ENISA Threat Landscape 2025, published by the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) on 1 October 2025, is the agency's annual, threat-centric assessment of the cybersecurity threats and trends shaping the EU. Section 1 (Executive Summary) describes this edition as introducing "a revised and concise format designed to deliver insights through a threat-centric approach and enhanced contextualisation," covering the EU's cyber threat ecosystem "from July 2024 to June 2025, drawing on nearly 4 900 selected and curated incidents." The publication is licensed under CC BY 4.0, authored by an ENISA team (Jamila Bouteemeur, Ifigeneia Lella, Ilias Bakatsis, Georgios Chatzichristos, Kevin Foley, Jussi Leskinen, Jakub Otcenasek, Dominik Ziolek, with EEAS STRATCOM), and carries ISBN 978-92-9204-723-8 / DOI 10.2824/1946374.
Key takeaways
- ENISA Threat Landscape 2025, published by the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) on 1 October 2025, is the agency's annual, threat-centric assessment of the cybersecurity threats and trends shaping the EU.
- ETL 2025 is built from 4,875 curated incidents in a fixed twelve-month window, and ENISA says plainly that this is not a complete census.
- ENISA published the ENISA Threat Landscape 2026 in September 2026, and it changes the method enough that its percentages should not be set side by side with ETL 2025's.
- Phishing led intrusion vectors, while DDoS dominated incident counts.
How was ETL 2025 produced, and what are its limits?
ETL 2025 is built from 4,875 curated incidents in a fixed twelve-month window, and ENISA says plainly that this is not a complete census. Section 2 states ENISA analysts "collected and analysed 4 875 incidents, mainly based on information from open sources, as well as anonymised information shared by EU Member States... and members of the ENISA Cyber Partnership Programme," over the reporting period 1 July 2024 to 30 June 2025 (cut-off 30 June 2025). Open-source and voluntarily shared information "do not constitute a complete picture," reporting depth and timeliness vary by threat type (ransomware and DDoS claims surface quickly; cyberespionage campaigns are typically documented 6 months to over 4 years later), and sectoral categorisation is imperfect when one incident spans multiple sectors — ENISA states it curated the dataset deliberately "to avoid inflating the threat."
The PDF currently published at ENISA's site is labelled version 1.3 (September 2026), and the report's own Log History table (Section 13) records reference-list edits in December 2025 and January 2026 and editorial changes in August 2026 — a reminder to confirm which point release of a living report a given figure comes from. Its page headers carry the marking TLP:CLEAR, which under FIRST's Traffic Light Protocol means the report can be shared without restriction.
Has ENISA published a newer edition?
ENISA published the ENISA Threat Landscape 2026 in September 2026, and it changes the method enough that its percentages should not be set side by side with ETL 2025's.
| ETL 2025 | ETL 2026 | |
|---|---|---|
| Published | 1 October 2025 (PDF v1.3, September 2026) | September 2026 |
| Reporting period | 1 July 2024 – 30 June 2025 | 1 January – 31 December 2025 (calendar year) |
| Incidents analysed | 4,875 | 8,257 |
| Identifier | ISBN 978-92-9204-723-8 | ISBN 978-92-9204-807-5 |
The ETL 2026 methodology section says the move to a calendar year creates "an overlap of six months with the previous ETL," and that ENISA "expanded the number of tracked cybercrime activities (including data breaches and fraud)," which affected the numbers without substantially changing trends and rankings. Cybercrime, for instance, is 13.4% of incidents in ETL 2025 and 29.3% of events in ETL 2026. This guide covers ETL 2025; use the edition whose reporting period matches the question you are answering.
What were the main intrusion vectors and incident types?
Phishing led intrusion vectors, while DDoS dominated incident counts. Section 3 breaks down the dataset by intrusion vector: social engineering (phishing, vishing, malspam, malvertising) accounted for about 60% of observed cases, exploitation of vulnerabilities for 21.3%, botnets for 9.9%, malicious applications for 8%, and unauthorised insider access for 0.8%. The outcomes differ: roughly 73% of phishing cases are classified "unknown" in follow-up, with 27% leading to confirmed intrusions, whereas nearly 70% of vulnerability-exploitation cases culminate in intrusions (68% of which deploy malicious code).
By incident type, DDoS made up about 76.7% of recorded cases, "overwhelmingly driven by hacktivist groups"; Section 5 separately states that DDoS "affected multiple sectors in the EU (81.4%)." Among confirmed intrusions, ransomware, banking trojans and infostealers together made up 87.3% of deployed malicious code, and 68.6% of intrusions led to data breaches advertised on cybercriminal forums. By threat category, mobile threats were the largest share at 42.4%, followed by web threats (27.3%), operational technology threats (18.2%), and supply chain risks (10.6%).
Which sectors were targeted most?
Public administration led by a wide margin. Section 5 states that once the 28.5% of incidents not tied to a specific sector are excluded, the top five targeted EU sectors were public administration (38.2%), transport (7.5%), digital infrastructure and services (4.8%), finance (4.5%), and manufacturing (2.9%); essential entities under the NIS2 Directive represented 53.7% of all recorded incidents. Public administration incidents were "largely impacted by hacktivist-led DDoS (96.2%)," with France (27%), Italy (26.3%) and Germany (16.2%) the most-affected Member States for that sector.
What does the report say about IoT, OT and edge devices?
Connected devices appear in three roles: OT systems as hacktivist targets, routers and edge devices as attacker infrastructure, and old consumer-router flaws that are still exploited. OT threats are 18.2% of the threat-category split, which Section 3 reads as "the growing exposure of industrial and critical systems."
- OT management interfaces. Section 9.4.1 reports Z-PENTEST-ALLIANCE's claimed targeting of "Internet-accessible OT management interfaces" in energy and water management, notably in Italy, Czechia, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, the Netherlands and Spain; ENISA notes these attacks "reportedly did not result in significant operational impact" and that the videos aim at psychological effect. It also records VoltRuptor, ICS-specific malware offered for sale by a group that emerged in June 2025.
- Routers as relay boxes. Section 7 says China-nexus activity in the EU "was particularly inflated by the compromise of edge devices," used as Operational Relay Boxes, and that Flax Typhoon's Quad7 botnet compromised "thousands of TP-link routers in Europe." It also lists UNC3886 targeting Juniper routers and Velvet Ant exploiting Cisco NX-OS zero-days. Old router CVEs. The appendix (Section 12.2) lists vulnerabilities documented as exploited against EU organisations, and several are years-old router flaws:
| CVE (from ETL 2025 Section 12.2) | Product named | In CISA KEV since |
|---|---|---|
| CVE-2015-2051 | D-Link DIR-645 router | 10 February 2022 |
| CVE-2017-18368 | ZyXEL P660HN-T1A | 7 August 2023 |
| CVE-2018-10957 | D-Link DIR-868L (CSRF) | not listed (KEV catalogue 2026.11.10) |
| CVE-2023-20118 | Cisco Small Business RV routers | 3 March 2025 |
ETL 2026 continues the theme, naming "unpatched legacy IoT and edge devices (impacting among others D-Link, Zyxel, DASAN, Huawei, Realtek and Netgear devices)" in its vulnerabilities chapter. For the device-design side of these weaknesses, see the OWASP IoT Top 10.
What does it say about supply-chain threats?
Supply chain risks are 10.6% of the threat-category split, and Section 4.2 describes two patterns. First, attackers target third-party service providers to reach many victims at once — an external provider running a ticketing platform for several Italian transport companies was breached in March 2025, paralysing one operator's ticketing for two days, and a Berlin transport operator's service provider breach in May 2025 affected data of 180,000 customers. Second, attackers compromise the digital supply chain directly: DPRK-nexus Lazarus deployed malicious npm packages mimicking legitimate libraries, detected secrets in repositories reportedly rose 25% between 2023 and 2024, and a late-2024 campaign compromised companies' Chrome extensions. Section 4.5 adds poisoned hosted ML models and trojanised PyPI packages aimed at the AI supply chain. ENISA's own guidelines for securing the IoT supply chain cover the controls side.
What do the vulnerability figures show?
Section 10.2 shows a growing, mostly network-reachable vulnerability pool, with exploitation concentrated on a few weakness types. 43,505 new vulnerabilities were disclosed in the reporting period, a 27% increase on the previous year; 7% were rated Critical, 26% High, 43% Medium and 3% Low, while 21% "remained unscored." 64% use the network as the CVSS attack vector. ENISA also notes it maintains the European Vulnerability Database (EUVD) alongside its CNA role — see the EUVD guide.
Per CISA's KEV catalogue, 245 vulnerabilities were added in the period, with CWE-78 (OS Command Injection), CWE-22 (Path Traversal) and CWE-416 (Use After Free) the top three associated weaknesses. The report also reproduces the 2024 CWE Top 25; several entries map directly onto embedded firmware:
| Rank (2024) | CWE | CVEs in KEV (per the table ENISA reproduces) |
|---|---|---|
| 2 | CWE-787 Out-of-bounds Write | 18 |
| 7 | CWE-78 OS Command Injection | 5 |
| 22 | CWE-798 Use of Hard-coded Credentials | 4 |
| 25 | CWE-306 Missing Authentication for Critical Function | 5 |
From an EU vantage point, ENISA's collection found at least 115 exploited vulnerabilities affecting Member State organisations, with attackers who "consistently exploit Internet-facing applications" (T1190) — Confluence, Exchange, Citrix NetScaler, Fortinet/Check Point/Palo Alto VPN appliances and similar perimeter products, "typical of mass-exploitation waves where perimeter services are scanned and compromised within hours of disclosure." Turning these lists into a patch order is covered in KEV and EPSS prioritisation.
How do cybercrime, state-aligned activity and hacktivism compare?
Hacktivism drives volume, cybercrime drives impact, and state-aligned activity is a small but persistent share. Section 6 reports cybercrime at 13.4% of all incidents, dominated by ransomware (81.1%). ENISA counted 82 distinct ransomware variants, led by Akira (11.6%), SafePay (10.1%) and Qilin (7.5%) — a fragmented field compared with ETL 2024, when LockBit3 alone accounted for nearly a quarter of claims. The report ties this to law-enforcement disruption, including LockBit's leaked internal database in May 2025, and notes that Operation Magnus (October 2024) against RedLine and META was followed by a "more than 350%" rise in Lumma infostealer use before a May 2025 action took down about 1,300 Lumma domains.
Section 7 identifies 46 distinct state-aligned intrusion sets, led by Russia-nexus sets (APT29, APT28, Sandworm), then China-nexus and DPRK-nexus sets, together 7.2% of incidents; about 14.2% of state-aligned activity could not be tied to a known set. Section 4.4 flags convergence: state-nexus sets using commodity ransomware and residential proxies, and criminals adopting state-style social engineering. Hacktivism represented "almost 80% of recorded incidents," driven by low-level DDoS with "very low impact" overall; NoName057(16), Dark Storm and Keymous+ were the most active against EU public administration.
How does AI show up in the report?
AI appears as both tool and lure. Section 4.5 reports state-nexus groups using commercial LLMs such as Gemini and ChatGPT "primarily as research assistants for boosting productivity as well as for reconnaissance and anomaly detection evasion," jailbroken or retrained models (WormGPT, EscapeGPT, FraudGPT) used for social engineering and malware development, fraudulent sites impersonating AI tools (Kling AI, Luma AI, Canva Dream Lab, DeepSeek-R1) to deliver malware, and the "Rules File Backdoor" technique that plants malicious instructions in configuration files used by AI coding assistants such as Cursor and GitHub Copilot.
What does ENISA recommend?
Sections 10.3–10.8 tie mitigations to the MITRE ATT&CK techniques seen in the dataset, in five groups: system hardening (execution prevention, configuration, code signing), access and privilege (least privilege, password policies, multi-factor authentication), network protections (intrusion prevention, traffic filtering, segmentation), monitoring (audit logging, secure application-development guidance) and resilience (backups, data loss prevention, encryption, timely patching, user training). ENISA says these "form the baseline of cyber hygiene."
How could a device vendor act on it? A worked example
Synthetic example, for illustration only. A maker of a Linux-based home router and a small industrial gateway reviews its threat model against ETL 2025:
| ETL 2025 finding | Question for the product | Action recorded |
|---|---|---|
| Edge devices and TP-Link routers used as relay boxes (Section 7) | Can a compromised unit be silently reused as a proxy? | Disable unused remote services by default; log outbound connections |
| Old router CVEs still exploited (Section 12.2) | Are end-of-support models still online? | Publish support end dates; issue mitigation guidance for affected legacy models |
| CWE-78 top KEV weakness (Section 10.2) | Does the web UI pass input to shell commands? | Add command-injection tests to the release checklist |
| Hacktivists target Internet-facing OT management interfaces (Section 9.4.1) | Is the gateway's admin UI reachable from the Internet by default? | Ship with WAN-side management off; document secure remote access |
What are the common pitfalls when quoting the report?
- Treating percentages as a census. The dataset is curated open-source reporting with known biases toward fast-surfacing DDoS and ransomware claims; use it for direction, not exact shares.
- Confusing volume with impact. Hacktivist DDoS is nearly 80% of incidents but "very low impact"; ransomware and infostealers matter more for most risk models.
- Mixing editions. ETL 2025 and ETL 2026 overlap by six months and count cybercrime differently.
- Quoting a superseded point release. Check the PDF version (v1.3 at the time of writing) before citing a figure externally.
- Reading KEV figures as EU-specific. The 245 figure comes from CISA's US catalogue; ENISA's EU view is the separate "at least 115" list.
SoftWSP matches a firmware image's SBOM against NVD, the CISA KEV catalogue, FIRST EPSS scores and CISA ICS advisories, and drafts a cited report for engineer review, so the KEV-listed router and perimeter flaws this report highlights show up against the components actually shipped; watchlist alerts can follow a CVE id or a vendor/product. SoftWSP does not ingest ENISA's incident dataset. See Device & Firmware Security.
This guide summarises ENISA Threat Landscape 2025 (published October 2025, PDF version 1.3 of September 2026), the ENISA Threat Landscape 2026 methodology, and the CISA KEV catalogue; it is not a substitute for the full text and does not constitute compliance, legal or threat-intelligence advice.
Put this guide to work
Frequently asked questions
What is the ENISA Threat Landscape, and how was the 2025 edition produced?
The **ENISA Threat Landscape (ETL)** is the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity's annual report on the prominent cybersecurity threats and trends affecting the EU. Per Section 2 (Methodology), the 2025 edition — published **1 October 2025** under reference ISBN 978-92-9204-723-8, DOI 10.2824/1946374 — was produced by ENISA analysts who "collected and analysed 4 875 incidents, mainly based on information from open sources, as well as anonymised information shared by EU Member States... and members of the ENISA Cyber Partnership Programme," covering the reporting period **1 July 2024 to 30 June 2025** (cut-off date 30 June 2025). The report explicitly flags caveats inherent to open-source reporting, including uneven reporting depth/timeliness and sectoral miscategorisation, and notes that ENISA curates the dataset to avoid inflating specific threats. The PDF file published on ENISA's site is labelled version 1.3 (September 2026), and the report's own Log History table records reference-list edits in December 2025 and January 2026 and editorial changes in August 2026.
What were the primary intrusion vectors and incident types across the reporting period?
Per Section 3 (Threat Landscape Overview), **social engineering — primarily phishing (including vishing, malspam and malvertising) — accounted for about 60% of observed intrusion cases**, with **exploitation of vulnerabilities at 21.3%**, **botnets at 9.9%**, **malicious applications at 8%**, and **insider-threat unauthorised access at 0.8%**. By incident type, **DDoS attacks made up about 76.7% of recorded cases** (separately cited as 81.4% of incidents when looking at sectoral spread), "overwhelmingly driven by hacktivist groups." Among confirmed intrusions, the combined share of ransomware, banking trojans and infostealers accounted for **87.3%** of deployed malicious code, and **68.6% of recorded intrusions led to data breaches** leaked on cybercriminal forums for sale. By threat category, mobile threats were the largest share at **42.4%**, followed by web threats (27.3%), operational technology threats (18.2%), and supply chain risks (10.6%).
What were the top targeted sectors, and how big a role did cybercrime, state-nexus activity and hacktivism play?
Section 5 reports that, once the 28.5% of incidents not associated with a specific sector are excluded, the **top five targeted EU sectors** were **public administration (38.2%)**, **transport (7.5%)**, **digital infrastructure and services (4.8%)**, **finance (4.5%)**, and **manufacturing (2.9%)** — with essential entities under NIS2 representing 53.7% of all recorded incidents. **Cybercrime accounted for 13.4% of all incidents**, dominated by ransomware (81.1% of cybercrime activity); ENISA counted **82 distinct ransomware variants** deployed against EU organisations, led by Akira (11.6% of deployments), SafePay (10.1%) and Qilin (7.5%). Section 7 identifies **46 distinct state-aligned intrusion sets** active in the EU, with Russia-nexus sets (led by APT29, APT28, Sandworm) the most active, followed by China-nexus (UNC5221/Volt Typhoon, Mustang Panda, APT41, Flax Typhoon, Salt Typhoon) and DPRK-nexus sets; state-aligned activity accounted for 7.2% of recorded incidents. Section 1 (Executive Summary) states hacktivist activity "continu[ed] to dominate reporting, representing almost 80% of recorded incidents and driven primarily by low-level distributed denial-of-service operations," with NoName057(16), Dark Storm and Keymous+ the most active hacktivist intrusion sets targeting public administration specifically.
What does the report say about exploited vulnerabilities and AI-enabled threat activity?
Section 10.2 states that, based on CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalogue, **245 vulnerabilities were added over the reporting period**, with the **top three associated Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) categories** being **CWE-78 (OS Command Injection)**, **CWE-22 (Path Traversal)**, and **CWE-416 (Use After Free)**. From an EU vantage point, ENISA's own open-source collection recorded **at least 115 exploited vulnerabilities** impacting or targeting EU Member State organisations, with MITRE ATT&CK mapping showing attackers "consistently exploit Internet-facing applications" (T1190) — perimeter software such as Confluence, Exchange (ProxyLogon/ProxyShell), Citrix NetScaler, and VPN appliances from Fortinet/Check Point/Palo Alto dominating the exploited set. Section 4.5 describes threat actors' "predictable use of AI": state-nexus groups (China-, Iran- and DPRK-nexus) using commercial LLMs such as Gemini and ChatGPT for reconnaissance and productivity, jailbroken/retrained models (WormGPT, EscapeGPT, FraudGPT) to automate social engineering and malware development, and fraudulent sites impersonating legitimate AI tools (Kling AI, Luma AI, DeepSeek-R1) to deliver malware.
Sources
- ENISA: ENISA Threat Landscape 2025 (October 2025) — publication page
- ENISA Threat Landscape 2025, full text PDF (v1.3, September 2026)
- CISA: Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog (cited as the source for the report's 245-vulnerability KEV figure)
- ENISA: ENISA Threat Landscape 2026 (September 2026) — publication page (newer edition; calendar-year 2025 reporting period, 8 257 incidents)
- ENISA Threat Landscape 2026, full text PDF (methodology: six-month overlap with ETL 2025, expanded cybercrime tracking)
- MITRE CWE: 2024 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses (reproduced in ETL 2025 Section 10.2)
- ENISA: European Vulnerability Database (EUVD)
- MITRE ATT&CK: T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application
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