NIST SP 800-61 Rev. 3, titled "Incident Response Recommendations and Considerations for Cybersecurity Risk Management: A CSF 2.0 Community Profile," was published in April 2025 as a full replacement for the long-standing Computer Security Incident Handling Guide (Rev. 2, August 2012). NIST's own publication record for Rev. 2 states it "was withdrawn on April 3, 2025" and "superseded by SP 800-61 Rev. 3" — this is not a minor refresh sitting alongside the old guide; the 2012 document is formally retired. NIST's abstract for Rev. 3 states it "seeks to assist organizations with incorporating cybersecurity incident response recommendations and considerations throughout their cybersecurity risk management activities as described by the NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) 2.0," aiming to help them "prepare for incident responses, reduce the number and impact of incidents that occur, and improve the efficiency and effectiveness of their incident detection, response, and recovery activities."
Key takeaways
- NIST SP 800-61 Rev.
- The Rev. 3 text gives NIST's own reason in section 2.1.
- The profile itself is two tables.
- Rev. 3 spans NIST CSF 2.0's six Functions — Govern, Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, Recover — and maps Rev.
Why did NIST replace, rather than revise, the 2012 guide?
SP 800-61 Rev. 2 organized incident response around its own four-phase lifecycle (Preparation; Detection and Analysis; Containment, Eradication, and Recovery; Post-Incident Activity), published before the Cybersecurity Framework existed in its current form. By the time NIST CSF 2.0 (see our CSF 2.0 guide) was published in February 2024 with a new GOVERN Function and a reorganized set of Functions, Categories, and Subcategories, incident response guidance that predated CSF risked drifting out of sync with the framework most organizations were already using to structure their broader risk management program. Rev. 3's subtitle — "A CSF 2.0 Community Profile" — signals a deliberate choice to stop maintaining a separate incident-response lifecycle model and instead express incident response recommendations directly in CSF 2.0's own vocabulary.
The Rev. 3 text gives NIST's own reason in section 2.1. When the old model was written, "incidents were relatively rare," their scope was narrow, and response and recovery "was usually completed within a day or two." Today, it says, recovery "often takes weeks or months," and lessons learned "should often be shared as soon as they are identified, not delayed until after recovery concludes." Appendix C records the result as "a full rewrite" that shifts the document from handling guidelines to recommendations for building incident response into risk management. Much of the old how-to detail moved to the NIST Incident Response project page so that NIST can update links without a new revision.
What does a "CSF 2.0 Community Profile" mean here?
Rev. 3 defines a Community Profile as "a baseline of CSF outcomes that is created and published to address shared interests and goals for reducing cybersecurity risk among a number of organizations" (see our CSF 2.0 guide for Profiles and Tiers generally). By badging Rev. 3 as a Community Profile rather than a standalone guide, NIST signals that it is meant to be read and applied through CSF 2.0's structure: on its CSRC page its keywords include "Cybersecurity Framework" alongside "incident handling," "incident management," and "incident response," and it is tagged under Applications as "cybersecurity framework."
The profile itself is two tables. Table 2 covers Preparation (Govern, Identify, Protect) and Lessons Learned (the Improvement Category, ID.IM); Table 3 covers Incident Response (Detect, Respond, Recover). Every CSF Function, Category and Subcategory gets a row and a priority:
- High: "Functions as a core incident response activity for most organizations"
- Medium: "Directly supports incident response activities for most organizations"
- Low: "Indirectly supports incident response activities for most organizations"
The last column holds items marked R (recommendation), C (consideration) or N (note). Appending one to the CSF ID gives a unique reference; NIST's own example is "GV.OC-03.R1," which says cybersecurity requirements "should include all requirements related to incident notifications, data breach reporting, and other aspects of incident response." Those IDs are what a runbook or audit finding can cite precisely.
How do the old four phases map to the six Functions?
Rev. 3 spans NIST CSF 2.0's six Functions — Govern, Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, Recover — and maps Rev. 2's phases onto them in its own Table 1:
| Rev. 2 phase | CSF 2.0 Functions (Rev. 3, Table 1) |
|---|---|
| Preparation | Govern; Identify (all Categories); Protect |
| Detection & Analysis | Detect; Identify (Improvement Category) |
| Containment, Eradication & Recovery | Respond; Recover; Identify (Improvement Category) |
| Post-Incident Activity | Identify (Improvement Category) |
Two Functions carry the incident-response-specific Categories directly:
| Function | Relevant Categories | What they cover |
|---|---|---|
| Respond (RS) | Incident Management (RS.MA), Incident Analysis (RS.AN), Incident Response Reporting and Communication (RS.CO), Incident Mitigation (RS.MI) | Actions taken once an incident is detected |
| Recover (RC) | Incident Recovery Plan Execution (RC.RP), Incident Recovery Communication (RC.CO) | Restoring assets and operations afterward |
Rev. 3's Figure 2 draws this in three layers. Govern, Identify and Protect sit at the bottom: NIST says they "are not part of the incident response itself" but broader risk management that supports it. Detect, Respond and Recover form the top layer, the response proper. Improvement (ID.IM) sits between them and takes lessons from every Function at any time. CSF 2.0 itself says actions supporting Respond and Recover "should be ready at all times and happen when cybersecurity incidents occur" (CSWP 29). Rev. 3 also states that "organizations should use the incident response life cycle framework or model that suits them best"; the CSF model is NIST's recommendation, not a mandate.
Which Community Profile rows does NIST rate High priority?
Most Table 2 rows are Low or Medium, and NIST notes they "are outside of the direct scope of responding to incidents." The High rows sit mainly in Table 3 and in the Improvement Category. A selection, with the recommendation text shortened:
| CSF ID | Outcome | Example item in Rev. 3 |
|---|---|---|
| ID.IM-04 | Incident response and other plans are maintained and improved | R1: synchronize business continuity plans with incident response plans |
| DE.AE-08 | Incidents are declared when adverse events meet defined criteria | R1: apply incident criteria and consider known false positives |
| RS.MA-02 | Incident reports are triaged and validated | R2: have mechanisms for third parties to report possible incidents |
| RS.MA-03 | Incidents are categorized and prioritized | R2: prioritize by scope, likely impact, time-critical nature and resources |
| RS.AN-03 | What happened and the root cause are established | R3: find "the underlying or systemic root causes" |
| RS.AN-07 | Incident data is collected with integrity and provenance preserved | R1: retain evidence under the organization's preservation procedures |
| RS.CO-02 | Internal and external stakeholders are notified | R3: notify in line with the laws for your sectors and locations |
| RS.MI-01 / RS.MI-02 | Incidents are contained / eradicated | RS.MI-02 R1: identify all affected hosts and services |
| RC.RP-05 | Integrity of restored assets is verified | R1: check for indicators of compromise and fix root causes first |
| RC.RP-06 | End of recovery is declared and documented | R1: prepare an after-action report |
ID.RA-08, "processes for receiving, analyzing, and responding to vulnerability disclosures are established," is rated Medium and points to SP 800-216 for disclosure practice.
What does Rev. 3 expect from suppliers and service providers?
Section 2.2 describes incident response as a shared effort: handlers may be on staff, on contract, or "available when needed," and responsibilities transferred to a provider "should be clearly defined in a contract." For a product supplier the relevant rows are:
- GV.SC-05 R1: supply chain risk management requirements "should include cybersecurity performance and vulnerability, threat, and incident disclosure and information sharing."
- GV.SC-08 (Medium): relevant suppliers are included in incident planning, response and recovery.
- ID.IM-02: improvements come from exercises "done in coordination with suppliers and relevant third parties."
- RC.CO-03 R3/R4: follow contract rules for incident information sharing with suppliers, and coordinate crisis communication with critical suppliers.
The matching control on the buyer's side is SP 800-53 IR-6(3) Supply Chain Coordination, which asks the organization to provide incident information to "the provider of the product or service" (see our SP 800-53 guide). A device maker should expect customers to write these duties into contracts and to call its security contact during their incidents.
What should an incident response policy contain?
Section 2.3 lists the elements "most incident response policies include":
- statement of management commitment;
- purpose and objectives;
- scope (to whom, to what and under what circumstances it applies);
- definitions of events, incidents, investigations and related terms;
- roles, responsibilities and authorities, such as who may disconnect or shut down assets;
- guidelines for prioritizing incidents, estimating severity and initiating recovery;
- performance measures.
Procedures and playbooks sit under the policy. Rev. 3 points to the CISA incident and vulnerability response playbooks as playbook examples.
Worked example: what happens when a customer reports a compromised controller?
Hypothetical case, for illustration only. A maker of building-automation controllers receives an email from a customer's security team: two units are contacting an unknown external address.
RS.MA-02 (triage):the product security lead confirms the report, collects firmware versions and network captures from the customer, and rates severity. DE.AE-08 (declare):the traffic is not from any documented service on those versions, so the maker declares an incident under its own criteria and names an incident lead (RS.MA-01 C1). RS.AN-07 (evidence):the customer images one unit's flash; the maker records hashes and keeps a custody log. RS.AN-03 (root cause):analysis finds a default service account left in one release. The vulnerability, not malware in the build, is the root cause. RS.AN-08 (magnitude):the maker checks which other releases ship the same account, using the SBOM and build records per version. RS.MI-01 / RS.MI-02:the customer blocks the address and disables the account by configuration; the maker ships a fixed release. RS.CO-02 (notify):the maker notifies other affected customers and assesses whether any regulatory clock runs; in the EU, an actively exploited vulnerability can trigger the CRA reporting duty (see CRA 24-hour reporting). RC.RP-06 and ID.IM:an after-action report feeds a release-checklist change.
What are the common pitfalls?
- Keeping Rev. 2 phase names as the only index. Map them with Table 1 instead of rewriting everything.
- Reading the profile as a checklist of equal weight. The High rows are where response depends on readiness; Low rows can wait.
- Forgetting the supplier side. Device makers are both the incident victim in their own IT and a supplier in their customers' incidents. Plan for both.
- No evidence rules. RS.AN-06 and RS.AN-07 ask for integrity and provenance of records; a chat thread is not enough.
- Waiting for recovery to share lessons. Rev. 3 explicitly says lessons should often be shared as soon as identified.
What does this mean for teams still citing the 2012 guide?
Any runbook, vendor SOW, insurance questionnaire, or internal policy that cites "NIST SP 800-61" for its four-phase lifecycle is citing a document NIST itself now lists as withdrawn. That does not mean the underlying practices (preserve evidence, contain before eradicating, document lessons learned) stopped being good advice — but it does mean:
- The authoritative current reference has changed. Citing "NIST SP 800-61" without a revision number now points, by NIST's own numbering, to Rev. 3's CSF-aligned content rather than Rev. 2's phase model.
- Teams built around CSF 2.0 already have a natural home for Rev. 3. If an organization has mapped its program to CSF 2.0's Functions and Categories, Rev. 3's recommendations can be read directly against the RS and RC Categories already in that Profile.
- Teams that have not adopted CSF 2.0 face a two-step adoption, first getting familiar with the six-Function structure, then applying Rev. 3's incident-specific recommendations within it — rather than adopting Rev. 3 as an island, the way Rev. 2 could be.
Where does this sit next to related guidance?
Incident response sits downstream of the vulnerability-handling and disclosure processes covered in our CVD process: ISO/IEC 29147 and 30111 guide and the prioritization models in our SSVC guide and KEV + EPSS guide — those help decide which vulnerabilities and signals warrant attention before an incident occurs, while SP 800-61 Rev. 3 covers what happens once a cybersecurity incident is actually underway. ISO/IEC 27035 is the international counterpart (see our ISO/IEC 27035 guide), and information sharing under RS.CO-03 is covered in our SP 800-150 guide. For OT-specific incident handling, SP 800-61 Rev. 3's general CSF-aligned recommendations should be read alongside sector-specific guidance such as NIST SP 800-82 (OT security), which this guide does not attempt to summarize.
What is a workable starting point?
Stop citing Rev. 2 as currentIt is formally withdrawn; update internal policy documents, vendor questionnaires, and training materials to reference Rev. 3 by name. Anchor incident response work in CSF 2.0's RESPOND and RECOVER Categories(RS.MA, RS.AN, RS.CO, RS.MI, RC.RP, RC.CO) rather than reconstructing a separate phase taxonomy, if your organization already tracks CSF 2.0. Treat Govern, Identify, Protect, and Detect as part of incident-response readiness, not a separate program — Rev. 3's own framing explicitly extends incident response considerations into those Functions rather than confining them to RS/RC. Re-map any Rev. 2-era runbook contentonto Rev. 3's Categories using NIST's Table 1, and cite the R/C/N identifiers you adopt, rather than assuming the old phase labels still carry NIST's authority unchanged. For product incidents, keep an SBOM per shipped version, so the RS.AN-08 magnitude check (which other units and versions are affected) has a fast answer (see PSIRT set-up for a hardware company).
SoftWSP's PSIRT service handles vulnerability intake, triage and researcher contact for device makers and drafts CRA reports for the manufacturer to submit. On the platform, firmware SBOMs are matched against NVD, CISA KEV, FIRST EPSS and CISA's CSAF ICS advisories, and watchlist alerts on a CVE ID, vendor or product flag new advisories; it does not perform forensics or network detection.
This guide summarises NIST SP 800-61 Rev. 3, its CSRC publication pages and the Rev. 2 withdrawal notice; it does not constitute legal or compliance advice.
Put this guide to work
Frequently asked questions
What is NIST SP 800-61 Rev. 3?
A NIST Special Publication titled "Incident Response Recommendations and Considerations for Cybersecurity Risk Management: A CSF 2.0 Community Profile," published in April 2025. NIST's own abstract states it "seeks to assist organizations with incorporating cybersecurity incident response recommendations and considerations throughout their cybersecurity risk management activities as described by the NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) 2.0," with the goal of helping organizations "prepare for incident responses, reduce the number and impact of incidents that occur, and improve the efficiency and effectiveness of their incident detection, response, and recovery activities."
What happened to the old SP 800-61 Rev. 2, the Computer Security Incident Handling Guide?
NIST withdrew it. SP 800-61 Rev. 2, "Computer Security Incident Handling Guide," was originally published in August 2012 (itself superseding a March 2008 Rev. 1), and NIST's own publication record states it "was withdrawn on April 3, 2025" and "superseded by SP 800-61 Rev. 3." Any team or vendor still citing Rev. 2's classic Preparation/Detection-and-Analysis/Containment-Eradication-and-Recovery/Post-Incident-Activity phase model is citing a withdrawn document — Rev. 3 replaces that structure rather than extending it.
What is a "CSF 2.0 Community Profile," and why does that matter for Rev. 3?
It is NIST's term for a shared, sector- or topic-specific starting point built on the Cybersecurity Framework's structure — see our [NIST CSF 2.0 guide](/guides/nist-csf-2-0/) for Profiles and Tiers generally. Rev. 3 is explicitly built this way rather than as a standalone methodology: NIST's own page lists its keywords as including "Cybersecurity Framework," and its Applications tag as "cybersecurity framework," signaling that the document's organizing logic is now CSF 2.0's six Functions (Govern, Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, Recover) rather than a dedicated incident-response phase diagram.
Does Rev. 3 still use the old Preparation / Detection & Analysis / Containment-Eradication-Recovery / Post-Incident phases?
Not as its primary structure. NIST's own executive summary for Rev. 3 describes the document in terms of the CSF 2.0 Functions — Govern, Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, Recover — rather than the four-phase lifecycle that organized Rev. 2. Teams whose runbooks, tooling, or vendor contracts still reference Rev. 2's phase names by that document's authority should confirm how (or whether) those phases map onto Rev. 3's CSF-aligned structure, since Rev. 2 is withdrawn rather than merely superseded-but-still-valid.
What are the CSF 2.0 Functions and Categories most relevant to incident response?
Per our own [NIST CSF 2.0 guide](/guides/nist-csf-2-0/), CSF 2.0's RESPOND Function (RS) breaks into four Categories — Incident Management (RS.MA), Incident Analysis (RS.AN), Incident Response Reporting and Communication (RS.CO), and Incident Mitigation (RS.MI) — and RECOVER (RC) breaks into Incident Recovery Plan Execution (RC.RP) and Incident Recovery Communication (RC.CO). NIST frames RESPOND and RECOVER as the two Functions that "should be ready at all times and happen when cybersecurity incidents occur," in contrast to the continuously-running GOVERN, IDENTIFY, PROTECT, and DETECT. SP 800-61 Rev. 3's stated purpose is to give organizations recommendations that sit across this full six-Function model, not only inside RESPOND and RECOVER.
Sources
- NIST CSRC: SP 800-61 Rev. 3 publication page — abstract, keywords, topics
- NIST CSRC: SP 800-61 Rev. 2 publication page — withdrawal notice (withdrawn 3 April 2025, superseded by Rev. 3)
- CISA: Federal Government Cybersecurity Incident and Vulnerability Response Playbooks (built on the incident response phases defined in NIST SP 800-61)
- NIST SP 800-61r3 full text (PDF): Tables 1–3, Sections 2.1–2.3, Appendix C
- NIST CSWP 29: The NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) 2.0 (26 February 2024)
- NIST CSRC: Incident Response project page (SP 800-61 online resources)
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