The OWASP IoT Top 10 is OWASP's 2018 list of the ten highest-priority security risks for building, deploying or managing Internet of Things systems, published by the OWASP (Open Worldwide Application Security Project) Internet of Things project and not revised since. The current edition, released in December 2018, replaced an earlier 2014 list and deliberately merged what had been separate risk/threat/vulnerability views into one list aimed at developers, manufacturers, enterprises and consumers at once. It is a free awareness and design-checklist resource, not a certification scheme or a legal requirement.
Key takeaways
- Quoted text is reproduced from the 2018 document.
- To keep it simple.
- Team formation: recruiting volunteer subject-matter experts and project leaders from manufacturers, consultancies, security testing and development backgrounds.
- No. The 2018 document states the team's intent "to continuing (sic) to improve the list on a two-year cadence" and to map the items to other OWASP projects such as the ASVS.
What are the 10 items in the 2018 list?
The ten items run from I1 (passwords) to I10 (physical hardening), in the order and wording of the OWASP IoT Top 10 2018 document:
| # | Item | What it covers |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Weak, Guessable, or Hardcoded Passwords | "Use of easily bruteforced, publicly available, or unchangeable credentials, including backdoors in firmware or client software that grants unauthorized access to deployed systems." |
| 2 | Insecure Network Services | "Unneeded or insecure network services running on the device itself, especially those exposed to the internet, that compromise the confidentiality, integrity/authenticity, or availability of information or allow unauthorized remote control." |
| 3 | Insecure Ecosystem Interfaces | "Insecure web, backend API, cloud, or mobile interfaces in the ecosystem outside of the device that allows compromise of the device or its related components. Common issues include a lack of authentication/authorization, lacking or weak encryption, and a lack of input and output filtering." |
| 4 | Lack of Secure Update Mechanism | "Lack of ability to securely update the device. This includes lack of firmware validation on device, lack of secure delivery (un-encrypted in transit), lack of anti-rollback mechanisms, and lack of notifications of security changes due to updates." |
| 5 | Use of Insecure or Outdated Components | "Use of deprecated or insecure software components/libraries that could allow the device to be compromised. This includes insecure customization of operating system platforms, and the use of third-party software or hardware components from a compromised supply chain." |
| 6 | Insufficient Privacy Protection | "User's personal information stored on the device or in the ecosystem that is used insecurely, improperly, or without permission." |
| 7 | Insecure Data Transfer and Storage | "Lack of encryption or access control of sensitive data anywhere within the ecosystem, including at rest, in transit, or during processing." |
| 8 | Lack of Device Management | "Lack of security support on devices deployed in production, including asset management, update management, secure decommissioning, systems monitoring, and response capabilities." |
| 9 | Insecure Default Settings | "Devices or systems shipped with insecure default settings or lack the ability to make the system more secure by restricting operators from modifying configurations." |
| 10 | Lack of Physical Hardening | "Lack of physical hardening measures, allowing potential attackers to gain sensitive information that can help in a future remote attack or take local control of the device." |
Quoted text is reproduced from the 2018 document. The OWASP Internet of Things project page lists it as the project's Top 10 resource.
Why did OWASP publish one list instead of several?
To keep it simple. OWASP's introduction to the 2018 release explains that, rather than maintain separate lists for risks versus threats versus vulnerabilities, or separate lists for developers versus enterprises versus consumers, the team "elected to have a single, unified list that captures the top things to avoid when dealing with IoT Security," because "there are now dozens of organizations releasing elaborate guidance on IoT Security" aimed at different audiences. The stated theme of the 2018 edition is simplicity.
How was the 2018 list built?
It was built in six phases, which the project documents as follows:
Team formation: recruiting volunteer subject-matter experts and project leaders from manufacturers, consultancies, security testing and development backgrounds. Project review: assessing what had changed in the industry since the 2014 list. Data collection: reviewing "multiple vulnerability sources (both public and private), with special emphasis on which issues caused the most actual impact and damage." Sister-project review: cross-checking the draft against other IoT security guidance, naming as examples the CSA IoT Controls Matrix, CTIA, Stanford's Secure Internet of Things Project, NISTIR 8200, ENISA's IoT Baseline Report, and the UK's Code of Practice for Consumer IoT Security. Community draft feedback: a public comment period including social-media calls for feedback and talks. Release: publication in December 2018.
Has the list been updated since 2018?
No. The 2018 document states the team's intent "to continuing (sic) to improve the list on a two-year cadence" and to map the items to other OWASP projects such as the ASVS. No later numbered IoT-specific Top 10 release appears on OWASP's project page; the current Internet of Things page still lists the 2018 edition as the Top 10 resource, alongside newer companion projects:
- the IoT Security Testing Guide (ISTG), which OWASP describes as "a comprehensive methodology for penetration tests in the IoT field";
- the IoT Security Verification Standard (ISVS), an incubator-stage project OWASP describes as establishing "a framework of security requirements for Internet of Things (IoT) applications" (see our OWASP ISVS guide).
The Firmware Security Testing Methodology (FSTM) sits next to these as the firmware-specific test method. OWASP's own project page, not a third-party claim, is the authoritative source on whether a newer official IoT Top 10 version exists.
How does the OWASP IoT Top 10 map to ETSI EN 303 645?
Through a community crosswalk, not through either document. The OWASP IoT Top 10 2018 Mapping Project maps the list to the GSMA IoT Security Assessment Checklist, the UK Code of Practice, ENISA's baseline recommendations, CTIA, CSA and ETSI. Its ETSI mapping file was made against the 2019 technical specification ETSI TS 103 645 V1.1.1, where the provisions were numbered 4.1 to 4.13. In the current ETSI EN 303 645 V3.1.3 the same thirteen headings sit in clause 5, some reworded. The table uses the current headings and the project's mapping:
| EN 303 645 V3.1.3 | TS V1.1.1 | OWASP items per the mapping project |
|---|---|---|
| 5.1 No universal default passwords | 4.1 | I1 |
| 5.2 Implement a means to manage reports of vulnerabilities | 4.2 | N/A |
| 5.3 Keep software updated | 4.3 | I4, I5 |
| 5.4 Securely store sensitive security parameters | 4.4 | I1, I7 |
| 5.5 Communicate securely | 4.5 | I7 |
| 5.6 Minimize exposed attack surfaces | 4.6 | I1, I2, I3, I5, I9, I10 |
| 5.7 Ensure software integrity | 4.7 | I4 |
| 5.8 Ensure that personal data is secure | 4.8 | I6 |
| 5.9 Make systems resilient to outages | 4.9 | N/A |
| 5.10 Examine system telemetry data | 4.10 | I8 |
| 5.11 Make it easy for users to delete user data | 4.11 | I6 |
| 5.12 Make installation and maintenance of devices easy | 4.12 | I9 |
| 5.13 Validate input data | 4.13 | I3 |
Source: OWASP IoT Top 10 2018 Mapping Project, ETSI file (last changed October 2019); clause headings from ETSI EN 303 645 V3.1.3 (2024-09).
Two rows matter most for regulated markets. First, ETSI's vulnerability-reporting clause maps to no OWASP item: provision 5.2-1 says "The manufacturer shall make a vulnerability disclosure policy publicly available", with contact details and timelines for acknowledgement and status updates. A team that only works from the OWASP list can miss the duty that the UK PSTI regime and Australia's smart device Rules both enforce. Second, I8 maps only to telemetry, while ETSI's published support period (provision 5.3-13: "The manufacturer shall publish, in an accessible way that is clear and transparent to the user, the defined support period") sits under 5.3. The OWASP list says nothing about publishing an end date.
Which items can a firmware review check, and which need other tests?
Only some of them. A binary-level firmware review sees the files on the image; it does not see the cloud, the companion app, or the circuit board. A practical split:
| Item | Evidence a firmware image can give | Needs a different test |
|---|---|---|
| I1 Passwords | hard-coded hashes in shadow files, embedded keys, default credentials in config | a check that per-unit passwords are actually unique on the production line |
| I2 Network services | which daemons and versions ship (telnetd, dropbear, dnsmasq) and their init scripts | a network scan of a running unit |
| I3 Ecosystem interfaces | API endpoints and certificates referenced in the image | a web, API and mobile app test |
| I4 Secure update | update client, signature checks, rollback counters in the code | an end-to-end OTA test, see OTA update security |
| I5 Components | the full component list as an SBOM, matched against known CVEs | none: this is the item a binary scan covers best |
| I6 Privacy | what personal data the code stores locally | a data-flow review of the back end |
| I7 Data transfer and storage | TLS libraries and settings, plaintext secrets on the filesystem | traffic capture on a live unit |
| I8 Device management | presence of remote-management and logging agents | a review of the fleet and decommissioning process |
| I9 Default settings | default config files, enabled debug options | an out-of-box test of a shipped unit |
| I10 Physical hardening | bootloader settings, such as an open U-Boot console | a lab test of JTAG/UART and board-level access |
For I1, the hard-coded credentials fix guide covers remediation. For I5, a firmware SBOM is the starting evidence, and the free SBOM viewer opens a CycloneDX or SPDX file in the browser.
Where does it fit next to the CRA and IEC 62443?
As a checklist in front of them, not a substitute. The OWASP IoT Top 10 is an awareness and design-checklist resource built by volunteers; it carries no certification scheme and no legal weight on its own. Device makers selling into regulated markets still need the actual standards and legal texts:
- ETSI EN 303 645 sets a formal, versioned baseline of consumer IoT security provisions (see our ETSI EN 303 645 guide); the mapping above shows where OWASP's items land in it.
- The EU Cyber Resilience Act essential requirements (see our CRA guide and Annex I explainer) overlap with OWASP items 1, 4, 5, 8 and 9. Annex I requires products to be made available "with a secure by default configuration" (Part I(2)(b)), to "ensure that vulnerabilities can be addressed through security updates" (Part I(2)(c)), and manufacturers to identify components "including by drawing up a software bill of materials" (Part II(1)). The CRA text does not reference OWASP's list by name.
- IEC 62443-4-2 sets technical requirements for industrial components (see our IEC 62443-4-2 vs CRA guide), a different target audience than OWASP's consumer- and enterprise-IoT framing.
A device maker can use the OWASP IoT Top 10 as an early design and review checklist, then confirm the specific clauses a target market requires from the relevant formal standard or regulation. OWASP's list does not replace that step.
Worked example: how would a team review a smart camera against the list?
Synthetic example, for illustration only: the product, findings and versions below are invented.
A maker of a Wi-Fi home camera ("Camera X", embedded Linux, companion app, cloud video storage) plans to ship to the EU and the UK and uses the list as its first review pass:
Split the items by ownerFirmware team: I1, I2, I4, I5, I9, I10. Cloud and app team: I3, I6, I7 (in transit). Operations: I8. Unpack the firmware image and build an SBOMThe component list shows BusyBox, dropbear, an old OpenSSL 1.1.1 branch and the vendor's own streaming daemon. Match the SBOM against known vulnerabilities (I5)OpenSSL 1.1.1 reached end of life on 11 September 2023, so the team plans an upgrade to a supported OpenSSL 3 series rather than triaging each CVE alone. Search the filesystem for credentials (I1)A root hash in /etc/shadowis identical across two firmware versions: a shared credential. The fix is a per-unit password set at manufacture, as ETSI provision 5.1-1 requires.List listening services (I2, I9)Init scripts start telnetd in production builds. It is removed from the release configuration. Check the update path (I4)The update client verifies a signature but has no rollback counter, so an older signed image can be reinstalled. That goes to the bootloader backlog. Lab-test the board (I10)The UART header gives a root shell. It is disabled in the production bootloader and the pads are left unpopulated. Add what OWASP leaves outThe team publishes a vulnerability disclosure policy (see our policy template) and a dated support period, which ETSI 5.2-1 and 5.3-13 need and the Top 10 does not.
The result is a findings list mapped to I-numbers and to ETSI clauses, ready for a formal assessment.
What are the common pitfalls?
- Treating the list as a standard. There is no OWASP IoT Top 10 certificate, and no regulator accepts "Top 10 compliant" as evidence.
- Assuming it covers vulnerability disclosure. The mapping project marks ETSI's reporting clause as N/A; disclosure and support periods have to be added from the regulation.
- Reviewing only the device. I3, I6 and I7 are largely about the cloud and app side of the ecosystem.
- Stopping at a component list for I5. A list of CVEs is input to triage, not a risk verdict; each match still needs an engineer to decide whether it applies to the build.
- Citing old clause numbers. The mapping project uses TS 103 645 numbers (4.x); current EN 303 645 numbers are 5.x.
- Ignoring physical access. EN 303 645 provision 5.6-4A requires debug interfaces to be "disabled or protected via a best practice authentication or access control mechanism", which an image-only review cannot confirm.
What does a firmware scan cover, and what is left to engineers?
SoftWSP's platform covers the binary side of I5 and part of I1: it extracts an SBOM from the firmware image as a CycloneDX 1.6 document and matches the components against NVD, CISA KEV, FIRST EPSS and CISA CSAF ICS advisories. AI then drafts a report in which every finding cites its component and advisory, and an engineer reviews it before release. The platform does not test network services on a live unit, cloud or app interfaces, privacy handling or physical hardening, and it does not analyse reachability, so items I2, I3, I6, I8 and I10 still need the tests in the table above. See device firmware security for how a review is scoped.
This guide summarises a public OWASP community project; it does not constitute legal or compliance advice.
Put this guide to work
Frequently asked questions
What is the OWASP IoT Top 10?
A list of the ten highest-priority security risks to avoid when building, deploying or managing Internet of Things systems, published by the OWASP Internet of Things project. OWASP's own project page describes the Internet of Things project as "An OWASP lab project," and the current edition is the 2018 release — there is no later numbered update.
What are the 10 items in the OWASP IoT Top 10?
In order: (1) Weak, Guessable, or Hardcoded Passwords, (2) Insecure Network Services, (3) Insecure Ecosystem Interfaces, (4) Lack of Secure Update Mechanism, (5) Use of Insecure or Outdated Components, (6) Insufficient Privacy Protection, (7) Insecure Data Transfer and Storage, (8) Lack of Device Management, (9) Insecure Default Settings, and (10) Lack of Physical Hardening.
How was the 2018 OWASP IoT Top 10 created?
A volunteer project team reviewed the 2014 original list, collected public and private vulnerability data, cross-checked the result against other IoT security projects (the team names CSA's IoT Controls Matrix, CTIA, Stanford's Secure Internet of Things Project, NISTIR 8200, ENISA's IoT Baseline Report and the UK's Code of Practice for Consumer IoT Security as examples it reviewed), then released a public draft for community feedback before publishing the final list in December 2018.
Has the OWASP IoT Top 10 been updated since 2018?
Not as a new numbered release, as far as this guide could confirm. The 2018 document itself said the team intended "to improve the list on a two-year cadence," but OWASP's own project page is the authoritative source for the current edition, and as of this guide's publication it lists no later IoT-specific Top 10 release.
How does the OWASP IoT Top 10 relate to ETSI EN 303 645 or the Cyber Resilience Act?
The OWASP IoT Top 10 is an awareness list, not a certifiable standard or legal text, so it carries no compliance weight on its own. It overlaps heavily in substance with ETSI EN 303 645's baseline provisions (see our guide) and with the vulnerability-handling and update duties in the EU Cyber Resilience Act's Annex I — useful as a design checklist, but not a substitute for either.
Sources
- OWASP: Internet of Things project page (lists and links the OWASP IoT Top 10 2018)
- OWASP: IoT Security Verification Standard (ISVS) project page
- ETSI EN 303 645 V3.1.3 (2024-09), Cyber Security for Consumer Internet of Things: Baseline Requirements
- Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 (Cyber Resilience Act), Annex I Part I and Part II, EUR-Lex
- OWASP: Internet of Things Top 10 2018 (PDF, wiki copy)
- OWASP: IoT Security Testing Guide (ISTG) project page
- OWASP IoT Top 10 2018 Mapping Project (GitHub)
- OWASP IoT Top 10 2018 Mapping Project: ETSI Cyber Security for Consumer IoT mapping (raw file)
- OpenSSL: OpenSSL 1.1.1 End of Life (11 September 2023)
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