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ISO/IEC 18974 (OpenChain Security Assurance Specification), explained

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ISO/IEC 18974:2023, "Information technology — OpenChain security assurance specification," is a short, free, International Standard that sets out what a quality open source software security assurance program must do: track what open source you use, check it against known vulnerabilities, and be able to affirm you did so. Published by ISO/IEC JTC 1 on 14 December 2023, it is the security-focused sister standard to the earlier OpenChain licence-compliance standard, ISO/IEC 5230:2020, and is maintained day to day by the OpenChain Project (a Linux Foundation / Joint Development Foundation initiative), not by ISO itself.

Key takeaways

  • The text grew in steps.
  • The specification is short by ISO standards: the ISO catalogue lists the published edition at 8 pages.
  • The introduction states that "each requirement consists of one or more verification materials (i.e., records) that must be produced to satisfy the requirement." Those records are what a customer or assessor asks to see.
  • export information about identified risks to third parties as appropriate.

What is it, and who maintains it?

OpenChain's own announcement of the standard's publication describes ISO/IEC 18974 as the result of "over seven years work in building simple, effective process management specifications for the open source supply chain," developed as "OpenChain Security Assurance 1.1" and taken through ISO/IEC JTC 1's PAS (Publicly Available Specification) Transposition ballot process before receiving its ISO/IEC number. The specification's own scope statement, published in the OpenChain Project's text of the standard, reads: "This specification contains the key requirements of a quality open source software security assurance program that establishes trust between organizations exchanging software solutions comprised of open source software." Unlike most ISO standards, where ISO and its national member bodies are the only source of the text, OpenChain's own GitHub repository hosts the specification text under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 (CC-BY-4.0) licence — free to read, quote and reuse with attribution — alongside the ISO-branded paid PDF sold through the ISO and IEC webstores.

The text grew in steps. OpenChain's ISO/IEC 18974 page lists a Security Assurance Reference Guide 1.0 (2021-08) and 2.0 (2022-03), then Specification 1.0 (2022-09) and 1.1 (2022-10); a governing board vote turned the guide into a specification on 2022-09-14. The same page states that "the OpenChain version and the ISO version are functionally identical. Conformance to one is the same as conformance to the other." The introduction to the text explains the focus: "a narrow subset of primary concern: checking open source Software against publicly known security vulnerabilities like CVEs, GitHub/GitLab vulnerability reports, and so on." It also says the specification covers the "what" and "why" of a program rather than the "how" and "when," so a program can be "scoped to a single product or a complete legal entity."

What do the four requirement clauses cover?

The specification is short by ISO standards: the ISO catalogue lists the published edition at 8 pages. Its substantive content sits in four top-level clauses, per the OpenChain Project's own published text:

Clause Requirement area What it covers
4.1 Program foundation Governance A written open source security assurance policy with internal communication and review; defined roles with documented competence; participant awareness of the policy and the consequences of non-conformance; a defined program scope with improvement metrics; and standard practices for threat identification, vulnerability detection and post-release monitoring
4.2 Relevant tasks defined and supported Resourcing and intake A public mechanism through which anyone can inquire about or report a vulnerability, with an internal response procedure; and assigned accountability, staffing, funding and technical expertise to actually run the program
4.3 Open source software content review and approval Inventory and remediation A documented, continuously maintained software bill of materials process; and vulnerability detection, risk scoring, remediation and post-release monitoring for the open source content identified
4.4 Adherence to the specification requirements Conformance An organisational affirmation that every requirement above is satisfied, valid for an 18-month conformance period before re-affirmation is required

Clause 4.1's last sub-requirement and clause 4.3's content review sit close together in practice: an organisation needs a working SBOM-style inventory (4.3.1) before it can run the threat-identification and vulnerability-monitoring practices clause 4.1.5 and 4.3.2 both call for.

Which records does each requirement need?

The introduction states that "each requirement consists of one or more verification materials (i.e., records) that must be produced to satisfy the requirement." Those records are what a customer or assessor asks to see. The left column below follows the numbered verification materials in the text; the right column is what a device maker would typically file.

Requirement Verification materials (summary) Typical record at a device maker
4.1.1 Policy 4.1.1.1 written policy; 4.1.1.2 procedure to make participants aware One-page open source security policy, onboarding slide
4.1.2 Competence 4.1.2.1–4.1.2.6 roles, competencies, participant list, competence evidence, reviews Role matrix for firmware, release and procurement staff, training log
4.1.3 Awareness 4.1.3.1 evidence of assessed awareness Signed acknowledgement or quiz results
4.1.4 Program scope 4.1.4.1 scope statement; 4.1.4.2 metrics; 4.1.4.3 review evidence "Covers product line X firmware", metrics such as days to triage
4.1.5 Standard practice 4.1.5.1 a documented procedure for each of the eight methods Procedure set (see next section)
4.2.1 Access 4.2.1.1 public inquiry method; 4.2.1.2 internal response procedure security.txt, security@ address, response runbook
4.2.2 Effectively resourced 4.2.2.1–4.2.2.4 named roles, staffing and funding, expertise, responsibilities Named owner and backup, budget line, external expert contact
4.3.1 SBOM 4.3.1.1 procedure for continuous recording plus an archive; 4.3.1.2 component records SBOM per release, source or package archive
4.3.2 Security assurance 4.3.2.1 detection and resolution procedure; 4.3.2.2 per-component record of vulnerabilities and actions "including even if no action was required" Vulnerability register per firmware version
4.4.1 Completeness 4.4.1.1 affirmation that the scoped program meets all requirements Signed conformance statement
4.4.2 Duration 4.4.2.1 affirmation within the past 18 months Dated re-affirmation

The text adds that verification materials "are not required to be made public," though an organisation may share them, "potentially under a Non-Disclosure Agreement (NDA)."

What do the eight methods in clause 4.1.5 cover?

Clause 4.1.5 requires a documented procedure for each of these methods:

  1. identify structural and technical threats to the supplied software;
  2. detect known vulnerabilities in supplied software;
  3. follow up on identified known vulnerabilities;
  4. communicate identified known vulnerabilities to the customer base when warranted;
  5. analyse supplied software for newly published known vulnerabilities after release;
  6. apply continuous and repeated security testing to all supplied software before release;
  7. verify that identified risks are addressed before release;
  8. export information about identified risks to third parties as appropriate.

For firmware, method 5 is the one most often missing: products stay in the field for years, so the check has to run again against new advisories for every version still supported. Method 8 is where a machine-readable advisory or VEX document fits (see CSAF and VEX for device makers).

How does the standard define a known vulnerability and an SBOM?

The definitions in clause 3 set the scope:

  • Known vulnerability (3.5): a vulnerability previously discovered in publicly available open source components, "including, but not limited to, CVEs, GitHub/GitLab vulnerability alerts, and package manager alerts."
  • Component record (3.1): supplier name, component name, version, other unique identifiers, dependency relationship, author of SBOM data and timestamp, "as defined by NTIA minimum elements." The NTIA Minimum Elements report of 12 July 2021 is one of three normative references (see our SBOM minimum elements guide).
  • SBOM (3.12): information "in a structured format such as SPDX" for a software package, which might include name, version, origin, licence, copyright and known vulnerabilities.
  • Supplied software (3.13): software an organisation distributes or makes available to third parties, which for a device maker includes firmware shipped on the device.

The bibliography also lists CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalogue, which many programs use when assigning the risk score in 4.3.2 (see KEV and EPSS prioritization).

Is it an SBOM format?

No. ISO/IEC 18974 does not define a file format for listing components. Clause 4.3.1 requires "a process … for creating and maintaining a bill of materials that includes each open source software component," and verification material 4.3.1.1 asks for a procedure ensuring all open source software "is continuously recorded across the lifecycle of the supplied software," plus an archive. It names SPDX only as an example. In practice, most organisations satisfy it with an existing SBOM format: CycloneDX, standardised as ECMA-424, or SPDX, standardised as ISO/IEC 5962:2021. See CycloneDX vs SPDX for SBOM formats and firmware SBOM without source code for how to build that inventory for an embedded or firmware product specifically, and Package URL identifiers for the "other unique identifiers" field — ISO/IEC 18974 then adds the vulnerability-detection, risk-scoring and remediation process on top of whatever inventory format you choose.

How does it relate to ISO/IEC 5230 (licence compliance)?

ISO/IEC 18974 is explicitly the younger sibling of ISO/IEC 5230:2020, OpenChain's earlier International Standard for open source licence compliance — the two share the same OpenChain governance model, the same self-certification approach, and (per OpenChain's own description) "a direct pedigree based on decades of open source management experience." The split matters operationally: 5230 is about whether you are honouring the licence obligations of the open source you ship (attribution, source availability, copyleft terms), while 18974 is about whether you are tracking and fixing known vulnerabilities in that same open source. An organisation that only conforms to one has solved half the open source supply-chain problem.

How is conformance declared?

Per clause 4.4.1, an organisation "conforms" to ISO/IEC 18974 by affirming that the program "satisfies the requirements presented in this document"; the rationale adds that "the mere meeting of a subset of these requirements is not considered sufficient." OpenChain's page lists three routes: an online self-certification checklist with material on GitHub, or "independent assessment or third-party certification from official partners." Self-certification is free and keeps the standard accessible to organisations of any size; a buyer may still prefer an outside assessment. Either way, conformant organisations can add themselves to OpenChain's public list. Conformance is valid for 18 months (clause 4.4.2) before the organisation must re-affirm against the specification's current text.

Worked example: what does one 4.3.2 record for a smart plug look like?

Hypothetical case, for illustration only; the CVE number is a placeholder. A smart plug maker scopes its program to one product line (4.1.4). Its firmware for release 2.3 contains an embedded web server library at version 1.4.

  1. Detect:the release SBOM is matched against vulnerability sources; one CVE (CVE-0000-00000, placeholder) affects library version 1.4.
  2. Score:the team records the CVSS base score and whether the CVE is in CISA KEV.
  3. Decide:the web server is used only for local setup and is off after pairing. The team documents this and still schedules an upgrade.
  4. Customer agreement:the program's policy says every finding above a set score needs customer sign-off, as the text's own example "all severity scores above 4.5" suggests; this one is above it, so the two OEM customers are informed.
  5. Record:the register entry is filed under 4.3.2.2.
Field Entry
Component web server library 1.4 (from SBOM, release 2.3)
Vulnerability CVE-0000-00000 (placeholder)
Score CVSS base score as published; KEV: no
Action Upgrade in 2.4; interim: service disabled after pairing
Customer agreement OEM A and OEM B informed, acknowledgements filed

What are the common pitfalls?

  • One SBOM for all releases. 4.3.1 asks for continuous recording across the lifecycle; each shipped version needs its own record.
  • No record for "no action". 4.3.2.2 explicitly includes vulnerabilities where nothing was done.
  • Scope too wide. Claiming the whole company when only one product line has records fails 4.4.1; scope it first.
  • Inquiry address nobody reads. 4.2.1.1 expects a channel "monitored by program participants."
  • Missed re-affirmation. Conformance lapses after 18 months unless renewed.
  • Treating ODM firmware as out of scope. It is supplied software if you ship it; the SBOM may have to come from the binary.

What is a workable starting point?

  1. Pick or confirm your SBOM mechanism first(CycloneDX or SPDX) — clause 4.3.1 needs a documented, continuously maintained component inventory before the vulnerability-detection requirements in 4.1.5 and 4.3.2 can run against real data.
  2. Write the policy and assign roles before claiming conformance(clause 4.1): a self-certification claim with no documented policy or named accountable owner will not survive a counterparty's own review of your verification materials.
  3. Calendar the 18-month re-affirmation(clause 4.4.2) the same way you would a certificate renewal, so conformance does not quietly lapse.
  4. Pair it with ISO/IEC 5230 if licence compliance matters to your buyers too— the two standards are designed to be adopted together, and several of the same internal roles and records can serve both.

SoftWSP's firmware assessments produce part of the clause 4.3 evidence. The platform extracts an SBOM from the firmware image as CycloneDX 1.6 JSON (it does not write SPDX) and matches the components against NVD, CISA KEV, FIRST EPSS and CISA's CSAF ICS advisories, with an AI-drafted report that cites the record behind each finding for an engineer to review. Risk scoring decisions, remediation choices and customer agreement under 4.3.2 stay with your team, and SoftWSP does not write VEX statements. Each new release needs its own scan; watchlist alerts on a CVE ID, vendor or product help with post-release monitoring between scans. See Device & Firmware Security.

This guide summarises the OpenChain Project's own freely published (CC-BY-4.0) text of ISO/IEC 18974:2023; it is not a substitute for the ISO-branded publication or formal conformance guidance, and does not constitute compliance or legal advice.

Put this guide to work

Frequently asked questions

What is ISO/IEC 18974?

ISO/IEC 18974:2023, "Information technology — OpenChain security assurance specification," is an International Standard published 14 December 2023 by ISO/IEC JTC 1. It is maintained day-to-day by the OpenChain Project (a Linux Foundation / Joint Development Foundation initiative) and was taken through ISO's PAS Transposition ballot process as what OpenChain calls "OpenChain Security Assurance 1.1" before formal publication. Per its own scope text: "This specification contains the key requirements of a quality open source software security assurance program that establishes trust between organizations exchanging software solutions comprised of open source software."

What does ISO/IEC 18974 actually require, clause by clause?

Four top-level clauses in the OpenChain Project's own published text of the specification: 4.1 Program foundation (policy, competence, awareness, program scope, and standard-practice implementation for threat identification, vulnerability detection and post-release monitoring); 4.2 Relevant tasks defined and supported (a public vulnerability-inquiry mechanism, plus accountability, staffing, funding and technical expertise to run the program); 4.3 Open source software content review and approval (a documented software bill of materials process, plus vulnerability detection, risk scoring, remediation and post-release monitoring); and 4.4 Adherence to the specification requirements (an organisational affirmation that every requirement is met, valid for an 18-month conformance period).

Is ISO/IEC 18974 free to read?

The OpenChain Project's own text of the specification is free: it is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 (CC-BY-4.0) licence and published on GitHub by the OpenChain Project, the same body that develops it. ISO and national standards bodies also sell an ISO-branded PDF of the identical specification (ISO/IEC 18974:2023, 8 pages per the ISO catalogue listing) for organisations that specifically need the ISO-branded copy; the substantive requirements are the same text either way.

How does ISO/IEC 18974 relate to ISO/IEC 5230 and to SBOM formats like CycloneDX or SPDX?

ISO/IEC 5230:2020 is OpenChain's earlier, sister International Standard for open source licence compliance; ISO/IEC 18974 is explicitly built as its security-assurance counterpart, covering vulnerability handling rather than licensing. Neither standard is an SBOM data format: CycloneDX (ECMA-424) and SPDX (ISO/IEC 5962:2021) define how to list components in a machine-readable file, while ISO/IEC 18974's clause 4.3.1 requires only that an organisation have a documented process to track its open source content — it can be satisfied using either SBOM format, or another inventory method, as the underlying record.

What counts as conformance, and for how long?

Per clause 4.4, an organisation conforms by affirming it satisfies every requirement in the specification; OpenChain offers this as free self-certification, recorded via its list of conformant organisations, and names independent assessment or third-party certification through its official partners as optional alternatives, so a third-party audit is not required. Clause 4.4.2 sets conformance as valid for 18 months, after which the organisation must re-affirm against the then-current specification text.

Sources

  1. ISO: ISO/IEC 18974:2023 — Information technology — OpenChain security assurance specification (catalogue record: edition 1, 8 pages, ICS 35.020, published 2023-12)
  2. OpenChain Project: "OpenChain Welcomes ISO/IEC 18974:2023, The International Standard For Open Source Security Assurance"
  3. OpenChain-Project/Security-Assurance-Specification (GitHub): the ISO/IEC 18974 standard text, CC-BY-4.0
  4. OpenChain Project: "Introducing ISO/IEC DIS 18974, Our Standard For Open Source Security Assurance"
  5. ISO/IEC 5962:2021 — SPDX Specification V2.2.1 (ISO catalogue)
  6. Ecma International: ECMA-424 CycloneDX Bill of Materials specification
  7. OpenChain Project: ISO/IEC 18974 Security Assurance page (adoption routes, past versions, functional identity of the OpenChain and ISO texts)
  8. NTIA: The Minimum Elements For a Software Bill of Materials (SBOM), 12 July 2021 (normative reference of ISO/IEC 18974)
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ISO/IEC 18974 (OpenChain Security Assurance Specification), explained