CVE-2020-9770 is a logic flaw in the Bluetooth stack of iOS and iPadOS before 13.4: when a paired BLE device reconnected, the phone carried on even if encryption or authentication failed, so a spoofed peripheral could feed it fake data (the BLESA attack). NVD scores it 6.5. Apple fixed it in iOS 13.4 and iPadOS 13.4, released on 2020-03-24.
Vulnerability summary
CVSS base score
6.5
Medium severity
EPSS score (FIRST)
1.2%
Probability of exploitation in the wild in the next 30 days
CISA KEV catalog
No
Not listed
Published
Vulnerability ID: CVE-2020-9770 · Source: NVD
Affected components
| Component | CPE | Version range |
|---|---|---|
| Apple iOS | cpe:2.3:o:apple:iphone_os:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* | before 13.4 (NVD); fixed in iOS 13.4 for iPhone 6s and later and iPod touch 7th generation (Apple HT211102) |
| Apple iPadOS | cpe:2.3:o:apple:ipados:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* | before 13.4 (NVD); fixed in iPadOS 13.4 for iPad Air 2 and later and iPad mini 4 and later (Apple HT211102) |
What does this mean for affected devices?
Apple's security notes for iOS 13.4 and iPadOS 13.4, released on 2020-03-24, list the bug under Bluetooth: "An attacker in a privileged network position may be able to intercept Bluetooth traffic", fixed as "A logic issue was addressed with improved state management". It applies to iPhone 6s and later, iPad Air 2 and later, iPad mini 4 and later, and iPod touch 7th generation. Apple credits Jianliang Wu of the PurSec Lab at Purdue University, and Xinwen Fu and Yue Zhang of the University of Central Florida. NVD's Primary score is 6.5, CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N, with no CWE assigned (NVD-CWE-noinfo), and its CPEs cover iOS and iPadOS before 13.4 (NVD).
What is BLESA?
The BLESA paper by Wu and colleagues (Purdue University and EPFL), Best Paper at USENIX WOOT 2020, analysed what happens when two previously paired BLE devices reconnect. It found two weaknesses in the specification: authentication on reconnection depends on the server asking for it, and a client that authenticates only after an error reply ("reactive authentication") can be served a spoofed reply first. On top of that, the BLE stacks of Android and iOS had a logic bug: they "continue the reconnection even when the encryption/authentication fails". The paper says the researchers reported it to Apple and Google on 2019-04-08 and that "Apple has acknowledged our findings, assigned the CVE-2020-9770 to the vulnerability, and fixed it"; the Android stack on their Pixel XL test phone was still vulnerable as of June 2020. They tested iPhone 8 on iOS 12.1, 12.4 and 13.3.1, and found the Linux BlueZ stack (5.48, used through gatttool) susceptible because it follows the specification's reactive authentication.
Why does it matter for BLE device makers?
The attack targets the phone, but the victims are the peripherals and the data they report. The researchers found that 10 of 12 real BLE devices they inspected, from sensors to smart locks, used no link-layer encryption or authentication, and that 67.7% of the companion apps they analysed never invoked pairing. They impersonated an Oura Ring and made its companion app on a Pixel XL display spoofed data. A device that relies on the phone to tell a real reconnection from a fake one inherits this flaw.
How do you mitigate it?
Update iPhones and iPads to iOS 13.4 or iPadOS 13.4 or later. On the peripheral side, require pairing and an encrypted link before serving any characteristic that matters, and authenticate data at the application layer when the peripheral cannot enforce it. Our Bluetooth LE security guide covers reconnection testing and pairing modes, and CVE-2020-15802 (BLURtooth) is another bonding flaw from 2020. For chip-level pairing bugs see CVE-2019-19194.
CVE-2020-9770 is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of 2026-11-18 (catalog version 2026.11.17). FIRST EPSS gives it 0.012, the 68.7th percentile, in the 2026-11-17 dataset (CISA KEV, FIRST EPSS).
Evidence
- Logic issue fixed with improved state management in iOS 13.4 and iPadOS 13.4; attacker in privileged network position may intercept Bluetooth traffic; NVD Primary 6.5 AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N; NVD-CWE-noinfo; CPE iphone_os and ipados before 13.4; published 2020-04-01. — NVD
- iOS 13.4 and iPadOS 13.4 released March 24, 2020; Bluetooth: available for iPhone 6s and later, iPad Air 2 and later, iPad mini 4 and later, iPod touch 7th generation; credit Jianliang Wu (PurSec Lab, Purdue), Xinwen Fu and Yue Zhang (UCF). — Apple HT211102
- BLESA: Spoofing Attacks against Reconnections in BLE, Wu, Nan, Kumar, Tian, Bianchi (Purdue), Payer (EPFL), Xu (Purdue), WOOT 20 Best Paper; two design weaknesses in the reconnection procedure; logic bug in Android and iOS stacks. — USENIX WOOT 2020
- Reported to Apple and Google 2019-04-08; Apple assigned CVE-2020-9770 and fixed it; Pixel XL Android 10 still vulnerable as of June 2020; iPhone 8 iOS 12.1/12.4/13.3.1 tested; BlueZ 5.48 via gatttool reactive authentication susceptible; Android and iOS continue reconnection when encryption/authentication fails; 10 of 12 inspected BLE devices no link-layer encryption/authentication; 67.7% of companion apps do not implement link-layer authentication; Oura Ring spoofing against Pixel XL. — BLESA paper (PDF)
- Not in the CISA KEV catalog, version 2026.11.17 (1,782 entries), checked 2026-11-18. — CISA KEV
- EPSS 0.01198, percentile 0.6866, dataset 2026-11-17, read 2026-11-18. — FIRST EPSS

Related advisories
Sources
Frequently asked questions
Which Apple devices does CVE-2020-9770 affect?
iOS and iPadOS before 13.4 on iPhone 6s and later, iPad Air 2 and later, iPad mini 4 and later, and iPod touch 7th generation. Apple fixed it in iOS 13.4 and iPadOS 13.4, released on 2020-03-24 (per Apple HT211102 and NVD).
Is CVE-2020-9770 the BLESA vulnerability?
Yes. The BLESA authors write that Apple assigned CVE-2020-9770 to the reconnection logic bug they reported on 2019-04-08 and fixed it. Apple credits Jianliang Wu of Purdue, the paper's first author (per the BLESA paper and Apple HT211102).
Does updating the phone protect my BLE peripheral?
It closes the iOS logic bug, but the BLESA authors also found the BlueZ stack on Linux susceptible by design and the Android stack still vulnerable in June 2020. Peripherals should require pairing and encryption for sensitive characteristics rather than rely on the central (per the BLESA paper).
Is CVE-2020-9770 exploited in the wild?
It is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of 2026-11-18 (catalog version 2026.11.17). FIRST EPSS gives it 0.012, the 68.7th percentile, in the 2026-11-17 dataset (per CISA KEV and FIRST EPSS).
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