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UL 2900-1 (software cybersecurity for network-connectable products), explained

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UL 2900-1, "Standard for Software Cybersecurity for Network-Connectable Products, Part 1: General Requirements," is a certification standard from UL Standards & Engagement (formerly Underwriters Laboratories), currently at Edition 2 (published 13 December 2023), that sets baseline software-security testing and risk-management requirements for any network-connected product. First published and ANSI-adopted in July 2017, with a further edition (ANSI/UL 2900-1-2026) published 29 June 2026 per its listing standards body. UL 2900-1 is a commercial standard — sold by UL and ANSI rather than published in full for free — so this guide draws on the publicly available scope statement and structure, cross-checked across UL's own product listing and an independent professional-association summary, rather than the purchased requirement text itself; a purchased copy remains the authoritative source for specific sub-requirement wording for any conformance claim.

Key takeaways

  • Edition 2 is the active edition, and FDA's recognition record names the 2017 first edition.
  • UL 2900-1 draws its own boundary carefully.
  • UL 2900-1 is the general, sector-agnostic Part 1.
  • Recognition gives a documented pathway, not a mandate.

What does the scope statement actually commit to?

UL's own product page and the CS2AI (Control System Cyber Security Association) standard summary both quote the identical scope line, and FDA's recognition record for the standard reproduces it as clause 1.1: "This standard applies to network-connectable products that shall be evaluated and tested for vulnerabilities, software weaknesses and malware." Clause 1.2 then breaks the substantive requirements into three areas:

Area What it covers
Risk management process Requirements on the software developer (vendor or other supply-chain member) to run a documented risk-management process for the product
Evaluation and testing methods The methods by which a product "shall be evaluated and tested for the presence of vulnerabilities, software weaknesses and malware"
Security risk controls Requirements on the presence of security risk controls in the product's architecture and design

Which edition is current, and which one did FDA recognise?

Edition 2 is the active edition, and FDA's recognition record names the 2017 first edition. The two facts come from two different primary records, and a submission should cite them precisely:

Record What it says Source
UL 2900-1 Edition 1 Published and ANSI-adopted July 2017; now listed as archived ULSE product listing
ANSI/CAN/UL 2900-1 Edition 2 Active; published 13 December 2023; last revision 29 June 2026, with ANSI and SCC approval dated the same day; sold in English and French ULSE product listing
29 June 2026 revision Summary of topics: inclusive-language edits and changes to definitions 3.22 and 3.28 ULSE product listing
FDA recognition 13-96 Date of entry 21 August 2017; "UL ANSI 2900-1 First Edition 2017"; extent of recognition: complete standard FDA record 13-96
FDA recognition 13-104 Date of entry 7 June 2018; UL 2900-2-1 first edition 2017, for network-connectable components of healthcare and wellness systems FDA record 13-104

The ULSE listing also shows which other UL documents reference Part 1, which hints at how far its reach goes beyond IoT: UL 338 (electronic vehicle immobilisation systems), UL 1699 (arc-fault circuit interrupters), UL 1400-1 (fault-managed power systems), UL 2800-1-1 (interoperable medical products) and UL 2900-2-3.

What does UL 2900-1 explicitly leave out?

UL 2900-1 draws its own boundary carefully. Per its scope section: "This standard does not contain requirements regarding functional testing of a product" — meaning it has no requirement to verify the product does what it's supposed to do, only that it resists vulnerabilities, weaknesses and malware — and "This standard does not contain requirements regarding the hardware contained in a product," meaning it is a software-only standard. A vendor relying on UL 2900-1 alone still needs separate functional and hardware-safety assurance; UL 2900-1 fills the software-cybersecurity gap specifically.

How does Part 1 fit the series and UL CAP?

UL 2900-1 is the general, sector-agnostic Part 1. Three sector-specific parts build on it rather than duplicating it:

  • UL 2900-2-1 — Particular Requirements for Network Connectable Components of Healthcare and Wellness Systems (published September 2017)
  • UL 2900-2-2 — industrial control system components (PLCs, SCADA, RTUs and similar), which stayed an Outline of Investigation
  • UL 2900-2-3 — electronic physical security and life-safety signalling systems (access control, surveillance cameras, DVR/NVR, alarm receiving and emergency-communication systems)

All four sit underneath the UL Cybersecurity Assurance Program (UL CAP), UL's certification program for network-connectable products and systems. Per secondary summaries of UL's own program description, UL CAP testing includes "static binary analysis for software weaknesses identified by Common Weakness Enumerations (CWE), open source software and third-party libraries, as well as structured penetration testing based on flaws identified in other tests," and the program additionally verifies that a certified vendor "maintains reasonably mature processes for the development and maintenance of the software" — so that a future patch or new version doesn't quietly regress below the certified protection level. UL CAP traces back to an April 2016 program launch developed in collaboration with the US Department of Homeland Security, aimed at giving buyers of IoT and other connected products independent confidence that a product meets a tested security baseline. UL's June 2018 announcement describes the series as giving makers "repeatable tests that can provide evidence to support any device cybersecurity claims."

What does FDA recognition give a medical device maker?

Recognition gives a documented pathway, not a mandate. FDA's own database entry, recognition number 13-96, records UL 2900-1 First Edition 2017 as recognised in full from 21 August 2017, on the grounds that it is "relevant to medical devices and is recognized on its scientific and technical merit and/or because it supports existing regulatory policies." Secondary reporting from the time (SoftwareCPR and UL) ties that entry to FDA Recognition List Number 047. The healthcare-specific companion UL 2900-2-1 followed as recognition 13-104 on 7 June 2018.

The same FDA record carries a caveat every regulatory team should read: "Conformance to this standard may not satisfy all the cybersecurity requirements outlined in Section 524B of FD&C Act." Section 524B (21 U.S.C. 360n-2) requires the sponsor of a "cyber device" submission to file a plan to monitor and address postmarket vulnerabilities, including coordinated vulnerability disclosure; to maintain processes that give reasonable assurance the device is cybersecure, with updates on a regular cycle and out-of-cycle patches for critical issues; and to "provide to the Secretary a software bill of materials, including commercial, open-source, and off-the-shelf software components." A UL 2900-1 test report is evidence for the design and testing part of that list. It does not replace the software bill of materials or the postmarket plan. FDA's record lists its February 2026 premarket guidance, Cybersecurity in Medical Devices: Quality Management System Considerations and Content of Premarket Submissions, as the relevant guidance; see our FDA premarket cybersecurity guide for its content.

What evidence should a team prepare before testing?

Most of the effort in a UL 2900-1 style evaluation is evidence the maker already owns. The table maps each scope area to the records that answer it and the public references a test lab is likely to use. It is a preparation aid built from the scope text and the series' published structure (the Part 2-2 preview lists the same areas), not a clause list.

Scope area Evidence to have ready Public reference
Vendor risk management Threat model or risk assessment per product; record of how risks were accepted or reduced; vulnerability intake and disclosure procedure FD&C Act 524B(b)(1) for medical devices
Known vulnerabilities Component inventory (SBOM) for the exact firmware build; known-CVE match results with dates NVD
Software weaknesses Static analysis results for own code; weakness findings mapped to CWE IDs MITRE CWE, CWE Top 25
Malware Build provenance; hash list of shipped binaries; scan results of the release image Lab's own toolchain
Malformed input and penetration testing List of exposed interfaces and protocols; earlier fuzzing or pen-test reports MITRE CAPEC attack patterns
Security risk controls Architecture description: authentication, remote access, cryptography, update and logging design OWASP FSTM for firmware test areas

How does UL 2900-1 compare with IEC 62443-4-2 and IEC 81001-5-1?

The three overlap but answer different questions. UL 2900-1 is a test-centred certification standard; the IEC documents define requirements that a product or process has to meet.

UL 2900-1 IEC 62443-4-2 IEC 81001-5-1
Publisher UL Standards & Engagement (ANSI, SCC) IEC TC 65 with ISA99 IEC, jointly with ISO health informatics
Focus Testing for vulnerabilities, weaknesses, malware; vendor risk process; design controls Technical requirements for IACS components by security level Secure lifecycle activities for health software
Hardware Excluded In scope (embedded and network devices) Software only
Typical buyer Medical, building and security products; contracts naming UL CAP Industrial automation Medical device and health IT makers
Typical use of the result UL CAP certificate ISASecure CSA or another 62443 scheme Process evidence in the device technical file

A maker selling into more than one market usually keeps one evidence base (SBOM, risk assessment, test reports) and maps it to each document, rather than running three separate programmes.

Worked example: scoping a first UL 2900-1 effort

Synthetic example: no real company or product. A 40-person maker of a networked infusion-pump gateway (embedded Linux, a web admin UI, an MQTT uplink and BLE pairing) receives a hospital tender that asks for "UL 2900 series testing or equivalent" and plans an FDA 510(k).

  1. Pick the partsThe product is a healthcare component, so the team scopes UL 2900-1 plus UL 2900-2-1, both recognised by FDA (13-96 and 13-104).
  2. Fix the buildTesting applies to one firmware version. The team freezes release 3.2.0 and records its image hash.
  3. Generate the inventoryAn SBOM of the image lists 412 components (synthetic figure); 37 have known CVEs on the match date, 4 of them in CISA's KEV catalogue.
  4. Triage before the lab doesThe engineers fix the 4 KEV entries and 9 others, and write a short rationale for each remaining CVE (component not built with the vulnerable feature, or interface not exposed).
  5. List the attack surfaceWeb UI, MQTT, BLE, the USB service port and the update channel each get a row with authentication method and owner.
  6. Collect the process recordsRisk assessment, disclosure policy and update procedure go into one folder that also feeds the 524B submission.

Takeaway. The lab tests the product, but the inventory, triage rationale and attack-surface list decide how long the engagement runs. They are reused in the FDA file.

What are the common pitfalls?

  • Citing the wrong edition. FDA's record 13-96 names the 2017 first edition; Edition 2 is the one on sale. A submission should state which edition the test report used.
  • Treating recognition as 524B compliance. FDA's own note says conformance "may not satisfy all" 524B requirements; the SBOM and postmarket plan are separate deliverables.
  • Testing a moving target. A report covers one build. A changed component list after the test needs a fresh known-vulnerability check.
  • Forgetting hardware. Debug ports, secure boot and tamper resistance fall outside UL 2900-1 by its own scope; a buyer may still ask about them.
  • Choosing Part 1 alone for a medical, ICS or alarm product when a sector part exists.

Where should a team start?

  1. Treat UL 2900-1 as the software-only floorIt has no hardware or functional-testing requirements — pair it with whatever hardware-safety and functional-verification standards already apply to the product.
  2. Pick the matching sector-specific part if one existsA medical, industrial-control, or physical-security product should be evaluated against UL 2900-2-1, -2-2 or -2-3 respectively, on top of the Part 1 general requirements — not Part 1 alone.
  3. Decide whether UL CAP certification is worth pursuing, separately from the standard itself: certification adds independent, repeatable evidence (CWE-based static analysis plus structured penetration testing) and an ongoing-maintenance assurance that a self-assessment against the written requirements does not provide on its own.
  4. For an FDA submission, cite the recognition precisely: number 13-96 for Part 1 and 13-104 for Part 2-1, with the edition your test report used, alongside the SBOM and postmarket plan that section 524B requires.
  5. Budget for a purchased copy before implementationLike most ANSI/UL standards, the actual clause-by-clause requirement text is commercial; the scope statement quoted here is enough to scope a program, not to build a test plan against.

SoftWSP covers the known-vulnerability part of that preparation. The platform extracts an SBOM from a firmware image as CycloneDX 1.6 JSON, matches its components against NVD, CISA KEV, FIRST EPSS and CISA CSAF ICS advisories, and drafts a report that cites each source for an engineer to review. It does not run malware, fuzzing or penetration tests, and the triage rationale stays the engineer's call. See Device & Firmware Security, or open an existing SBOM in the free SBOM viewer.

This guide summarises UL 2900-1's publicly available scope statement and structure (UL's own product listing, FDA's recognized-standards records, a professional-association standard summary, and independent secondary reporting); it is not a substitute for the full purchased standard and does not constitute compliance or legal advice.

Put this guide to work

Frequently asked questions

What is UL 2900-1, and who publishes it?

UL 2900-1, "Standard for Software Cybersecurity for Network-Connectable Products, Part 1: General Requirements," is a certification standard published by UL Standards & Engagement (formerly Underwriters Laboratories), the US safety-testing and certification organisation, and adopted as an American National Standard (ANSI). It was first published and ANSI-adopted in July 2017; the current active edition is Edition 2, published 13 December 2023 (as ANSI/CAN/UL 2900-1), with a further edition in development (ANSI/UL 2900-1-2026, published 29 June 2026 per its own standards-body listing). UL 2900-1 is a commercial standard sold by UL and ANSI rather than published in full for free; this guide draws on the publicly available scope statement, structure, and corroborating secondary summaries rather than the full purchased requirement text; a purchased copy remains the authoritative source for specific sub-requirement wording.

What does UL 2900-1 actually require, per its own scope section?

Its scope statement, corroborated identically across UL's own product listing and an independent standards-tracking summary, reads: "This standard applies to network-connectable products that shall be evaluated and tested for vulnerabilities, software weaknesses and malware." The standard then describes three requirement areas: (a) requirements regarding the software developer's (vendor's, or other supply-chain member's) **risk management process** for their product; (b) **methods by which a product shall be evaluated and tested** for the presence of vulnerabilities, software weaknesses and malware; and (c) requirements regarding the presence of **security risk controls** in the architecture and design of a product.

What does UL 2900-1 explicitly NOT cover?

Two exclusions, per the same scope section: "This standard does not contain requirements regarding functional testing of a product" — i.e., it has no requirements to verify a product functions as designed, only that it resists vulnerabilities, weaknesses and malware — and "This standard does not contain requirements regarding the hardware contained in a product," i.e., it is a software-only standard. Vendors needing hardware-level assurance or functional/safety certification must pair UL 2900-1 with a separate standard covering that ground.

How does UL 2900-1 relate to the rest of the UL 2900 series, and to UL CAP?

UL 2900-1 is Part 1 — the general, sector-agnostic requirements. Sector-specific parts build on it: **UL 2900-2-1** (Particular Requirements for Network Connectable Components of Healthcare and Wellness Systems, published September 2017), **UL 2900-2-2** (industrial control system components such as PLCs, SCADA and RTUs), and **UL 2900-2-3** (electronic physical security and life-safety signalling systems — access control, surveillance, alarm and emergency-communication systems). All four sit underneath the **UL Cybersecurity Assurance Program (UL CAP)**, UL's certification program for network-connectable products and systems, which per UL's own description evaluates products via "static binary analysis for software weaknesses identified by Common Weakness Enumerations (CWE), open source software and third-party libraries, as well as structured penetration testing based on flaws identified in other tests," and verifies that a vendor "maintains reasonably mature processes for the development and maintenance of the software" so future patches don't regress the certified security level. UL CAP traces to an April 2016 program launch developed in collaboration with the US Department of Homeland Security.

Has the FDA recognised UL 2900-1 for medical device submissions?

Yes, for Part 1 and the healthcare-specific Part 2-1. According to independent secondary reporting (SoftwareCPR and UL's own announcements), UL 2900-1 Ed. 1 (2017) was added to FDA's list of recognized consensus standards around 21 August 2017 under FDA Recognition List Number 047, under the authority of the FDA Modernization Act of 1997's standards-recognition program — confirm the live Recognition Number against FDA's Recognized Consensus Standards database directly. The healthcare-specific companion, **UL 2900-2-1**, followed with its own FDA recognition around June 2018. FDA recognition lets a device maker cite conformance to a recognized standard as part of a premarket cybersecurity submission rather than having to justify a bespoke test methodology from scratch; it does not make certification itself mandatory — UL 2900 series certification remains voluntary unless a specific regulator or customer contract requires it.

Sources

  1. UL Standards & Engagement (shopULstandards.com): UL 2900-1, Edition 2 — product listing (title, edition, publication date 2023-12-13, ICS code, price, scope description)
  2. CS2AI (Control System Cyber Security Association): UL2900-1 — Software Cybersecurity for Network-Connectable Products, Part 1 — standard summary (scope quoted, requirement categories)
  3. Black Duck (blackduck.com): "What Is UL 2900 and How Does It Work?" — UL 2900 series overview, UL CAP description, FDA recognition timeline
  4. UL Solutions (ul.com): "The US FDA has officially recognized the UL 2900 Cybersecurity standard for medical devices" — company announcement
  5. SoftwareCPR: "FDA Recognizes UL2900-1 for Cybersecurity" — August 2017 recognition-date summary
  6. FDA: Recognized Consensus Standards database (accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfstandards) — searchable primary record; verify the live Recognition Number directly here
  7. FDA Recognized Consensus Standards: recognition 13-96, UL ANSI 2900-1 First Edition 2017 (date of entry 2017-08-21, complete standard, section 524B note)
  8. FDA Recognized Consensus Standards: recognition 13-104, UL ANSI 2900-2-1 First Edition 2017 (date of entry 2018-06-07)
  9. 21 U.S.C. 360n-2 (FD&C Act section 524B, Ensuring cybersecurity of devices), Cornell Legal Information Institute
  10. MITRE: Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE)
  11. MITRE: Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC)
  12. NIST: National Vulnerability Database (NVD)
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UL 2900-1 (software cybersecurity for network-connectable products), explained