The GSMA IoT Security Guidelines are a set of non-binding, freely downloadable guideline documents published by the GSM Association (GSMA), the trade body representing mobile network operators, aimed at helping the IoT industry build secure connected products and services. The overview document — CLP.11, "IoT Security Guidelines Overview Document," read for this guide at Version 2.0, dated 31 October 2017 — states its own role in its first section: "This document is the first part of a set of GSMA security guideline documents that are intended to help the nascent 'Internet of Things' industry establish a common understanding of IoT security issues." Each 2017 CLP PDF is marked "This is a Non-binding Permanent Reference Document of the GSMA," Security Classification "Non-confidential," Copyright © 2017 GSM Association — freely downloadable, but not an open licence, so treat direct quotes here as brief excerpts rather than a substitute for reading the source PDFs.
Key takeaways
- An overview, two ecosystem guides, an operator guide and a checklist, but the numbering has changed since 2017.
- Your own: GSMA deliberately does not define one.
- Four tiers again, starting at §6 (CLP.13 §5 is a list of frequently asked security questions).
- Network operator guidance now sits in FS.60 §7 and §8.
What is in the document set today?
An overview, two ecosystem guides, an operator guide and a checklist, but the numbering has changed since 2017. GSMA reissued the overview in 2024 as FS.60, and FS.60 states: "The present document replaces previous GSMA IoT Security guideline recommendations contained in CLP.11 and CLP.14." The two ecosystem guides remain at their 2020 versions:
| Document | Covers | Latest version found | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| FS.60 | IoT Security Guidelines Overview, including network operator guidance | Version 1.0, 26 Apr 2024 | current |
| CLP.11 | IoT Security Guidelines Overview Document, the original primer read here | Version 2.2, 29 Feb 2020 | archived, replaced by FS.60 |
| CLP.12 | IoT Security Guidelines for IoT Service Ecosystem: back-end servers, APIs, cloud infrastructure | Version 2.2, 29 Feb 2020 | current companion to FS.60 |
| CLP.13 | IoT Security Guidelines for IoT Endpoint Ecosystem: connected devices and gateways | Version 2.2, 29 Feb 2020 | current companion to FS.60 |
| CLP.14 | IoT Security Guidelines for Network Operators | Version 2.2, 29 Feb 2020 | archived, replaced by FS.60 |
| CLP.17 | GSMA IoT Security Assessment Checklist, for self-assessment | distributed in the GSMA IoT Security Assessment download | see below |
CLP.11 §1.2 and FS.60 §1.2 give the same reading order: "It is recommended that this document, (i.e. the overview document) is read as a primer before reading the supporting documents."
CLP.11 §1.4 names three audiences: IoT Service Providers ("enterprises or organisations who are looking to develop new and innovative connected products and services"), IoT Device Manufacturers ("providers of IoT Devices to IoT Service Providers to enable IoT Services") and IoT Developers, plus Network Operators acting in either of the first two roles. FS.60 adds regulators and test labs.
What are the two ecosystems, and how are they split?
CLP.11 §4 (illustrated in its own "Example IoT Model" figure) divides any IoT deployment into two halves connected by a communications network, each covered by its own recommendation document:
- Service Ecosystem (§4.1, → CLP.12): "the set of services, platforms, protocols, and other technologies required to provide capabilities and collect data from Endpoints deployed in the field": servers, databases, and the APIs (CLP.11 cites oneM2M as an example) that let IoT Service Providers monetise collected data.
- Endpoint Ecosystem (§4.2, → CLP.13): "low complexity devices, rich devices and gateways that connect the physical world to the digital world," with CLP.11 naming "motion sensors, digital door-locks, automotive telematics systems, sensor-driven industrial control systems, and more" as examples.
CLP.13 §3 then sorts devices into three models: 3.1 The Lightweight Endpoint ("typically a sensor or simple physical device, such as a light switch or a door lock", possibly on "an eight-bit microcontroller"), 3.2 The Complex Endpoint (a persistent connection to a back end over cellular, including LPWA, or Wi-Fi/Ethernet), and 3.3 The Gateway (or 'Hub'). Its §2 lists why endpoints are hard to secure: low power consumption, low cost, long life (">10 years") and physical accessibility. The split matters because a cloud back-end's risks (API abuse, server compromise) are not a sensor's risks (physical tampering, side-channel attacks).
Which risk method does GSMA expect you to use?
Your own: GSMA deliberately does not define one. CLP.11 §5.2 ("Risk Model References") says: "Rather than attempt to define a risk assessment and threat modelling process here, please review the following references for an adequate depiction and walk-through of the risk assessment process: National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)'s Risk Management Framework [5]; Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT)'s OCTAVE model [6]." The OCTAVE reference is the SEI report on OCTAVE Allegro (CMU/SEI-2007-TR-012). FS.60 §5.3 keeps both and adds ETSI TS 102 165 Threat Vulnerability Risk Analysis (TVRA). What CLP.11 §5.1 does define is the goal: producing "a set of policies, procedures, and controls that remediate, monitor, and respond to gaps in security," with stated benefits of "Informing personnel, Enhancing processes, Defining (or updating) policies, Executing remediation, Monitoring for new gaps, Enhancing the product or service."
How are CLP.12's Service Ecosystem recommendations prioritised?
In four tiers. CLP.12 (Version 2.0, 31 October 2017, and unchanged in structure at Version 2.2) organises its guidance as follows:
| Tier | Section | Example recommendations |
|---|---|---|
| Critical | §5 | 5.1 Implement a Service Trusted Computing Base; 5.2 Define an Organizational Root of Trust; 5.8 Define an Incident Response Model; 5.9 Define a Recovery Model; 5.10 Define a Sunsetting Model |
| High-Priority | §6 | 6.1 Define a Clear Authorization Model; 6.2 Manage the Cryptographic Architecture; 6.6 Define an Update Model; 6.9 Implement Input Validation; 6.11 Enforce Strong Password Policy |
| Medium-Priority | §7 | 7.1 Define an Application Execution Environment; 7.3 Use a Private APN for Cellular Connectivity |
| Low-Priority | §8 | 8.1 Rowhammer and Similar Attacks; 8.2 Virtual Machine Compromises |
What does CLP.13 recommend for the device itself?
Four tiers again, starting at §6 (CLP.13 §5 is a list of frequently asked security questions). Examples from Version 2.2:
| Tier | Section | Example recommendations for device makers |
|---|---|---|
| Critical | §6 | 6.1 Implement an Endpoint Trusted Computing Base; 6.3 Use a Tamper Resistant Trust Anchor; 6.8 Uniquely Provision Each Endpoint; 6.9 Endpoint Password Management; 6.10 Use a Proven Random Number Generator; 6.11 Cryptographically Sign Application Images; 6.17 Insecure Bootloaders |
| High | §7 | 7.1 Use Internal Memory for Secrets; 7.3 Use Tamper Resistant Product Casing; 7.5 Over the Air Application Updates; 7.11 Implement Persistent Pentesting |
| Medium | §8 | 8.2 Disable Debugging and Testing Technologies; 8.5 Third Party Code Auditing; 8.10 Device Decommissioning and Sunsetting |
| Low | §9 | 9.4 Defeating a Cold Boot Attack; 9.6 Combating Focused Ion Beams and X-Rays; 9.7 Consider Supply Chain Security |
Firmware teams should note where the tiers put things: unique provisioning and signed images are Critical, while third-party code auditing is Medium and supply chain security is Low. Annex B of CLP.13 is a tutorial on using UICC cards in an IoT service, which matters for cellular devices. For the device-side controls themselves, see our guides on secure boot and a hardware root of trust and OTA update security.
What does GSMA ask of network operators?
Network operator guidance now sits in FS.60 §7 and §8. The archived CLP.14 set out four network security principles (secure identification, secure authentication, secure communication channels, and availability of channels), then the services operators can offer: subscription management with UICC/eUICC, network authentication and encryption for 2G, 3G, LTE and LPWA, roaming protection and device management. FS.60 §8.4 covers LPWA networks, including signal storm mitigation and device block listing. A device maker using cellular IoT inherits these protections only if its operator provides them, so they belong in the supplier questionnaire.
How does a GSMA IoT Security Assessment work, and is it a certification?
It is a self-assessment, not a certification. CLP.11 §1.2.1 says completing the CLP.17 checklist "will allow an entity to demonstrate the security measures they have taken to protect their products, services and components from cybersecurity risks", and says "Assessment declarations can be made by submitting a completed declaration to the GSMA." The checklist rows follow the guideline sections: the OWASP IoT Top 10 mapping of the checklist uses IDs such as "CLP12_5.1" and "CLP13_6.8".
FS.60 §1.2.1 is direct about its limits: "while GSMA encourage the use of CLP.17 as a means of initial security baselining internally to a manufacturer or service provider, GSMA recommend the use of EN 303 645 / TS 103 701 or equivalent for the purpose of internationally recognised product security conformity assessments." See our guides to ETSI EN 303 645 and its assessment method, ETSI TS 103 701.
How does GSMA line up with ETSI EN 303 645 and the OWASP IoT Top 10?
FS.60 points to ETSI as the floor: "As a minimum, all consumer IoT devices, products and services should meet the requirements set out in ETSI EN 303 645", and §7.3 says "For consumer IoT endpoint devices it is recommended that they are certified based on ETSI EN 303 645." For industrial devices FS.60 suggests that 62443 "may also be considered". GSMA publishes no clause-by-clause ETSI crosswalk. The community OWASP mapping does link checklist rows to the OWASP IoT Top 10, for example CLP13_6.8 Uniquely Provision Each Endpoint to I1 (passwords), CLP13_7.5 Over the Air Application Updates to I4 (update mechanism) and CLP13_8.2 Disable Debugging and Testing Technologies to I9 and I10.
How has the numbering changed over time?
CLP.11's Document History shows v1.0 on 08-Feb-2016 (editors Ian Smith of GSMA and Don A. Bailey of Lab Mouse Security), v1.1 on 07-Nov-2016 (references to the GSMA IoT Security Assessment scheme added) and v2.0 on 29-Sep-2017 (LPWA, meaning NB-IoT/LTE-M, network information added; editor Rob Childs, GSMA), published on 31 October 2017. The v2.2 PDFs add v2.1 (March 2019, references updated) and v2.2 (29 February 2020, references to GSMA IoT.04 added). FS.60's history records version 1.0 on 26 April 2024 as the "Updated FASG edition of IoT Security Guidelines CLP.11", owned by the device security group of GSMA's Fraud and Security Group (FASG). The 2017 CLP PDFs carry the line "This is a Non-binding Permanent Reference Document of the GSMA"; FS.60 does not, and is maintained under GSMA's AA.34 rules.
Worked example: how would a smart water meter team use the set?
Synthetic example, for illustration only: the company, device and findings are invented.
A maker of an NB-IoT water meter (a Lightweight Endpoint in CLP.13 terms, battery powered, 12-year life) wants evidence for a utility tender that asks about "GSMA IoT security". It follows the five-step process in FS.60 §9:
Evaluate the technical modelIt lists each component: microcontroller, cellular module, SIM, bootloader, application firmware, the utility's head-end API. For each it records who sources it and who patches it. Review the current security modelIt reads CLP.13 §3.1 and CLP.12 §4 against that list and finds no secure-boot chain on the application processor. Review and evaluate recommendationsCritical items first: 6.8 (unique provisioning) is met by per-device keys injected at the factory; 6.11 (signed images) and 6.17 (insecure bootloaders) are gaps; 7.5 (OTA updates) is partly met, but the update server accepts unsigned packages. Implement and reviewIt adds image signing and verification, locks the debug port (8.2), and builds a firmware SBOM so third-party components (8.5) can be checked against known vulnerabilities each release. Plan the ongoing lifecycleIt documents a sunsetting plan (CLP.13 8.10) for meters still in the field in year 12.
For the tender it submits a CLP.17-style self-assessment. Because FS.60 points to EN 303 645 for recognised conformity, it also plans a TS 103 701 assessment for consumer variants.
What are the common pitfalls?
- Citing CLP.11 as current. For overview and operator topics, cite FS.60 v1.0; for service and device controls, cite CLP.12 and CLP.13 v2.2.
- Calling a CLP.17 declaration a certificate. GSMA itself recommends EN 303 645 / TS 103 701 for recognised conformity.
- Mixing up section numbers. CLP.12's recommendations run from §5 to §8 and CLP.13's from §6 to §9, so "6.1" means a different control in each.
- Skipping the risk assessment. The tiers are defaults; GSMA expects your own NIST RMF, OCTAVE or TVRA analysis to decide what applies.
- Treating supply chain as low priority because CLP.13 lists it at §9.7. Regulations such as the Cyber Resilience Act require component tracking regardless.
Where should a device team start?
Read FS.60 first, then CLP.13 for the device and CLP.12 for the back end. Place your product in CLP.13's model(lightweight, complex or gateway) before picking recommendations. Bring your own risk methodology, and record which tier items you accept, defer or reject, and why. Use CLP.17 for internal baseliningand an ETSI EN 303 645 assessment where a recognised result is needed. Keep firmware evidence current: component lists, signing and update records.
For the firmware part, SoftWSP's platform extracts an SBOM from the device image as a CycloneDX 1.6 document and matches its components against NVD, CISA KEV, FIRST EPSS and CISA CSAF ICS advisories. AI drafts a report in which every finding cites its component and advisory, for an engineer to review. That is evidence for CLP.13 items such as 8.5 Third Party Code Auditing; it does not test trust anchors, tamper resistance or network services, and it is not a GSMA assessment. See Device & Firmware Security, or open an existing SBOM in the free SBOM viewer.
This guide summarises text read directly from GSMA FS.60 v1.0 (2024), the CLP.11, CLP.12, CLP.13 and CLP.14 PDFs (v2.0, 2017, and v2.2, 2020); it is not a substitute for the full guideline documents and does not constitute compliance or legal advice.
Put this guide to work
Frequently asked questions
What is the GSMA IoT Security Guidelines document set?
It is a set of non-binding guideline documents published by the GSM Association (GSMA), the trade body representing mobile network operators, aimed at the IoT industry. Per the overview document's own text: "This document is the first part of a set of GSMA security guideline documents that are intended to help the nascent 'Internet of Things' industry establish a common understanding of IoT security issues. The set of guideline documents promotes a methodology for developing secure IoT Services to ensure security best practices are implemented throughout the life cycle of the service." The version of the set read for this guide — CLP.11 "IoT Security Guidelines Overview Document," Version 2.0, dated 31 October 2017 — is marked "This is a Non-binding Permanent Reference Document of the GSMA," Security Classification "Non-confidential," Copyright © 2017 GSM Association.
How is the document set structured, and which document do you read first?
Per CLP.11 §1.2 and its Figure 1 ("GSMA IoT Security Guidelines Document Structure"), the set has four core documents plus a checklist: **CLP.11** (IoT Security Guidelines Overview Document — this document), **CLP.12** (IoT Security Guidelines for IoT Service Ecosystem), **CLP.13** (IoT Security Guidelines for IoT Endpoint Ecosystem), **CLP.14** (IoT Security Guidelines for Network Operators), plus **CLP.17** (GSMA IoT Security Assessment Checklist), which "enables the suppliers of IoT products, services and components to self-assess the conformance of their products, services and components to the GSMA IoT Security Guidelines." CLP.11 §1.2 states directly: "It is recommended that this document, (i.e. the overview document) is read as a primer before reading the supporting documents."
What is the Service Ecosystem vs. Endpoint Ecosystem split, and why does it matter?
CLP.11 §4 splits every IoT deployment into two halves joined by a communications network. §4.1 defines the **Service Ecosystem** as "the set of services, platforms, protocols, and other technologies required to provide capabilities and collect data from Endpoints deployed in the field" — servers, APIs, and back-end infrastructure, covered in detail by CLP.12. §4.2 defines the **Endpoint Ecosystem** as "low complexity devices, rich devices and gateways that connect the physical world to the digital world," with examples including "motion sensors, digital door-locks, automotive telematics systems, sensor-driven industrial control systems, and more" — covered by CLP.13. The split matters because the two halves face different threat models and get their own dedicated recommendation documents rather than one combined list.
What risk-assessment method does CLP.11 prescribe?
None of its own — CLP.11 §5.2 ("Risk Model References") is explicit that it defers rather than invents: "Rather than attempt to define a risk assessment and threat modelling process here, please review the following references for an adequate depiction and walk-through of the risk assessment process: National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)'s Risk Management Framework [5]; Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT)'s OCTAVE model [6]." §5.1 does define the goal of whatever process is used: "to create (or update) a set of policies, procedures, and controls that remediate, monitor, and respond to gaps in security found in the technical part of the organization," listing core benefits as "Informing personnel, Enhancing processes, Defining (or updating) policies, Executing remediation, Monitoring for new gaps, Enhancing the product or service."
How does CLP.12 prioritise its Service Ecosystem recommendations?
CLP.12 ("IoT Security Guidelines for IoT Service Ecosystem," Version 2.0, 31 October 2017 — the same publication date and version line as CLP.11) organises its recommendations into four priority tiers, per its own table of contents: **§5 Critical Recommendations** (e.g. 5.1 Implement a Service Trusted Computing Base, 5.2 Define an Organizational Root of Trust, 5.8 Define an Incident Response Model), **§6 High-Priority Recommendations** (e.g. 6.1 Define a Clear Authorization Model, 6.2 Manage the Cryptographic Architecture, 6.9 Implement Input Validation), **§7 Medium-Priority Recommendations**, and **§8 Low-Priority Recommendations** (e.g. 8.1 Rowhammer and Similar Attacks). CLP.13 covers the equivalent ground for the Endpoint Ecosystem, with its own Critical to Low tiers in §6 to §9.
Is CLP.11/CLP.12 still the current version, and does GSMA charge for these documents?
Partially superseded: the overview was renumbered and revised in 2024. The CLP.11/CLP.12/CLP.13/CLP.14/CLP.17 numbering dates to 2016–2017 (CLP.11's own Document History shows v1.0 on 08-Feb-2016, v1.1 on 07-Nov-2016, and the v2.0 read for this guide on 29-Sep-2017/31-Oct-2017). GSMA's current website now lists the overview document under a new code, **FS.60** ("GSMA IoT Security Guidelines Overview", Version 1.0, 26 April 2024), which replaces CLP.11 and CLP.14, with those two PDFs moved to an archive page; CLP.12 and CLP.13 (Version 2.2, 29 February 2020) remain the companion documents. On cost: unlike many formal standards bodies, GSMA publishes these PDFs for free public download from gsma.com; they are **not open-licensed**, however — the CLP PDFs carry "This document is confidential to the Association and is subject to copyright protection... to be used only for the purposes for which it has been supplied," so quote briefly rather than republish wholesale.
Sources
- GSMA: CLP.11 — IoT Security Guidelines Overview Document, Version 2.0, 31 October 2017 (PDF, fetched directly)
- GSMA: CLP.12 — IoT Security Guidelines for IoT Service Ecosystem, Version 2.0, 31 October 2017 (PDF, fetched directly)
- GSMA: IoT Security Guidelines Overview — FS.60 (current document landing page)
- GSMA: IoT Security Guidelines (current landing page, document set and assessment scheme)
- GSMA: IoT Security Guidelines Document Archive (archived CLP.11 and CLP.14 PDFs)
- NIST: Risk Management Framework (RMF) — official project page
- GSMA: FS.60 — IoT Security Guidelines Overview, Version 1.0, 26 April 2024 (PDF)
- GSMA: CLP.12 — IoT Security Guidelines for IoT Service Ecosystem, Version 2.2, 29 February 2020 (PDF)
- GSMA: CLP.13 — IoT Security Guidelines for IoT Endpoint Ecosystem, Version 2.2, 29 February 2020 (PDF)
- GSMA: CLP.14 — IoT Security Guidelines for Network Operators, Version 2.2, 29 February 2020 (PDF, archived)
- Carnegie Mellon SEI: Introducing OCTAVE Allegro (CMU/SEI-2007-TR-012)
- OWASP IoT Top 10 2018 Mapping Project: GSMA IoT Security Assessment Checklist mapping (raw file)
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