To set up a PSIRT (product security incident response team) in a hardware company, publish a way to receive vulnerability reports, name the people who triage them, agree how fixes and advisories are released, and, for products sold in the EU, build a tested route to file Cyber Resilience Act reports within 24 hours (early warning) and 72 hours (full notification) of becoming aware of active exploitation — obligations already in force since 11 September 2026. Seven steps below cover all of it for a small or mid-size device maker.
Key takeaways
- A minimum viable PSIRT has six parts: intake with a security.txt file, a triage rule, a route to a CVE ID, a fix-and-release path, a CSAF advisory, and VEX statements on which products are affected.
- Firmware stays in the field for years, and a vulnerability found in a product you shipped is still your problem.
- A vulnerability disclosure policy that says what is in scope, how to report, what reporters can expect and what you will not do (no legal action against good-faith research).
- With two people, one leads and one deputises, and both can act alone on any step; with three, the third person owns regulatory reports and the advisory.
What is the minimum viable PSIRT for a small device maker?
A minimum viable PSIRT has six parts: intake with a security.txt file, a triage rule, a route to a CVE ID, a fix-and-release path, a CSAF advisory, and VEX statements on which products are affected. Each part is small, and one to three people can run all of them if the templates exist before the first report.
| Part | Minimum that works | Step |
|---|---|---|
| Intake | Disclosure policy, security.txt, one monitored inbox | 1 |
| People | A lead, a deputy and a regulatory contact | 2 |
| Triage | Reproduce, score with CVSS, check KEV and EPSS | 3 |
| CVE ID | Request through a CNA whose scope covers the product | 4 |
| Fix and advisory | Free security update, CSAF advisory with VEX | 5 |
| CRA route | Tested Single Reporting Platform access | 6 |
Why does a hardware company need a PSIRT now?
Firmware stays in the field for years, and a vulnerability found in a product you shipped is still your problem. The EU Cyber Resilience Act (Regulation (EU) 2024/2847) turned that into law: since 11 September 2026, manufacturers must report actively exploited vulnerabilities and severe incidents in their products under Article 14, and from 11 December 2027 the vulnerability handling duties in Annex I Part II apply to every product placed on the EU market. Article 69(3) of the Regulation makes the reporting duty reach back: Article 14 applies to products placed on the market before 11 December 2027 as well, so cameras sold in 2023 are covered. Buyers' security questionnaires ask for the same thing: a working process, not a shared mailbox.
Step 1: Publish how researchers can reach you
- A vulnerability disclosure policy that says what is in scope, how to report, what reporters can expect and what you will not do (no legal action against good-faith research). Our VDP template is a starting point.
- A security.txt file at
/.well-known/security.txtwith a contact, an expiry date and a link to the policy. RFC 9116 makesContactandExpiresmandatory, allowsExpiresonly once and recommends a date less than a year ahead. Our security.txt guide for product makers walks through every field. - One security@ address that is monitored every day, with an encryption key if you accept sensitive details.
This covers Annex I Part II points (5) and (6): a coordinated vulnerability disclosure policy and a contact address for reporting vulnerabilities, including in third-party components. Put the Expires date in a shared calendar: a stale file tells researchers your contact may no longer work.
Step 2: Who does what with one, two or three people?
With two people, one leads and one deputises, and both can act alone on any step; with three, the third person owns regulatory reports and the advisory. A single person cannot cover a 24-hour clock through holidays, so a one-person PSIRT needs an outsourced intake or a named back-up outside the team.
| Task | 1 person | 2 people | 3 people |
|---|---|---|---|
| Watch the inbox, acknowledge reports | Owner + outsourced intake | Lead and deputy on a rota | Lead and deputy on a rota |
| Reproduce, score, decide priority | Owner | Lead; deputy reproduces | Lead; deputy reproduces |
| Request the CVE ID, coordinate suppliers | Owner | Lead | Lead |
| Build and test the fix | Owner with the product engineer | Deputy with the product engineer | Deputy with the product engineer |
| Advisory, CSAF and VEX | Owner | Lead writes, deputy checks | Regulatory contact writes, lead checks |
| Sign CRA reports | Owner or managing director | Lead with management sign-off | Regulatory contact |
Step 3: Triage every report the same way
Acknowledgethe reporter quickly and give a reference number. For published deadlines to set your own targets against, see PSIRT response SLA examples. Reproduceon the affected firmware versions; use the SBOM of each version to see which models share the vulnerable component. See firmware SBOM. Scoreseverity with CVSS, using the CVSS calculator so every case records the same vector, and prioritise with exploitation data such as CISA KEV and EPSS. See KEV and EPSS. Decidewhether there is reliable evidence of active exploitation. If there is, the CRA clock in Step 6 has started.
ISO/IEC 30111 describes this internal handling process; ISO/IEC 29147 describes the reporter-facing side. Our CVD process guide explains both.
Step 4: Get a CVE ID through a CNA
A confirmed vulnerability that will be disclosed should get a CVE ID, so customers' scanners can match it. Only a CVE Numbering Authority (CNA) assigns one, and the CNA Operational Rules 4.2.1 list "Software and hardware Suppliers, including product security incident response teams (PSIRTs)" among the organisations that become CNAs. Rule 4.2.1.1 gives the first opportunity to assign to the CNA with the most appropriate scope, often the supplier of the product. A small maker that is not a CNA asks a CNA whose published scope covers it; when the flaw sits in a chip vendor's SDK, that vendor may own the assignment. CNA rules explained covers the process.
Step 5: Fix, release and publish a CSAF advisory with VEX
- Fix without delay and ship the security update free of charge, with an advisory that states the impact and what users should do (Annex I Part II points (2) and (8)).
- Distribute updates securely: signed images, integrity checks, rollback protection (point (7)).
- After the fix is out, publish the advisory: affected products and versions, impact, severity and remediation (point (4)).
- Publish it in CSAF too. The CSAF 2.0 standard defines a "Security Advisory" profile and a "VEX" profile; VEX gives each product one of four states,
fixed,known_affected,known_not_affectedorunder_investigation, and requires an impact statement for every product marked not affected. See CSAF and VEX. - Credit the reporter if they agree.
When the vulnerable code sits in a chip vendor's SDK or an ODM's build, coordinate with them; ISO/IEC TR 5895 covers multi-party disclosure.
Step 6: Prepare the CRA reporting route
| Report | Deadline under Article 14 |
|---|---|
| Early warning, actively exploited vulnerability or severe incident | Within 24 hours of becoming aware |
| Vulnerability or incident notification | Within 72 hours of becoming aware |
| Final report, exploited vulnerability | At most 14 days after a corrective or mitigating measure is available |
| Final report, severe incident | Within one month after the 72-hour notification |
Reports go through the ENISA Single Reporting Platform to the coordinating CSIRT of your main EU establishment. Test access with at least two people before you need it, and keep templates ready. Details: CRA 24h/72h reporting.
Under Article 14(7), a manufacturer with no EU establishment notifies the CSIRT of the Member State of its authorised representative, then importer, then distributor, and otherwise of the Member State with the most users. Article 14(8) adds a second audience: once aware, inform the impacted users about the vulnerability or incident and the mitigations they can apply, where appropriate in a machine-readable format. ENISA's Single Reporting Platform page links the platform, its user guides and the list of CSIRTs designated as coordinators; on 2026-11-13 it noted that the platform was upgraded to version 1.3 on 4 November 2026.
Step 7: Record every case and review it
Log when you became aware, what you knew, what you decided and what you sent; authorities and customers will look at the timeline. After every significant case, check what was slow: intake, reproduction, the supplier, the release. Feed the result into the next release and into supplier contracts, for example agreed fix times for your ODM.
Which CRA duty does each step cover?
Each step above answers a specific provision of the Cyber Resilience Act. The table is our mapping of the Regulation text, read on 2026-11-13; the last column is the evidence an authority or a customer audit can ask to see. CRA Annex I explained covers the whole annex.
| CRA provision | What it requires (condensed) | Step | Evidence to keep |
|---|---|---|---|
| Annex I Part II (1) | Document vulnerabilities and components, with an SBOM | 3 | SBOM per firmware version |
| Annex I Part II (2), (7), (8) | Remediate without delay; separate security updates where feasible; distribute securely and free of charge with advisories | 5 | Fix tickets, signed releases, notices |
| Annex I Part II (3) | Regular security tests and reviews | 7 | Test reports, case reviews |
| Annex I Part II (4) | Disclose fixed vulnerabilities with impact, severity and remediation | 4, 5 | CVE records, published advisories |
| Annex I Part II (5), (6) | Enforce a CVD policy; provide a contact address, including for third-party components | 1 | Policy history, security.txt |
| Article 13(6) | Report a component vulnerability to its maintainer and share the fix | 5 | Upstream report, patch record |
| Article 13(8) and (9) | Handle vulnerabilities for the support period (at least five years, unless the product is expected to be in use for less); keep updates available for 10 years or the support period, if longer | 2, 5 | Declared support period, update archive |
| Article 14(1) to (4), (8) | Early warning, notification, final report; inform impacted users | 6 | Submitted reports with timestamps, user notice |
Article 13(7) also asks manufacturers to document the vulnerabilities they become aware of; Step 7 produces that record.
Worked example: what does the first serious case look like, hour by hour?
This is a hypothetical example, not a customer case. A 40-person maker of IP cameras, established in Germany, ships firmware built on a chip vendor's SDK. Its PSIRT is the head of firmware (lead) and a senior engineer (deputy), with the managing director as regulatory contact.
Friday 17:40A researcher emails security@ with a proof of concept for a command injection in the camera's web interface. The on-call deputy acknowledges within the hour. Friday 19:00The deputy reproduces the issue. The SBOMs of the firmware versions in support show the vulnerable web server component in four camera models. Saturday 10:00The lead records a CVSS vector and checks CISA KEV, vendor advisories and the report for signs of exploitation. There are none, so the case runs under the CVD policy and no CRA clock starts. Tuesday 15:00An installer reports cameras rebooting with unknown processes and shares logs that match the same injection. The lead records this as reliable evidence of active exploitation. The 24-hour clock of Article 14(2)(a) starts at this moment of awareness. Wednesday 11:00The early warning goes through the Single Reporting Platform to the German CSIRT designated as coordinator, naming the Member States where the four models are sold. ThursdayThe notification follows inside 72 hours: affected products, the general nature of the exploit, the mitigation users can apply now (turn off remote web access). Impacted users receive the same mitigation under Article 14(8). Day 9 after the first reportA signed fix ships free of charge with an advisory and a CSAF file under the CVE ID the chip vendor's CNA assigned. The chip vendor also receives the patch under Article 13(6). Within 14 days of the fixThe final report describes the vulnerability, its severity and impact, what is known about the attacker, and the security update.
What kept the clock manageable. The SBOM of each firmware version answered "which models?" within an hour. Two people had already tested the reporting platform, and the templates were ready.
Where does AI help in PSIRT triage, and where does it stop?
AI helps with reading and writing around a case; the decisions stay with named people. Matching components to known CVEs and ranking them by KEV, EPSS and CVSS is work that code does reproducibly. A language model is useful for turning that ranked list into readable notes, summarising a long researcher report, and drafting advisories or VEX justifications from evidence an engineer collected.
It should not decide that a product is not affected, set a severity or judge active exploitation, because each of those is a statement the manufacturer signs. SoftWSP works this way: code extracts the SBOM from a firmware image, matches it against NVD, CISA KEV, FIRST EPSS and CSAF advisories and scores it with a fixed ruleset, and AI drafts a report in which every claim sentence must cite a matched record, for an engineer to review. AI-assisted SBOM and vulnerability triage shows the full path.
What should be ready before the first report arrives?
- Policy and security.txt published, the file signed, and its
Expiresdate in a shared calendar. - security@ inbox checked every day by a named person, with an auto-reply that says what reporters can expect.
- Rota covering weekends and holidays.
- SBOM for every firmware version in support, so "which models?" takes minutes.
- Written decision rules: the CVSS version you use, how KEV and EPSS feed priority, and who decides that a case shows active exploitation.
- A CNA contact for CVE IDs, or your own CNA scope.
- Reporting platform access tested by two people, and the coordinating CSIRT identified under Article 14(7).
- Templates for acknowledgment, early warning, notification, final report, user notice and CSAF advisory.
- Supplier contacts at the chip vendor and the ODM, with agreed response times and a sharing rule such as TLP.
- Support period declared for each product and stated in the user information.
Once these basics run reliably, FIRST's PSIRT Services Framework describes the full catalogue of PSIRT services, and the PSIRT Maturity Document helps you decide what to add next.
What are the common pitfalls?
- Starting the clock at confirmation. Article 14 counts from when the manufacturer becomes aware of active exploitation. Write down who decides, then log the time.
- Forgetting the users. Informing impacted users under Article 14(8) is a separate duty from notifying the CSIRT.
- Forgetting old products. Article 69(3) puts products sold before December 2027 under the reporting duty too.
- No SBOM per version. Without one you cannot say which models are affected within 24 hours.
- Fixing only your own copy. Article 13(6) asks you to report a component vulnerability to its maintainer and share your fix.
- A one-person PSIRT. A 24-hour deadline needs a deputy who can act when the lead is away.
Run it yourself or outsource it
A small device maker can run this process with two named people and good templates. If nobody can watch the security inbox every day, intake and coordination can be outsourced while you keep the decisions. SoftWSP's PSIRT service does exactly that: we triage reports, check which products contain the component, and draft CRA reports for the manufacturer to sign and submit.
Put this guide to work
Frequently asked questions
What is the minimum PSIRT a small hardware company needs?
A published vulnerability disclosure policy and security.txt file, one monitored security contact address, a named owner and a deputy who triage every report, a severity rule, a fix-and-advisory process, and for products sold in the EU a tested route to file Cyber Resilience Act reports within 24 and 72 hours.
Does a PSIRT need full-time staff?
Not necessarily. Many small device makers run the PSIRT as a role shared by a product owner and a firmware engineer, with an on-call rota for weekends, or outsource intake and coordination while keeping decisions in-house.
Which standards describe a PSIRT process?
ISO/IEC 29147:2018 covers receiving reports and disclosing remediation information, ISO/IEC 30111:2019 covers the internal handling process, and FIRST's own framework page describes its PSIRT Services Framework v1.1 as a document "detailing possible services that... product incident response teams (PSIRTs) may provide." ISO/IEC TR 5895:2022 covers multi-party disclosure, common when firmware is built on third-party SDKs.
What does the Cyber Resilience Act require from a PSIRT?
Annex I Part II of the Cyber Resilience Act (Regulation (EU) 2024/2847) requires a coordinated vulnerability disclosure policy, a contact address for vulnerability reports, fixes without delay, free security updates with advisories, and public disclosure of fixed vulnerabilities. Article 14 adds reports on actively exploited vulnerabilities and severe incidents; the European Commission's own CRA reporting page states manufacturers must submit "an early warning within 24 hours of becoming aware" and "a full notification within 72 hours," plus a final report.
How is a PSIRT different from a SOC?
A SOC watches your own IT systems for attacks. A PSIRT handles vulnerabilities in the products you sell, including firmware already in customers' hands, and coordinates with the reporters, suppliers and users of those products.
Does a small device maker need to become a CVE Numbering Authority?
No. A maker that is not a CNA can ask a CNA whose published scope covers the product. The CVE Program's CNA Operational Rules 4.2.1 state in rule 4.2.1.1: "The CNA with the most appropriate scope MUST be contacted and given the first opportunity to assign. In many cases, this CNA is the Supplier of the Product in question." Makers that publish advisories regularly often become CNAs themselves, and the rules list hardware suppliers and their PSIRTs among typical CNAs.
Sources
- Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 (Cyber Resilience Act), Articles 13, 14, 69(3), 71(2) and Annex I Part II, EUR-Lex (OJ L, 20 Nov 2024; read 13 Nov 2026)
- European Commission: CRA reporting obligations
- ISO/IEC 29147:2018 — Vulnerability disclosure (ISO catalogue)
- ISO/IEC 30111:2019 — Vulnerability handling processes (ISO catalogue)
- FIRST: PSIRT Services Framework, Version 1.1
- RFC 9116: A File Format to Aid in Security Vulnerability Disclosure (security.txt)
- ENISA: CRA Single Reporting Platform (SRP), user guidance and list of CSIRTs designated as coordinators (read 13 Nov 2026)
- CVE Program: CNA Operational Rules, Version 4.2.1 (effective 20 October 2026; read 13 Nov 2026)
- OASIS: Common Security Advisory Framework (CSAF) Version 2.0, OASIS Standard (18 Nov 2022; read 13 Nov 2026)
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