NIST SP 800-172A Revision 3, "Assessing Enhanced Security Requirements for Controlled Unclassified Information," is the companion assessment-procedures document that tells an assessor how to verify the 103 active enhanced requirements in SP 800-172 are actually in place against the advanced persistent threat. Per its own abstract, the publication "provides federal agencies with assessment procedures for the enhanced security requirements in NIST SP 800-172," supporting "(1) self-assessments; (2) independent, third-party assessments; or (3) government-sponsored assessments." Authored by Victoria Pillitteri and Ron Ross, Revision 3 was approved by the NIST Editorial Review Board on 2026-04-27 and published in May 2026, superseding the original edition of 15 March 2022.
Key takeaways
- Section 1.2 of the publication is explicit about its own lineage: Section 2 "mirrors the material included [in] SP 800-171A, Sec.
- Every determination statement in SP 800-172A carries a trailing "E" before its segment separators, marking it as targeting an SP 800-172 enhanced requirement rather than a baseline SP 800-171 one.
- Most of the 103 procedures assess the contractor's own operations: a security operations center, threat hunting, training.
- Prepare. The organization sets objective, scope and time frame, selects assessors with independence in mind, and hands over artifacts.
How is this built directly on SP 800-171A's model?
Section 1.2 of the publication is explicit about its own lineage: Section 2 "mirrors the material included [in] SP 800-171A, Sec. 2, with minor updates to reflect the enhanced security requirements and assessment procedures." That means the same building blocks carry over from our SP 800-171A guide:
- Three assessment methods — examine ("the process of reviewing, studying, inspecting, or analyzing assessment objects"), interview ("the process of holding discussions with individuals or groups about assessment objects"), and test ("the process of exercising assessment objects... under specified conditions to compare actual with expected behavior").
- Four assessment object categories — specifications (documented artifacts), mechanisms (hardware/software/firmware safeguards), activities (protection-related actions involving people), and individuals.
- Depth and coverage attributes, which Section 2.1 says define "the rigor, scope, and level of effort for the assessment as well as the degree of assurance" — for the full basic/focused/comprehensive definitions, the publication points to SP 800-53A rather than redefining them (see our SP 800-53A guide).
Section 2.2 confirms the same lineage for the overall process: "The assessment procedures in this publication are based on and sourced to the assessment procedures in SP 800-53A."
What does the trailing "E" in an identifier mean?
Every determination statement in SP 800-172A carries a trailing "E" before its segment separators, marking it as targeting an SP 800-172 enhanced requirement rather than a baseline SP 800-171 one. The publication's own worked example:
03.01.01E Dual Authorization— ASSESSMENT OBJECTIVE: Determine ifA.03.01.01E.ODP[01]: privileged commands and/or other actions requiring dual authorization are defined, andA.03.01.01E: dual authorization is enforced for them. REFERENCES — Source Assessment Procedures: AC-03(02).
As with SP 800-171A, organization-defined parameters (ODPs) appear as ODP[nn] in square brackets, and square brackets separately mark where one requirement has been decomposed into several granular determination statements (e.g., A.03.10.03E.a[01] through [04]).
How many families and active procedures are there?
Section 3 groups its procedures into the same 17 families Table 1 of SP 800-172 defines: Access Control, Awareness and Training, Audit and Accountability, Configuration Management, Identification and Authentication, Incident Response, Maintenance, Media Protection, Personnel Security, Physical Protection, Planning, Risk Assessment, Security Assessment and Monitoring, System and Communications Protection, System and Information Integrity, System and Services Acquisition, and Supply Chain Risk Management.
Reading the final PDF directly, exactly 12 requirement identifiers are marked "Withdrawn" and carry no assessment procedure: 03.01.03E, 03.04.01E, 03.09.01E, 03.09.02E, 03.11.04E through 03.11.07E, 03.14.02E, 03.14.03E, 03.14.06E, and 03.14.07E. That matches, identifier for identifier, the 12 withdrawn requirements our SP 800-172 guide found by counting SP 800-172's own requirement table — leaving active assessment procedures for the same 103 enhanced requirements currently in force.
Which procedures reach firmware, devices and suppliers?
Most of the 103 procedures assess the contractor's own operations: a security operations center, threat hunting, training. A smaller group lands on the products the contractor buys and deploys, and the evidence for those often has to come from the device or firmware maker. The rows below are taken from the procedures in the Rev. 3 PDF; the last column is our reading of what a supplier can realistically hand over.
| Procedure | What the assessor determines | SP 800-53A source | Evidence a device maker can supply |
|---|---|---|---|
03.04.03E Automated Maintenance of System Component Inventory |
Automated mechanisms keep the component inventory current, complete, accurate and available | CM-08(02) | Machine-readable component list per release |
03.05.01E Cryptographic Bidirectional Authentication |
Defined devices authenticate before connecting, using cryptographically based bidirectional authentication | IA-03(01) | Mutual-TLS or equivalent design note, test log |
03.05.03E Device Attestation |
Device identification and authentication are handled based on attestation, through a defined configuration management process | IA-03(04) | Attestation design (key provisioning, what is measured) |
03.05.04E No Embedded Unencrypted Static Authenticators |
Unencrypted static authenticators are not embedded in applications or other static storage | IA-05(07) | Image scan for embedded credentials, fix record |
03.14.09E Cryptographic Protection |
Cryptographic mechanisms detect unauthorized changes to software, firmware and information | SI-07(06) | Signed-image format, verification code path |
03.14.10E Protection of Boot Firmware |
Defined mechanisms protect the integrity of boot firmware in defined components | SI-07(10) | Secure-boot chain description, refused-image test |
03.17.03E Component Authenticity |
Anti-counterfeit policy and procedures detect and prevent counterfeit components | SR-11 | Authorized-channel statement, serial verification method |
03.17.05E Supply Chain Integrity – Pedigree |
Integrity safeguards and an analysis method validate internal composition and provenance | SR-04(04) | SBOM, hardware component inventory, firmware hashes |
The pedigree procedure is unusually concrete about artifacts. Its examine list includes a "bill of materials for critical systems or system components" and "manufacturer declarations of platform attributes (e.g., serial numbers, hardware component inventory) and measurements (e.g., firmware hashes) that are tightly bound to the hardware itself." For background on the boot-integrity rows, see our guide to secure boot and hardware roots of trust; for the inventory and pedigree rows, see firmware SBOM.
How do findings feed the assurance case?
Applying a procedure produces one of two findings (Section 2.1): satisfied, where "the assessment objective has been met, producing a fully acceptable result," or other than satisfied, covering either a genuine anomaly needing remediation or a case where "the assessor was unable to obtain sufficient information to make the specific determination called for." Section 2.2 frames this evidence as part of a broader assurance case — "a body of evidence organized into an argument demonstrating" compliance — that can combine the publication's own system-level procedures with independent third-party product assessments. The publication specifically cites Common Criteria Testing Laboratories evaluating products under ISO/IEC 15408 and Cryptographic Module Validation Program testing laboratories evaluating modules under FIPS 140 as examples of assessments that can feed into the same assurance case (see our FIPS 140-3 guide).
How does an assessment run, phase by phase?
Appendix D describes a four-phase process "based on the methodology in SP 800-53A":
PrepareThe organization sets objective, scope and time frame, selects assessors with independence in mind, and hands over artifacts. Footnote 6 lists prior results that may be reused, including "vulnerability scans," "vendor flaw remediation activities," and "ISO 15408 evaluations." PlanAssessors pick the requirements in scope from the system security plan, select and tailor procedures (methods, objects, depth and coverage values), and remove duplicated effort before the plan is approved. ConductEach determination statement yields satisfied or other than satisfied, and the result is an assessment report. Analyze and reportFindings drive a risk response — acceptance, mitigation, rejection, transfer or sharing — and updates to the system security plan and plan of action and milestones.
For a supplier, phase 1 is where its evidence enters. Material that arrives during phase 3 tends to become an "insufficient information" finding.
Which edition does CMMC Level 3 use?
Not Rev. 3. The CMMC Program rule, 32 CFR Part 170, incorporates by reference "SP 800-172A, Assessing Enhanced Security Requirements for Controlled Unclassified Information, March 2022" and the February 2021 SP 800-172. The eCFR text, current to 9 November 2026, still carries that wording; Part 170 was last amended on 16 December 2024.
| Item | What 32 CFR 170 says |
|---|---|
| Requirement set | Table 1 to §170.14(c)(4): 24 selected SP 800-172 Feb2021 requirements, with DoD-set ODPs |
| Assessor | §170.18: DCMA DIBCAC, after a Final Level 2 (C3PAO) status on the same scope; repeated every three years |
| Evidence record | §170.18 requires "the return value of the hashing algorithm" for each artifact name to be uploaded to eMASS |
| POA&M | §170.21(a)(3): score at least 0.8 of the total; seven named requirements may not be deferred; closeout within 180 days |
The numbering gap matters in practice. By identifier, nine of the 24 CMMC Level 3 requirements — 3.1.3e, 3.4.1e, 3.9.2e, 3.11.4e to 3.11.7e, 3.14.3e and 3.14.6e — sit on slots that Rev. 3 marks "Withdrawn." One of them, 3.14.3e, is the CMMC requirement that brings "specialized assets including IoT, IIoT, OT" into scope; SP 800-172 Rev. 3 says its slot is "Addressed by 03.15.01E, 03.13.16E," and three SP 800-171 requirements. A CMMC package therefore cites the 2021/2022 identifiers, while Rev. 3 governs contracts that name it directly. Our SP 800-171 and CMMC guide covers the Level 2 side.
What changed from the 2022 edition?
Appendix F's change log lists four changes from the original 15 March 2022 edition: restructuring the assessment procedure syntax to align with SP 800-53A, adding assessment procedures for the new and revised requirements introduced in SP 800-172 Revision 3, adding a references section naming each procedure's source SP 800-53A control, and a one-time version-number change to stay aligned with SP 800-172 Revision 3's own numbering.
Worked example: what does a supplier evidence pack look like?
Synthetic example. "GW-200" is an invented network gateway, not a real product or customer. A defense prime's contract for a critical program conveys an SP 800-172 Rev. 3 subset, and the prime's assessor plans 03.05.03E, 03.05.04E, 03.14.10E and 03.17.05E against systems that include the GW-200. The gateway's maker prepares:
Scope sheetWhich of the prime's selected procedures touch the GW-200, and the ODP values the prime has set (for example, which components need boot-firmware protection). ODPs are the prime's to define; the maker asks for them in writing. Boot firmware (`A.03.14.10E`)A two-page description of the boot chain and signing-key custody, plus a test record showing that an image with one modified byte is refused at boot. Attestation (`A.03.05.03E`)How device identity keys are provisioned at the factory. Where a hardware variant has no attestation support, the pack says so, so the prime can plan for an "other than satisfied" result instead of discovering it in phase 3. Static authenticators (`A.03.05.04E`)The result of a credential search across the release image and the fix record for one test key found in a debug script (see how to fix hard-coded credentials). Pedigree (`A.03.17.05E`)The CycloneDX SBOM for release 4.2.1 and SHA-256 hashes of the shipped images. The prime's team can open the SBOM in the SBOM viewer. IndexOne table: artifact name, version, hash, and the determination statement it supports.
What are the common pitfalls?
- Citing the wrong edition. A CMMC Level 3 package uses the February 2021 and March 2022 identifiers; a Rev. 3 contract uses
03.xx.xxE. Mixing them makes the assessor reconcile numbering instead of reviewing evidence. - Leaving ODPs blank. Where a requirement has an ODP, the first determination statement is that the ODP "is defined." An undefined value fails before any mechanism is examined.
- Treating the select-from list as a checklist. The introduction says the list "should not be directly associated with actual compliance or noncompliance."
- Unversioned evidence. A design note that names no firmware version cannot be tested, and under CMMC each artifact is recorded by hash.
- Over-reading a module certificate. A FIPS 140-3 validation covers the module, version and operating environment on the certificate, not the device's boot chain or attestation.
What is a workable starting point?
Only build to this after SP 800-172 itself appliesLike its parent publication, SP 800-172A only matters once a federal agency has designated specific CUI as tied to a critical program or high-value asset and conveyed a selected requirement subset in a contract. Reuse SP 800-171A assessment skills directlyThe methodology, object categories, and depth/coverage model are unchanged — the only new habit to build is reading the trailing "E" correctly and following each procedure's REFERENCES line back to its SP 800-53A source control. Decide which assessment type fits before planningSelf-assessment, independent third-party assessment, and government-sponsored assessment are explicitly presented as equally valid starting points — the right choice depends on who needs to rely on the resulting assurance case. Don't treat the full object list as a checklistAs with SP 800-53A and SP 800-171A, the broad list of potential methods and objects for a procedure "does not necessarily reflect and should not be directly associated with actual compliance or noncompliance" on its own. Track SP 800-172 and SP 800-172A as a pairBoth were revised to Rev. 3 together in May 2026; confirm any CMMC or contract reference points to the revision you expect before relying on a specific procedure.
SoftWSP extracts a CycloneDX 1.6 SBOM from a firmware image, matches its components against NVD, CISA KEV, FIRST EPSS and CISA CSAF ICS advisories, and drafts a cited report for an engineer to review. That output can be one examine artifact for the inventory and pedigree rows above; it does not test boot-firmware protection or attestation, and it is not an SP 800-172A assessment. See Device & Firmware Security.
This guide summarises NIST SP 800-172A Revision 3 (May 2026), the related SP 800-172/SP 800-53A publications and 32 CFR Part 170 as published on eCFR; it is not a substitute for the full text and does not constitute compliance or legal advice.
Put this guide to work
Frequently asked questions
What is NIST SP 800-172A?
"Assessing Enhanced Security Requirements for Controlled Unclassified Information" — the companion assessment-procedures document to [NIST SP 800-172](/guides/nist-sp-800-172-enhanced-security-requirements/). Per its own abstract, "this publication provides federal agencies with assessment procedures for the enhanced security requirements in NIST SP 800-172," with procedures that "are flexible and can be tailored to the needs of federal agencies and assessors," supporting "(1) self-assessments; (2) independent, third-party assessments; or (3) government-sponsored assessments," each conducted "with varying degrees of rigor based on federal agency-defined depth and coverage attributes." Revision 3, authored by Victoria Pillitteri and Ron Ross, was approved by the NIST Editorial Review Board on 2026-04-27 and published in May 2026, superseding the original edition of 15 March 2022.
How is this different from SP 800-171A, and what do the "E"-suffixed identifiers mean?
SP 800-171A assesses SP 800-171's baseline CUI requirements; SP 800-172A assesses the smaller, stricter set of enhanced requirements in SP 800-172 that apply only when CUI is tied to a "critical program" or "high value asset." The publication states outright, in its own Section 1.2, that its Section 2 "mirrors the material included [in] SP 800-171A, Sec. 2, with minor updates to reflect the enhanced security requirements and assessment procedures" — same examine/interview/test methods, same four assessment-object categories (specifications, mechanisms, activities, individuals), same depth/coverage attributes sourced to SP 800-53A, Appendix D. The one structural difference is the determination-statement identifier: SP 800-172A always inserts a trailing "E" before the segment separators, e.g. `A.03.01.01E` for the Dual Authorization procedure (which traces to SP 800-53 control AC-03(02)), flagging that the identifier points to an SP 800-172 enhanced requirement rather than a baseline SP 800-171 one.
How many assessment procedures does Section 3 contain?
Section 3's procedures are grouped into the same 17 requirement families as SP 800-172 itself (Table 1: Access Control, Awareness and Training, Audit and Accountability, Configuration Management, Identification and Authentication, Incident Response, Maintenance, Media Protection, Personnel Security, Physical Protection, Planning, Risk Assessment, Security Assessment and Monitoring, System and Communications Protection, System and Information Integrity, System and Services Acquisition, Supply Chain Risk Management). Our own count of the identifiers in the final PDF finds exactly 12 requirement slots explicitly marked "Withdrawn" (03.01.03E, 03.04.01E, 03.09.01E, 03.09.02E, 03.11.04E through 03.11.07E, 03.14.02E, 03.14.03E, 03.14.06E, 03.14.07E) — each carries no assessment procedure — leaving active procedures for the same 103 enhanced requirements our [SP 800-172 guide](/guides/nist-sp-800-172-enhanced-security-requirements/) counted directly in that publication's Appendix C.
What does an individual assessment procedure look like, and what counts as a result?
The publication's own worked example (Sec. 2.1), for `03.01.01E Dual Authorization`, shows an ASSESSMENT OBJECTIVE built from determination statements ("Determine if: ... dual authorization is enforced for \<A.03.01.01E.ODP\[01\]: privileged commands and/or other actions\>"), followed by POTENTIAL ASSESSMENT METHODS AND OBJECTS broken into Examine / Interview / Test select-from lists, and a REFERENCES line naming the source SP 800-53A control (here, AC-03(02)). Applying a procedure produces a finding of **satisfied** — "the assessment objective has been met, producing a fully acceptable result" — or **other than satisfied**, meaning either a potential anomaly the organization needs to address, or that the assessor "was unable to obtain sufficient information to make the specific determination." Section 2.2 frames the resulting evidence as part of an **assurance case**, which can combine this publication's own procedures with independent third-party product assessments, such as Common Criteria evaluations under ISO/IEC 15408 or FIPS 140 cryptographic module validation.
Sources
- NIST: SP 800-172A Rev. 3, Assessing Enhanced Security Requirements for Controlled Unclassified Information (May 2026) — publication page
- NIST SP 800-172Ar3 (Pillitteri, Ross), full text PDF
- NIST: SP 800-172 Rev. 3, Enhanced Security Requirements for Protecting Controlled Unclassified Information — publication page
- NIST: SP 800-53A Rev. 5, Assessing Security and Privacy Controls — publication page (shared methodology)
- NIST SP 800-172r3, Enhanced Security Requirements for Protecting CUI, full text PDF (withdrawn-requirement notes)
- eCFR: 32 CFR Part 170, Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification (CMMC) Program (§§ 170.2, 170.14, 170.18, 170.21)
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