Security Advisory

CVE-2013-20003: Z-Wave S0 All-Zero Key Exchange

Last updated:
  • CVE-2013-20003

CVE-2013-20003 is the Z-Wave S0 key-exchange weakness: devices using S0 security, from "Sierra Designs" (circa 2013, as the CVE record names it) and Silicon Labs, rely on a known all-zero key when a device joins, so an attacker in radio range during pairing can obtain the network key and spoof Z-Wave traffic. NVD scores it 8.3. The protection is S2 pairing, not a firmware patch.

Vulnerability summary

CVSS base score

8.3

High severity

EPSS score (FIRST)

0.6%

Probability of exploitation in the wild in the next 30 days

CISA KEV catalog

No

Not listed

Published

Vulnerability ID: CVE-2013-20003 · Source: NVD

Affected components

ComponentCPEVersion range
Silicon Labs Z-Wave modules ZM5101, ZM5202, ZGM130S037HGN, ZGM2305A27HGN, ZGM230SB27HGN (S0 security)cpe:2.3:o:silabs:zm5202_firmware:s2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*devices using S0 security (CERT/CC CVE record); NVD CPEs list these five modules; no firmware fix for the S0 exchange, use S2
Z-Wave devices using S0 security ("Sierra Designs" per the CVE record, circa 2013)—S0 security (CERT/CC CVE record); no fixed version

What does this mean for affected devices?

NVD's description: "Z-Wave devices from Sierra Designs (circa 2013) and Silicon Labs (using S0 security) may use a known, shared network key of all zeros, allowing an attacker within radio range to spoof Z-Wave traffic." NVD's Primary score is CVSS v3.1 8.3 (high), vector CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H, with CWE-338; CVSS v2 is 7.9, and CERT/CC adds CWE-327. NVD's CPE configuration lists five Silicon Labs Z-Wave modules: ZM5101, ZM5202, ZGM130S037HGN, ZGM2305A27HGN and ZGM230SB27HGN (NVD). CERT/CC published the record on 2022-02-04 with "Z-Wave" from Silicon Labs and Sierra Designs as the affected products, version S0 (CVE record).

What exactly is the all-zero key?

It is the temporary key that protects the S0 network-key exchange. Pen Test Partners describe it: "S0 exchanges the network key by encrypting it with a fixed key of 0000000000000000", so an attacker in RF range when a device is paired can obtain the network key and attack any device on the network. They note SensePost documented this in 2013 (Pen Test Partners Z-Shave). The network key itself is not zero; it is exposed because it travels under a key everyone knows. Once it is captured, every S0 frame on that network can be read and forged.

Is there a firmware fix?

No. S0 works as specified; the replacement is S2, whose key exchange uses Diffie-Hellman and can be authenticated with a five-digit code entered on the controller, per Pen Test Partners. S2 has its own pairing caveat: an attacker present during pairing can strip S2 support from the node information frame and force a fallback to S0, which is CVE-2018-25029 (Z-Shave). The same Silicon Labs chip families appear in CVE-2020-9057 (no encryption at all on 100/200/300 series) and CVE-2020-9061 (invalid node information frames injected into 500 series controllers).

How do you reduce the exposure?

Pair devices with S2 Authenticated or S2 Access Control, entering the device's DSK code on the controller, and treat any warning that a device joined with S0 as a reason to remove and re-add it. Include devices only when needed and with no unknown radio nearby, since the key leaks only at that moment. Keep S0-only devices away from locks, alarms and other access functions, and consider the network key exposed if an S0 inclusion happened in an untrusted setting. Our Z-Wave protocol security guide covers S0, S2 and the downgrade in detail, and the weak cryptography fix guide covers fixed-key designs as a class.

CVE-2013-20003 is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of 2026-11-18 (catalog version 2026.11.13). FIRST EPSS gives it 0.0057, the 48th percentile, in the 2026-11-17 dataset (CISA KEV, FIRST EPSS).

How to fix this class of issueThis advisory's weakness class is Weak cryptography. Our practical guide covers how to detect, fix, verify and disclose it: How to fix weak cryptography in embedded firmware.

Evidence

  • NVD description as quoted; NVD Primary CVSS 3.1 8.3 AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H, v2 7.9; CWE-338 (NVD), CWE-327 (CERT/CC); CPE silabs zm5101, zm5202, zgm130s037hgn, zgm2305a27hgn, zgm230sb27hgn firmware; published 2022-02-04. — NVD
  • CNA certcc; affected: Silicon Labs Z-Wave version S0, Sierra Designs Z-Wave S0; references SensePost 2013 paper and Pen Test Partners Z-Shave. — CVE record
  • S0 exchanges the network key encrypted with a fixed key of 0000000000000000; attacker in RF range at pairing obtains the network key; documented by SensePost in 2013; S2 uses Diffie-Hellman and optional five-digit code authentication; S2 can be downgraded to S0 by spoofing the node info frame. — Pen Test Partners: Z-Shave
  • Not in the CISA KEV catalog, version 2026.11.13, checked 2026-11-18. — CISA KEV
  • EPSS 0.00572, percentile 0.4792, dataset 2026-11-17. — FIRST EPSS

Related advisories

Sources

  1. NVD
  2. CVE record CVE-2013-20003 (CERT/CC as CNA)
  3. Pen Test Partners: Z-Shave, exploiting Z-Wave downgrade attacks
  4. CISA KEV
  5. FIRST EPSS

Frequently asked questions

Which Z-Wave devices are affected by CVE-2013-20003?

Z-Wave devices that use S0 security, from "Sierra Designs" (circa 2013, as the CVE record names it) and Silicon Labs, per the CERT/CC CVE record; NVD's CPEs name the Silicon Labs ZM5101, ZM5202, ZGM130S037HGN, ZGM2305A27HGN and ZGM230SB27HGN modules.

Is the Z-Wave network key itself all zeros?

No. Pen Test Partners explain that S0 encrypts the network key with a fixed all-zero key while a device joins, so anyone in radio range at that moment can decrypt it.

How is CVE-2013-20003 fixed?

By pairing with S2 instead of S0. S2 uses a Diffie-Hellman key exchange that can be authenticated with the device's DSK code, but it must be protected against the S2-to-S0 downgrade tracked as CVE-2018-25029.

Is CVE-2013-20003 in the CISA KEV catalog?

No, not as of 2026-11-18 (catalog version 2026.11.13). FIRST EPSS gives it 0.0057, the 48th percentile, in the 2026-11-17 dataset (per CISA KEV and FIRST EPSS).