The EU Cyber Solidarity Act is a European Union regulation aimed, in the European Commission's own words, at "strengthen[ing] capacities in the EU to detect, prepare for and respond to significant and large-scale cybersecurity threats and attacks." The Commission adopted its original legislative proposal on 18 April 2023 — the same day it described the package as a step toward "a European cyber shield," in Commissioner Thierry Breton's words from the Commission's press release. The Act, formally Regulation (EU) 2025/38, entered into force on 4 February 2025.
Unlike NIS2 or the Cyber Resilience Act, the Cyber Solidarity Act does not impose security obligations on individual manufacturers, operators, or products. It instead funds and coordinates EU-level and cross-border detection, preparedness, and incident-response capacity — infrastructure and reserves that sit above what any single Member State or company is required to build on its own.
Key takeaways
- Unlike NIS2 or the Cyber Resilience Act, the Cyber Solidarity Act does not impose security obligations on individual manufacturers, operators, or products.
- The adopted text of Regulation (EU) 2025/38, signed on 19 December 2024 and published in the Official Journal on 15 January 2025, has five chapters and 26 articles.
- Participation is voluntary.
- Only authorities can call on the Reserve.
Two main components
The Commission's policy page describes the Act as built around two primary mechanisms:
European Cybersecurity Alert System — a network of National and Cross-Border Cyber Hubs across the EU that, per the Commission, "use advanced technology such as Artificial Intelligence (AI) and data analytics to detect and share warnings on threats with authorities across borders." This infrastructure didn't start from zero: a first phase, launched in November 2022 under the Digital Europe Programme, had already selected "two consortia of cross-border Security Operations Centres (now Cyber Hubs)" before the Regulation formally entered into force.
Cybersecurity Emergency Mechanism — improves EU preparedness and response across three areas, per the Commission:
| Area | What it does |
|---|---|
| Preparedness testing | Tests entities in "crucial sectors such as finance, energy and healthcare" for weaknesses, with sector selection informed by EU-level risk assessment |
| EU Cybersecurity Reserve | Incident-response services from vetted private "trusted providers," deployable at the request of Member States, EU institutions/bodies, or DEP-associated third countries during a significant or large-scale incident |
| Mutual assistance | Supports one Member State offering assistance to another affected by a cybersecurity incident |
What does the Regulation contain, chapter by chapter?
The adopted text of Regulation (EU) 2025/38, signed on 19 December 2024 and published in the Official Journal on 15 January 2025, has five chapters and 26 articles. Article 1 names three instruments: the European Cybersecurity Alert System, the Cybersecurity Emergency Mechanism and the European Cybersecurity Incident Review Mechanism. Most key terms are borrowed from NIS2 (Directive (EU) 2022/2555): a "significant cybersecurity incident" is one that meets the criteria of NIS2 Article 23(3), and the sectors in scope are the NIS2 Annex I and Annex II sectors.
| Chapter | Articles | What it sets up |
|---|---|---|
| I General provisions | 1–2 | Objectives; definitions, mostly by reference to NIS2 |
| II European Cybersecurity Alert System | 3–9 | National Cyber Hubs, Cross-Border Cyber Hubs, information sharing, security, funding |
| III Cybersecurity Emergency Mechanism | 10–20 | Preparedness testing, other preparedness actions, the EU Cybersecurity Reserve, mutual assistance, support to third countries |
| IV Incident Review Mechanism | 21 | ENISA incident review reports |
| V Final provisions | 22–26 | Digital Europe Programme amendments, delegated acts, evaluation, entry into force |
Source: Regulation (EU) 2025/38, as published 15 January 2025.
How do National and Cross-Border Cyber Hubs work?
Participation is voluntary. Under Article 4, a Member State that joins the Alert System designates one National Cyber Hub: a CSIRT, a cyber crisis management authority or another entity. That hub may exchange data with private-sector entities, and the information it requests "may include telemetry, sensor and logging data." Under Article 5, three or more Member States can form a Hosting Consortium, which runs a Cross-Border Cyber Hub under a written consortium agreement.
Article 6 lists what hubs share: cyber threats, near misses, vulnerabilities, indicators of compromise, adversarial tactics, alerts and detection-tool configuration advice, anonymised where appropriate. ENISA was required to publish interoperability guidelines on sharing formats and protocols by 5 February 2026. Under Article 7, when a hub learns of a potential or ongoing large-scale incident, it must pass early warnings to Member State authorities and the Commission through EU-CyCLONe and the CSIRTs network "without undue delay."
Article 9 sets the EU co-funding shares. The procurement runs jointly with the European Cybersecurity Competence Centre (ECCC):
| Recipient | EU share of acquisition costs | EU share of operating costs |
|---|---|---|
| Member State National Cyber Hub | up to 50 % | up to 50 % |
| Hosting Consortium (Cross-Border Cyber Hub) | up to 75 % | up to 50 % |
Source: Regulation (EU) 2025/38, Article 9(1) and 9(3).
There is a condition attached. A National Cyber Hub that has not joined a Cross-Border Cyber Hub within 2 years of acquiring the tools or receiving the grant loses eligibility for further support under Chapter II.
How is the EU Cybersecurity Reserve requested and deployed?
Only authorities can call on the Reserve. Companies cannot request it directly. Article 14(3) limits users to Member States' cyber crisis management authorities and CSIRTs, CERT-EU, and the competent authorities of DEP-associated third countries. The Commission has overall responsibility and may entrust operation of the Reserve to ENISA. Articles 15 and 16 set out the procedure:
The user takes its own mitigation measures firstThis is a precondition for support (Article 15(2)). The request goes through the right channelFor Member State users, that is the NIS2 single point of contact. The request describes the affected entity, the potential impact, the spillover risk to other Member States and the support needed (Article 15(3) and (5)). The contracting authority assesses itIt weighs the scale and severity of the incident, the type of entity (essential entities under NIS2 get higher priority), cross-border impact and the user's own measures. For Member State users and CERT-EU, a response is due "no later than 48 hours" after the request (Article 16(1) and (3)). The service runs under a specific agreementThe agreement is between the trusted provider and the user, and sometimes the affected entity too. It is based on ENISA templates and covers liability (Article 16(5) and (6)). The user reports backWithin 2 months of the end of the support, the user sends a summary report on the service, results and lessons learned to the Commission, ENISA and the relevant networks (Article 16(9)).
The Reserve may only be used for entities in NIS2 Annex I or Annex II sectors or for EU bodies (Article 16(8)). Unused pre-committed services can be converted into preparedness services such as exercises or training (Article 14(2)).
What must a trusted managed security service provider show?
The Reserve is staffed by private providers chosen through procurement. Article 17(2) lists the minimum criteria the contracting authority must put in the procurement documents:
| Criterion (Article 17(2)) | What the provider must demonstrate |
|---|---|
| (a) Integrity and competence | Professional integrity, independence and technical competence, with continuity of expertise |
| (b) Confidentiality | Rules on classified information followed, including by subsidiaries and subcontractors; evidence, findings and reports protected |
| (c) Governance | A transparent governing structure, free of conflicts of interest |
| (d), (e) Security | Security clearance where a Member State requires it; adequate security of its own IT systems |
| (f) Tooling | Hardware and software with no known exploitable vulnerabilities, kept updated, and compliant with Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, the Cyber Resilience Act |
| (g)–(i) Delivery | Experience with national authorities or critical-sector entities; deployment at short notice; service in the required official languages |
| (j) Certification | Certification under an EU scheme for managed security services within 2 years of the scheme applying, once such a scheme exists under Regulation (EU) 2019/881 |
| (k) Conversion | Terms for converting unused response services into preparedness services |
Criterion (f) is the one direct link to product law: the responders' own tools must meet CRA requirements.
What is the incident review mechanism, and who runs it?
The Act also creates a European Cybersecurity Incident Review Mechanism. At the request of the Commission or of national authorities acting through the EU-CyCLONe network, the EU Cybersecurity Agency (ENISA) reviews a specific significant or large-scale incident and, per the Commission, "should deliver a report that includes lessons learned, and where appropriate, recommendations to improve Union's cyber response." This is a retrospective, lessons-learned function rather than a real-time response role — it runs alongside, not instead of, the Emergency Mechanism's active-response tools.
What goes into an incident review report?
Under Article 21, ENISA carries out the review with support from the CSIRTs network and with the approval of the Member States concerned. It collects feedback from Member States, EU bodies, industry (including managed security service providers) and, where appropriate, the affected entities. The report covers the main causes of the incident, the known exploitable vulnerabilities involved and the lessons learned. Where appropriate, it also makes recommendations to improve the Union's cyber posture. Affected Member States can ask for the data in the report to be anonymised.
Unpatched vulnerabilities stay out of the report. Article 21(3) states that the report "shall not include any details about actively exploited vulnerabilities that remain unpatched." ENISA may publish a public version, limited to reliable public information or information released with the consent of those concerned (Article 21(5)).
Funding
The Commission states the Alert System and Emergency Mechanism are financed under the Digital Europe Programme's "Cybersecurity and Trust" specific objective. The Regulation re-allocates an additional €100 million from other Digital Europe Programme objectives, which the Commission says brings the new DIGITAL cybersecurity total to €842.8 million. Part of that increase reinforces the budget the European Cybersecurity Competence Centre (ECCC) manages for Cyber Hubs and preparedness work; the rest supports standing up the EU Cybersecurity Reserve. Combined with funding already scheduled for 2023–2027 (which the Commission says "could bring the total to €551 million") and €115 million already spent on 2021–2022 pilot activity, the Commission states the overall budget — including Member State contributions — "could amount up to €1.109 billion."
Which dates matter?
| Date | Event | Source |
|---|---|---|
| 18 April 2023 | Commission adopts the proposal | Commission press release |
| 19 December 2024 | Regulation signed by the European Parliament and the Council | Regulation (EU) 2025/38 |
| 15 January 2025 | Published in the Official Journal (OJ L, 2025/38) | Regulation (EU) 2025/38 |
| 4 February 2025 | Entry into force, 20 days after publication (Article 26) | Commission policy page |
| By 5 February 2026 | ENISA interoperability guidelines for Cross-Border Cyber Hubs (Article 6(4)) | Regulation (EU) 2025/38 |
| By 5 February 2027, then at least every 4 years | Commission evaluation report to Parliament and Council (Article 25) | Regulation (EU) 2025/38 |
| At least every 2 years | ECCC mapping of hub tools (Article 9(4)); ENISA mapping of Reserve services (Article 14(6)); review of Reserve priorities (Article 14(4)) | Regulation (EU) 2025/38 |
The Commission's policy page confirms the entry-into-force date. The other dates come from the Regulation text. The Act is a regulation, so it is "binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States" (Article 26), with no national transposition step as there is for NIS2.
Why this matters beyond EU institutions
The Cyber Solidarity Act's reserve and alert infrastructure is aimed at Member States, critical-sector operators, and EU bodies — not directly at individual device or software vendors. But it changes the environment those vendors operate in: a large-scale incident involving a vulnerable product category is more likely to trigger a coordinated, EU-level response and an ENISA-led review than before the Act existed, which raises the reputational and regulatory stakes of a widely-exploited flaw. Device makers already tracking obligations under the Cyber Resilience Act or NIS2 should treat the Solidarity Act's reserve and alert system as the EU-level backstop that activates when a vulnerability in their product class becomes a cross-border incident, not as a separate compliance duty of its own.
Worked example: how would the Act engage on a widely exploited device flaw?
An illustrative scenario, not a real case. A remotely exploitable flaw in a widely sold industrial gateway is used against water utilities in several Member States. This is how the instruments in the Regulation would line up:
DetectionNational Cyber Hubs pick up indicators from telemetry and partners and share them inside their Cross-Border Cyber Hub (Articles 4 and 6). Because the incident could become large-scale, the hubs send early warnings through EU-CyCLONe and the CSIRTs network (Article 7). ResponseAn affected Member State's CSIRT has already taken its own measures. It then asks for Reserve support through its NIS2 single point of contact and gets an answer within 48 hours (Articles 15 and 16). A trusted provider supports the response at the utilities, because water is an NIS2 Annex I sector. Mutual assistanceAnother Member State sends technical experts, and the Emergency Mechanism can fund this through grants (Article 18). ReviewEU-CyCLONe or the Commission asks ENISA for an incident review. The report names the main causes and the exploited vulnerability, but leaves out details of any flaw that is still unpatched (Article 21).
The gateway's manufacturer has no duty under the Cyber Solidarity Act at any of these steps. Its duties come from the CRA: it must report actively exploited vulnerabilities and ship fixes. The utilities' duties come from NIS2, including incident reporting. Where the Solidarity Act changes things for the manufacturer is visibility: its product becomes a named subject in an EU-level review.
Common misreadings to avoid
- "It creates new compliance duties for companies." It does not. Article 1(4) makes its actions complementary to the CSIRTs network, EU-CyCLONe and the NIS Cooperation Group. Company duties stay in NIS2, the CRA and sector law.
- "A company can call in the EU Cybersecurity Reserve." Only the users listed in Article 14(3) can. An affected company works through its national CSIRT or authority.
- "Preparedness testing is mandatory." Coordinated preparedness testing is voluntary for Member States and for entities (Article 12(1) and 12(4)). Test results can lead to recommendations that an entity may build into a remediation plan (Article 12(7)).
- "The Reserve is free of liability rules." Each deployment runs under an agreement that includes liability conditions (Article 16(5)). The Commission, ENISA and users bear no contractual liability to third parties for the services (Article 16(7)).
SoftWSP's device and firmware security work helps manufacturers close the vulnerabilities that this kind of EU-level response exists to catch after the fact: see device & firmware security services.
This guide summarises a public European Commission publication; it does not constitute legal or compliance advice.
Put this guide to work
Frequently asked questions
What is the EU Cyber Solidarity Act?
A European Union regulation that "aims to strengthen capacities in the EU to detect, prepare for and respond to significant and large-scale cybersecurity threats and attacks," per the European Commission's own policy page. The Commission adopted its original proposal on 18 April 2023, describing it at the time as part of "a European cyber shield." The Act, formally Regulation (EU) 2025/38, entered into force on 4 February 2025. Unlike NIS2 or the Cyber Resilience Act, it does not set security requirements for individual products or companies — it builds EU-level and cross-border detection and response capacity that sits above national and sector-level cybersecurity law.
What is the European Cybersecurity Alert System?
One of the Act's two main components. The Commission describes it as being "composed of National and Cross-Border Cyber Hubs" across the EU that "use advanced technology such as Artificial Intelligence (AI) and data analytics to detect and share warnings on threats with authorities across borders." The underlying infrastructure predates the Regulation itself: the Commission's page notes that "during a first phase, launched in November 2022, two consortia of cross-border Security Operations Centres (now Cyber Hubs) were selected," under the EU's Digital Europe Programme.
What is the Cybersecurity Emergency Mechanism, and what is the EU Cybersecurity Reserve?
The Act's second main component, which the Commission states "will ensure that preparedness and response to cybersecurity incidents are improved" by acting in three areas: (1) supporting preparedness by "testing entities in crucial sectors such as finance, energy and healthcare" for vulnerabilities; (2) creating an EU Cybersecurity Reserve of "incident response services from private service providers ('trusted providers')" that Member States, EU bodies, or associated third countries can call on during a significant or large-scale incident; and (3) "ensuring mutual assistance" between Member States responding to an incident.
What is the cybersecurity incident review mechanism, and how is the Act funded?
The Act also establishes a European Cybersecurity Incident Review Mechanism: at the request of the Commission or national authorities (the EU-CyCLONe network), the EU Cybersecurity Agency (ENISA) reviews a specific significant or large-scale incident and "should deliver a report that includes lessons learned, and where appropriate, recommendations to improve Union's cyber response." On funding, the Commission states the Alert System and Emergency Mechanism are financed under the Digital Europe Programme's 'Cybersecurity and Trust' objective, with the Regulation re-allocating an additional €100 million, bringing the new DIGITAL cybersecurity total to €842.8 million — which the Commission says could reach "up to €1.109 billion" including Member State contributions and funds already foreseen for 2021–2027.
Sources
- Regulation (EU) 2025/38 (Cyber Solidarity Act), Official Journal L, 15 January 2025 — full text, Articles 1–26
- European Commission: EU Cyber Solidarity Act — policy page (components, funding, entry into force)
- European Commission: Proposed Regulation on the Cyber Solidarity Act (library entry, 13 April 2023)
- European Commission: press release — Cyber: towards stronger EU capabilities (18 April 2023 adoption of proposal)
- European Commission: EU Cyber Solidarity Act Factsheet (library entry)
- ENISA: EU incident response and cyber crisis management (topic page, covers EU-CyCLONe)
About this guide
SoftWSP Regulation Desk
Covers the Cyber Resilience Act cluster: 34 guides.

In this cluster
Questions about this page?
