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Cyber Resilience Act

EUCC (EU Common Criteria cybersecurity certification scheme), explained

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The EUCC (European Common Criteria-based cybersecurity certification scheme) is a voluntary EU-wide certification scheme, applicable since 27 February 2025, that lets ICT suppliers run chips, smartcards, hardware and software through a single assessment process at one of two assurance levels — Substantial and High — instead of a patchwork of national ones. ENISA, the EU Agency for Cybersecurity, drafted it as a candidate scheme starting in 2020; the European Commission adopted it as Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/482 of 31 January 2024 — the first scheme adopted under the certification framework the Cybersecurity Act (Regulation (EU) 2019/881) established.

Key takeaways

  • ENISA's certification site states plainly that the EUCC "defines two assurance levels: Substantial, High," chosen according to the risk associated with how the product, service, or process will actually be used.
  • EUCC isn't a new evaluation methodology — it formalizes one that already existed.
  • ITSEFs and CBs are collectively referred to in the regulation as Conformity Assessment Bodies (CABs).
  • A device maker gets an EUCC certificate by having an accredited ITSEF evaluate the product against a security target and an accredited CB issue the certificate.

What are EUCC's two assurance levels?

ENISA's certification site states plainly that the EUCC "defines two assurance levels: Substantial, High," chosen according to the risk associated with how the product, service, or process will actually be used. The two levels are tied to AVA_VAN, the Common Criteria vulnerability-assessment component family: ENISA states the levels "have been mapped with AVA_VAN, the vulnerability assessment class of the Common Criteria standard." Interestingly, ENISA's broader description of the EU certification framework notes that schemes in general may offer any of three tiers — basic, substantial, or high — which means EUCC's designers deliberately chose to skip the "basic" tier and only certify at the two higher bars.

The exact mapping sits in Article 4 of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/482. It is expressed in AVA_VAN components, not in Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs):

EUCC assurance level AVA_VAN components (Article 4) Where it is typically used
Substantial AVA_VAN.1 or AVA_VAN.2 Software and devices whose intended use carries moderate risk
High AVA_VAN.3, AVA_VAN.4 or AVA_VAN.5 Secure elements, smartcards and hardware security boxes; the Regulation's recitals name "Smart cards and similar devices" and "Hardware devices with security boxes" as the two technical domains widely used at AVA_VAN.4 and AVA_VAN.5

Article 4(4) adds that the certificate must state whether the assurance components were used as "conformant" or "augmented" under the Common Criteria. A certificate therefore reads as, for example, "high, AVA_VAN.4", which tells a buyer more than an EAL number alone.

How does EUCC build on Common Criteria and SOG-IS?

EUCC isn't a new evaluation methodology — it formalizes one that already existed. The underlying standard is Common Criteria, also published internationally as ISO/IEC 15408, and ENISA states the EUCC scheme itself "is based on the time-proven SOG-IS Common Criteria evaluation framework already used across 17 EU Member States." SOG-IS (Senior Officials Group Information Systems Security) is the informal multi-country mutual-recognition arrangement that predates EUCC; ENISA's site notes vendors holding an existing national SOG-IS certificate can have it reassessed and converted into an EUCC certificate, rather than starting the evaluation over.

Two version details matter for planning. According to the ENISA EUCC topic page, the December 2024 amendment, Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/3144, fixed the standards to CC:2022 and CEM:2022 (ISO/IEC 15408:2022 and ISO/IEC 18045:2022), while allowing certificates against Common Criteria v3.1 revision 5 until 31 December 2027. A second amendment adopted on 8 December 2025 covers ICT product series certification, assurance continuity and new state-of-the-art documents, as listed on the ENISA EUCC library page.

Outside the EU, recognition is a separate question. The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement's management committee published CCMC-011 "CCRA and EUCC Co-existence" in March 2025. It states that EUCC "places requirements for issuing Common Criteria (CC) certificates on EU member states which do not fully align with the CCRA". An EUCC certificate carries the CCRA mark only when additional per-certificate government oversight is in place.

Who actually does the evaluation?

Role Who What they do
ENISA EU Cybersecurity Agency Authored the scheme's technical content; maintains the public certificate register and supporting documents
ITSEF IT Security Evaluation Facility Runs the technical Common Criteria evaluation against the product
CB Certification Body Issues the certificate based on the ITSEF's evaluation
NCCA National Cybersecurity Certification Authority The Member State authority that accredits and oversees ITSEFs and CBs

ITSEFs and CBs are collectively referred to in the regulation as Conformity Assessment Bodies (CABs). Authorization requirements differ by assurance level: ENISA's documentation notes that a CB seeking authorization to certify at the high level faces additional requirements, including NCCA involvement in a pilot certification, reflecting the higher stakes of a high-assurance evaluation. ENISA keeps a public search for conformity assessment bodies by scheme and country.

What does a device maker have to do to get an EUCC certificate?

A device maker gets an EUCC certificate by having an accredited ITSEF evaluate the product against a security target and an accredited CB issue the certificate. Article 6 rules out conformity self-assessment, so there is no route without these two bodies. The sequence below follows Articles 5 to 11 of the Regulation:

  1. Define the target of evaluation (TOE)Decide which hardware, firmware and documentation the certificate covers. A narrow TOE is cheaper to evaluate but tells buyers less.
  2. Write or adopt a security targetArticle 5 allows a security target defined by the applicant, or one that claims a certified protection profile for the product category.
  3. Choose the assurance levelPick the AVA_VAN component from the product's intended use and the attack potential buyers expect (table above).
  4. Engage a CB and an ITSEFwhose accreditation, and for "high" authorisation, covers the product category (Article 9(1)(a)).
  5. Provide the evidenceArticle 8 requires all "developer action elements" evidence for the chosen assurance level, "where necessary, details on the ICT product and its source code". It also requires a link to the website with the supplementary security information required by Article 55 of the Cybersecurity Act, and a description of your vulnerability management and disclosure procedures. Earlier evaluation results can be reused if the ITSEF confirms they still apply.
  6. Sign the holder's commitmentsArticle 9(2) makes the applicant sign undertakings that include keeping the certified product strictly identical to what was evaluated and respecting the mark and label rules.
  7. Pass evaluation and reviewThe ITSEF concludes "without objection", the CB reviews the technical reports, and the CB issues the certificate, which ENISA publishes.
  8. Apply the mark and labelArticle 11 requires the assurance level, the AVA_VAN level, the certificate identifier and a QR code linking to the certificate details.

How long is a certificate valid, and what does it cost?

An EUCC certificate is valid for the period the CB sets, and Article 12 caps it at 5 years. A longer period needs the prior approval of the NCCA. Under Annex IV, the holder can ask for a review when the certificate is due to expire within nine months, when the product or another factor affecting its security changes, or to have the vulnerability assessment repeated. Annex IV.4 also lets an applicant include an assessed patch management procedure in the certification, so later patches can be applied under that procedure rather than triggering a fresh evaluation each time. Article 8(7) obliges the applicant, the CB and the ITSEF to keep the certification documentation for 5 years after the certificate expires.

On cost and duration, neither the Implementing Regulation nor ENISA publishes a fee schedule or a standard evaluation time. Fees are set commercially by each CB and ITSEF and depend on the TOE scope, the AVA_VAN level and whether earlier evaluation results can be reused. Get written quotes from more than one CAB before budgeting, and treat any single published "average" as an estimate rather than an official figure.

What must the certificate holder do after certification?

The certificate holder must keep monitoring the product, handle vulnerabilities under a defined procedure and report to the CB, for as long as the certificate is valid. These duties sit in Chapters V and VI of the Implementing Regulation:

Duty Article Evidence to keep
Monitor vulnerability information about the product, "including known dependencies", from your own means, users, researchers and other sources 27(1) Monitoring records per certified product
Maintain vulnerability management procedures, supplemented where necessary by EN ISO/IEC 30111, and publish a way to receive reports 33(1)–(2) Published intake channel, written procedure
Record every potential vulnerability and analyse its impact against the TOE and the AVA_VAN level 33(3), 34 Impact analysis per report
Send a vulnerability impact analysis report to the CB without undue delay when conformity is likely affected 35 Report covering impact, attack proximity, remedy
Propose remediation; the CB reviews the certificate 36 Remediation plan, review outcome
Remedy any non-compliance within the period the CB sets, at most 30 days, or face suspension or withdrawal 29 Correspondence with the CB
After withdrawal, publish publicly known and remediated vulnerabilities in the European vulnerability database 39 Database entries

If a vulnerability cannot be remedied and is not residual, Article 35(6) says the certificate is withdrawn. Our ISO/IEC 29147 and 30111 guide covers how to build the intake and handling process these articles assume.

How does EUCC relate to the EU CRA and ETSI EN 303 645?

EUCC is a voluntary certification scheme, while the Cyber Resilience Act is a mandatory product law. The CRA lets EUCC certificates count in three ways. Article 27(8) of the CRA presumes conformity with the Annex I essential requirements as far as a Cybersecurity Act certificate covers them. Article 27(9) lets the Commission name, by delegated act, the schemes that can be used, and a certificate at least "substantial" then removes the third-party assessment for the corresponding requirements of important products. Article 8(1) lets the Commission require a certificate at least "substantial" for the Annex IV critical products: hardware devices with security boxes, smart meter gateways and secure-cryptoprocessing devices, and smartcards and secure elements. Until such a delegated act applies, those products follow the third-party routes described in our conformity assessment guide and Annex III and IV guide.

EUCC ETSI EN 303 645 EU CRA
Nature Voluntary EU certification scheme European standard (consumer IoT baseline) Mandatory regulation for products with digital elements
Who assesses Accredited ITSEF + CB; no self-assessment Manufacturer, or a lab under a labelling scheme Manufacturer or notified body, depending on product class
Depth Common Criteria evaluation up to AVA_VAN.5 Outcome-focused baseline provisions such as no universal default passwords, a vulnerability reporting channel and software updates Annex I essential requirements
Typical products Secure elements, smartcards, HSMs, gateways Smart speakers, cameras, plugs, toys All connected products on the EU market

ETSI EN 303 645 sits at the other end of the scale: it is the baseline behind consumer IoT labels and the UK PSTI regime, not a Common Criteria evaluation. Many device makers use both — EN 303 645 for the finished consumer device and an EUCC-certified secure element inside it. For radio equipment, EN 18031 remains the separate harmonised-standard route under the Radio Equipment Directive.

Worked example: what does an EUCC path look like for a smart meter gateway?

This is a hypothetical example, not a customer case. A 120-person maker of smart meter gateways sells to European grid operators. Smart meter gateways appear in CRA Annex IV point 2, and its buyers already ask for Common Criteria evidence.

  1. ScopeThe team defines the TOE as the gateway firmware plus its secure element, and claims a certified protection profile for the product category (Article 5(1)(b)).
  2. LevelBecause the gateway is critical infrastructure equipment exposed to skilled attackers, the team targets "high" at AVA_VAN.4 in the "Hardware devices with security boxes" technical domain.
  3. ReuseThe secure element already holds a certificate, so the gateway follows composite product evaluation. The ITSEF reuses the chip's evaluation results under Article 8(3)–(5).
  4. EvidenceThe team prepares design documentation, source code access for the ITSEF, its published security information page and a written vulnerability handling procedure (Article 8(6)).
  5. After issueThe firmware team monitors CVEs in every third-party component of the gateway, as Article 27(1)(a) expects for "known dependencies". It writes an impact analysis for each relevant report and sends the CB a report when conformity is affected.
  6. CRA linkIf the Commission adopts a delegated act under CRA Article 8(1) for smart meter gateways, this certificate is the evidence route. Until then, it supports the Article 32(3) third-party assessment that applies by default.

No cost or duration is given here because none is officially published; the maker gets quotes from two CABs found through ENISA's search.

What are the common pitfalls?

  • Asking for "EAL4+" and assuming that answers the question. EUCC levels are defined by AVA_VAN in Article 4; state both the level and the AVA_VAN component.
  • Choosing a TOE that excludes the firmware update path. Buyers and market surveillance read the scope; a narrow TOE gives a narrow claim.
  • Treating the certificate as a one-off. Articles 27 and 33–36 create ongoing monitoring and reporting duties, and Article 29 allows only 30 days to fix non-compliance.
  • Forgetting dependencies. "Known dependencies" in Article 27 includes third-party libraries in the firmware; without a current firmware SBOM there is nothing to monitor against.
  • Assuming global recognition. CCRA recognition of an EUCC certificate depends on the extra oversight described in CCMC-011.
  • Planning a v3.1 evaluation that will finish after 31 December 2027. Check the transition date in the 2024/3144 amendment before starting.
  • Assuming the CRA already requires EUCC. Mandatory certification needs a delegated act under Article 8(1); check the Official Journal for one covering your category.

Can AI help prepare for an EUCC vulnerability-assessment evaluation?

SoftWSP does not run ITSEF-style Common Criteria evaluation and cannot substitute for the independent testing an EUCC certificate requires. What its firmware pipeline can do, ahead of engaging an ITSEF, is extract a product's software components into a CycloneDX 1.6 SBOM and match them against NVD, CISA KEV, FIRST EPSS and CISA CSAF ICS advisories. That is evidence about the known-vulnerability exposure that AVA_VAN's vulnerability-assessment class examines, and about the "known dependencies" Article 27 asks holders to monitor. AI-assisted analysis drafts a cited, plain-language summary of that evidence, component by component, for an engineer to review. Watchlist alerts on a CVE ID or vendor/product can then flag new advisories for components you care about. It is preparatory input, not a substitute for the ITSEF's own testing or the certificate it issues.

SoftWSP's device and firmware security assessments can help a team scope what level of independent assurance — EUCC, IEC 62443-4-2, or another route — actually fits their product and customer base before committing to a formal certification evaluation: see device & firmware security services.

This guide summarises public ENISA and European Union publications; it does not constitute legal or compliance advice.

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Frequently asked questions

What is the EUCC, and what does it certify?

The EUCC (European Common Criteria-based cybersecurity certification scheme) is, per ENISA's own description, a voluntary EU-wide scheme that "allows ICT suppliers who wish to showcase proof of assurance to go through an EU commonly understood assessment process to certify ICT products such as technological components (chips, smartcards), hardware and software." ENISA developed it as a candidate scheme starting in 2020, drawing heavily on the existing SOG-IS Common Criteria evaluation framework already used across 17 EU Member States. The European Commission adopted it as Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/482 of 31 January 2024 — the first scheme adopted under the EU's cybersecurity certification framework established by the Cybersecurity Act, Regulation (EU) 2019/881.

What are the EUCC's two assurance levels?

ENISA's own certification site states the EUCC "defines two assurance levels: Substantial, High," selected according to "the level of risk associated with the intended use of the product, service or process, in terms of probability and impact of an accident." ENISA states these two levels "have been mapped with AVA_VAN, the vulnerability assessment class of the Common Criteria standard" — the family of Common Criteria components that determines how resistant to attack a product must be shown to be. For the regulation's precise article-level mapping of AVA_VAN components to Common Criteria Evaluation Assurance Levels (EAL1-EAL7), consult Regulation (EU) 2024/482 itself rather than secondary summaries. Separately, ENISA's broader certification-framework page notes that EU certification schemes in general may specify any of three tiers — "basic, substantial, or high" — so the EUCC's decision to offer only the top two of those three is itself a notable scoping choice, not the full range the framework allows.

How does EUCC relate to Common Criteria, ISO/IEC 15408, and SOG-IS?

EUCC is built on Common Criteria, the international IT-security evaluation standard also published as ISO/IEC 15408, and ENISA states the scheme "is based on the time-proven SOG-IS Common Criteria evaluation framework already used across 17 EU Member States." SOG-IS (the Senior Officials Group Information Systems Security mutual-recognition agreement) is the pre-existing, informal multi-country arrangement EUCC is designed to formalize and eventually supersede at EU level; ENISA's site notes that vendors holding an existing national SOG-IS certificate can have it reassessed and converted to an EUCC certificate rather than starting evaluation from zero.

Who runs the EUCC, and when did it start applying?

ENISA (the EU Agency for Cybersecurity) authored the EUCC's technical content and maintains the public certificate register and supporting technical documents, but certification itself is carried out by accredited Conformity Assessment Bodies (CABs) — IT Security Evaluation Facilities (ITSEFs) that run the technical evaluation, and Certification Bodies (CBs) that issue the certificate — overseen by each EU Member State's National Cybersecurity Certification Authority (NCCA). Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/482 was adopted 31 January 2024, published in the Official Journal on 7 February 2024, and — per its own entry-into-force clause, which states the Regulation "shall apply from 12 months after entry into force" — has applied across the EU since 27 February 2025. Two amending regulations followed, in December 2024 and December 2025.

Sources

  1. ENISA: EUCC Certification Scheme — certification library entry
  2. ENISA: EUCC — browse-topic page (assurance levels, SOG-IS basis)
  3. ENISA news: "An EU Prime! EU adopts first Cybersecurity Certification Scheme"
  4. ENISA: Cybersecurity Certification Framework (Regulation (EU) 2019/881, assurance tiers, scheme list)
  5. EFTA EEA-Lex: Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/482 of 31 January 2024 — factsheet (OJ reference, application date)
  6. EUR-Lex: Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/482 (EUCC), Articles 4, 6, 8, 9, 11, 12, 27, 29, 33-39 and Annex IV
  7. ENISA: Find a Conformity Assessment Body
  8. CCRA Management Committee: CCMC-011 "CCRA and EUCC Co-existence" v1.0 (19 March 2025)
  9. EUR-Lex: Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 (Cyber Resilience Act), Articles 8 and 27, Annex IV
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EUCC (EU Common Criteria cybersecurity certification scheme), explained