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Firmware vulnerabilities & fixes

ETSI TR 103 621 (implementation guide to EN 303 645), explained

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ETSI TR 103 621, "Guide to Cyber Security for Consumer Internet of Things," is the worked-examples companion to ETSI EN 303 645's baseline requirements. Where EN 303 645 states outcomes ("the consumer IoT device shall have a secure update mechanism") and ETSI TS 103 701 defines how to test for them, TR 103 621 answers the question a firmware team actually asks first: what does meeting this provision look like in practice? Currently at V2.1.1 (July 2025), it is freely downloadable from ETSI — unlike the paywalled IEC/ISO standards covered elsewhere on this site — and this guide was written directly from that published text.

Key takeaways

  • ETSI TR 103 621, "Guide to Cyber Security for Consumer Internet of Things," is the worked-examples companion to ETSI EN 303 645's baseline requirements.
  • TR 103 621 is a non-binding Technical Report from ETSI Technical Committee CYBER that shows example ways to meet each EN 303 645 provision.
  • The three documents split the work into requirements, examples and test method.
  • Read V2.1.1: it is the only edition written against EN 303 645 V3.1.3's provision numbering.

What is TR 103 621, and what is it not?

TR 103 621 is a non-binding Technical Report from ETSI Technical Committee CYBER that shows example ways to meet each EN 303 645 provision. Clause 1's scope states the document "serves as guidance to help manufacturers and other stakeholders in meeting the cyber security provisions defined for Consumer IoT devices in ETSI EN 303 645 and ETSI TS 103 645." The Introduction sets out the division of labour: EN 303 645 "remains outcome focused," TS 103 701 "deals with the assessment of conformance," and TR 103 621 provides "non-exhaustive examples of practical solutions that can be used to meet these provisions."

Two limits matter as much as the purpose. First, the examples are explicitly non-exhaustive and non-binding: "the examples provided herein are not limitative; it is possible to meet the provisions in ETSI EN 303 645 by using other solutions." Second, Clause 5 states examples "are not given in a specific qualitative order" — they are ordered "from the most widely applicable examples to the more specific ones," and examples tied to a constrained device or a specific use case are marked as such. The aim is a workable approach, not the single correct one.

How does it sit between EN 303 645 and TS 103 701?

The three documents split the work into requirements, examples and test method.

Document Role
ETSI EN 303 645 States the outcome-focused baseline requirements ("shall"/"should" provisions) and holds the ICS pro forma in its Annex B
ETSI TR 103 621 (this guide) Non-exhaustive worked examples of how to meet each provision
ETSI TS 103 701 Defines the conformance-assessment methodology (ICS/IXIT, test groups, verdicts) used to test against EN 303 645

Clause 4.3 notes a feedback loop: implemented examples "inform the definition of test scenarios and the development of a test plan based on ETSI TS 103 701," and a domain-specific specialization of EN 303 645 would allow more precise examples and test plans, "leading to stronger certainty on the test expectations and outcomes."

The cross-references between the three documents are slightly out of step. TR 103 621 V2.1.1's reference list cites TS 103 701 V2.1.1 with the date "2025-04", while the published TS 103 701 V2.1.1 carries 2025-05 on its cover and "V2.1.1 May 2025 Publication" in its history — same edition. In the other direction, TS 103 701 V2.1.1 lists TR 103 621 V1.2.1 (2022-09), because the TS appeared two months before TR V2.1.1.

Which edition should you read, and what changed in V2.1.1?

Read V2.1.1: it is the only edition written against EN 303 645 V3.1.3's provision numbering. The document history on the last page of the PDF lists three publications.

TR 103 621 edition Published Written against (per its reference list)
V1.1.1 March 2022 EN 303 645 V2.1.1 era
V1.2.1 September 2022 EN 303 645 V2.1.1, TS 103 645 V2.1.2, TS 103 701 V1.1.1
V2.1.1 July 2025 EN 303 645 V3.1.3 (2024-09), TS 103 645 V3.1.1 (2024-01), TS 103 701 V2.1.1

Compared with V1.2.1, V2.1.1 adds examples for the lettered provisions EN 303 645 V3 introduced (5.1-2A, 5.3-4A/4B, 5.3-6A/6B, 5.3-15A/15B, 5.6-4A/4B, 5.13-1A/1B, 6-3A/3B), marks 5.3-4, 5.3-6 and 5.3-15 "Void," and adds Annex A (interface model) and Annex B (conditional and feature-based provisions in the ICS).

What do the examples actually look like?

Each example is a short implementation pattern under the verbatim provision text. Clause 6 works through every EN 303 645 Clause 5 provision group in order, from authentication (5.1-x) to input validation (5.13-x); secure update (5.3-x) is the longest, with 5.3-1 to 5.3-16 plus six lettered additions and three numbers now void. Two representative entries:

  • Provision 5.3-8 ("Security updates shall be timely"): the guide gives three examples, including a manufacturer process where "the security update creation is triggered within 14 days and the update is published within 90 days," and explains EN 303 645's own "bulletin process" language with a fourth example of notifying users via a bulletin website, newsletter and social media after a fix ships.
  • Provision 5.2-1 (public vulnerability disclosure policy): examples include a dedicated policy page following ETSI TR 103 838's CVD guide or ISO/IEC 29147, or using a third-party vulnerability-reporting service such as the IoT Security Foundation's or HackerOne's. The vulnerability disclosure policy template covers the minimum contents 5.2-1 lists.

Clause 7 mirrors this structure for EN 303 645's Clause 6 data-protection provisions. Annex A gives the rule of thumb that "every interface, that is used to physically connect the device to another device... is a physical interface," distinct from logical interfaces reached through another device; a web GUI is both a user and a logical interface.

Which examples fit constrained, battery or hub-based devices?

Several examples target small MCUs without a secure element, battery devices and sensors behind a hub. Read these first on a constrained platform:

Provision TR 103 621 example (paraphrased from V2.1.1) Fits
5.1-2 Factory derives each default password by hashing an HSM-held secret with the serial number or MAC and taking the last 8 bytes in hex (Example 2) Devices with no on-chip CSPRNG
5.3-9 Version number inside the signed package; device refuses a lower version, with a re-sign process for justified rollbacks (Example 3) Any signed-update design
5.3-10 Smart-home controller verifies the signature and forwards only validated updates over a trusted channel (Example 4) Sensors and actuators behind a hub
5.4-3 Without a secure element, secrets sit in flash encrypted with a key derived in RAM from private device-unique hardware values (Example 2) Low-cost MCUs
5.5-1 Thermostat pairs over ECDH with two masked public-key bytes entered as a PIN on the hub, then AES-128-CCM with a counter as IV (Example 3) Smart-home radio protocols
5.3-15A Non-updatable sensor whose network link is detached when vulnerable, with readings still available over a physical interface (Example 1) Devices that cannot be updated

Where a constrained device cannot meet a recommendation, Clause 8 (below) holds matching justification patterns. For the boot-chain side of 5.7-1, see secure boot and hardware root of trust.

How do the examples become ICS and IXIT entries?

They become evidence through two documents the supplier organisation (SO) hands to the test laboratory (TL): the Implementation Conformance Statement (ICS) and the Implementation eXtra Information for Testing (IXIT). Clause 4.3 of TS 103 701 V2.1.1 sets out the sequence:

  1. Identify the device under test (DUT)using the pro forma in clause A.2 of TS 103 701.
  2. Complete the ICS(pro forma in EN 303 645 Annex B). Per TS 103 701 clause 4.4, mandatory provisions are claimed "Yes"; "N/A" only when a condition or feature does not exist on the DUT; "N" for an applicable provision not fulfilled. Every "N/A" and "N" needs a justification in the "Detail" column.
  3. Describe the chosen TR 103 621 approach in the IXITfor every "Yes" (pro forma in clause A.3; Table B.1 maps provisions to entries). Incomplete IXIT information can lead to an INCONCLUSIVE verdict.
  4. Expect the TL to challenge the ICSPhase 4 checks that no mandatory provision is claimed "N" and that every "N/A" is plausible — TS 103 701 gives the example that claiming 5.3-8 "N/A" is wrong if any update mechanism exists.
  5. Let the TL testeach claimed provision and assign an overall verdict. A FAIL on a recommendation can still reach an overall PASS if it is re-claimed "N" with a justification.

TR 103 621 Annex B shows step 2 in miniature: a simple broadcast-only public sensor does not meet ICS conditions 14, 15 and 16, so provisions 5.1-5, 5.3-2 and 5.5-8 are claimed "N/A" with a justification, while a cloud-connected fitness wearable has features t), u) and x), so 5.8-2 must be "Yes."

What does a worked ICS extract look like?

Synthetic example, for illustration only — not a real product or assessment. A battery-powered Zigbee door sensor paired to a mains-powered hub, with no user accounts on the sensor itself, might produce these ICS lines:

Provision ICS claim Basis drawn from TR 103 621
5.1-2A (no passwords machine-to-machine) Yes Example 2: unique pre-shared key provisioned by the hub at network on-boarding
5.3-4A (configurable automated updates) N Clause 8.2.4A, Example 3: the battery device needs user-initiated updates so a power loss cannot corrupt firmware
5.3-9 (verify update authenticity) Yes Example 2 for 5.3-9 / Example 4 for 5.3-10: the hub verifies and forwards over the secured Zigbee link
5.6-8 (hardware memory access control) N Clause 8.2.20: single address space, no memory management unit

Each "N" row still needs device-specific facts in the Detail column; the TR's sentence is only the starting pattern.

When can a recommendation legitimately not be followed?

A recommendation can be skipped when a recorded risk judgment, not convenience, supports it. Clause 8.1 warns that "not supporting a given recommendation has an impact on the security provided by the device," and that a risk analysis "could conclude that a given use case should not be implemented." Clause 8.2 then gives a defensible justification example for more than 30 provisions. Representative cases:

  • Provision 5.3-1 (components should be securely updateable): "the software of a battery charge controller is not meant to be modified once it has been vetted for safety."
  • Provision 5.9-1 (resilience to network/power outages): "the device is a temperature sensor that only provides on-demand temperature readings; resilience is not an important aspect for this device."
  • Provision 5.6-9 (secure development processes): "the manufacturer is rebranding the device, which is obtained from a supplier under white label."
  • Provision 5.2-2 (act on vulnerabilities in a timely manner): affected models are outside their published support periods, the issue is rated medium or low, supported models are unaffected, so the manufacturer "chooses not to fix the issue and instead provides users with mitigation guidance."
  • Provision 5.6-4B (physically protect debug ports): a single port used for communication and charging, with debug functionality disabled in software — and "if a debug interface has been disabled, it is not necessary to physically protect it."

EN 303 645's Provision 5.0-1 already requires "a justification... recorded for each recommendation... that is considered to be not applicable for or not fulfilled"; Clause 8 turns that duty into a library of patterns to adapt rather than invent.

Which examples line up with the UK PSTI regime?

Four provisions map onto the UK regime. Schedule 2 of the PSTI regulations (SI 2023/1007) deems the three Schedule 1 requirements met by compliance with named EN 303 645 provisions:

PSTI requirement EN 303 645 provision named in Schedule 2 Where TR 103 621 helps
Passwords 5.1-1 and, where relevant, 5.1-2 Clause 6.1 and 6.2 examples (sticker plus forced change; derived or generated unique passwords)
Reporting security issues 5.2-1 (or listed ISO/IEC 29147 paragraphs) Clause 6.6 (policy page or third-party reporting service)
Support period 5.3-13 Clause 6.21 (published end date, and how to communicate an extension)

One caution: regulation 2 defines "ETSI EN 303 645" as V2.1.1 of June 2020, while TR 103 621 V2.1.1 quotes V3.1.3; quote the edition the law names. The PSTI statement of compliance guide covers the paperwork side.

What does it say about misuse and domestic abuse?

Clause 5 adds a topic the baseline standard does not cover: misuse of consumer IoT for domestic abuse and coercive control — audio/video recording, data manipulation, shared-account access enabling stalking, and remote control of locks or heating. Citing published research, it recommends legal policy, technology that can evidence misuse "without violating data protection/privacy regulations," and awareness-raising, while noting that technical mitigation "might not eliminate the risk entirely." Treat it as in scope when designing shared accounts, activity logs and remote control.

What are the common pitfalls?

Most problems come from treating the TR as something it says it is not.

  • Reading the TR without the standard open. Each example assumes the exact EN 303 645 wording, and the TR often notes that EN 303 645 has its own examples to check first.
  • Quoting an example as if it were a requirement. The 90-day figures under 5.2-2 and 5.3-8 are examples; EN 303 645 itself only says "timely."
  • Copying a Clause 8 sentence as the whole justification. "Constrained device" without MCU, memory and lifetime facts invites a challenged ICS.
  • Mixing provision numbering across editions. Lettered provisions such as 5.3-4A do not exist in EN 303 645 V2.1.1 or in TR V1.2.1.
  • Claiming "N/A" for a recommendation you simply did not implement. TS 103 701 reserves "N/A" for a missing condition or feature; an unimplemented but applicable recommendation is "N."
  • Ignoring the hub's trust assumptions. Example 3 under 5.3-10 relies on a shared network secret and on other local devices not tampering, which the TR itself calls "a strong assumption."

Can AI map a firmware's implementation to TR 103 621's examples?

Only partly: software can supply component evidence, but mapping it to provisions stays an engineering judgment. SoftWSP extracts a software bill of materials (CycloneDX 1.6 JSON) from a firmware image and matches its components against NVD, the CISA KEV catalogue, FIRST EPSS scores and CISA ICS advisories, then drafts a cited report for an engineer to review. That is evidence for Provision 5.2-3 ("continually monitor for, identify and rectify") and the timeliness question behind 5.3-8. SoftWSP does not detect update mechanisms, fill an ICS or IXIT, or write Clause 8 justifications; those stay with the manufacturer and its test lab.

For engineer-led help reviewing a product's implementation choices against EN 303 645 provisions and TR 103 621's examples, see Device & Firmware Security.

This guide quotes ETSI's own freely published text of ETSI TR 103 621 V2.1.1 (2025-07); it is not a substitute for the full published document and does not constitute compliance or legal advice.

Put this guide to work

Frequently asked questions

What is ETSI TR 103 621?

ETSI TR 103 621, "Guide to Cyber Security for Consumer Internet of Things," is a Technical Report from ETSI Technical Committee CYBER. Per its own Clause 1 scope, it "serves as guidance to help manufacturers and other stakeholders in meeting the cyber security provisions defined for Consumer IoT devices in ETSI EN 303 645 and ETSI TS 103 645," and "is complementary to ETSI EN 303 645 and ETSI TS 103 701. It explains the relationship between these specifications and how they can be used together." The current version is V2.1.1, published July 2025; it was first published as V1.1.1 in March 2022 and updated to V1.2.1 in September 2022 before the V2.1.1 revision. Unlike IEC and ISO standards, ETSI deliverables are freely downloadable from ETSI's own site — this guide was written directly from ETSI's published PDF.

What does TR 103 621 actually contain?

Two long example clauses, plus explanatory front matter. Clause 6, "Examples to meet cyber security provisions for consumer IoT," runs through essentially every numbered provision in EN 303 645's Clause 5 (passwords, vulnerability disclosure, secure updates, secure storage, secure communication, network/interface minimization, software integrity, personal-data confidentiality, resilience, telemetry, deletion, installation and maintenance, and input validation), giving two to five worked implementation examples per provision. Clause 7 does the same for EN 303 645's Clause 6 data-protection provisions. Clause 8, "Handling of recommendations," then gives worked examples of situations where a given "should"-level recommendation legitimately cannot be followed, with the justification a manufacturer would need to record. Annex A explains EN 303 645's physical/logical/user interface categories with worked examples, and Annex B explains conditional and feature-based provisions using a simple broadcast-only sensor and a cloud-connected fitness wearable as contrasting examples.

How does TR 103 621 relate to EN 303 645 and TS 103 701?

Clause 4 states the relationship directly: EN 303 645 "provides baseline cyber security provisions for a wide range of Consumer IoT products and remains outcome focused," meaning it says what must be achieved without mandating how. TS 103 701 "deals with the assessment of conformance of IoT products against the provisions of ETSI EN 303 645," i.e. it is the test methodology. TR 103 621 was "developed to guide manufacturers on its implementation, by providing non-exhaustive examples of practical solutions that can be used to meet these provisions" — it is neither the requirements document nor the test methodology, but a worked-examples companion to both. The scope clause is explicit that "the examples provided herein are not limitative; it is possible to meet the provisions in ETSI EN 303 645 by using other solutions," and Clause 4.3 notes that implementing TR 103 621's examples can inform TS 103 701 test-scenario and test-plan development, producing "stronger certainty on the test expectations and outcomes" — without TR 103 621 itself being a certification document. See [ETSI EN 303 645](/guides/etsi-en-303-645-consumer-iot-security/) for the baseline requirements and [ETSI TS 103 701](/guides/etsi-ts-103-701-iot-conformance-assessment/) for the conformance-assessment methodology; TR 103 621 itself cites TS 103 701 V2.1.1 (2025-04) as its current companion edition.

Is every EN 303 645 recommendation mandatory, and what happens when one can't be met?

No — EN 303 645 mixes "shall" provisions (mandatory) with "should" provisions (recommended, not mandatory), and TR 103 621's Clause 8.1 states plainly that "not supporting a given recommendation has an impact on the security provided by the device," so "a risk analysis from the manufacturer or a third party could conclude that a given use case should not be implemented" even where a recommendation isn't met. Clause 8.2 then works through more than 30 numbered provisions with concrete justification examples — for instance, under Provision 5.3-1 (components should be securely updateable), it gives "the software of a battery charge controller is not meant to be modified once it has been vetted for safety" as a legitimate reason a component stays immutable, and under Provision 5.9-1 (resilience), "the device is a temperature sensor that only provides on-demand temperature readings; resilience is not an important aspect for this device." These are documented exceptions with recorded rationale, not silent gaps — EN 303 645's own Provision 5.0-1 requires a justification to be recorded for every recommendation a device doesn't fulfil.

Does the guide address anything beyond the technical provisions themselves?

Yes — Clause 5 includes a notable discussion of how consumer IoT devices can be misused for domestic abuse (coercive control via audio/video recording, data control, shared-account access, or remote control of locks and heating), citing published research, and recommends mitigations spanning legal policy, technology that evidences misuse without violating privacy law, and user-facing awareness content. This sits alongside, not instead of, the provision-by-provision technical guidance, and reflects that EN 303 645's baseline provisions on authentication, access control and data protection have safety implications beyond the usual confidentiality/integrity/availability framing.

Sources

  1. ETSI TR 103 621 V2.1.1 (2025-07): Guide to Cyber Security for Consumer Internet of Things (current version, freely downloadable from ETSI)
  2. ETSI TR 103 621 V1.1.1 (2022-03): first published version
  3. ETSI EN 303 645 V3.1.3 (2024-09): Cyber Security for Consumer Internet of Things: Baseline Requirements (the standard TR 103 621 provides implementation examples for)
  4. ETSI TS 103 701 V2.1.1 (2025-05): Cyber Security for Consumer Internet of Things: Conformance Assessment of Baseline Requirements (the companion edition TR 103 621 itself references, dated 2025-04 in its reference list)
  5. ETSI TR 103 621 V1.2.1 (2022-09): previous edition (reference list cites EN 303 645 V2.1.1 and TS 103 701 V1.1.1)
  6. UK SI 2023/1007 (PSTI security requirements), Schedule 2: conditions for deemed compliance, naming EN 303 645 provisions 5.1-1, 5.1-2, 5.2-1 and 5.3-13
  7. UK SI 2023/1007, regulation 2: definition of ETSI EN 303 645 as V2.1.1 (June 2020)
  8. IoT Security Foundation — official site
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