Security Advisory

CVE-2020-15802: BLURtooth Bluetooth CTKD Key Overwrite

Last updated:
  • CVE-2020-15802

CVE-2020-15802, BLURtooth, is a flaw in Cross-Transport Key Derivation (CTKD) in Bluetooth Core Specification 4.2 and 5.0: on a dual-mode device, an attacker in radio range can pair over one transport and overwrite the bond on the other, replacing an authenticated key with a weaker one. NVD scores it 5.9. The fix is the CTKD restrictions mandated from Core 5.1.

Vulnerability summary

CVSS base score

5.9

Medium severity

EPSS score (FIRST)

7.1%

Probability of exploitation in the wild in the next 30 days

CISA KEV catalog

No

Not listed

Published

Vulnerability ID: CVE-2020-15802 · Source: NVD

Affected components

ComponentCPEVersion range
Bluetooth Core Specification (dual-mode BR/EDR + LE implementations using CTKD)cpe:2.3:a:bluetooth:bluetooth_core_specification:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*before 5.1 (NVD); 4.2 through 5.0 (Bluetooth SIG, CERT/CC VU#589825); fix: CTKD restrictions mandated in Core 5.1 and later

What does this mean for affected devices?

NVD's description: "Devices supporting Bluetooth before 5.1 may allow man-in-the-middle attacks, aka BLURtooth." CTKD "may permit an unauthenticated user to establish a bonding with one transport, either LE or BR/EDR, and replace a bonding already established on the opposing transport ... potentially overwriting an authenticated key with an unauthenticated key, or a key with greater entropy with one with less." NVD's Primary score is 5.9, CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N, with CWE-287 and a CPE for the Core Specification before 5.1 (NVD).

Which devices are exposed?

Only dual-mode devices that support both BR/EDR (Classic) and LE and use CTKD. The Bluetooth SIG notice of 2020-09-09 credits researchers at EPFL, the University of Oxford, CISPA and, independently, Purdue University. An attack needs a device that permits pairing on either transport "with no authentication (e.g. JustWorks) or no user-controlled access restrictions on the availability of pairing". If a spoofing device's CTKD-derived key overwrites a stronger or authenticated key, a MITM between previously bonded devices may follow. CERT/CC VU#589825 adds that the attacker can reach profiles or services that are not otherwise restricted.

Vendor statements in VU#589825 show how the dual-mode condition sorts products: Microchip states its "Bluetooth Dual Mode solutions do NOT implement Cross-Transport Key Derivation (CTKD)" and are not affected, and Zyxel and Belden say their products either lack CTKD or Bluetooth. Juniper's Mist advisory of 2020-09-16 says Mist access points are not affected because they run BLE only, for location services, with no BT Classic and no pairing. Debian classes it as a Bluetooth protocol issue, not a package bug.

How do you fix it?

The SIG recommends that "potentially vulnerable implementations introduce the restrictions on Cross-Transport Key Derivation mandated in Bluetooth Core Specification versions 5.1 and later". CERT/CC spells this out: do not let a CTKD-derived key overwrite a bond when that would lower the key strength or drop it from authenticated to unauthenticated, which means the host must store each key's length and authentication status. Limit pairable mode to explicit user action or devices with no bonds, keep that window short, and overwrite a bond only while in pairing mode. Ask the chipset or stack vendor which release carries the 5.1 CTKD rules; a Core version number on a datasheet is not proof.

Our Bluetooth LE security guide covers bonding tests, and the authentication bypass fix guide covers the weakness class. Related pairing flaws: CVE-2020-26558 (Passkey Entry impersonation), CVE-2022-25836 (LE Passkey method confusion) and CVE-2020-9770 (BLESA).

CVE-2020-15802 is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of 2026-11-18 (catalog version 2026.11.17). FIRST EPSS gives it 0.0714, the 94.4th percentile, in the 2026-11-17 dataset (CISA KEV, FIRST EPSS).

How to fix this class of issueThis advisory's weakness class is Authentication bypass. Our practical guide covers how to detect, fix, verify and disclose it: How to fix authentication bypass in embedded firmware.

Evidence

  • Devices supporting Bluetooth before 5.1 may allow MITM, aka BLURtooth; CTKD in Core 4.2 and 5.0 may permit an unauthenticated user to bond on one transport and replace the bond on the other; NVD Primary 5.9 AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N; CWE-287; CPE bluetooth_core_specification before 5.1; published 2020-09-11. — NVD
  • SIG statement on BLURtooth: researchers at EPFL, Oxford, CISPA and Purdue; CTKD in Core 4.2 through 5.0; attacker in range of dual-mode device supporting CTKD that permits pairing with no authentication (e.g. JustWorks) or no user-controlled restrictions; MITM between devices previously bonded; recommends CTKD restrictions mandated in Core 5.1 and later. SIG notice date 09/09/2020 per the SIG reporting page. — Bluetooth SIG
  • VU#589825 published 2020-09-09, updated 2021-02-16; attacker gains access to profiles or services that are not restricted; solution: disallow overwrite reducing key strength or MITM protection, host tracks key length and authentication status; restrict pairable mode and its duration; vendor statements: Microchip dual-mode solutions do not implement CTKD, not affected; Zyxel not affected; Belden devices do not support Bluetooth. — CERT/CC
  • Mist Security Advisory, publication date 2020-09-16: Mist products not impacted; APs only operate BLE for location services and AP operations, no BT classic; only advertising channels, no pairing. — Juniper Mist
  • Debian notes: Bluetooth protocol issue, reference VU#589825. — Debian security tracker
  • Not in the CISA KEV catalog, version 2026.11.17 (1,782 entries), checked 2026-11-18. — CISA KEV
  • EPSS 0.07137, percentile 0.94369, dataset 2026-11-17, read 2026-11-18. — FIRST EPSS

Related advisories

Sources

  1. NVD
  2. Bluetooth SIG statement on BLURtooth (CTKD)
  3. CERT/CC VU#589825: Devices supporting Bluetooth BR/EDR and LE using CTKD are vulnerable to key overwrite
  4. Juniper Mist Security Advisory: BLURtooth Attack
  5. Debian security tracker: CVE-2020-15802
  6. CISA KEV
  7. FIRST EPSS

Frequently asked questions

Is an LE-only device affected by CVE-2020-15802?

No. BLURtooth needs a dual-mode device that supports both BR/EDR and LE and uses Cross-Transport Key Derivation. Juniper, for example, says its BLE-only Mist access points are not affected (per the Bluetooth SIG, CERT/CC VU#589825 and the Mist advisory).

Does a Bluetooth 5.1 chip mean the device is fixed?

Not by itself. The SIG asks implementations to adopt the CTKD restrictions mandated from Core 5.1, and the host stack must refuse a key overwrite that lowers key strength or authentication. Ask the stack vendor which release implements this (per the Bluetooth SIG and CERT/CC VU#589825).

What can a product do besides updating the stack?

CERT/CC and the SIG recommend making a device pairable only after user action or when it has no bonds, keeping pairing mode short, and overwriting an existing bond only while in pairing mode (per CERT/CC VU#589825).

Is CVE-2020-15802 exploited in the wild?

It is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of 2026-11-18 (catalog version 2026.11.17). FIRST EPSS gives it 0.0714, the 94.4th percentile, in the 2026-11-17 dataset (per CISA KEV and FIRST EPSS).