Guidelines for Securing the Internet of Things, published by the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) in November 2020 (catalogue TP-02-20-946-EN-N, authored by Christina Skouloudi, Apostolos Malatras and Rossen Naydenov), maps security risk across the entire IoT supply chain rather than just the finished product. Its executive summary frames the motivation directly: "security is not only about the end product, but also about the processes to be followed to develop the product," because "the majority of these devices are comprised from a multitude of components from different suppliers (both hardware and software)," making the supply chain "a weak link for cybersecurity because organisations cannot always control the security measures taken by supply chain partners." The report is released under ENISA's standard copyright notice — reproduction authorised provided the source is acknowledged — and is free to download from enisa.europa.eu.
Key takeaways
- The report models the IoT supply chain as six lifecycle phases, then splits them into ten stages for mapping threats.
- Chapter 3 groups threats into five categories and tags each threat with the stages where it most often enters.
- Section 4.2 lists 30 practices: 8 for Actors, 13 for Processes and 9 for Technologies.
- Guideline 5.4 is the largest, with 13 practices including PRO-05, PRO-08 and PRO-13.
What are the six phases and ten stages?
The report models the IoT supply chain as six lifecycle phases, then splits them into ten stages for mapping threats. Section 2.1 of the report PDF first divides the chain into a physical aspect (devices, electronic components, manual assembly and distribution) and a logic aspect (software development and deployment, network communications, virtual interactions), then defines the phases:
| Phase | What happens |
|---|---|
| Conceptual | Product/service design, security requirements, threat-model groundwork; the report notes "cost-driven decisions or mistakes at this stage may result in security flaws in the final product" |
| Development | Semiconductor fabrication through firmware/software build; described as "one of the most critical phases as most of the risks and threats arise from poor decisions, omissions or mistakes at this point" |
| Production | Manufacturing and assembly of the physical device |
| Utilisation | The device is deployed and operated by the end user |
| Support | "Maintaining updates for the devices (firmware, software and libraries) and remote support" — the phase the report says has drawn the most security tooling and standards attention |
| Retirement | Secure disposal and decommissioning |
Section 2.2 then names ten stages: Product Design, Semiconductor Fabrication, Component Manufacturing, Component & Embedded Software Assembly, Device Programming, IoT Platform Development, Distribution & Logistics, Service Provision & End-User Operation, Technical Support & Maintenance, and Device Recovery & Repurpose. Every threat and practice later in the report points back to these stage names, so they are the vocabulary to use in supplier questionnaires.
What threats does the IoT supply chain face?
Chapter 3 groups threats into five categories and tags each threat with the stages where it most often enters. A selection that matters most to firmware teams:
| Category | Threat (report wording) | Stages the report tags |
|---|---|---|
| Physical attack | Sabotage | Component assembly & embedded software |
| Physical attack | Exploitation of inadequate physical enclosures (for example a maintenance port left open in the field) | Service provision; technical support |
| IP loss | Reverse engineering | Component assembly; device programming; technical support; disposal |
| IP loss | Overproduction and cloning | Component manufacturing; component assembly |
| Nefarious activity/abuse | Malware insertion via "insecure update mechanisms and poisoned update services" | Component manufacturing through service provision (five stages) |
| Nefarious activity/abuse | Tampering and counterfeits (counterfeit or trojaned chips on tampered boards) | Semiconductor fabrication; component manufacturing; assembly; distribution & logistics; recovery |
| Legal | Non-compliance with standards and regulation | Product design; service provision; technical support |
| Unintentional damage | Use of factory authentication settings | Product design through technical support (five stages) |
The report also lists magnetic field attacks, exploitation of debug interfaces such as JTAG, attacks on registration procedures, grey markets, compromise of network, undetected disruptions and user errors. On factory credentials it is direct: devices "should never leave the factory with a fixed global default credentials or a credentials derived from easily obtainable information (i.e. MAC address)." The list is illustrative, and the report says generic threats such as vandalism still apply "in addition to the specific threats of the supply chain."
Which 30 good practices does the report list?
Section 4.2 lists 30 practices: 8 for Actors, 13 for Processes and 9 for Technologies. Each has a short description and references.
| Group | Practices |
|---|---|
| Actors | ACT-01 prioritize suppliers that provide security guarantees · ACT-02 improve transparency · ACT-03 develop innovative trust models · ACT-04 treat supply chain security as a continuous process · ACT-05 maintain and train a skilled workforce · ACT-06 promote a risk-based developer culture · ACT-07 promote IoT security awareness for users · ACT-08 provide security promises to customers |
| Processes | PRO-01 adopt security by design · PRO-02 improve data collection and measurement · PRO-03 create supply chain integrity metrics · PRO-04 develop supply chain threat models · PRO-05 identify third-party software · PRO-06 establish a comprehensive test plan · PRO-07 security-by-default factory settings · PRO-08 commit to security patches for a stated period · PRO-09 secure scrap management · PRO-10 secure data removal · PRO-11 comprehensive documentation · PRO-12 develop or adapt supply chain standards · PRO-13 provide SBOMs for IoT devices |
| Technologies | TEC-01 plan device upgradeability and obsolescence · TEC-02 use emerging technologies for control and auditing · TEC-03 hardware mechanisms for internal validation · TEC-04 SLAs that require software integrity measures · TEC-05 device identity management · TEC-06 strong root of trust · TEC-07 remote update mechanisms · TEC-08 authentication built into circuits (for example PUF) · TEC-09 hardware-software collaboration |
Five practices carry most of the firmware work. PRO-05 says third-party software "must be documented as part of the supply chain security process," and names OWASP Dependency-Track for component analysis. PRO-13 says SBOMs "should ideally be available for all IoT products." PRO-08 says the patch support period "should be explicitly and clearly indicated in advance to procurement." TEC-04 puts secure boot and firmware signing into supplier SLAs, and TEC-06 anchors both in a hardware root of trust (see our secure boot and root of trust guide). ACT-01 also names ISO 27036, ISO 28000 and NISTIR 8259 as signals of a supplier's commitment.
How do the five guidelines group the practices?
Chapter 5 sorts every practice under one of five guidelines and names the "most pertinent" standards for each:
| Guideline | Most pertinent standards cited |
|---|---|
| 5.1 Forging better relationships between actors | ISO/IEC 27001, ISO 27036 |
| 5.2 Cybersecurity expertise should be further cultivated | NISTIR 8276 |
| 5.3 Security by design | ISO 20243 |
| 5.4 Take a comprehensive and explicit approach to security | ISO/IEC 11889 (TPM), IETF RFC 8520 (MUD), IEEE 802.1AR-2018, ISO 20243 |
| 5.5 Leverage existing standards and good practices | GSMA SAS-UP, CMU security and privacy label |
Guideline 5.4 is the largest, with 13 practices including PRO-05, PRO-08 and PRO-13. ISO 20243 is the Open Trusted Technology Provider Standard; our ISO/IEC 20243 guide covers it.
How does Annex A link a threat to a practice?
Annex A is a matrix: for each practice it lists the threats it addresses and the stages involved. Read it backwards when you start from a threat. For example, "identify third-party software" (PRO-05) is mapped to, among others, use of factory authentication settings, use of unpatched devices and systems, malware insertion and exploitation of debug interfaces, in product design, platform development, assembly and device programming. "Implement mechanisms for remote update" (TEC-07) is mapped to unpatched devices, technological evolution during the device life cycle and failure of recovery procedures. That makes the annex a ready-made rationale column for a risk register.
How does the report line up with the Cyber Resilience Act?
The report is guidance, not law, and no regulation names it as a required control. Several practices do line up with text in the Cyber Resilience Act, so evidence built for one can support the other:
| ENISA practice | CRA text it lines up with |
|---|---|
| PRO-05 identify third-party software; ACT-01 supplier guarantees | Article 13(5): exercise "due diligence when integrating components sourced from third parties" |
| PRO-13 provide SBOMs | Annex I Part II(1): "drawing up a software bill of materials in a commonly used and machine-readable format covering at the very least the top-level dependencies" |
| PRO-08 commit to a patch period; TEC-07 remote update | Annex I Part II(2): remediate vulnerabilities "without delay, including by providing security updates" |
| PRO-07 security-by-default settings | Annex I Part I(2)(b): made available "with a secure by default configuration" |
Recital 34 adds that due diligence may include checking that a component is free from vulnerabilities registered in the European vulnerability database. A line-up is not a conformity argument: the CRA's own text and its harmonised standards decide what is enough. Our Cyber Resilience Act guide covers the obligations themselves.
Worked example: how does a device maker apply it to one supplier module?
Synthetic example: the company, module and supplier are made up.
A maker of a smart thermostat buys a Wi-Fi module from a contract manufacturer, with firmware flashed at the supplier's site. The security lead uses the report in six steps:
Place the module on the stage mapIt passes through Component Manufacturing, Component & Embedded Software Assembly, Device Programming and Distribution & Logistics before it reaches the thermostat line. Pull the threats for those stagesfrom Chapter 3: tampering and counterfeits, overproduction and cloning, malware insertion, use of factory authentication settings. Pick practices from Annex Athat address those threats: ACT-01, PRO-05, PRO-07, PRO-13, TEC-04, TEC-08. Turn them into supplier requirements:a component SBOM per firmware release (PRO-13), signed images verified by secure boot (TEC-04), unique per-device credentials instead of a shared default (PRO-07), and a stated security-update period (PRO-08). Verify on arrival:sample units are tested at incoming inspection (PRO-06 says acceptance testing "should occur independently"), and the delivered firmware is compared against the supplier SBOM. Record the resultagainst the CRA line-up table above, so the same evidence serves the technical documentation.
Hardware provenance itself (counterfeit chips, overproduction) needs physical and contractual checks; a hardware bill of materials helps there.
How does this build on ENISA's earlier IoT work?
The report positions itself as an extension, not a replacement, of ENISA's prior IoT security output: it "builds up on existing ENISA studies on IoT security, the baseline IoT security recommendations and the secure software development lifecycle" — ENISA's 2017 Baseline Security Recommendations for IoT and 2019 Good Practices for Security of IoT (Secure SDLC) report. Where the 2019 SDLC report focuses on the software development process itself, this 2020 supply chain report widens the lens to the physical supply chain stages the SDLC report doesn't cover — semiconductor fabrication, component manufacturing, and distribution/logistics — alongside the familiar software stages.
What are the common pitfalls?
- Citing the report as a legal requirement. It is a 2020 good-practice study; quote the CRA or your sector rule for obligations.
- Using only the software stages. Counterfeits, overproduction and grey markets enter in fabrication, logistics and recovery, where an SBOM sees nothing.
- Asking suppliers for "an SBOM" without a format or depth. State the format, the minimum depth and the delivery point per release; see SBOM minimum elements.
- Skipping the retirement stages. PRO-09 (scrap) and PRO-10 (data removal) cover rejected units and returned devices, which leak keys and firmware.
- Treating practice IDs as a checklist score. The report says its threat list is illustrative; the Annex A mapping is a starting point for your own risk assessment.
What part of this does SoftWSP cover?
A narrow, firmware-side part. SoftWSP extracts an SBOM from a firmware image and writes it as CycloneDX 1.6 JSON, which supports PRO-05 and PRO-13 and lets you compare a supplier's SBOM with what was actually shipped. It then matches components against NVD, CISA KEV, FIRST EPSS and CISA CSAF ICS advisories, and an AI step drafts a cited report for an engineer to review. It does not assess suppliers, trace hardware provenance or detect counterfeit chips. For the pillar view, see our firmware SBOM guide; for hands-on help, see Device & Firmware Security.
This guide summarises the public ENISA report (© ENISA 2020, reproduction authorised provided the source is acknowledged) and quotes the Cyber Resilience Act from the Official Journal; it does not constitute legal or compliance advice.
Put this guide to work
Frequently asked questions
What is the ENISA Guidelines for Securing the Internet of Things report?
Published by the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) in November 2020, catalogue number TP-02-20-946-EN-N, authored by Christina Skouloudi, Apostolos Malatras and Rossen Naydenov. Its own executive summary states the goal: ENISA, "with the input of IoT experts created security guidelines for the whole lifespan: from requirements and design, to end use delivery and maintenance, as well as disposal," to help "IoT manufacturers, developers, integrators and all stakeholders that are involved to the supply chain of IoT to make better security decisions." It is released under ENISA's standard copyright notice: "Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged."
What are the six phases of ENISA's IoT supply chain reference model?
Section 2.1 defines a Supply Chain Reference Model for IoT with six phases: the Conceptual Phase (product/service design, security requirements), the Development Phase (hardware fabrication through firmware/software build), the Production Phase, the Utilisation Phase, the Support Phase ("maintaining updates for the devices (firmware, software and libraries) and remote support"), and the Retirement Phase (secure disposal). The report also breaks these into ten granular supply chain stages, from Product Design and Semiconductor Fabrication through Technical Support & Maintenance and Device Recovery & Repurpose.
What threat categories does the report identify?
Chapter 3 groups IoT supply chain threats into five high-level categories, each mapped to the supply chain stages it most affects: Physical Attack (e.g. sabotage during assembly, grey-market diversion of discarded units); Intellectual Property Loss (e.g. IP theft, reverse engineering, overproduction and cloning); Nefarious Activity/Abuse (e.g. magnetic field attacks, malware insertion via insecure update mechanisms, exploitation of debug interfaces, attacks on device registration); Legal; and Unintentional Damage or Loss of Information. The report notes threats are illustrative, not exhaustive, and that "horizontal threats that apply to all domains (e.g. vandalism) should still be considered."
How are the good practices organized?
Section 4.2 groups good practices into three categories: Actors (e.g. ACT-01 "prioritize working with suppliers that provide security guarantees," ACT-04 treat supply chain security as a continuous process, ACT-05 maintain a trained workforce), Processes (e.g. PRO-01 "adopt security by design principles"), and Technologies (e.g. TEC-09 combining hardware and software security measures, such as PUF-based key protection). Chapter 5 then rolls these up into five higher-level guidelines, including Security by Design and "take a comprehensive and explicit approach to security," each cross-referenced to relevant standards such as ISO/IEC 27001, ISO 27036, ISO 20243 and NISTIR 8276.
How does this relate to other ENISA IoT publications?
The report states it "builds up on existing ENISA studies on IoT security, the baseline IoT security recommendations and the secure software development lifecycle" — referring to ENISA's 2017 Baseline Security Recommendations for IoT and its 2019 Good Practices for Security of IoT (Secure Software Development Lifecycle) report. This supply chain study extends that earlier SDLC-focused work to cover the full physical and logical supply chain, including semiconductor fabrication, component manufacturing and distribution/logistics stages the SDLC report does not address.
Sources
- ENISA: Guidelines for Securing the Internet of Things — publication page
- ENISA: Guidelines for Securing the Internet of Things, full report PDF (Skouloudi, Malatras, Naydenov), November 2020
- ENISA news: IoT Security — ENISA publishes guidelines on securing the IoT supply chain
- ISO: ISO/IEC 27001 — Information security management systems (catalogue record)
- EUR-Lex: Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 (Cyber Resilience Act) — Article 13(5), Annex I Parts I and II, recital 34
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