CVE-2020-10648 is a verified boot bypass in the U-Boot bootloader: a crafted FIT image can add a default configuration that reuses a valid signature but loads an unsigned kernel. NVD scores it 7.8 for U-Boot through 2020.01, and Siemens lists RUGGEDCOM ROX devices before V2.17.1 as affected.
Vulnerability summary
CVSS base score
7.8
High severity
EPSS score (FIRST)
1.4%
Probability of exploitation in the wild in the next 30 days
CISA KEV catalog
No
Not listed
Published
Vulnerability ID: CVE-2020-10648 · Source: NVD
Affected components
| Component | CPE | Version range |
|---|---|---|
| Das U-Boot bootloader, FIT verified boot (configuration signature check) | cpe:2.3:a:denx:u-boot:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* | through 2020.01 (NVD); 2018.03 and 2020.01 verified affected (F-Secure) |
| Siemens RUGGEDCOM ROX MX5000, MX5000RE, RX1400, RX1500, RX1501, RX1510, RX1511, RX1512, RX1524, RX1536 and RX5000 | — | all versions before V2.17.1; fixed in V2.17.1 (Siemens SSA-577017, CISA ICSA-26-134-16) |
What does this mean for affected devices?
CVE-2020-10648 is a verified boot bypass in the U-Boot bootloader. NVD's description says Das U-Boot through 2020.01 "allows attackers to bypass verified boot restrictions and subsequently boot arbitrary images by providing a crafted FIT image to a system configured to boot the default configuration" (NVD). NVD scores it 7.8 with vector CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H and weakness CWE-20; its CPE entries cover versions before 2018.03 and the 2020.01 release.
Dmitry Janushkevich of F-Secure's hardware security team published the details on oss-security on 2020-03-18. A signed FIT configuration carries a hashed-nodes list naming the image nodes covered by its signature, and U-Boot did not check that this list matched the kernel, device tree and ramdisk the configuration actually loads. An attacker holding one properly signed FIT can therefore add a configuration that reuses the same signature node but points at a different kernel, and set the default property to select it. The advisory says the attack works when the setup "does not explicitly choose to boot a specific configuration", verified versions 2018.03 and 2020.01 as affected, and gives a mitigation: name the configuration in the bootm command, as in its example bootm <loadaddr>#conf@1 - <fdtaddr>, where the two placeholders are the image and device tree load addresses. The Debian security tracker records the fix in its 2020.04 u-boot package.
The device angle is Siemens. Its ProductCERT advisory SSA-577017, published on 2026-05-12, lists CVE-2020-10648 among 23 U-Boot flaws in RUGGEDCOM ROX MX5000, MX5000RE, RX1400, RX1500, RX1501, RX1510, RX1511, RX1512, RX1524, RX1536 and RX5000 devices before V2.17.1, with the same 7.8 score and an update to V2.17.1 or later as the fix. CISA republished it as ICSA-26-134-16 (CSAF).
The CVE is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of 2026-11-16 (catalog version 2026.11.13). FIRST EPSS gives it 0.0140, the 73.0th percentile, in the 2026-11-15 dataset (CISA KEV, FIRST EPSS).
Where a device's boot chain depends on FIT signatures, the version check matters more than for most U-Boot bugs, because this flaw defeats the protection itself. Device makers should rebuild on a fixed U-Boot and pass an explicit configuration name to bootm. Operators of RUGGEDCOM ROX devices should move to V2.17.1. Our U-Boot security guide explains how FIT verified boot works and compares this CVE with CVE-2018-3968, our secure boot guide covers the wider chain of trust, and CVE-2026-46728 is a later FIT signature bypass that also turns on the hashed-nodes property.
Evidence
- U-Boot through 2020.01 allows bypass of verified boot with a crafted FIT image on a system configured to boot the default configuration; NVD CVSS v3.1 7.8 (AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H); CWE-20. — NVD
- F-Secure (2020-03-18): U-Boot does not verify that hashed-nodes correlate with the sub-images the configuration loads; crafted configuration with the same signature node; works when the setup does not explicitly choose a configuration; 2018.03 and 2020.01 verified affected; mitigation: specify the configuration in bootm. — oss-security (F-Secure advisory)
- Debian: fixed in u-boot 2020.04+dfsg-1 (unstable). — Debian security tracker
- SSA-577017 (2026-05-12): CVE-2020-10648 (CVSS 7.8) affects RUGGEDCOM ROX MX5000, MX5000RE, RX1400, RX1500, RX1501, RX1510, RX1511, RX1512, RX1524, RX1536, RX5000 before V2.17.1; update to V2.17.1. — Siemens ProductCERT SSA-577017
- CISA republished SSA-577017 as ICSA-26-134-16 on 2026-05-14. — CISA ICSA-26-134-16 (CSAF)
- Not in the CISA KEV catalog as of 2026-11-16 (catalog version 2026.11.13). — CISA KEV
- EPSS 0.01401 (73.0th percentile), dataset 2026-11-15, read 2026-11-16. — FIRST EPSS

Related advisories
Sources
Frequently asked questions
What does an attacker need to exploit CVE-2020-10648?
A properly signed FIT image for the device and a way to replace the image the device boots, plus a boot setup that uses the FIT's default configuration instead of naming one explicitly (per the F-Secure advisory on oss-security).
How can CVE-2020-10648 be mitigated without a new U-Boot build?
F-Secure's advisory suggests naming the configuration explicitly in the bootm command, as in bootm <loadaddr>#conf@1 - <fdtaddr> with the image and device tree load addresses filled in, so a crafted default configuration is never selected (per oss-security).
Which Siemens devices are affected by CVE-2020-10648?
RUGGEDCOM ROX MX5000, MX5000RE, RX1400, RX1500, RX1501, RX1510, RX1511, RX1512, RX1524, RX1536 and RX5000, all versions before V2.17.1. Siemens recommends updating to V2.17.1 or later (per Siemens SSA-577017 and CISA ICSA-26-134-16).
Is CVE-2020-10648 exploited?
It is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of 2026-11-16 (catalog version 2026.11.13). FIRST EPSS gives it 0.0140, the 73.0th percentile, in the 2026-11-15 dataset (per CISA KEV and FIRST EPSS).
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