CVE-2019-16871 is a remote code execution path through Beckhoff's ADS protocol: anyone who can reach ADS on an Embedded Windows PLC (through TwinCAT 3.1.4024.0) or a TwinCAT engineering station can run code as SYSTEM. NVD scores it 9.8. There is no patch; Beckhoff advisory 2017-001 says to keep ADS on protected networks or use Secure ADS.
Vulnerability summary
CVSS base score
9.8
Critical severity
EPSS score (FIRST)
5.3%
Probability of exploitation in the wild in the next 30 days
CISA KEV catalog
No
Not listed
Published
Vulnerability ID: CVE-2019-16871 · Source: NVD
Affected components
| Component | CPE | Version range |
|---|---|---|
| Beckhoff TwinCAT 3 (Embedded Windows PLCs and Windows engineering stations) | cpe:2.3:a:beckhoff:twincat:3.1:build_4024.0:*:*:*:*:*:* | Through 3.1.4024.0 per NVD (CPE: 3.0 up to 3.1, 3.1 build 4022, 3.1 build 4024.0); no fixed version, Secure ADS available from 3.1 Build 4024.0 (Beckhoff 2017-001) |
| Beckhoff TwinCAT 2 | cpe:2.3:a:beckhoff:twincat:2.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:* | 2.0 (NVD CPE); Beckhoff 2017-001 lists TwinCAT 2 and 3 as affected by the ADS design limitation; no fix |
What does this mean for affected devices?
NVD describes CVE-2019-16871 this way: "Beckhoff Embedded Windows PLCs through 3.1.4024.0, and Beckhoff Twincat on Windows Engineering stations, allow an attacker to achieve Remote Code Execution (as SYSTEM) via the Beckhoff ADS protocol." NVD's Primary score is CVSS v3.1 9.8 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H) with CWE-290 (authentication bypass by spoofing) and a legacy CVSS v2 score of 9.3. Its CPE configuration covers TwinCAT 2.0, TwinCAT 3.0 up to 3.1, and 3.1 builds 4022 and 4024.0. MITRE assigned the ID and published the record on 2019-12-19 without a score of its own (NVD, CVE record).
Why is there no patch?
Because the CVE describes what ADS is. Beckhoff's advisory 2017-001, "ADS is only designed for use in protected environments" (version 1.4 of 2019-12-03, which added CVE-2019-16871 next to CVE-2017-16726), states that ADS "does not provide security properties" and "has not been designed to achieve security purposes". It lists two consequences for TwinCAT 2 and 3: "An attacker can forge arbitrary ADS packets when legitimate ADS traffic is observable", and "An attacker, who has access via ADS could make use of various local services". NVD records the outcome as remote code execution as SYSTEM. Beckhoff thanks Peter Schwanke (FH Aachen) and Yury Serdyuk of Kaspersky Lab for coordinated disclosure.
What does Beckhoff recommend?
Advisory 2017-001 gives three options. Use ADS "only in protected environments, where security measures are not required and no attack is possible". If all ADS applications run on the same system, block ADS at the firewall. For distributed applications, use ADS over IPsec, ADS-over-MQTT, OPC UA, or Secure ADS, "available since TwinCAT 3.1 Build 4024.0", which carries ADS over an encrypted connection; plain ADS can then be disabled and connections made unidirectional. Beckhoff adds that whoever has ADS access can still use the local services, so Secure ADS narrows who has access rather than what access allows. In practice that means the ADS ports, TCP 48898 and UDP 48899 as our guide lists them, reach a controller only from the engineering and HMI hosts that need them.
How does it relate to other Beckhoff advisories?
Our Beckhoff TwinCAT ADS protocol security guide explains routes, ports and Secure ADS in detail. Older ADS findings are the brute-forceable ADS login CVE-2014-5414 and the open administrative services in Embedded PC images CVE-2014-5415; the TwinCAT RT driver padding leak is CVE-2020-12494. The authentication bypass fix guide covers adding authentication to a trusted-network protocol.
CVE-2019-16871 is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of 2026-11-19 (catalog version 2026.11.18, 1,786 entries). FIRST EPSS gives it 0.05302, the 92.7th percentile, in the 2026-11-18 dataset (CISA KEV, FIRST EPSS).
Evidence
- NVD: Beckhoff Embedded Windows PLCs through 3.1.4024.0 and TwinCAT on Windows engineering stations allow RCE as SYSTEM via ADS; NVD Primary CVSS v3.1 9.8 AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H, v2 9.3; CWE-290; CPE twincat 2.0, 3.0 to before 3.1, 3.1 build_4022, 3.1 build_4024.0; references Beckhoff advisory 2017-001 (Vendor Advisory) and an ic4.be blog post that returns 404 on 2026-11-19; published 2019-12-19; read 2026-11-19. — NVD
- CVE record: state PUBLISHED, assigner MITRE, published 2019-12-19; vendor and product n/a; no CNA CVSS; checked 2026-11-19. — CVE.org
- Beckhoff Advisory 2017-001 'ADS is only designed for use in protected environments', published 2017-03-13, version 1.4 of 2019-12-03 (added CVE-2019-16871); related CVE-2017-16726 and CVE-2019-16871; appearance TwinCAT 2/3; ADS does not provide security properties; attacker can forge ADS packets when traffic is observable and use local services with ADS access; solution protected environments, firewall ADS when local only, ADS over IPsec, ADS-over-MQTT, OPC UA or Secure ADS since TwinCAT 3.1 Build 4024.0; acknowledgement Peter Schwanke (FH Aachen) and Yury Serdyuk (Kaspersky Lab); read 2026-11-19. — Beckhoff
- Not in the CISA KEV catalog version 2026.11.18 (1,786 entries), checked 2026-11-19. — CISA KEV
- EPSS 0.05302, percentile 0.92743, dataset 2026-11-18, read 2026-11-19. — FIRST EPSS

Related advisories
Sources
Frequently asked questions
Is there a TwinCAT update that fixes CVE-2019-16871?
No. Beckhoff files the CVE under advisory 2017-001, which treats it as a property of the ADS protocol. The remedy is to run ADS only in protected networks, block it at the firewall where it is used locally, or switch to Secure ADS (TwinCAT 3.1 Build 4024.0 and later), ADS over IPsec, ADS-over-MQTT or OPC UA (per Beckhoff 2017-001).
Does Secure ADS remove the risk?
It removes plain, unauthenticated network access, because ADS then travels over an encrypted, authenticated connection and plain ADS can be disabled. Beckhoff notes that anyone who still has ADS access can use the local services, so access must be limited to trusted engineering and HMI hosts (per Beckhoff 2017-001).
Which systems are affected?
NVD names Beckhoff Embedded Windows PLCs through TwinCAT 3.1.4024.0 and TwinCAT on Windows engineering stations, with CPEs for TwinCAT 2.0 and TwinCAT 3 up to 3.1 build 4024.0. Beckhoff's advisory lists TwinCAT 2 and 3 (per NVD and Beckhoff 2017-001).
Is CVE-2019-16871 exploited in the wild?
It is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of 2026-11-19 (catalog version 2026.11.18). FIRST EPSS gives it 0.05302, the 92.7th percentile, in the 2026-11-18 dataset (per CISA KEV and FIRST EPSS).
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