the standard's existence on paper means it is active in your substation — per FieldComm-style industry practice elsewhere in OT, security features that exist in a specification are routinely shipped disabled by default. Patch libiec61850-based and ABB IEC 61850 products against the CVEs above (MZ Automation recommends updating to 1.6.2; ABB's patch timeline runs from S+ Operations 3.4, released January 2026, through the Q2 2027 target date ABB's advisory names for the AC 800M 6.1.1 track of the CI868 fix, whose 7.0 track was released in December 2025) or any newer CISA ICS advisory matching your exact product and version. Segment substation LANs carrying GOOSE/SV/MMS traffic from business networks and the internet, since IEC 61850 traffic was never designed to be exposed outside a trusted local network, and ABB's own advisory recommends firewalling control networks and using a VPN for any required remote access rather than direct exposure.

Sources

  1. IEC: IEC 61850:2026 SER — Communication networks and systems for power utility automation — ALL PARTS (bundled catalogue record, 53 publications, TC 57)
  2. IEC: IEC 61850-9-2:2011, Part 9-2: Specific communication service mapping (SCSM) — Sampled values over ISO/IEC 8802-3 (catalogue record and scope, Edition 2.0, published 2011-09-22)
  3. IEC: IEC 62351-6:2020, Part 6: Security for IEC 61850 (catalogue record and scope, Edition 1.0, published 2020-10-20)
  4. CISA ICS Advisory ICSA-26-211-10: MZ Automation GmbH libiec61850 (released 30 July 2026; CVE-2026-66720 and 7 related CVEs)
  5. CISA ICS Advisory ICSA-26-120-01: ABB System 800xA, Symphony Plus IEC 61850 (released 30 April 2026; CVE-2025-3756)
  6. NIST Special Publication 800-82 Revision 3, Guide to Operational Technology (OT) Security (September 2023)
  7. IEC 62351-6:2020 publisher preview (iTeh sample: clause 4.1, contents, normative references)
  8. IEC 62351-9:2023, Part 9: Cyber security key management for power system equipment (catalogue record)
  9. IEC TR 61850-90-5:2012, Use of IEC 61850 to transmit synchrophasor information according to IEEE C37.118 (catalogue record)
  10. cisagov CSAF: ICSA-26-211-10 machine-readable advisory (JSON)
  11. cisagov CSAF: ICSA-26-204-06 MZ Automation libIEC61850 (JSON, 23 July 2026)
  12. cisagov CSAF: ICSA-26-120-01 ABB System 800xA, Symphony Plus IEC 61850 (JSON)
  13. cisagov CSAF: ICSA-25-133-02 Hitachi Energy Relion 670/650/SAM600-IO Series, Update C (JSON)
  14. MZ Automation libiec61850 release v1.6.2.1 (24 September 2026)
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