IP camera and NVR firmware vulnerabilities are among the most exploited IoT flaws because cameras expose a web server, ONVIF, RTSP and often a cloud P2P link, often with root privileges, and as of 2026-11-17 CISA's KEV catalog lists 14 camera and NVR entries, including Hikvision CVE-2021-36260 and Dahua CVE-2021-33044. To fix them, a device maker identifies the SoC SDK, web server and vendor build in each image, maps them to vendor advisories, ships fixed builds, removes default credentials and closes services nobody needs.
Key takeaways
- Cameras and video recorders combine three properties attackers look for: reachable network services, root-level code written for one SoC SDK and reused across many brands, and long service lives without updates.
- A typical camera or recorder exposes five kinds of surface, and each needs its own entry in a threat model.
- Six CVEs cover the main patterns: web server command injection, authentication bypass, memory corruption in an embedded web server and memory corruption in a current product line.
- CVE-2021-36260 gives an unauthenticated attacker a root shell through the camera's web server.
Why are IP cameras among the most exploited IoT devices?
Cameras and video recorders combine three properties attackers look for: reachable network services, root-level code written for one SoC SDK and reused across many brands, and long service lives without updates. CISA's KEV catalog version 2026.11.13 has 14 entries that name IP cameras, NVRs or NVR software, from Hikvision, Dahua, Amcrest, Edimax, NUUO, PTZOptics, QNAP, Reolink and TVT. All four Hikvision and Dahua entries have FIRST EPSS scores above 0.99 on 2026-11-16, which puts them among the CVEs most likely to see exploitation attempts; our KEV and EPSS prioritisation guide explains how to weigh the two signals.
The OEM model multiplies each flaw. SEC Consult's 2018 XMEye research describes Xiongmai as one of the largest makers of cameras, DVRs and NVRs, selling as a white-label OEM, and notes that hacked Xiongmai devices supplied large parts of the DDoS firepower in the 2016 Mirai attacks, when only devices with TCP port 23 or 9527 exposed could be infected. The researcher who found CVE-2021-36260 made the same point about Hikvision: the Watchful IP report does not list OEM firmware because "there's too many to try to obtain and check". A camera sold under a small brand can carry the same board, SDK and web application as a big-name one, and the same CVE.
This guide is about the camera and recorder layer. For the router SDK that also turns up in some camera boards, see our Realtek SDK vulnerabilities guide; for the small web servers themselves, see our lighttpd, GoAhead and Boa guide.
What is the attack surface of an IP camera or NVR?
A typical camera or recorder exposes five kinds of surface, and each needs its own entry in a threat model.
| Surface | Typical ports | What runs there | Why it matters |
|---|---|---|---|
| Web interface and vendor API | 80, 443 | A vendor web application, or an embedded server such as uc-httpd, Boa or lighttpd | CVE-2021-36260 and CVE-2018-10088 are in this layer; it often runs as root |
| ONVIF | 80/443 (SOAP), 3702/UDP (WS-Discovery) | Device, media and PTZ services for video management software | Separate user store and authentication path from the web interface |
| RTSP | 554 | Live and recorded video streams | Weak or absent stream authentication leaks video without touching the web interface |
| Vendor binary protocols | Vendor-specific, for example 9527 on Xiongmai | Configuration and NVR-to-camera control | Each vendor login handler is one more authentication path to review |
| Cloud P2P | Outbound, via the vendor's relay | Remote viewing from a phone app without port forwarding | Reaches devices behind NAT and firewalls |
ONVIF Profile S defines a device that sends video over an IP network to a client, such as video management software, that can configure, request and control the stream, including PTZ control, audio in, multicasting and relay outputs. ONVIF is deprecating Profile S, and the last date for product conformance submissions is March 31, 2027, so new products should target the newer profiles. Whatever the profile, an ONVIF service is a second login path into the device; the AXIS OS hardening guide lists HTTP and HTTPS as carrying both the web interface and the VAPIX and ONVIF APIs, RTSP on port 554 and WS-Discovery on UDP 3702 among the services enabled by default.
Cloud P2P changes the exposure model most. SEC Consult found that XMEye P2P Cloud was enabled by default on all Xiongmai devices, that each device's cloud ID was derived from its MAC address and therefore guessable, and that the connection was not properly encrypted. Its conclusion was that the feature "bypasses firewalls and effectively allows remote connections into private networks", so the common advice not to expose a camera to the internet does not protect a device that dials out to a relay by itself.
Which camera CVEs matter most for device makers?
Six CVEs cover the main patterns: web server command injection, authentication bypass, memory corruption in an embedded web server and memory corruption in a current product line. Scores are NVD's Primary CVSS v3.x and the vendor's own score where one exists; EPSS values are FIRST's for 2026-11-16, and KEV status is from catalog version 2026.11.13.
| CVE | What it is | Affected | Fix | NVD / vendor CVSS | EPSS | KEV |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2021-36260 | Command injection in the web server of some Hikvision products through insufficient input validation | Most recent Hikvision camera ranges and some NVRs, firmware back to at least 2016 | Patched builds from June 2021, for example IPC_G3 and IPC_H5 V5.5.800 build 210628 | 9.8 / none on NVD | 0.999 | Yes, added 2022-01-10 |
| CVE-2017-7921 | Improper authentication that lets a user escalate privileges and access device information | Seven Hikvision IP camera series, firmware V5.0.9 to V5.4.5 (2014-2016 builds) | V5.4.41 build 170309/170310 and later, V5.4.71 for DS-2DEx/DS-2DFx | 9.8 / none published | 0.99998 | Yes, added 2026-03-05 |
| CVE-2021-33044 | Authentication bypass in Dahua's login process | Dahua IPC, PTZ, thermal and video intercom models with builds before June 2021 | Builds from June-August 2021 per model | 9.8 / 8.1 | 0.99989 | Yes, added 2024-08-21 |
| CVE-2021-33045 | Second authentication bypass in the same login process | Builds before May 2020 on the same model lines | Same fixed builds | 9.8 / 8.1 | 0.996 | Yes, added 2024-08-21 |
| CVE-2025-31700 | Buffer overflow triggered by crafted packets, causing crashes or code execution | Dahua IPC-1XXX, IPC-2XXX, IPC-WX, IPC-ECXX, SD and TPC series with builds before 2025-04-16 | Builds after 2025-04-16 | none (Deferred) / 8.1 | 0.011 | No |
| CVE-2018-10088 | Buffer overflow in the XiongMai uc-httpd 1.0.0 web server | uc-httpd 1.0.0 in XiongMai-based cameras, DVRs and NVRs | No vendor fix listed in the sources we found | 9.8 / none | 0.397 | No |
The vendor scores differ from NVD's. Dahua scores CVE-2021-33044 and CVE-2021-33045 at 8.1 with high attack complexity in DHCC-SA-202106-001, while NVD gives 9.8; the KEV listing settles the ranking either way. For CVE-2025-31700, NVD shows only Dahua's 8.1 because the record is in Deferred status as of 2026-11-17.
How does the Hikvision web server injection (CVE-2021-36260) work?
CVE-2021-36260 gives an unauthenticated attacker a root shell through the camera's web server. Watchful IP, who reported it to Hikvision on 21 June 2021, describes it as a zero-click remote code execution that needs only access to the HTTP or HTTPS port, "typically 80/443", with no username or password and no action by the owner, and that is not detectable by any logging on the camera itself. The shell is unrestricted, which is more access than the owner gets: Hikvision limits the owner to a "protected shell" that filters input to mostly informational commands.
Two details matter for device makers. First, the latest firmware was vulnerable when the report was written, and the researcher found affected firmware types from 2016 to mid-2021, including IPC_E, IPC_G, IPC_H and IPD PTZ lines. Second, distribution lagged: Watchful IP found patched firmware fully deployed on Hikvision's China region portal but only partially on the global site and missing from European and Russian portals at disclosure on 18 September 2021. A fix that exists only on one portal leaves the installed base exposed. The bug class is the one our command injection in embedded firmware guide covers: request data reaching a shell without validation.
How do the Hikvision and Dahua authentication bypasses differ?
Both let an attacker in without valid credentials, but in different layers. Hikvision's HSRC-201703-04 for CVE-2017-7921 says that "while processing a specified request code" a privilege escalation may occur on select IP cameras, letting attackers "acquire or tamper with the device information". It was first released on 2017-03-10 and covers CVE-2017-7923 as well. Hikvision's affected ranges differ from NVD's in one row: Hikvision lists the DS-2CD2xx0 series up to V5.4.4 build 161107 and adds the DS-2DEx series, so check the vendor table, not only the NVD description.
Dahua's CVE-2021-33044 and CVE-2021-33045 sit in the login process. CISA's KEV entries describe the first as a bypass when the client specifies the NetKeyboard type during authentication and the second as a bypass when the client specifies the loopback device. Dahua's advisory, first published on 2021-09-01, lists fixed builds per model line, for example DH_IPC-HX5XXX-Volt_MultiLang_PN_Stream3_V2.820.0000000.5.R.210705, and the affected models include PTZ domes, thermal cameras and VTO video intercoms. Both cases share a design lesson: special client types and internal-only paths in a login handler need the same checks as the normal path.
What did Dahua fix in 2025 (CVE-2025-31700)?
CVE-2025-31700 and CVE-2025-31701 are buffer overflows in current Dahua product lines, fixed in builds after 2025-04-16. Dahua's DHCC-SA-202507-001, first published on 2025-07-23 after reports from the Bitdefender IoT Research Team, says crafted packets can cause crashes or remote code execution, and notes that ASLR on some devices lowers the chance of code execution while denial-of-service attacks "remain a concern". It scores both at 8.1 and points to a separate PDF for the exact affected models.
The advisory also shows how a camera maker reaches the installed base. Customers check the build time on the device's version information page; products with cloud upgrade receive the fixed version "within 30 working days"; other units need a manual download. A memory-safety bug in packet parsing is the class our memory corruption in embedded firmware guide covers.
What does XiongMai show about OEM boards (CVE-2018-10088)?
XiongMai shows what happens when a white-label board carries the same web server, credentials and cloud feature into many brands. NVD describes CVE-2018-10088 as a buffer overflow in XiongMai uc-httpd 1.0.0, the embedded web server on these devices, and SEC Consult reported in October 2018 that it and other 2017 flaws, including CVE-2017-16725, were "still not fixed in the most recent firmware version". We found no XiongMai advisory listing a fixed build, so for a uc-httpd 1.0.0 device the practical fix is replacing the web server or the firmware line.
The same research found more systemic issues. The admin user's default password was blank, with no forced change at setup, and an undocumented user named default with a fixed password could still log in through the XMEye cloud after the admin password was changed. SEC Consult also noted that the same password hash algorithm appears in Dahua products and asked whether it comes from the HiSilicon SoC SDK both vendors use. Firmware updates were not authenticated in a way that stopped a malicious update: an attacker could modify the file system or the InstallDesc command file in an update image and persist on flash. Our hard-coded credentials in embedded firmware guide covers removing accounts like these.
How do you identify the camera SoC SDK, web server and versions in an image?
Identify four things in order: the SoC and its SDK, the vendor firmware line and build, the web server, and the open-source packages around them.
SoC and SDKIn the unpacked image, look at the bootloader banner, the kernel version and the kernel modules. SoC vendor SDKs name their media and driver modules after the chip family, such as HiSilicon hi35xxmodules, and the SDK's media libraries sit next to them. The SoC SDK sets the kernel version, which often stays fixed for the life of a product line.Vendor firmware line and buildVendors group many models under one image. Hikvision firmware types such as IPC_G3,IPC_H5orIPD_H8share one build, with version strings such asIPC_G3_EN_STD_5.5.160_210416, where the last six digits are the build date. Dahua build names encode series, platform, release line and date, as inV2.820.0000000.5.R.210705. Record this string per model: it is what vendor advisories list.Web serverFind the HTTP server binary and its version. It may be a vendor application, an embedded server such as uc-httpd, Boa, GoAhead or lighttpd, or a CGI layer behind one of them. Compare the Serverresponse header on a test device with the binary, because vendors often change or remove the header.Other servicesList the ONVIF, RTSP, P2P cloud and vendor protocol daemons, the ports they open and the user they run as, then confirm on a running test unit with a port scan of every interface. Open-source packagesRecord BusyBox, OpenSSL or mbed TLS, the C library and any embedded web server with their versions; our firmware SBOM guide shows how they become an SBOM. Encrypted imagesMany camera vendors encrypt their update files, and the Watchful IP report notes the researcher "needed to decrypt firmware" to find the flaw. A device maker should run the analysis on its own unencrypted build output, not on the field update file.
The OWASP Firmware Security Testing Methodology guide places these steps in a full assessment, including emulating the web server and ONVIF service.
How should a device maker patch and harden camera firmware?
Patch the code, then remove the conditions that turned each bug into a mass compromise.
Fix and rebuild per firmware lineMap each CVE to every firmware type that carries the affected code, including OEM variants, and ship fixed builds for all of them at once. The Watchful IP report lists more than 20 Hikvision firmware types affected by CVE-2021-36260; fixing one line leaves the rest exposed. Publish on every channelPut fixed builds on every regional portal and in the cloud upgrade service on the same day, and state the fixed build per model in the advisory, as Dahua's tables do. Our CSAF and VEX for device makers guide shows a machine-readable format. No default passwordMake the installer create the administrator account at first setup. The AXIS OS hardening guide says that when setting up the device "you'll need to create a username and password for the administrator account", and from AXIS OS 13 the factory default is HTTPS only. Apply one password policy to web, ONVIF and RTSP users, and delete undocumented and service accounts. Authenticate everything that serves videoRequire credentials for RTSP and ONVIF, turn off anonymous viewing, and keep ONVIF replay protection on. Axis recommends against features such as anonymous viewing and always-multicast mode. Make cloud P2P opt-inTurn the P2P relay off by default, use random device IDs, not MAC-derived ones, encrypt the session end to end, and rate-limit lookups at the relay. SEC Consult sent more than 33,000 queries from one IP address to the XMEye cloud without being blocked. Close what the product does not needDisable Telnet, debug and vendor maintenance ports, UPnP port mapping and unused protocols in the shipped build, not only in a hardening guide. Our MiniUPnPd guide covers why UPnP port mapping widens exposure. Sign updates and bootVerify the firmware signature before installing an update and at boot, so that an attacker with admin access cannot persist a modified image. Axis Edge Vault, for example, combines secure boot with a signed OS; our firmware OTA update security and secure boot and hardware root of trust guides cover both. Ship an SBOM per releaseAxis supplies an SBOM with every device software release published on axis.com. An SBOM lets customers and your own PSIRT match a new CVE against shipped builds in minutes.
For consumer cameras, these steps also map to the ETSI EN 303 645 baseline; our ETSI EN 303 645 guide covers its no-universal-default-password and software update provisions.
How do you test camera firmware before release?
Test the shipped build on a real unit and in emulation, and test it as an attacker would reach it.
Service inventoryScan every interface, including Wi-Fi and any PoE management port, and compare the open ports with the product's documented list. Anything unlisted is a finding. Authentication on every pathTry each web, ONVIF, RTSP and vendor protocol endpoint without credentials and with a low-privilege user. Include unusual client types and internal-only login paths, the place where CVE-2021-33044 and CVE-2021-33045 sat. Input handlingFuzz the web server, the ONVIF SOAP parser and the vendor protocol with malformed and oversized input, on an emulated build with sanitizers where possible, and on hardware for the final check. Credentials and accountsSearch the file system for password hashes, fixed accounts and keys shared across units, and confirm the first-setup flow blocks network services until the admin account exists. Cloud and update pathsConfirm P2P is off by default, that device IDs cannot be derived from the MAC address, and that the update path rejects an unsigned or modified image. Regression against known CVEsRe-run the SBOM and CVE match on every release candidate, and diff it against the previous release. Our firmware diffing and patch analysis guide shows how to confirm a fix landed in the shipped binary.
Worked example: how would you triage a camera image?
Synthetic example, not a real product. A camera maker reviews an OEM board image for a new bullet camera before relabelling it.
IdentifyThe kernel modules and media libraries show a HiSilicon hi35xxSDK, the web server banner and binary are uc-httpd 1.0.0, and the version file gives a 2019 build date.MatchCVE-2018-10088 applies to uc-httpd 1.0.0, and the OEM has no advisory listing a fixed build. The BusyBox and OpenSSL versions match further CVEs, which the engineer checks for backports. Check exposureA port scan of a test unit shows the web interface, RTSP without authentication, a vendor protocol on 9527 and a P2P client that registers with a cloud relay at boot. The admin password is blank. DecideThe maker asks the OEM for a build with a maintained web server and records CVE-2018-10088 as affected until it ships. Meanwhile its own build turns off the P2P client and port 9527, forces admin creation at first setup and requires RTSP authentication. ReleaseIt rebuilds, re-scans, publishes an SBOM and a VEX statement per CVE, and adds the board to its PSIRT watch list for future OEM advisories.
How does AI-assisted analysis help with camera firmware?
SoftWSP's automated scan unpacks a firmware image, catalogs the open-source packages it can identify in the extracted file system with their versions, and matches each one against CVE records, CISA's KEV catalog and FIRST's EPSS scores. This is deterministic code: the code scores, and AI narrates. You can inspect the resulting CycloneDX file in the free SBOM viewer.
Camera firmware shows the limits of that matching clearly. NVD files the Hikvision and Dahua CVEs above under per-model firmware CPEs, such as Dahua's ipc-hx5xxx_firmware with an end version of 2.820.0000000.18.r.210705, not under a package name a file-system catalog can see. A catalog also cannot tell whether P2P is enabled, whether RTSP requires credentials or whether the admin password is set at first boot. Mapping the model and vendor build to those records, recognising the SoC SDK and the vendor web application, and checking ONVIF, RTSP and cloud settings is the engineer's part of the review. AI writes the plain-language summary of each finding, citing the component, version and record behind every sentence, and an engineer checks it before the report is delivered.
For the Hikvision and Dahua CVEs above, our advisory pages give the full record: CVE-2021-36260, CVE-2017-7921, CVE-2021-33044 and CVE-2021-33045. To have a specific camera or recorder image reviewed, see our device and firmware security services.
This guide draws on the Watchful IP report on CVE-2021-36260, Hikvision HSRC-201703-04, Dahua advisories DHCC-SA-202106-001 and DHCC-SA-202507-001, SEC Consult's XMEye P2P Cloud research, the AXIS OS hardening guide, ONVIF's Profile S page, NVD, CISA's KEV catalog (version 2026.11.13) and FIRST EPSS data dated 2026-11-16, all read directly on 2026-11-17.
Put this guide to work
Frequently asked questions
Why are IP cameras and NVRs exploited so often?
Cameras and recorders combine a web server, ONVIF and RTSP services and often a vendor cloud P2P link, run them with root privileges, and stay installed for years without firmware updates. As of 2026-11-17, CISA's KEV catalog (version 2026.11.13) has 14 entries for IP cameras, NVRs or NVR software, including Hikvision CVE-2021-36260 and CVE-2017-7921 and Dahua CVE-2021-33044 and CVE-2021-33045. Their FIRST EPSS scores on 2026-11-16 are all above 0.99. Many of the same boards ship under other brands, so a single SDK flaw reaches many products.
Which camera CVEs should a device maker check first?
Start with the KEV entries. CVE-2021-36260 is an unauthenticated command injection in the web server of many Hikvision cameras and some NVRs, added to KEV on 2022-01-10. CVE-2021-33044 and CVE-2021-33045 are Dahua login authentication bypasses, added on 2024-08-21. CVE-2017-7921 is a Hikvision improper authentication flaw in 2014-2016 camera firmware, added on 2026-03-05. Then check CVE-2025-31700 and CVE-2025-31701, Dahua buffer overflows in builds before 2025-04-16, and CVE-2018-10088, a buffer overflow in the XiongMai uc-httpd 1.0.0 web server.
How do I identify the camera SDK, web server and firmware build in an image?
Unpack the image and record the SoC family from kernel modules, the bootloader and the SDK libraries, the web server from its binary name and response header, and the vendor build string from the version file or the device's system information page. Dahua build names, for example, encode the series, platform, firmware line and build date, such as V2.820.0000000.5.R.210705. Hikvision firmware types such as IPC_G3 or IPC_H5 group cameras that share one image. Record the vendor build, not only the open-source package versions, because NVD files vendor camera CVEs under per-model firmware CPEs.
How should a camera maker handle default credentials?
Ship with no usable default password: force the installer to create the administrator account at first setup, as Axis does, and refuse to enable any network service before that happens. Remove undocumented accounts. SEC Consult found that XiongMai devices had a blank admin password plus an undocumented user named default that still worked through the XMEye cloud after the admin password was changed. Keep ONVIF and RTSP users under the same password policy as the web interface, and turn off anonymous viewing.
Can SoftWSP find camera vulnerabilities in my firmware automatically?
SoftWSP's automated scan unpacks a firmware image, catalogs the open-source packages it can identify with their versions, and matches them against CVE records, CISA's KEV catalog and FIRST EPSS scores. AI then writes a plain-language summary that cites the component, version and record behind each finding, and an engineer reviews it. Vendor camera CVEs such as the Hikvision and Dahua ones above are filed under per-model firmware identifiers, so mapping your model and build to those records, and checking ONVIF, RTSP and cloud P2P settings, is part of the engineer review, not an automatic verdict.
Sources
- Watchful IP: Unauthenticated RCE in Hikvision IP camera/NVR firmware (CVE-2021-36260)
- Hikvision HSRC-201703-04: Privilege escalating vulnerability in certain Hikvision IP cameras (CVE-2017-7921, CVE-2017-7923)
- Dahua DHCC-SA-202106-001: Identity authentication bypass vulnerability found in some Dahua products
- Dahua DHCC-SA-202507-001: Vulnerabilities found in some Dahua embedded products
- SEC Consult: Millions of Xiongmai video surveillance devices can be hacked via cloud feature (XMEye P2P Cloud)
- Axis: AXIS OS hardening guide
- ONVIF: Profile S
- NIST NVD: CVE-2021-36260
- NIST NVD: CVE-2021-33044
- NIST NVD: CVE-2017-7921
- NIST NVD: CVE-2018-10088
- NIST NVD: CVE-2025-31700
- CISA: Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) Catalog
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