Security Advisory

CVE-2021-27097: U-Boot Modified FIT Image Check

Last updated:
  • CVE-2021-27097

CVE-2021-27097 is a flaw in how the U-Boot bootloader before 2021.04-rc2 handles a modified FIT image: U-Boot did not reject malformed trees, such as a FIT with two root nodes, when working out what a signature covers. That matters on devices that use U-Boot verified boot. NVD scores it 7.8; U-Boot 2021.04 fixes it.

Vulnerability summary

CVSS base score

7.8

High severity

EPSS score (FIRST)

1.1%

Probability of exploitation in the wild in the next 30 days

CISA KEV catalog

No

Not listed

Published

Vulnerability ID: CVE-2021-27097 · Source: NVD

Affected components

ComponentCPEVersion range
Das U-Boot bootloader (FIT image handling)cpe:2.3:a:denx:u-boot:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*Up to and including 2021.01, and 2021.04-rc1 (NVD); before 2021.04-rc2 (CVE record); first fixed release 2021.04
Debian u-boot packagepkg:deb/debian/u-bootbullseye fixed in 2021.01+dfsg-5+deb11u2 (DLA-4320-1, 2025-10-01); unstable fixed in 2021.07+dfsg-2; buster marked no-dsa (minor issue); bookworm and later fixed (Debian security tracker, as of 2026-11-20)
Buildroot boot/uboot (default 'latest version')—2021.01 in Buildroot 2021.02 and the 2021.02.x branch, with no patches; 2021.04 from Buildroot 2021.05 (commit bd62da59). Boards that pin their own U-Boot version need a separate check
Yocto Project poky meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot—hardknott (3.3) builds 2021.01 with backported CVE-2021-27097 and CVE-2021-27138 patches; dunfell (3.1) builds 2020.01 with no patch for either (as of 2026-11-20)

What does this mean for affected devices?

NVD's description is one line: "The boot loader in Das U-Boot before 2021.04-rc2 mishandles a modified FIT." FIT (Flattened Image Tree) is U-Boot's devicetree-structured image format, and U-Boot's FIT_SIGNATURE option adds "signature verification of FIT uImages", the basis of its verified boot. The record was published on 2021-02-17 (NVD, CVE record).

What do the fix commits change?

The details are in the upstream commits that the CVE record links, written by Simon Glass and crediting Bruce Monroe, Arie Haenel and Julien Lenoir of Intel as reporters:

  • Commit 8a7d4cf9 ("fdt_region: Check for a single root node of the correct name") notes that fdt_find_regions() "assumes that the FIT is a valid devicetree. If the FIT has two root nodes this is currently not detected in this function, nor does libfdt's fdt_check_full() notice." In U-Boot's signature code, fdt_find_regions() builds the list of regions to hash for a signed configuration, so a malformed tree can change what the signature check covers.
  • Commit 6f3c2d8a ("image: Add an option to do a full check of the FIT") adds CONFIG_FIT_FULL_CHECK, which runs libfdt's fdt_check_full() on the FIT. Its help text says it "helps to protect against carefully crafted FITs which take advantage of bugs or omissions in the code." It defaults to on and is selected by FIT_SIGNATURE; SPL_FIT_FULL_CHECK is selected by SPL_FIT_SIGNATURE.

Tom Rini's merge commit b6f4c757 fixes this CVE and CVE-2021-27138 together and adds verified-boot tests, including vboot_evil.py. The merge is in tag v2021.04-rc2, so the first release with the fix is U-Boot 2021.04.

How severe is CVE-2021-27097?

NVD's Primary score is CVSS v3.1 7.8 (CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H), the same as the MITRE CNA score; v2 is 6.8. NVD's weakness entry is NVD-CWE-noinfo. The local vector and user interaction fit the attack: someone has to get a crafted FIT image onto the device's boot path, for example through an update package or writable boot storage. The impact is on devices that rely on signed FIT images to keep untrusted code from booting.

Which firmware builds carry it?

Any product whose U-Boot is older than 2021.04 and has no backport, with FIT support enabled. NVD's CPE covers U-Boot up to and including 2021.01 plus 2021.04-rc1. No device vendor or CISA advisory names products for this CVE as of 2026-11-20; downstream status comes from the distributions and build systems:

  • Debian fixed bullseye in 2021.01+dfsg-5+deb11u2 with DLA-4320-1 (dated 2025-10-01, covering both CVEs) and unstable in 2021.07+dfsg-2. Buster was marked no-dsa as a minor issue; bookworm, trixie and later ship fixed packages (Debian security tracker).
  • Buildroot's default U-Boot ("latest version") was 2021.01 in Buildroot 2021.02, and the 2021.02.x branch kept it with no patches in boot/uboot. The bump to 2021.04 of 2021-04-20 shipped in Buildroot 2021.05. Many board configs pin their own U-Boot version or a vendor fork, so check the configured version, not the Buildroot release.
  • Yocto Project: the poky hardknott branch (3.3) builds U-Boot 2021.01 with backported patches for both CVEs. The dunfell branch (3.1) builds 2020.01 and, as of 2026-11-20, carries patches for CVE-2020-8432 and CVE-2020-10648 but none for these two. Vendor BSP layers often replace the poky recipe, so check the U-Boot your BSP actually builds.

How do you fix CVE-2021-27097?

Rebuild on U-Boot 2021.04 or later, or apply the commits from merge b6f4c757 to your fork, and keep CONFIG_FIT_FULL_CHECK (and CONFIG_SPL_FIT_FULL_CHECK in SPL) enabled. Signed configurations get it automatically. Then re-test that a tampered FIT is rejected. Our U-Boot security guide ranks this CVE in its version-matching example and covers verified boot hardening; the secure boot and hardware root of trust guide covers the chain the bootloader sits in. An earlier FIT verified boot bypass is CVE-2020-10648; other U-Boot flaws on this site include CVE-2022-34835 and CVE-2019-14192.

Is CVE-2021-27097 exploited?

It is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of 2026-11-20 (catalog version 2026.11.18, 1,786 entries). FIRST EPSS gives it 0.01076, the 65.7th percentile, in the 2026-11-19 dataset (CISA KEV, FIRST EPSS).

How to fix this class of issueNo dedicated SoftWSP guide covers this weakness class; the fix is usually the vendor patch or firmware update referenced above. Our related guide explains how to plan and verify it: NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4: enterprise patch management planning, explained.

Evidence

  • NVD (read 2026-11-20): status Modified; published 2021-02-17; NVD Primary CVSS v3.1 7.8 CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H, v2 6.8; MITRE Secondary 7.8; CWE NVD-CWE-noinfo; CPE denx:u-boot up to and including 2021.01 and 2021.04-rc1; references commits 6f3c2d8a, 8a7d4cf9, b6f4c757 and DLA-4320-1. — NVD
  • U-Boot commits 8a7d4cf9 and 6f3c2d8a (Simon Glass, 2021-02-15/16; reported by Bruce Monroe, Arie Haenel, Julien Lenoir of Intel), read 2026-11-20: fdt_find_regions() did not detect two root nodes; new CONFIG_FIT_FULL_CHECK uses fdt_check_full(), default y, selected by FIT_SIGNATURE; SPL_FIT_FULL_CHECK selected by SPL_FIT_SIGNATURE. Merge b6f4c757 (Tom Rini) fixes CVE-2021-27097 and CVE-2021-27138 and adds vboot_evil.py; the merge is contained in tag v2021.04-rc2. In v2021.04 common/image-fit-sig.c, fdt_find_regions() gets 'a list of regions to hash'. — U-Boot repository
  • Debian security tracker and DLA-4320-1 (read 2026-11-20): bullseye fixed in 2021.01+dfsg-5+deb11u2 (DLA-4320-1, 2025-10-01, CVE-2021-27097 and CVE-2021-27138); unstable fixed in 2021.07+dfsg-2; buster no-dsa (minor issue); bookworm 2023.01+dfsg-2+deb12u3, trixie 2025.01-3+deb13u1 fixed. — Debian
  • Buildroot (read 2026-11-20): boot/uboot latest version 2021.01 in tag 2021.02 and branch 2021.02.x with no patches in boot/uboot; commit bd62da59 'boot/uboot: bump to version 2021.04' (2021-04-20); tag 2021.05 latest version 2021.04. — Buildroot
  • Yocto poky (read 2026-11-20): hardknott u-boot 2021.01 with CVE-2021-27097-1..4 and CVE-2021-27138-1..2 patches in u-boot-common.inc; dunfell u-boot 2020.01 with patches for CVE-2020-8432 and CVE-2020-10648 only. — Yocto Project poky
  • CVE record (checked 2026-11-20): state PUBLISHED, CNA MITRE, published 2021-02-17; CNA CVSS v3.1 7.8; references the three upstream commits. — CVE.org
  • Not in the CISA KEV catalog, version 2026.11.18 (1,786 entries), checked 2026-11-20. — CISA KEV
  • EPSS 0.01076, percentile 0.65696, dataset 2026-11-19, read 2026-11-20. — FIRST EPSS

Related advisories

Sources

  1. NVD
  2. U-Boot merge commit b6f4c757: fix CVE-2021-27097 and CVE-2021-27138
  3. U-Boot commit 8a7d4cf9: fdt_region: Check for a single root node of the correct name
  4. U-Boot commit 6f3c2d8a: image: Add an option to do a full check of the FIT
  5. Debian security tracker: CVE-2021-27097
  6. Debian LTS Advisory DLA-4320-1: u-boot security update
  7. Buildroot commit bd62da59: boot/uboot: bump to version 2021.04
  8. Yocto Project poky (hardknott): u-boot-common.inc with CVE patches
  9. CVE.org record CVE-2021-27097 (CNA: MITRE)
  10. CISA KEV
  11. FIRST EPSS

Frequently asked questions

Which U-Boot version fixes CVE-2021-27097?

U-Boot 2021.04 is the first release with the fix; the merge commit b6f4c757 is in tag v2021.04-rc2. Debian backported it to bullseye in 2021.01+dfsg-5+deb11u2 (DLA-4320-1), and Yocto hardknott carries backported patches on 2021.01.

Does CVE-2021-27097 matter if my device does not use verified boot?

Much less. The fix is tied to FIT signature verification: the full check is selected by FIT_SIGNATURE, and the flaw changes what a signature check sees. Without signed FIT images, anyone who can replace the image can already boot their own code.

What should a firmware team check after updating?

That CONFIG_FIT_FULL_CHECK (and CONFIG_SPL_FIT_FULL_CHECK for SPL) is enabled, which happens automatically with FIT_SIGNATURE, and that a deliberately tampered FIT with an extra root node is rejected on the target hardware.

Is a Buildroot or Yocto build affected?

It depends on the branch and the board. Buildroot's default U-Boot is fixed from Buildroot 2021.05 (U-Boot 2021.04); Yocto hardknott carries backports, while dunfell's U-Boot 2020.01 recipe has no patch for this CVE as of 2026-11-20. Board-specific U-Boot forks need their own check.