As of 23 January 2026, CISA's Secure Software Development Attestation Form — the standard form federal software producers used to attest that their development practices followed the NIST Secure Software Development Framework (SSDF, SP 800-218) — is no longer mandatory government-wide: OMB Memorandum M-26-05 rescinded the September-2022 requirement that created it, leaving each federal agency to decide for itself whether to still use the form.
Key takeaways
- Self-attestation — a signed statement covering the producer's name, the products it applies to, and a declaration that the producer follows the practices itemized in the standard form.
- The form has three sections, and Section III holds four practice statements tied to EO 14028 subsection 4(e).
- Yes, for the producer's own code.
- CISA published the finalized Secure Software Development Attestation Common Form on 11 March 2024.
Where did the requirement come from?
The attestation requirement traces back to Executive Order 14028, "Improving the Nation's Cybersecurity" (12 May 2021), which directed NIST to issue software supply chain security guidance and directed OMB to require agencies to comply with it. OMB's resulting memorandum, M-22-18, Enhancing the Security of the Software Supply Chain through Secure Software Development Practices, signed 14 September 2022 by then-Director Shalanda D. Young, stated the core rule directly: "Federal agencies must only use software provided by software producers who can attest to complying with the Government-specified secure software development practices, as described in the NIST Guidance" — meaning NIST SP 800-218 and NIST's companion Software Supply Chain Security Guidance.
M-22-18 gave agencies three ways a producer could satisfy the requirement:
Self-attestation— a signed statement covering the producer's name, the products it applies to, and a declaration that the producer follows the practices itemized in the standard form. M-22-18 calls this "the minimum level required." A Plan of Action and Milestones (POA&M)— if a producer could not attest to one or more practices, it could instead "identify those practices to which they cannot attest, document practices they have in place to mitigate those risks," and submit a POA&M; the agency could then still use the software if it found that documentation satisfactory. A third-party assessment— from a FedRAMP-certified Third Party Assessor Organization (3PAO) or one approved by the agency, "acceptable in lieu of a software producer's self-attestation, including in the case of open source software."
OMB Memorandum M-23-16 (9 June 2023) then adjusted the mechanics without changing the underlying requirement: it tied the compliance deadlines to the release of CISA's standard "common form" rather than to M-22-18's original publication date, clarified that agencies do not need to collect attestations for third-party components bundled inside a producer's end product, and exempted no-cost, publicly available proprietary software (such as free web browsers) from attestation collection.
What does the form ask a producer to sign?
The form has three sections, and Section III holds four practice statements tied to EO 14028 subsection 4(e). The version OMB approved under control number 1670-0052 ("Approved with change" on 8 March 2024, expiring 31 March 2027) is published with its information collection record on reginfo.gov. Section I sets the attestation type (new, following an extension or waiver, or revised) and the scope: company-wide, an individual product, or multiple products or specific versions, each listed with name, version and release date. Section II records the producer and a primary contact. Section III is the attestation itself:
| # | Requirement (form wording, shortened) | EO 14028 | SSDF tasks named in the form's appendix (sample) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Software is "developed and built in secure environments": separated environments, logged and audited trust relationships, multi-factor authentication and conditional access, minimised risky products in the build environment, encrypted sensitive data such as credentials, continuous monitoring and incident response | 4(e)(i) | PO.3.2, PO.3.3, PO.5.1, PO.5.2 |
| 2 | A "good-faith effort to maintain trusted source code supply chains" using automated tools or comparable processes for internal code and third-party components | 4(e)(iii) | PO.1.1, PS.3.1, PW.4.1, RV.1.1 |
| 3 | Provenance maintained "for internal code and third-party components incorporated into the software to the greatest extent feasible" | 4(e)(vi) | PO.1.3, PS.3.2, RV.1.2 |
| 4 | Automated vulnerability checks run on an ongoing basis and before releases, a policy to address findings before release, and a vulnerability disclosure program | 4(e)(iv) | PW.7.1, PW.8.2, RV.1.3, RV.2.2 |
The signer is the CEO "or their designee," an employee with "the authority to bind the corporation." The signer also attests that the producer will notify each agency "if and when the producer ceases to make consistent use of the practices." The instructions warn that "willfully providing false or misleading information may constitute a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001." Instead of signing, a producer may tick the box for a 3PAO assessment and attach it; the agency "shall take appropriate steps to ensure that the assessment is not posted publicly." The final wording changes are listed in CISA's 30-day notice of 16 November 2023.
Does the form cover device firmware?
Yes, for the producer's own code. M-22-18 states that "the term 'software' for purposes of this memorandum includes firmware, operating systems, applications, and application services ... as well as products containing software" (M-22-18 PDF). The approved form then sets the scope:
- In scope: software developed after 14 September 2022; older software "modified by major version changes" after that date (the form's example is version 2.5 going to 3.0); and software delivered through continuous changes.
- Out of scope: software developed by federal agencies; open-source software an agency obtains freely and directly; "third-party open source and proprietary components that are incorporated into the software end product"; and freely available public software.
For a device maker, that means the attestation speaks for the firmware your team writes and builds, not for the Linux kernel, BusyBox or vendor SDK inside the image. Requirements 2 and 3 still reach those components indirectly, because you attest to managing their security and provenance.
What is the common form and what were its deadlines?
CISA published the finalized Secure Software Development Attestation Common Form on 11 March 2024. CISA's own announcement describes it as developed "in close consultation with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)" and "based upon practices established in" NIST SP 800-218, stating the release was "a major step in the implementation of its requirement that producers of software used by the Federal Government attest to the adoption of secure development practices."
Per M-23-16's formula, that publication date started two clocks: critical-software attestations were due "no later than three months after" the form's Paperwork Reduction Act approval, and all-software attestations six months after. CISA also stood up the Repository for Software Attestations and Artifacts (RSAA), an online submission system, shortly after the form's release, as an alternative to emailing attestations directly to agencies.
What happened to attestation in the 2025 executive orders?
A plan to make attestations machine-readable and checked by CISA was started and then removed. Executive Order 14144 of 16 January 2025, section 2(b)(i), told OMB to recommend FAR contract language requiring software providers to submit through the RSAA "machine-readable secure software development attestations," "high-level artifacts to validate those attestations," and a list of their federal civilian agency customers. Executive Order 14306 of 6 June 2025 struck subsections 2(a) and 2(b) of EO 14144, and instead directed NIST to publish a preliminary update to the SSDF by 1 December 2025.
| Date | Step |
|---|---|
| 12 May 2021 | EO 14028 signed |
| 14 Sep 2022 | M-22-18 requires attestation |
| 9 Jun 2023 | M-23-16 resets deadlines to the common form |
| 8 Mar 2024 | OMB approves the form (control 1670-0052) |
| 11 Mar 2024 | CISA publishes the form |
| 16 Jan 2025 | EO 14144 adds RSAA validation steps |
| 6 Jun 2025 | EO 14306 strikes them |
| 23 Jan 2026 | M-26-05 rescinds M-22-18 and M-23-16 |
What changed on 23 January 2026?
On 23 January 2026, OMB Director Russell T. Vought issued Memorandum M-26-05, Adopting a Risk-based Approach to Software and Hardware Security. It rescinds the mandate outright: "OMB Memoranda M-22-18 and M-23-16, a companion policy, are hereby rescinded." The memo's stated rationale is that M-22-18 "imposed unproven and burdensome software accounting processes that prioritized compliance over genuine security investments" and "diverted agencies from developing tailored assurance requirements for software."
In place of a single government-wide form, M-26-05 puts the decision back with each agency: "Each agency head is ultimately responsible for assuring the security of software and hardware that is permitted to operate on the agency's network. There is no universal, one-size-fits-all method of achieving that result." Agencies must still "maintain a complete inventory of software and hardware and develop software and hardware assurance policies and processes that match their risk determinations," but using the attestation form itself is now explicitly optional — the memo states agencies "may choose to use the government-wide secure software development resources developed under M-22-18, such as the Secure Software Development Attestation Form," and may separately choose to require an SBOM by contract. CISA's own resource page for the form has already been updated to describe it as implementing M-26-05 rather than the rescinded M-22-18, confirming the form itself was not withdrawn — only the mandate to use it.
What M-26-05 does not rescind is notable: it leaves Executive Order 14028 in place, continues to reference NIST SP 800-218 as a resource, and points agencies to CISA's Hardware Bill of Materials (HBOM) Framework and the CISA-led Minimum Elements for an SBOM (see our SBOM Minimum Elements guide) as further optional tools.
What evidence should sit behind each attestation line?
Keep evidence you could show an agency or a 3PAO the day after you sign. The form itself only has an attachments field for artifacts or addenda, but M-26-05 lets agencies require "a current software bill of materials (SBOM) upon request" by contract, and a 3PAO will ask for records. For a device maker, typical evidence looks like this:
| Line | Evidence a firmware team can keep |
|---|---|
| 1. Secure build environments | Network diagram showing the build server apart from office IT; MFA policy for source control and CI; signing keys in an HSM or key vault; CI audit logs |
| 2. Trusted source code supply chain | Approved-dependency list for SDKs and open-source packages; dependency and container scanning in CI; review records for vendor BSP updates |
| 3. Provenance | Per-release firmware SBOM; build provenance or signed release manifests; image hashes |
| 4. Vulnerability checks and disclosure | Scan results for each release candidate; a release gate for open critical findings; a public vulnerability disclosure policy and a security.txt file |
Line 4's disclosure program is the same capability federal disclosure guidance expects; see our NIST SP 800-216 guide. The free security.txt generator covers the contact file.
How would a device maker answer two agencies today?
Worked example, synthetic: "Example Sensor Co." and both requests are invented for illustration. Example Sensor Co. sells an environmental sensor gateway, firmware 3.0, released in 2025. In 2026 one agency asks for the CISA form; a second asks only for an SBOM on request, as M-26-05 allows.
Check scopeFirmware 3.0 is a major version released after 14 September 2022, so it would be in scope under the form's own rules. Choose the attestation typeAttest for the individual product and version, not company-wide, because an older product line still builds on a shared server without MFA. Review each line against evidenceAll four lines are supported for firmware 3.0. Had one line shown a gap, the route would be the form's alternative: name the practice that cannot be attested, document the mitigation and submit a POA&M with dates. Sign at the right levelThe CEO delegates to the VP Engineering in writing, who signs as the designee with authority to bind the company. Answer the second agencySend the current CycloneDX SBOM for firmware 3.0 under the contract term and record which version was sent. Set a reminderIf MFA is ever removed from the build server, the signed form obliges the company to notify the first agency.
What are the common pitfalls?
- Signing company-wide by default. One weak product line makes the whole attestation inaccurate.
- Forgetting the notification duty. The signer promises to tell agencies if practices lapse.
- Assuming open-source components are covered by someone else. They are outside the attestation, but lines 2 and 3 are about how you manage them.
- Treating an old contract clause as current. A 2024 solicitation citing M-22-18 refers to a rescinded memo; ask the contracting officer what applies now.
- Posting a 3PAO report publicly. The form tells agencies to keep it non-public; do the same.
What does this mean in practice?
A software producer selling to the US federal government today has no single, government-wide attestation to point to — each agency may now ask for a self-attestation, a POA&M, a third-party assessment, an SBOM on request, all of them, or none, depending on that agency's own risk-based policy. Existing contracts and solicitations written during 2024–2025 may still reference the now-rescinded M-22-18 requirement by name; producers should confirm with the contracting agency whether that clause still reflects current policy rather than assuming it does. For teams that already built an SSDF-aligned development process to satisfy the original mandate, that work is not wasted — NIST SP 800-218 itself was not withdrawn (see our NIST SSDF SP 800-218 guide), and agencies retain the option to request the same attestation form on a case-by-case basis. The same evidence also feeds a federal buyer's SP 800-161 supply chain review and the EU Cyber Resilience Act duties in CRA Annex I.
For lines 3 and 4, SoftWSP extracts a CycloneDX 1.6 SBOM from a firmware image, matches its components against NVD, CISA KEV, FIRST EPSS and CISA CSAF ICS advisories, and drafts a cited report for your engineers to review. It is evidence for your file, not an attestation or a 3PAO assessment; build-environment controls and the signature stay with you. See device firmware security.
This guide summarises public OMB and CISA publications; it does not constitute legal or compliance advice.
Put this guide to work
Frequently asked questions
What is the Secure Software Development Attestation Form?
A standard form CISA published, per OMB Memorandum M-22-18, for software producers to attest that their federally-sold software was developed in conformance with the NIST Secure Software Development Framework (SSDF), SP 800-218. CISA's own announcement states it released the form on 11 March 2024, "taking a major step in the implementation of its requirement that producers of software used by the Federal Government attest to the adoption of secure development practices," developed "in close consultation with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)" and "based upon practices established in" NIST SP 800-218.
What did OMB M-22-18 actually require?
M-22-18, signed 14 September 2022 by then-OMB Director Shalanda D. Young, required: "Federal agencies must only use software provided by software producers who can attest to complying with the Government-specified secure software development practices, as described in the NIST Guidance." An acceptable self-attestation had to include the producer's name, a description of the covered products, and a statement that the producer follows the practices itemized in the standard form. If a producer could not attest to every practice, the memo allowed an alternative: identify the gaps, document interim mitigations, and submit a Plan of Action and Milestones (POA&M) — the agency could still use the software if it found that documentation satisfactory. A third option, a third-party assessment from a FedRAMP-certified or agency-approved assessor, was also acceptable in place of self-attestation, including for open-source components.
What were the compliance deadlines?
M-22-18 set deadlines in days-after-publication (90 days to inventory software, 270 days to collect critical-software attestations, 365 days for all software), but OMB Memorandum M-23-16 (9 June 2023) replaced those with deadlines pegged to CISA's common form instead: critical-software attestations due "no later than three months after" OMB's Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA) approval of the form, and all-software attestations due six months after. CISA's form received PRA approval and was published on 11 March 2024, which — per secondary reporting on that timeline — placed the critical-software deadline around 8 June 2024 and the all-software deadline around 8 September 2024.
Is the attestation requirement still mandatory?
No — as of 23 January 2026 it is agency-discretionary, not mandatory. OMB Memorandum M-26-05, Adopting a Risk-based Approach to Software and Hardware Security, states plainly: "OMB Memoranda M-22-18 and M-23-16, a companion policy, are hereby rescinded." In their place, M-26-05 says agencies "shall continue to maintain a complete inventory of software and hardware and develop software and hardware assurance policies and processes that match their risk determinations," and that agencies "may choose to use the government-wide secure software development resources developed under M-22-18, such as the Secure Software Development Attestation Form" — framing the form as an optional tool rather than a government-wide mandate. CISA's own resource page for the form has since been updated to describe it as implementing M-26-05 rather than the rescinded M-22-18.
Why did OMB rescind the mandatory attestation requirement?
M-26-05 gives its own rationale directly: M-22-18 "imposed unproven and burdensome software accounting processes that prioritized compliance over genuine security investments," which "diverted agencies from developing tailored assurance requirements for software and neglected to account for threats posed by insecure hardware." The memo states each agency head is "ultimately responsible for assuring the security of software and hardware that is permitted to operate on the agency's network," and that "there is no universal, one-size-fits-all method of achieving that result" — replacing the single common form with agency-by-agency, risk-based judgment. The memo is explicit about what it does *not* rescind: Executive Order 14028 and NIST SP 800-218 remain referenced as resources agencies can still use.
Sources
- OMB Memorandum M-26-05, Adopting a Risk-based Approach to Software and Hardware Security (23 January 2026) — rescinds M-22-18 and M-23-16
- OMB Memorandum M-22-18, Enhancing the Security of the Software Supply Chain through Secure Software Development Practices (14 September 2022)
- OMB Memorandum M-23-16, Update to Memorandum M-22-18 (9 June 2023)
- CISA: In Effort to Bolster Government Cybersecurity... Takes Step to Ensure Secure Development Practices (news release, 11 March 2024)
- CISA: Secure Software Development Attestation Form (resource page, current)
- reginfo.gov: OMB control number 1670-0052, Secure Software Self-Attestation Common Form (ICR 202311-1670-001, approved 8 March 2024)
- Federal Register 2023-25251: CISA 30-day notice on the Secure Software Development Attestation Common Form (16 November 2023)
- Federal Register: Executive Order 14144, Strengthening and Promoting Innovation in the Nation's Cybersecurity (16 January 2025)
- Federal Register: Executive Order 14306, Sustaining Select Efforts To Strengthen the Nation's Cybersecurity (6 June 2025)
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