CVE-2017-16725 is a stack-based buffer overflow in the NetSurveillance web interface of Xiongmai IP cameras and DVRs that may let a remote attacker execute code or crash the device, which then reboots into a state with Telnet open. NVD scores it 9.8. CISA's ICSA-17-341-01 of 2017-12-07 covers all versions, and no vendor fix has been listed since.
Vulnerability summary
CVSS base score
9.8
Critical severity
EPSS score (FIRST)
9.2%
Probability of exploitation in the wild in the next 30 days
CISA KEV catalog
No
Not listed
Published
Vulnerability ID: CVE-2017-16725 · Source: NVD
Affected components
| Component | CPE | Version range |
|---|---|---|
| Xiongmai IP cameras and DVRs using the NetSurveillance web interface | — | all versions; Xiongmai did not respond to ICS-CERT and no fixed version is listed (CISA ICSA-17-341-01); still unfixed in the most recent firmware as of October 2018 (SEC Consult) |
| Xiongmai AHB7004T, AHB7008, AHB7016, AHB7032 and AHB7804R/AHB7808R boards and IPG, IPM and IVG modules (NVD CPE list) | cpe:2.3:o:xiongmaitech:ahb7004t-g-v4_firmware:4.02.r11.7601:*:*:*:*:*:*:* | 136 firmware CPEs: 50 name builds such as 4.02.R11.7601, 4.02.R11.3070 and 4.02.R11.NAT.ONVIFC.20171120; 86 carry no version (NVD) |
What does this mean for affected devices?
NVD describes CVE-2017-16725 as "a Stack-based Buffer Overflow issue" in "Xiongmai Technology IP Cameras and DVRs using the NetSurveillance Web interface", which "may allow an attacker to execute code remotely or crash the device. After rebooting, the device restores itself to a more vulnerable state in which Telnet is accessible." NVD's Primary CVSS v3.0 score is 9.8 (critical), vector CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H, with CWE-119 and a legacy CVSS v2 score of 10.0. Its configuration lists 136 Xiongmai firmware CPEs: AHB7004T, AHB7008, AHB7016 and AHB7032 boards, AHB7804R and AHB7808R boards, and IPG, IPM and IVG modules. 50 of them name builds such as 4.02.R11.7601, 4.02.R11.3070 and 4.02.R11.NAT.ONVIFC.20171120; the other 86 carry no version (NVD).
CISA's ICSA-17-341-01, released on 2017-12-07, is the device advisory. It names "IP Cameras and DVRs using the NetSurveillance Web interface", all versions, maps the flaw to CWE-121 with the same 9.8 score, and credits Clinton Mielke for reporting it. Its mitigation section, preserved in CISA's CSAF file, has one vendor line: "Xiongmai Technology has not responded to requests to coordinate with NCCIC/ICS-CERT." At release CISA knew of no public exploits that specifically targeted the flaw.
SEC Consult's XMEye research of 9 October 2018 shows the fix never arrived in the following year. It says that flaws published in 2017 "are still not fixed in the most recent firmware version", naming CVE-2017-16725 and CVE-2018-10088 with a complete exploit chain available. SEC Consult had worked with ICS-CERT since March 2018, ICS-CERT had tried to reach Xiongmai and China's CNCERT/CC, and "although Xiongmai had seven months' notice, they have not fixed any of the issues." Its recommendation was to stop using Xiongmai and Xiongmai OEM devices altogether.
The device angle is wider than the Xiongmai name suggests:
- White-label reach. Xiongmai sells only as an OEM, and SEC Consult found more than one hundred brands selling its devices, which "will not mention 'Xiongmai' anywhere" in the manual, box or interface. One way to spot them is the
err.htmerror page, one of the few places the firmware names Xiongmai. - Telnet after reboot. The crash path matters because Telnet was the Mirai entry point. SEC Consult notes that from 2016, Mirai variants took over Xiongmai devices through high-privileged shells on TCP ports 23 (Telnet) and 9527 using hard-coded credentials.
CVE-2017-16725 is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of 2026-11-17 (catalog version 2026.11.13). FIRST EPSS gives it 0.09216, the 95th percentile, in the 2026-11-16 dataset (FIRST EPSS).
With no vendor fix, the response is containment or replacement. Keep the NetSurveillance web interface and ports 23 and 9527 unreachable from untrusted networks, turn off the XMEye cloud feature where the firmware allows it, and plan to replace the unit. For a device maker shipping a Xiongmai-based board, our IP camera and NVR firmware vulnerabilities guide treats this as the OEM-board case and recommends replacing the web server or the firmware line. The bug class is the one our memory corruption fix guide covers, and our hard-coded credentials fix guide covers the Telnet accounts that made the reboot state dangerous.
Evidence
- Stack-based buffer overflow in Xiongmai IP cameras and DVRs using the NetSurveillance web interface; code execution or crash; reboot restores a state with Telnet accessible; Primary CVSS v3.0 9.8; CWE-119; CVSS v2 10.0; 136 firmware CPEs, 50 with builds and 86 without. — NVD
- ICSA-17-341-01 released 2017-12-07; all versions; CWE-121; CVSS 9.8; reported by Clinton Mielke; Xiongmai did not respond to NCCIC/ICS-CERT; no known public exploits at release. — CISA ICSA-17-341-01 (CSAF)
- 2017 flaws including CVE-2017-16725 and CVE-2018-10088 still not fixed in the most recent firmware (9 October 2018); ICS-CERT coordination since March 2018; more than one hundred OEM brands; err.htm identification; Mirai used ports 23 and 9527 with hard-coded credentials. — SEC Consult
- Not in the KEV catalog, version 2026.11.13, checked 2026-11-17. — CISA KEV
- EPSS 0.09216, 95th percentile, 2026-11-16 dataset. — FIRST EPSS

Related advisories
Sources
Frequently asked questions
Is there a firmware fix for CVE-2017-16725?
No fix is listed. CISA's 2017 advisory says Xiongmai did not respond to coordination requests, and SEC Consult reported in October 2018 that the flaw was still not fixed in the most recent firmware (per CISA ICSA-17-341-01 and SEC Consult).
How do I tell whether a camera or DVR is Xiongmai-based?
Branded devices rarely name Xiongmai. SEC Consult found more than one hundred brands selling its hardware and points to the device's err.htm error page, one of the few places the firmware mentions Xiongmai, as a way to identify it (per SEC Consult).
Why does the Telnet state after a crash matter?
NVD's description says the device restores itself to a state with Telnet accessible after rebooting, and Mirai variants took over Xiongmai devices through Telnet and port 9527 shells with hard-coded credentials, so a crash can open the door a botnet already uses (per NVD and SEC Consult).
Is CVE-2017-16725 in the CISA KEV catalog?
No. It is not listed in catalog version 2026.11.13, checked 2026-11-17, and FIRST EPSS gives it 0.09216 in the 2026-11-16 dataset (per CISA KEV and FIRST EPSS).
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