Core DDS — the real-time publish/subscribe middleware that OMG standardizes and that ROS 2 uses as its default middleware — carries no mandatory authentication, access control or encryption of its own; those are the job of a separate specification, DDS Security, that a deployment can simply not install. A 2021 coordinated disclosure (CISA advisory ICSA-21-315-02), the product of research by Trend Micro Research, TXOne Networks, Alias Robotics and ADLINK Technology, found 13 CVEs spanning six independent DDS implementations — from network-amplification flaws to a heap-based buffer overflow CISA rated capable of remote code execution — none of them a break of DDS Security's cryptography, because in most of the affected deployments that layer was never the thing being tested.
Key takeaways
- RTPS also fixes the defaults that make DDS easy to find on a network.
- No. Core DDS defines the data model, QoS and wire protocol but no authentication, access control or encryption.
- The permissions schema allows a <default> of ALLOW or DENY for anything no rule matches; the OMG example permissions file ends with <default>DENY</default>, and that is the value to ship.
- Source: CISA CSAF for ICSA-21-315-02, revision 2 (1 February 2022), checked 13 November 2026; RTI and researcher fix versions checked 18 November 2026.
What is DDS, and where is it actually used?
DDS (Data Distribution Service) is a publish/subscribe middleware standard from the Object Management Group (OMG), at version 1.4 since March 2015, built for real-time data exchange between participants that do not need to know about each other in advance. Publishers and subscribers meet through named Topics and a shared Quality of Service contract. A companion specification, DDSI-RTPS (version 2.5, April 2022), defines the wire protocol that lets different vendors' stacks talk to each other.
RTPS also fixes the defaults that make DDS easy to find on a network. Section 9.6.2 of RTPS 2.5 sets a port base of 7400 and a domain gain of 250, so domain 0 discovery runs on UDP 7400 and domain 1 on 7650. Every participant must announce itself on the multicast group 239.255.0.1, by default every 30 seconds. Anyone on the segment can listen to that discovery traffic and learn which participants, topics and types exist.
ROS 2's documentation states that ROS 2 "uses DDS as its middleware", with eProsima Fast DDS as the default RMW (ROS Middleware) implementation and RTI Connext DDS, Eclipse Cyclone DDS and GurumNetworks GurumDDS also supported. Beyond robotics, DDS runs in autonomous vehicles, medical devices, air-traffic control, power and smart-grid systems, simulators and defence platforms. That is the same safety-critical estate our NIST SP 800-82 guide to OT security covers, and a growing share of it runs DDS inside the machine rather than a classic fieldbus.
Does core DDS include security, and what does the separate DDS Security spec add?
No. Core DDS defines the data model, QoS and wire protocol but no authentication, access control or encryption. Security sits in a separate specification, DDS Security, which OMG describes as "the Security Model and Service Plugin Interface (SPI) architecture for compliant DDS implementations". It defines five plugin interfaces:
| Plugin (SPI) | What it does | Builtin implementation |
|---|---|---|
| Authentication | Verifies a participant's identity, runs mutual authentication and establishes a shared secret | DDS:Auth:PKI-DH (X.509 + Diffie-Hellman); DDS:Auth:PSK in 1.2 |
| Access Control | Decides which domains a participant may join and which Topics it may publish or subscribe to, from signed governance and permissions documents | DDS:Access:Permissions; DDS:Access:PSK in 1.2 |
| Cryptographic | Encrypts, signs and hashes, and derives session keys from the shared secret | DDS:Crypto:AES-GCM-GMAC; DDS:Crypto:PSK in 1.2 |
| Logging | Records security events | DDS:Logging:DDS_LogTopic |
| Data Tagging | Adds classification tags to data samples | None |
The specification has three formal versions:
| Version | OMG adoption date | What a device maker notices |
|---|---|---|
| 1.0 | August 2016 | First plugin architecture and builtin plugins |
| 1.1 | July 2018 | The version most shipping stacks and ROS 2 SROS2 build on |
| 1.2 | February 2026 (formal/25-03-06) | Adds pre-shared-key (PSK) builtins, a key-revision switch and a PSK protection setting for whole RTPS messages |
Every plugin is opt-in. A DDS system that never loads them is still a conformant DDS system, in the same way a GOOSE network can be fully IEC 61850 conformant with no IEC 62351 message authentication at all.
How do the governance and permissions documents control a domain?
With the builtin DDS:Access:Permissions plugin, two XML files decide what security a domain enforces, and both must be signed in S/MIME format by a Permissions CA whose certificate every participant trusts (DDS Security 1.2, §10.4.1). The governance document is shared by the whole domain. The permissions document is issued per participant and binds an X.509 subject name to a validity period, allow and deny rules for publish, subscribe and relay, and a default action.
| Governance element | Safer production value | What goes wrong with the weak value |
|---|---|---|
allow_unauthenticated_participants |
FALSE | TRUE lets participants that fail or skip authentication join and use topics left unprotected |
enable_join_access_control |
TRUE | FALSE lets any authenticated identity join, whatever its permissions say |
discovery_protection_kind, liveliness_protection_kind |
ENCRYPT or SIGN | NONE leaves secure-endpoint discovery and liveliness traffic open to reading or spoofing |
rtps_protection_kind |
SIGN or ENCRYPT | NONE leaves whole RTPS messages unprotected (per-topic settings still apply) |
Topic rule: enable_read_access_control / enable_write_access_control |
TRUE | FALSE means any participant in the domain can read or write that topic |
Topic rule: metadata_protection_kind, data_protection_kind |
ENCRYPT for control and patient data | NONE sends the sample in clear text |
The permissions schema allows a <default> of ALLOW or DENY for anything no rule matches; the OMG example permissions file ends with <default>DENY</default>, and that is the value to ship. Version 1.2 adds enable_key_revision and rtps_psk_protection_kind. Read the PSK plugins carefully: section 10.7 says DDS:Auth:PSK "does not do any Authentication", treating every discovered participant as unauthenticated. A PSK only proves that a peer knows the shared key, so one leaked device key opens the whole domain.
What did the 2021 multi-vendor DDS vulnerability disclosure find?
CISA advisory ICSA-21-315-02, "Multiple Data Distribution Service (DDS) Implementations", was published on 11 November 2021 and updated on 1 February 2022; its machine-readable CSAF record lists 13 CVEs across six implementations. The research came from Trend Micro Research, TXOne Networks, Alias Robotics and ADLINK Technology, reported by Federico Maggi, Ta-Lun Yen and Chizuru Toyama, with Patrick Kuo, Mars Cheng, Víctor Mayoral-Vilches and Erik Boasson credited.
| Vendor / product | Affected versions (CISA) | CVE(s) | CVSS v3 (CISA) | What it allowed |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Eclipse CycloneDDS | Before 0.8.0; the researchers list the fixes from 0.8.1 | CVE-2021-38441 (CWE-123), CVE-2021-38443 (CWE-228) | 6.6 | A "write-what-where" condition and improper handling of invalid structures in the XML parser |
| eProsima Fast DDS | Before 2.4.0 | CVE-2021-38425 (CWE-406) | 7.5 | Network amplification: a specially crafted packet floods a target device with unwanted traffic |
| GurumNetworks GurumDDS | All versions | CVE-2021-38423 (CWE-131), CVE-2021-38439 (CWE-122) | 6.6; 8.6 | Incorrect buffer-size calculation, and a heap-based buffer overflow CISA states "may cause a denial-of-service condition or remotely execute arbitrary code" |
| OCI OpenDDS | Before 3.18.1 | CVE-2021-38445 (CWE-130), CVE-2021-38447 (CWE-405), CVE-2021-38429 (CWE-406) | 7.0; 8.6; 7.5 | Improper length-parameter handling, asymmetric resource consumption, and network amplification |
| RTI Connext DDS Professional / Secure / Micro | 4.2x–6.1.0 (Professional/Secure); 3.0.0+ (Micro). RTI's bulletin lists the 4.5x, 5.3, 6.0 and 6.1 lines for 38427 and 38433, fixed in 4.5d.rev41, 5.3.1.35, 6.0.1.25 and 6.1.0.3 | CVE-2021-38427, CVE-2021-38433 (both CWE-121), CVE-2021-38435 (CWE-131), CVE-2021-38487 (CWE-406) | 6.6; 6.6; 6.6; 7.5 | Two stack-based buffer overflows, incorrect buffer-size calculation, and network amplification |
| TwinOaks Computing CoreDX DDS | Before 5.9.1 | CVE-2021-43547 (CWE-406) | 7.5 | Network amplification via a specially crafted discovery packet |
Source: CISA CSAF for ICSA-21-315-02, revision 2 (1 February 2022), checked 13 November 2026; RTI and researcher fix versions checked 18 November 2026. Scores are CISA's; NVD scores several of these higher, for example 9.8 for CVE-2021-38423 and 9.1 for CVE-2021-38429, and the Trend Micro white paper gives CVE-2021-38423 8.6.
The most common pattern is network amplification (CWE-406): per CISA, "an attacker sends a specially crafted packet to flood target devices with unwanted traffic", abusing DDS's own discovery so one spoofed packet directs a flood at a victim. The overflows are memory-safety bugs in packet and XML parsing, not breaks of the security plugins. CISA's mitigations are the usual ICS baseline: minimise network exposure, keep control-system devices off the internet, put them behind firewalls and use a VPN for remote access.
Which DDS vulnerabilities have been published since 2022?
Plenty, and several sit in the security layer itself. NVD records published since the 2021 advisory include:
| CVE (NVD published) | Product | Issue | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2023-50257 (2024-02-19) | Fast DDS | With SROS2 on, unencrypted disconnect data lets an attacker force subscribers off a publisher | 2.13.0, 2.12.2, 2.11.3, 2.10.3, 2.6.7 |
| CVE-2024-28231 (2024-03-20) | Fast DDS | Crafted DATA submessage causes a heap overflow (GHSA-9m2j-qw67-ph4w) | 2.14.0, 2.13.4, 2.12.2, 2.10.4, 2.6.8 (the record says 2.12.3) |
| CVE-2025-62799 (2026-02-03) | Fast DDS | One malformed DATA_FRAG packet from an unauthenticated sender overflows the heap (GHSA-cg8v-g888-pjh6) | 3.4.1, 3.3.1, 3.2.4, 2.14.6, 2.6.11 |
| CVE-2026-22590 (2026-09-09) | Fast DDS | Out-of-bounds read in DATA_FRAG handling (GHSA-7r7h-hwfj-q626) | 2.6.12, 2.14.6, 3.2.4, 3.3.1, 3.4.2 |
| CVE-2025-67109 (2025-12-23) | Cyclone DDS | Improper verification of the certificate time bypasses certificate checks (CISA-ADP CVSS v3.1 10.0; no NVD score) | 0.10.5 |
| CVE-2026-52836 (2026-09-17) | OpenDDS | Malformed RTPS UDP submessage crashes a reachable participant | 3.34.0 |
| CVE-2026-2675, CVE-2026-30799 (2026-06-17) | RTI Connext Professional, Security Plugins | Missing authentication for a critical function; RTI's vulnerability page says a malicious authenticated participant could impersonate other participants | Per branch, e.g. 7.7.0 |
| CVE-2026-7866 (2026-09-22) | RTI Connext Professional, Core Libraries | Stack-based buffer overflow, CNA (RTI) CVSS v4 10.0 | 7.7.0.1 and per-branch fixes |
| CVE-2026-27509 (2026-02-26) | Unitree Go2 robot firmware | No DDS authentication on an actuator topic: an adjacent attacker joins domain 0 and plants Python that runs as root (VulnCheck advisory) | Vendor firmware |
Source: NVD API records, checked 13 November 2026; fixed versions as stated in each record, except two Fast DDS rows corrected from eProsima's own sources (checked 16 November 2026). For CVE-2024-28231 the record names 2.12.3, but Fast DDS has no v2.12.3 tag and the 2.12 backport, commit 9956bb0, is already in v2.12.2. For CVE-2025-62799 the record names only 3.4.1, 3.3.1 and 2.6.11, while eProsima's advisory and the v2.14.6 and v3.2.4 release notes list the fix there too.
Two lessons follow. Parser bugs reach a device before any authentication happens, so DDS Security does not replace patching. And the Unitree case is the textbook result of shipping a domain with no security at all. Score these for your own product with the CVSS calculator and rank them with KEV and EPSS like any other component CVE.
Worked example: is DDS Security really on in this robot?
Synthetic example, not a real product. A maker ships a ROS 2 mobile robot whose firmware bundles Fast DDS 2.14.2, with SROS2 keystores generated at the factory.
Read the stack version from the firmware SBOMFast DDS 2.14.2 is below 2.14.6, so CVE-2026-22590 and CVE-2025-62799 both apply; the fix for CVE-2024-28231 (2.14.0) is already in. The CVE-2025-62799 record names fixes only for 3.4.1, 3.3.1 and 2.6.11, but eProsima's v2.14.6 release notes list it as fixed, so one upgrade on the 2.14 branch closes both. Check the launch environmentThe SROS2 instructions set ROS_SECURITY_ENABLE=trueandROS_SECURITY_STRATEGY=Enforce. The service file sets the first but not the second, and ROS 2's rcl security code treats any value other thanEnforceas permissive: a node whose keys are missing starts without security instead of failing.Open the governance fileIt has allow_unauthenticated_participantsTRUE andrtps_protection_kindNONE, copied from a lab template.Capture discovery trafficA laptop on the robot's service port sees SPDP announcements on 239.255.0.1:7400, so domain 0 is visible to anything plugged in. Fix and re-testUpgrade to 2.14.6, set Enforce, set unauthenticated participants FALSE, protect RTPS and the drive and e-stop topics with ENCRYPT, default DENY, then confirm a participant without keys can no longer join.
What should a device maker using DDS check first?
Inventory the exact DDS implementation and versionyour product ships, including the one inside a ROS 2 distribution, and confirm it is past the ICSA-21-315-02 ranges (Cyclone DDS 0.8.1+, Fast DDS 2.4.0+, OpenDDS 3.18.1+, CoreDX DDS 5.9.1+, RTI and GurumDDS fixes as listed) and the later CVEs above. A firmware SBOM is the reliable way to know. Don't assume DDS Security is active because the stack supports itGovernance and permissions files must be written and signed, and identities provisioned, before anything is enforced on the wire. Treat an unsecured domain as an unauthenticated broadcast mediumAnyone who reaches the segment can discover participants and, without access control, publish or subscribe to any topic. Segment DDS traffic away from IT networks and the internet, following CISA's ICSA-21-315-02 mitigations and the zone model in the Purdue model guide; the 2021 researchers reported finding DDS endpoints reachable from the internet. Map DDS Security to your component requirementsFor IEC 62443-4-2 claims on authentication, integrity and confidentiality, the governance and permissions files are your evidence. Re-check after every middleware, firmware or ROS 2 upgradethat the version did not regress and the security configuration survived.
What are the common pitfalls?
- Lab templates in production. Example governance files with permissive settings ship unchanged.
- Mixing vendors under security. The SROS2 instructions say "secure communication between vendors is not supported", so a mixed-vendor fleet tends to fall back to no security.
- Treating PSK as authentication. In DDS Security 1.2, PSK proves knowledge of a shared key, not identity.
- Ignoring certificate time. Identity checks depend on validity periods and a trusted clock; CVE-2025-67109 shows what a time-check bug does.
- Long-lived permissions. A
validitywindow of many years means a stolen device identity stays useful for years. - Default domain 0 everywhere. Every product on domain 0 sees every other one on the same segment.
What can a network capture or firmware scan show about DDS?
A capture shows who talks DDS, but not how securely. SoftWSP's OT Snapshot builds an asset and connection inventory from Zeek connection logs, so it can show which hosts exchange UDP traffic on the RTPS port range (7400 and up) and in which direction. It does not decode RTPS, so it cannot read the DDS vendor, version, topics or whether DDS Security is active; an engineer reviews the governance and permissions files for that. On the firmware side, a Firmware Scan builds a CycloneDX SBOM from the image and matches the components it identifies, such as a Fast DDS or Cyclone DDS library, against NVD, CISA KEV, FIRST EPSS and CISA ICS advisories, with an engineer reviewing the cited report. See OT Snapshot.
Put this guide to work
Frequently asked questions
Does core DDS include authentication or encryption by default?
No. The core Data Distribution Service specification — maintained by the Object Management Group (OMG), currently at version 1.4 (adopted March 2015) — defines a publish/subscribe data model, Quality of Service policies and a wire protocol (DDS-RTPS) for real-time data exchange between participants on a network, but it does not mandate authentication, access control or encryption as part of that baseline. Security is instead the subject of a separate, standalone specification, DDS Security, first adopted by OMG in August 2016 (version 1.0), revised in July 2018 (version 1.1), and most recently in February 2026 (version 1.2). That split mirrors how IEC 62351 layers security onto the base IEC 61850 substation protocol, or how MQTT's own spec only recommends, rather than requires, TLS and authentication: a real-time middleware designed first for low-latency data delivery, with cryptographic protection added afterward as an optional, separately-versioned layer that an implementation or deployment can skip entirely and still be a conformant DDS system.
What does the DDS Security specification actually add on top of core DDS?
A Security Model built on five Service Plugin Interfaces (SPIs) that compliant DDS implementations can invoke: an Authentication plugin that verifies the identity of a participant and performs mutual authentication to establish a shared secret; an Access Control plugin that enforces policy decisions on what an authenticated participant may do — which domains it can join, which Topics it can publish or subscribe to — typically configured through XML governance and permissions documents; a Cryptographic plugin that implements the actual encryption, decryption, hashing and digital-signature operations, including deriving session keys from the shared secret the Authentication plugin established; a Logging plugin that supports auditing of security-relevant DDS events; and a Data Tagging plugin that lets implementations attach classification tags to individual data samples. OMG's own specification page states DDS Security defines "the Security Model and Service Plugin Interface (SPI) architecture for compliant DDS implementations," and the spec also ships builtin reference implementations of each plugin so vendors have an interoperable baseline rather than needing to write authentication and crypto code from scratch. Critically, every one of this is opt-in: a DDS deployment that never loads the Security plugins is still a standards-conformant DDS system, running with none of the above.
What did the 2021 multi-vendor DDS vulnerability disclosure actually find?
CISA's advisory ICSA-21-315-02, "Multiple Data Distribution Service (DDS) Implementations" (originally published 11 November 2021, updated 1 February 2022), documents 13 CVEs across six independent DDS implementations, the product of research by Trend Micro Research, TXOne Networks, Alias Robotics and ADLINK Technology, reported to CISA by Federico Maggi (Trend Micro Research), Ta-Lun Yen and Chizuru Toyama (TXOne Networks, Trend Micro), with Patrick Kuo, Mars Cheng, Víctor Mayoral-Vilches and Erik Boasson also credited as contributors. The affected implementations were Eclipse CycloneDDS (versions before 0.8.0), eProsima Fast DDS (before 2.4.0), GurumNetworks GurumDDS (all versions), Object Computing Inc.'s OpenDDS (before 3.18.1), Real-Time Innovations (RTI) Connext DDS Professional and Connext DDS Secure (4.2x through 6.1.0 per CISA; RTI's own bulletin gives per-CVE ranges, for example the 4.5x, 5.3, 6.0 and 6.1 lines for the two XML parser overflows) and Connext DDS Micro (3.0.0 and later), and TwinOaks Computing CoreDX DDS (before 5.9.1). The bug classes recur across vendors rather than clustering in one: several implementations shared a network-amplification flaw (CWE-406) where, per CISA, "an attacker sends a specially crafted packet to flood target devices with unwanted traffic" — exploiting DDS's discovery mechanism to turn one spoofed packet into a flood aimed at a victim; others had stack- or heap-based buffer overflows (CWE-121, CWE-122) in packet or XML parsing, the most severe of which, a GurumDDS heap-based buffer overflow (CVE-2021-38439, CVSS v3 8.6), CISA states "may cause a denial-of-service condition or remotely execute arbitrary code." CISA's advisory frames DDS's reach plainly, noting the affected software is used in sectors worldwide with vendor headquarters across multiple countries — consistent with DDS's role as the default middleware for ROS 2 robots, plus deployments in medical devices, autonomous vehicles, aerospace and industrial control.
What should a device maker or integrator using DDS check first?
Inventory which DDS implementation and version your product or deployment actually ships — ROS 2 alone supports multiple interchangeable DDS vendors (eProsima Fast DDS is ROS 2's default RMW implementation, with RTI Connext DDS, Eclipse Cyclone DDS and GurumNetworks GurumDDS also supported) — and confirm it is patched past the versions CISA listed as vulnerable in ICSA-21-315-02 (Fast DDS 2.4.0+, OpenDDS 3.18.1+, CoreDX DDS 5.9.1+, and the RTI and GurumDDS fixes referenced in that advisory), and for Cyclone DDS use 0.8.1 or later: CISA lists 0.8.0 as the first unaffected release, but the researchers list the XML-parser fixes from 0.8.1. Do not assume DDS Security is active just because the implementation supports it: like IEC 62351 authentication on a GOOSE network, the plugins exist in the spec but have to be explicitly configured — governance and permissions files set up, participants provisioned with identity certificates — before any authentication, access control or encryption is actually enforced on the wire. If DDS Security is not in use, treat the DDS domain as an unauthenticated broadcast medium: anyone who can reach the network segment can discover participants and, depending on configuration, publish or subscribe to any topic, which is the same trust assumption GOOSE and Sampled Values make on an unsecured substation LAN. Segment DDS traffic — whether it is a robot's internal pub/sub bus, a hospital's medical-device network, or a plant's control-system backbone — away from general IT networks and the internet, consistent with CISA's own mitigation guidance in ICSA-21-315-02 to minimize exposure and isolate control-system devices behind firewalls; the research teams behind the 2021 disclosure separately reported finding DDS endpoints reachable from the public internet during their work, underscoring that this is not a theoretical exposure.
Sources
- OMG: DDS (Data Distribution Service) specification — version history and catalogue
- OMG: DDS Security specification — version history (1.0 Aug 2016, 1.1 Jul 2018, 1.2 Feb 2026)
- OMG: DDS Security Version 1.1 (PDF)
- CISA ICS Advisory ICSA-21-315-02: Multiple Data Distribution Service (DDS) Implementations (Update A, published 11 Nov 2021, updated 1 Feb 2022)
- Trend Micro Research: "A Security Analysis of the Data Distribution Service (DDS) Protocol" (white paper)
- Trend Micro Research: "Critically Underrated: Studying the Data Distribution Service (DDS) Protocol"
- ROS 2 Documentation: RMW Implementations (DDS vendor support, default RMW)
- ROS 2 Design: "ROS on DDS"
- OMG DDS Foundation Wiki: DDS Security guidebook entry (plugin architecture summary)
- OMG: DDS Security Version 1.2 (formal/25-03-06, February 2026; builtin PKI, PSK, Permissions and AES-GCM-GMAC plugins, governance and permissions XSD)
- OMG: DDSI-RTPS Version 2.5 (April 2022; default ports PB 7400, DG 250, multicast 239.255.0.1)
- CISA CSAF record for ICSA-21-315-02 (revision 2, 1 February 2022), cisagov/CSAF on GitHub
- eProsima Fast DDS security advisory GHSA-9m2j-qw67-ph4w (CVE-2024-28231)
- eProsima Fast DDS security advisory GHSA-7r7h-hwfj-q626 (CVE-2026-22590)
- NVD: CVE-2025-67109 (Eclipse Cyclone DDS certificate time verification, fixed in 0.10.5)
- NVD: CVE-2026-52836 (OpenDDS malformed RTPS submessage, fixed in 3.34.0)
- NVD: CVE-2026-2675 (RTI Connext Professional Security Plugins, missing authentication)
- RTI: Connext vulnerability list
- VulnCheck: Unitree Go2 missing DDS authentication enables adjacent RCE (CVE-2026-27509)
- ROS 2 rcl security.c (any ROS_SECURITY_STRATEGY other than Enforce is permissive)
- ROS 2 SROS2: Linux setup (ROS_SECURITY_ENABLE, ROS_SECURITY_STRATEGY=Enforce)
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