FIRST's CSIRT Services Framework is a free, 65-page reference document — currently Version 2.1.0, dated November 2019 and marked TLP:WHITE (shareable without restriction) — that describes the services a Computer Security Incident Response Team (CSIRT) can provide. Published by FIRST (the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams) with support from the TF-CSIRT Community and the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), it is a planning and common-vocabulary document, not a certifiable standard: per its own Notice, it describes what FIRST "believes are best practices," offered "for informational purposes only," with FIRST disclaiming liability for its use.
Key takeaways
- The framework organizes everything into four nested levels: SERVICE AREAS -> SERVICES -> FUNCTIONS -> SUB-FUNCTIONS.
- Section 7 of the framework text defines six services, each with named functions.
- FIRST publishes the PSIRT Services Framework as the product-side counterpart, and the CSIRT framework cites it in Annex 3.
- In the EU, national CSIRTs work together in the CSIRTs Network.
What is the framework for?
The framework's stated mission is "to facilitate the establishment and improvement of CSIRT operations, especially in supporting teams that are in the process of choosing, expanding, or improving their service portfolio." It is explicit about its own limits: "this document does not explain how to build or improve a CSIRT or corresponding team" — that guidance lives in other resources it lists in its own Annex 3. An initial version of the framework was published in 2017; this edition, v2.1.0, is described as "an improved version of the second version of the CSIRT Services Framework," restructured to remove purely internal administrative work ("Support Services" such as hiring or travel reimbursement) from the catalogue, since those activities "do not constitute service offerings to constituents."
FIRST itself was founded in 1990, per its about page, and it describes its community as "a wide variety of security and incident response teams including especially product security teams." That is why the framework is written to be read alongside the product-side PSIRT framework rather than in isolation.
How is the framework structured?
The framework organizes everything into four nested levels: SERVICE AREAS -> SERVICES -> FUNCTIONS -> SUB-FUNCTIONS.
| Level | Definition, per the framework | Role |
|---|---|---|
| Service Area | "Group[s] services related to a common aspect" to "facilitate understanding and communication" | Top-level category |
| Service | "A set of recognizable, coherent functions oriented towards a specific result," specified with Description, Purpose and Outcome fields | The unit most teams plan around |
| Function | "An activity or set of activities aimed at fulfilling the purp[ose]" of a service | Reusable building block |
| Sub-function | A lower-level activity performed within a function, used where appropriate | Implementation detail |
What are the five Service Areas?
| Service Area | Services it groups (per the framework's own table of contents) |
|---|---|
| 1 — Information Security Event Management | Monitoring and Detection (log/sensor management, detection use cases, contextual data); Event Analysis (correlation, qualification) |
| 2 — Information Security Incident Management | Incident Report Acceptance; Incident Analysis; Artifact and Forensic Evidence Analysis; Mitigation and Recovery; Incident Coordination; Crisis Management Support |
| 3 — Vulnerability Management | Vulnerability Discovery/Research; Vulnerability Report Intake; Vulnerability Analysis; Vulnerability Coordination; Vulnerability Disclosure; Vulnerability Response |
| 4 — Situational Awareness | Data Acquisition (policy aggregation, asset mapping, collection, data processing); Analysis and Synthesis (projection/inference, event detection, decision support, situational impact); Communication |
| 5 — Knowledge Transfer | Awareness Building; Training and Education; Exercises; Technical and Policy Advisory (risk management support, business continuity/disaster recovery planning support, policy support, technical advice) |
Service Area 3, Vulnerability Management, is the area that overlaps most directly with a PSIRT's own work: it covers the same discovery-intake-analysis-coordination-disclosure-response chain that SoftWSP's CVD process guide for ISO/IEC 29147 and 30111 and the vulnerability disclosure policy template describe in operational detail, and that the CRA's 24h/72h reporting duty — Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 — now attaches legal deadlines to in the EU. Service Area 2 maps to incident handling guides such as NIST SP 800-61.
What does Vulnerability Management contain, function by function?
Section 7 of the framework text defines six services, each with named functions. It also says, for several of them, that the work is usually done by someone other than the CSIRT, which is the part device makers most often miss:
| Service (§) | Functions | Who the framework says usually does it |
|---|---|---|
| Vulnerability discovery / research (7.1) | Incident response vulnerability discovery; public source vulnerability discovery; vulnerability research (fuzzing, reverse engineering) | CSIRT, or "researchers, vendors, PSIRTs, or third-party specialists" |
| Vulnerability report intake (7.2) | Report receipt (monitor channels, acknowledge, set expectations); report triage and processing (handle artefacts in isolation, merge duplicates) | CSIRT; if it has no analysis service, it forwards the report "to the affected vendor(s), PSIRT(s), or a vulnerability coordinator" |
| Vulnerability analysis (7.3) | Triage (validation and categorisation); root cause analysis; remediation development (patch, mitigation) | Root cause "may best be conducted by the product vendor"; remediation development "is typically performed by other entities (e.g., product vendors, PSIRTs)" |
| Vulnerability coordination (7.4) | Notification/reporting; stakeholder coordination, including agreement on disclosure timing | CSIRT or coordinator, working with finders, vendors and PSIRTs |
| Vulnerability disclosure (7.5) | Policy and infrastructure maintenance; announcement and dissemination; post-disclosure feedback | CSIRT for its constituency; vendor for its own products |
| Vulnerability response (7.6) | Detection/scanning; remediation (deploying patches or workarounds) | "Usually performed by other specialized groups… typically not the CSIRT," and "unlikely to be provided by a Coordinating CSIRT" |
Two details are worth copying into your own process. The analysis service notes that vulnerabilities "that are not remediated or mitigated should be documented as acceptable risks," which is exactly the record a risk assessment needs. And the response service says detection works best with "a systems inventory" that "can be queried for software version information," which for a device fleet means an SBOM per firmware version matched against sources such as KEV and EPSS.
What is the difference between a CSIRT and a PSIRT?
FIRST's text draws the line directly: "The focus on constituents as well as the services offered are the key differentiators between the CSIRT of an organization and other security teams represented in the same organization, such as a PSIRT. Generally, the focus on products is the key differentiator between the PSIRT and any other security team, including but not limited to CSIRTs inside an organization." A CSIRT's job is defending a defined constituency's infrastructure; a PSIRT's job is handling vulnerabilities in a manufacturer's own products, wherever those products run. FIRST is also careful to note the two are not independent: "many CSIRTs warn constituents about security vulnerabilities. Such warnings are almost always based on information provided by vendor PSIRTs." A hardware or firmware maker's PSIRT, in other words, is frequently the upstream source feeding downstream CSIRTs' own advisories. See the FIRST PSIRT Services Framework explained and setting up a PSIRT for a hardware company for the product-side counterpart.
How do CSIRT services map to the PSIRT framework and the CRA?
FIRST publishes the PSIRT Services Framework as the product-side counterpart, and the CSIRT framework cites it in Annex 3. For a device maker selling in the EU, Annex I Part II of the CRA adds legal duties to the same chain. A working map:
| CSIRT service (Area 3) | PSIRT framework counterpart | CRA duty for the manufacturer |
|---|---|---|
| Discovery / research | Service Area 2, Vulnerability Discovery | Annex I Part II (1): identify and document vulnerabilities and components, including an SBOM; (3) regular security tests |
| Report intake | Service 2.1, Intake of Vulnerability Reporting | Part II (6): a contact address for reporting vulnerabilities |
| Analysis | Service Area 3, Vulnerability Triage and Analysis | Part II (2): address and remediate vulnerabilities without delay |
| Coordination | Service Area 1, Stakeholder Ecosystem Management, and Area 5 coordination | Part II (5): a coordinated vulnerability disclosure policy; Article 13(6): report component vulnerabilities to the component maintainer |
| Disclosure | Area 5 notification and disclosure | Part II (4): publish information about fixed vulnerabilities; Part II (8): advisories with updates |
| Response | Area 4 remediation and release | Part II (7) and (8): secure, timely update distribution, free of charge |
Advisories for downstream CSIRTs travel best in a machine-readable format; see CSAF and VEX for device makers.
Which three types of CSIRT does it describe?
The framework builds its constituency model around three recognizable CSIRT types:
- Enterprise CSIRT — "focused on the security of computer systems and networks that make up the infrastructure of an organization."
- Coordinating CSIRT — where a large organization runs multiple internal security teams, one "might serve as coordinator and single point of contact to the external parties." Coordinating CSIRTs are also established as independent entities serving "a specific set of individuals and/or organizations known as a constituency" who share some common characteristic, such as belonging to the same research network or country.
- National CSIRT — "a distinctive type of Coordinating CSIRT" that facilitates, and often coordinates, the activities of CSIRTs located in a particular nation, or offers limited services to that nation's citizens or critical-infrastructure sectors.
In the EU, national CSIRTs work together in the CSIRTs Network. ENISA's CSIRTs Network page describes it as "composed of CSIRTs appointed by EU Member States and CERT-EU," established by the NIS Directive and strengthened by NIS2, with ENISA as secretariat and the Commission as an observer. Under CRA Article 14, a manufacturer notifies an actively exploited vulnerability "simultaneously to the CSIRT designated as coordinator" and to ENISA through the Single Reporting Platform: an early warning within 24 hours and a vulnerability notification within 72 hours. Article 14(7) picks that CSIRT by the Member State where "decisions related to the cybersecurity of its products with digital elements are predominantly taken." For a device maker, that national coordinating CSIRT is the one it will deal with first.
Worked example: what would a small device maker's catalogue look like?
Synthetic example. The company, team sizes and choices below are invented to show how the framework is used; they do not describe a real organisation.
A 60-person maker of industrial Ethernet gateways has two engineers who share security duties, an IT administrator, and a managed security provider for office monitoring. Using the five Service Areas as a checklist, it writes a one-page catalogue:
| Service | Provided? | Owner | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Monitoring and detection (Area 1) | Yes, for office IT | Managed provider | Contract defines what is escalated |
| Incident analysis and coordination (Area 2) | Yes | IT administrator, with an incident retainer | Plays exercised once a year |
| Vulnerability report intake (7.2) | Yes | Product security engineer | Published policy and security.txt |
| Vulnerability analysis (7.3) | Yes | Firmware lead | Root cause and fix are the maker's job here, as the framework expects of vendors |
| Vulnerability coordination (7.4) | Yes | Product security engineer | Upstream maintainers for open-source components; national coordinating CSIRT for CRA notifications |
| Vulnerability disclosure (7.5) | Yes | Product security engineer | Advisories with each security release |
| Vulnerability response (7.6) | Partly | Customers run patching; the maker ships updates and a component list | Matches the framework's note that this is "typically not the CSIRT" |
| Situational awareness (Area 4) | Light | Product security engineer | Daily KEV and EPSS check against shipped SBOMs |
| Knowledge transfer (Area 5) | Light | Firmware lead | Secure coding sessions twice a year |
The point of the exercise is the "no" and "partly" rows: written down, they tell customers and the national CSIRT where to go instead.
What are the common pitfalls?
- Treating the catalogue as a checklist to complete. The framework says "no CSIRT is expected to provide all described services."
- Merging CSIRT and PSIRT intake. Reports about your products and reports about your own IT need different handling, owners and disclosure rules, even if one inbox receives both.
- Leaving remediation development to "the CSIRT." The framework expects vendors and PSIRTs to build fixes; for your own products, that is you.
- No named coordinator. Without knowing which national CSIRT is designated as coordinator for you, the 24-hour CRA early warning has no destination.
- No sharing rules. Coordination with other teams breaks down without agreed handling labels such as FIRST TLP.
What is a workable starting point?
Use the five Service Areas as a gap-analysis checklist, not a certification targetThe framework itself states no team is expected to run every service — pick the ones that match your mandate and constituency. Treat Vulnerability Management (Area 3) as the bridge to your PSIRT work, since it is the one Service Area whose discovery-to-disclosure chain lines up directly with product vulnerability handling — pair it with ISO/IEC 29147 and 30111 or the CRA's own Annex I Part II text for anything that needs to withstand an audit. Scope your team type (Enterprise, Coordinating or National) before picking services— a Coordinating CSIRT's external single-point-of-contact role implies different Communication and Incident Coordination functions than an Enterprise CSIRT defending its own infrastructure only. Remember this is guidance, not a standard: FIRST's own notice disclaims liability and offers the document "for informational purposes only" — pair it with a standard your compliance team can actually cite where regulatory weight matters.
SoftWSP's PSIRT service can run the vulnerability intake, triage and stakeholder coordination that sits at the CSIRT/PSIRT boundary, so product vulnerabilities reach your own and your downstream CSIRTs' advisories on time: see PSIRT service. For the situational-awareness side, the SoftWSP platform extracts a CycloneDX 1.6 SBOM from firmware and matches it against NVD, the CISA KEV catalog, FIRST EPSS and CISA's CSAF ICS advisories, with an AI-drafted, cited report for an engineer to review.
This guide summarizes FIRST's freely published CSIRT Services Framework v2.1.0 (TLP:WHITE); it is general information, not legal advice.
Put this guide to work
Frequently asked questions
What is the FIRST CSIRT Services Framework, and who publishes it?
It is a free, 65-page reference document from FIRST (the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams), currently Version 2.1.0, dated November 2019 and marked TLP:WHITE (shareable without restriction). Per its own Purpose section, it is "a high-level document describing in a structured way a collection of cyber security services and associated functions that Computer Security Incident Response Teams and other teams providing incident management related services may provide." FIRST states the document "is developed by recognized experts from the FIRST community with strong support from the Task Force CSIRT (TF-CSIRT) Community, and the International Telecommunications Union (ITU)." An initial version of the framework was published in 2017; version 2.1.0 is, per the document's own text, "an improved version of the second version of the CSIRT Services Framework," restructured after community feedback to remove purely internal administrative activities ("Support Services") from the service catalogue.
How is the framework structured, and what are its five Service Areas?
The framework defines four nested levels: "SERVICE AREAS -> SERVICES -> FUNCTIONS -> SUB-FUNCTIONS." A Service Area "groups services related to a common aspect" to aid understanding and communication; a Service is "a set of recognizable, coherent functions oriented towards a specific result"; a Function is "an activity or set of activities aimed at fulfilling the purpose" of a service. The five numbered Service Areas, per the document's own table of contents, are: (1) Information Security Event Management, (2) Information Security Incident Management, (3) Vulnerability Management, (4) Situational Awareness, and (5) Knowledge Transfer. No single CSIRT is expected to run every service in every area — the framework's own Purpose section states "the services described are those potential services a CSIRT could provide. No CSIRT is expected to provide all described services. Each team will need to choose services that support their mission and constituents, as described by their mandate."
What is the difference between a CSIRT and a PSIRT, per FIRST's own text?
FIRST's framework states it directly: "The focus on constituents as well as the services offered are the key differentiators between the CSIRT of an organization and other security teams represented in the same organization, such as a PSIRT. Generally, the focus on products is the key differentiator between the PSIRT and any other security team, including but not limited to CSIRTs inside an organization." The two are not independent of each other: "many CSIRTs warn constituents about security vulnerabilities. Such warnings are almost always based on information provided by vendor PSIRTs." FIRST maintains a separate, parallel PSIRT Services Framework for product-security teams — see [the FIRST PSIRT Services Framework explained](/guides/first-psirt-services-framework/) for that document's own service areas.
What types of CSIRT does the framework describe?
Three, built on the constituency concept. An Enterprise CSIRT "is focused on the security of computer systems and networks that make up the infrastructure of an organization." Where a large organization runs multiple internal security teams, one "might serve as coordinator and single point of contact to the external parties" — this is called a Coordinating CSIRT, which can also exist as "independent entities serving a specific set of individuals and/or organizations known as a constituency" who "share some common characteristics (like being part of a national research network or belonging to a specific country)." A National CSIRT is described as "a distinctive type of Coordinating CSIRT" that facilitates and often coordinates CSIRT activity for a particular nation, or offers limited services to that nation's citizens or critical-infrastructure sectors.
Sources
- FIRST: Computer Security Incident Response Team (CSIRT) Services Framework, Version 2.1.0 (PDF, November 2019, TLP:WHITE) — full text: Purpose, CSIRT/PSIRT distinction, Framework Structure, 5 Service Areas with Services/Functions/Sub-functions, Annexes
- FIRST: CSIRT Services Framework v2.1 — standards landing page (version history, translations)
- FIRST: Services Framework overview (CSIRT and PSIRT frameworks index)
- EUR-Lex: Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 (Cyber Resilience Act) — official text
- FIRST: PSIRT Services Framework v1.1 — standards landing page
- FIRST: About FIRST
- ENISA: CSIRTs Network
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