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ENISA Baseline Security Recommendations for IoT (2017), explained

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ENISA's "Baseline Security Recommendations for IoT in the context of Critical Information Infrastructures" is the EU cybersecurity agency's first major attempt to lay out, horizontally across every IoT sector, what the asset classes, threats, gaps and recommended good practices actually are. Published 20 November 2017 by the European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA — renamed the EU Agency for Cybersecurity in 2019, but still operating under the ENISA acronym), the report predates the device-specific regulatory wave that followed — ETSI EN 303 645, NIST's NISTIR 8259 series, the EU Cyber Resilience Act — and remains a useful reference for its asset taxonomy, threat taxonomy, and gap analysis, even as a 2017-era document whose specific recommendations have since been superseded by more prescriptive instruments.

Key takeaways

  • Section 3.4 works through three critical attack scenarios: IoT administration system compromise, value manipulation in IoT devices, and botnet/commands injection.
  • Chapter 4 sorts the measures into three categories, and each good practice carries an ID made of the category code and a number.
  • Lack of awareness and knowledge — including "differences in fundamental terminology" around safety versus security.
  • It is a documented input to EN 303 645, and the CRA reaches it only through that standard.

Why did ENISA tackle IoT horizontally instead of sector by sector?

ENISA had already published vertical IoT studies — Smart Homes, Smart Cities and Intelligent Public Transport, Smart Grids, Smart Cars, Smart Airports, and eHealth and Smart Hospitals — but the report's Introduction notes that "a major challenge in defining baseline security measures for IoT is the entailed complexity that is brought by the diversity of application areas for IoT." This report therefore "considers the horizontal aspects of IoT as seen across vertical sectors," aiming at measures that apply whether the deployment is a substation or a connected hospital device.

The stakes are framed plainly: "attacks on IoT deployments could dramatically jeopardise people's security, privacy and safety, while additionally IoT in itself can be used as an attack vector against other critical infrastructures." The findings rest on 26 interviews with experts from industry, policy, academia and research across 9 EU member states and the US, then a workshop of ENISA's IoT Security Experts Group (IoTSEC) in The Hague on 20 October 2017.

What does the IoT asset taxonomy cover?

Section 2.5 builds a high-level reference model (Figure 4) from eight architectures the report reviewed, including the AIOTI High Level Architecture, the FP7 IoT-A reference model, NIST's Network of Things, the ITU-T IoT reference model, ISO/IEC CD 30141, ISACA, oneM2M and IEEE P2413. Table 2 then lists eight asset groups:

Asset group Assets in Table 2
IoT Devices Hardware, Software (OS, firmware, applications), Sensors, Actuators
Other IoT Ecosystem Devices Devices to interface with Things, Devices to manage Things, Embedded systems
Communications Networks, Protocols
Infrastructure Routers, Gateways, Power supply, Security assets (firewalls, IDS/IPS, authentication systems)
Platform & Backend Web-based services, Cloud infrastructure and services
Decision making Data mining, Data processing and computing
Applications & Services Data analytics and visualisation, Device and network management, Device usage
Information At rest, In transit, In use

From the expert ratings (Figure 6), the report found sensors, then device and network management, then communication protocols, gateways and applications/services most critical, each "marked as critical by at least two thirds or more of the experts interviewed."

What are the threat taxonomy and attack scenarios?

Section 3.2 builds a threat taxonomy (Figure 8, Table 3) "consistent with the ENISA Threat Taxonomy," including Nefarious Activity/Abuse threats — malware, exploit kits, targeted attacks, DDoS, counterfeit malicious devices, attacks on privacy, modification of information — each mapped to the asset groups it affects. The weighted expert scores in Figure 10 put the average impact at 3.7 out of 5; sensitive data leakage/modification and DDoS scored 4.2, malware and weak passwords 4.1, exploit kits 4.0.

Section 3.4 works through three critical attack scenarios: IoT administration system compromise, value manipulation in IoT devices, and botnet/commands injection.

How are the 83 good practices organised, and what do their IDs mean?

Chapter 4 sorts the measures into three categories, and each good practice carries an ID made of the category code and a number. Counting the IDs in the report PDF gives 83:

Category IDs Sections (with ID ranges)
Policies (PS) GP-PS-01 to 12 Security by design 01–07, Privacy by design 08–09, Asset management 10, Risk and threat identification 11–12
Organisational, People and Process (OP) GP-OP-01 to 14 End-of-life support 01–03, Proven solutions 04, Vulnerability and incident management 05–08, Training 09–11, Third parties 12–14
Technical Measures (TM) GP-TM-01 to 57 Hardware security 01–02, Trust and integrity 03–07, Strong defaults 08–09, Data protection 10–14, Safety 15–17, Updates 18–20, Authentication 21–26, Authorisation 27–28, Physical access 29–33, Cryptography 34–37, Communications 38–46, Interfaces and network services 47–53, Input/output 54, Logging 55, Monitoring and auditing 56–57

Annex A gives each good practice its security domain (one of eleven, from governance and risk management to crisis management) and the sources it was drawn from, such as ISO/IEC 27001, NIST SP 800-53, OWASP's Security by Design Principles, GSMA's IoT Security Guidelines and the IoT Security Foundation. Annex B maps each measure to the threats it addresses. Some IDs read like later regulation: GP-TM-09 asks for "hard to crack, device-individual default passwords," GP-TM-18 wants an update package whose "digital signature, signing certificate and signing certificate chain" the device verifies before updating, and GP-OP-02 says to "disclose the duration and end-of-life security and patch support."

Which gaps and recommendations did ENISA name?

Chapter 5 names six gaps:

  1. Fragmentation in existing security approaches and regulations— "no common EU-wide approach to cyber security in IoT."
  2. Lack of awareness and knowledge— including "differences in fundamental terminology" around safety versus security.
  3. Insecure design and/or development— "public vulnerabilities ... left unfixed," "unnecessary communication ports left open," and "weak passwords policies or default passwords left unchanged."
  4. Lack of interoperabilityacross devices, platforms and frameworks.
  5. Lack of economic incentivesfor manufacturers to pay for security.
  6. Lack of proper product lifecycle management, from patching to deployment.

Chapter 6 (Table 8) lists seven recommendations; the Executive Summary names who each is intended for:

# Recommendation Intended for (Executive Summary)
1 Promote harmonization of IoT security initiatives and regulations Industry, providers, manufacturers, associations
2 Raise awareness for the need for IoT cybersecurity Industry, providers, manufacturers, associations, academia, consumer groups, regulators
3 Define secure software/hardware development lifecycle guidelines for IoT Developers, platform operators, industry, manufacturers
4 Achieve consensus for interoperability across the IoT ecosystem Industry, providers, manufacturers, associations, regulators
5 Foster economic and administrative incentives for IoT security Industry, associations, academia, consumer groups, regulators
6 Establishment of secure IoT product/service lifecycle management Developers, platform operators, industry, manufacturers
7 Clarify liability among IoT stakeholders Industry, regulators

Recommendation 6 says security updates "need to be provided where practically possible without special knowledge requirements or financial obligations on the end user/consumer within a defined term and conditions until 'end-of-support,'" a date that "must be clearly defined by the manufacturer/provider ... and must be clearly communicated to the end user/consumer." ENISA later expanded recommendation 3 into its IoT secure development lifecycle guidance.

How does the 2017 baseline relate to ETSI EN 303 645 and the CRA?

It is a documented input to EN 303 645, and the CRA reaches it only through that standard. The Introduction of ETSI EN 303 645 V3.1.3 (2024-09) says its provisions were "developed following a review of published standards, recommendations and guidance," naming "ENISA Baseline Security Recommendations [i.8]," and points to the ENISA "Interactive Tool" [i.15] for mappings; that tool's page now returns 404 on the ENISA site. On the CRA side, the JRC/ENISA Cyber Resilience Act Requirements Standards Mapping (2024) maps EN 303 645 V2.1.1 to all 13 product requirements, numbered as in the CRA proposal, which "result somehow all covered by the standard even if with some gaps." That mapping does not cite the 2017 baseline.

The table below is SoftWSP's side-by-side reading of the three texts, not an official ENISA or Commission mapping:

ENISA 2017 good practice EN 303 645 V3.1.3 provision CRA text
GP-TM-09, GP-TM-22: device-individual default passwords, no weak or blank passwords 5.1-1: passwords "unique per device or defined by the user" Annex I Part I (2)(b) secure by default; (2)(d) protection from unauthorised access
GP-OP-06, GP-OP-08: coordinated disclosure, public reporting mechanism 5.2-1: publish a vulnerability disclosure policy Annex I Part II (5) CVD policy; (6) contact address
GP-OP-02, GP-OP-03: disclose support duration, patch until end-of-support 5.3-13: publish the defined support period Article 13(8) support period of at least five years; 13(19) end date shown at purchase
GP-TM-18, GP-TM-19: signed updates verified on the device, automatic updates 5.3-2: secure update mechanism Annex I Part I (2)(c); Part II (7) secure distribution of updates
GP-TM-49: no shared secret key across a product family 5.4-4: update and communication keys unique per device Annex I Part I (2)(d) and (f)
GP-TM-45, GP-TM-50: disable unused ports, expose only necessary ones 5.6-1: unused interfaces disabled Annex I Part I (2)(j) limit attack surfaces

Where the texts differ, the later ones are stricter: EN 303 645 uses "shall" for provisions such as 5.1-1, and the CRA makes support periods a legal duty, while the 2017 report only recommends. The same goes for the other texts that followed the 2017 publication: NIST's NISTIR 8259 series (2020, see our NIST IoT device cybersecurity guide), ENISA's narrower Guidelines for Securing the IoT Supply Chain (2020) and SBOM Technical Advisory, and the radio-equipment standard EN 18031. For the testable versions, start with our guides to ETSI EN 303 645 and the Cyber Resilience Act.

How do you use the baseline in a product review? (worked example)

Synthetic example, not a real product. A maker of a Wi-Fi smart plug runs a pre-release review and uses the asset taxonomy to make sure nothing is skipped:

Asset group Finding (synthetic) Good practice Next step
IoT Devices (Software) Firmware SBOM lists a TLS library with two known CVEs GP-TM-39, GP-OP-03 Upgrade the library; record in the CRA vulnerability log
IoT Devices (Hardware) UART console open on the production board GP-TM-33 Lock the debug port in production firmware
Infrastructure (Gateways) Default admin password shared across the product line GP-TM-09, GP-TM-22 Per-device password at manufacture (EN 303 645 5.1-1)
Platform & Backend Update server accepts unsigned packages GP-TM-18 Sign updates and verify on the device
Information (In transit) Telemetry sent over plain HTTP GP-TM-39 Move to TLS

The taxonomy found the gateway and backend rows a firmware-only review would have missed; the EN 303 645 and CRA columns decide what must be fixed before shipping.

What is a workable starting point?

  1. Use the asset taxonomy to scope a review, not to certify oneTable 2's eight groups catch gateways, management interfaces, backends and data-in-use; the report sets no pass/fail bar.
  2. Use the GP IDs as a checklist vocabularyand record, for each one, the EN 303 645 provision or CRA clause you will be assessed against.
  3. Treat the six gaps as a maturity self-check— the list still reads as current for many smaller IoT makers.
  4. Cite it freely, with attributionThe copyright notice reads "Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged," unlike many paywalled standards.

What are the common pitfalls?

  • Citing it as a conformance baseline. ENISA's legal notice says it "does not necessarily represent state-of-the-art and ENISA may update it from time to time"; EN 303 645, EN 18031 and the CRA are the texts you are assessed against.
  • Copying the 2017 five-row asset summaries found online. Table 2 has eight groups; Infrastructure, Platform & Backend and Decision making are easy to drop.
  • Expecting an official GP-to-CRA crosswalk. ENISA's own CRA mapping covers EN 303 645 and other standards, not this report.
  • Reading "biannually" in GP-TM-57 as a legal interval. Penetration-test frequency is a recommendation here, not a requirement.

SoftWSP's Device & Firmware Security work covers the IoT Devices (Software) row of that worked example: it reads a firmware SBOM (CycloneDX 1.6), matches the components against NVD, CISA KEV, FIRST EPSS and CISA's ICS advisories, and produces an AI-drafted, cited report that an engineer reviews before it is issued. It does not test default passwords, debug ports or backend services, and it does not assign findings to ENISA gaps for you.

This guide quotes ENISA's "Baseline Security Recommendations for IoT in the context of Critical Information Infrastructures" (November 2017), ETSI EN 303 645 V3.1.3, the JRC/ENISA CRA standards mapping (2024) and Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, each read on 14 November 2026. It is not a substitute for the full 103-page report and is not compliance or certification advice.

Put this guide to work

Frequently asked questions

What is the ENISA Baseline Security Recommendations for IoT report, and who is it for?

"Baseline Security Recommendations for IoT in the context of Critical Information Infrastructures" is a study published 20 November 2017 by the European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA, now the EU Agency for Cybersecurity), ISBN 978-92-9204-236-3, doi: 10.2824/03228. Per ENISA's publication page, the study "aims to set the scene for IoT security in Europe" and "serves as a reference point in this field and as a foundation for relevant forthcoming initiatives and developments." Its Target Audience section states its primary audience is "organisations that want to adopt IoT or are already adopting IoT solutions," alongside IoT developers, manufacturers, operators and policymakers. The report explicitly builds on ENISA's own prior vertical-sector IoT studies — Smart Homes, Smart Cities and Intelligent Public Transport, Smart Grids, Smart Cars, Smart Airports, and eHealth/Smart Hospitals — and deliberately takes a horizontal, cross-sector approach instead. Its findings were validated through 26 expert interviews spanning industry, policy, academia and research organizations from 9 EU member states and the United States, discussed at an ENISA IoT Security Experts Group workshop in The Hague on 20 October 2017.

What is the IoT asset taxonomy and threat taxonomy the report defines?

Section 2.5 (Table 2) groups IoT assets into eight asset groups — IoT Devices (Hardware, Software, Sensors, Actuators), Other IoT Ecosystem Devices (interface/aggregator devices, management devices, embedded systems), Communications (Networks, Protocols), Infrastructure (routers, gateways, power supply, security assets), Platform & Backend, Decision making, Applications & Services, and Information (At rest, In transit, In use) — built from a high-level IoT reference model (Figure 4) that the report synthesized from eight existing architectures it reviewed, including the AIOTI High Level Architecture, the FP7 IoT-A Architectural Reference Model, NIST's Network of Things, ITU-T's IoT reference model, and ISO/IEC CD 30141. Based on its expert interviews, the report found sensors, device/network management controls, and communication protocols/gateways/applications rated most critical, each flagged critical by "at least two thirds or more of the experts interviewed." Section 3.2's threat taxonomy (Figure 8, Table 3), built to be "consistent with the ENISA Threat Taxonomy," organizes IoT-specific threats under categories including Nefarious Activity/Abuse (malware, exploit kits, targeted attacks, DDoS, counterfeit malicious devices, attacks on privacy, modification of information) — weighted-average expert scoring (Figure 10) rated the overall threat impact at 3.7 out of 5, with sensitive data leakage/modification (4.2/5), DDoS (4.2/5) and weak passwords (4.1/5) scored among the most impactful individual threats.

What are the report's seven high-level recommendations?

Chapter 6 (Table 8) lists seven recommendations, and the Executive Summary addresses each to specific stakeholder groups: (1) Promote harmonization of IoT security initiatives and regulations (industry, providers, manufacturers, associations); (2) Raise awareness for the need for IoT cybersecurity (industry, providers, manufacturers, associations, academia, consumer groups, regulators); (3) Define secure software/hardware development lifecycle guidelines for IoT (developers, platform operators, industry, manufacturers); (4) Achieve consensus for interoperability across the IoT ecosystem (industry, providers, manufacturers, associations, regulators); (5) Foster economic and administrative incentives for IoT security (industry, associations, academia, consumer groups, regulators); (6) Establishment of secure IoT product/service lifecycle management (developers, platform operators, industry, manufacturers); and (7) Clarify liability among IoT stakeholders (industry, regulators). On interoperability specifically, Section 6.2.4 recommends organizations "encourage the use of open interoperability frameworks that incorporate security," "provide transparency on the security of interoperability frameworks," and "promote open and accessible interoperability laboratories and testbeds for security." On lifecycle management, Section 6.2.6 states security updates "need to be provided where practically possible without special knowledge requirements or financial obligations on the end user/consumer within a defined term and conditions until 'end-of-support,'" which "must be clearly defined by the manufacturer/provider ... and must be clearly communicated to the end user/consumer" — language that anticipated requirements later formalized in instruments like the EU's [Cyber Resilience Act](/guides/cyber-resilience-act/) and [EN 18031](/guides/en-18031/).

What gaps did the report identify, and how does this 2017 report relate to later ENISA and EU IoT work?

Chapter 5 names six gaps found through expert interviews and a review of existing IoT security resources: (1) fragmentation in existing security approaches and regulations, with "no common EU-wide approach to cyber security in IoT"; (2) lack of awareness and knowledge, including inconsistent understanding of basic safety-versus-security terminology among security professionals themselves; (3) insecure design and/or development, evidenced by recurring issues such as "public vulnerabilities ... left unfixed," unnecessary open ports, and "weak passwords policies or default passwords left unchanged"; (4) lack of interoperability across IoT devices, platforms and frameworks, driven partly by proprietary protocols; (5) lack of economic incentives for manufacturers to absorb security costs; and (6) lack of proper product lifecycle management, including patching and deployment practices. This report predates — and its gaps analysis and default-password/update findings anticipated — later, more prescriptive EU and international instruments: [ETSI EN 303 645](/guides/etsi-en-303-645-consumer-iot-security/) (2020), NIST's NISTIR 8259 series (2020, see our [NIST IoT device cybersecurity guide](/guides/nist-iot-device-cybersecurity-requirements/)), and ENISA's own later, narrower [Guidelines for Securing the IoT Supply Chain](/guides/enisa-guidelines-securing-iot-supply-chain/) (2020) and [SBOM Technical Advisory](/guides/enisa-sbom-technical-advisory/). Readers should treat this 2017 report as a foundational, horizontal reference establishing the problem space and vocabulary (asset taxonomy, threat taxonomy, gap analysis) rather than as a current conformance baseline — ENISA's own Legal Notice on the report states it "does not necessarily represent state-of-the-art and ENISA may update it from time to time," and no update superseding the full 2017 text has been issued as of November 2026.

Sources

  1. ENISA: "Baseline Security Recommendations for IoT" — official publication landing page (European Union Agency for Cybersecurity, publication date 20 November 2017)
  2. ENISA: "Baseline Security Recommendations for IoT in the context of Critical Information Infrastructures" — full report PDF (November 2017; Executive Summary, Introduction/Scope/Target audience, Section 2 IoT asset taxonomy and reference model, Section 3 threat taxonomy and attack scenarios, Chapter 5 gaps analysis, Chapter 6 seven high-level recommendations, Annex A detailed good practices; ISBN 978-92-9204-236-3, doi: 10.2824/03228; copyright notice: "Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged")
  3. NIST: NISTIR 8259 — Foundational Cybersecurity Activities for IoT Device Manufacturers
  4. ETSI EN 303 645 V3.1.3 (2024-09), Cyber Security for Consumer Internet of Things: Baseline Requirements — Introduction cites the ENISA baseline [i.8]; provisions 5.1-1, 5.2-1, 5.3-2, 5.3-13, 5.4-4, 5.6-1
  5. JRC and ENISA: Cyber Resilience Act Requirements Standards Mapping (EUR 31892 EN, 2024) — EN 303 645 V2.1.1 mapped to all 13 product requirements
  6. Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 (Cyber Resilience Act), Article 13(8) and 13(19), Annex I Parts I and II, EUR-Lex
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ENISA Baseline Security Recommendations for IoT (2017), explained