California SB-327 (Civil Code Title 1.81.26, "Security of Connected Devices") was the first US state law requiring a baseline cybersecurity standard for internet-connected consumer products. It is short, which makes it easy to summarize but genuinely hard to apply with confidence: the statute sets a general "reasonable security feature" standard plus one concrete, specific password rule, and leaves the rest to interpretation.
Key takeaways
- California SB-327 (Civil Code Title 1.81.26, "Security of Connected Devices") was the first US state law requiring a baseline cybersecurity standard for internet-connected consumer products.
- The two statutes are separate: SB-327's connected-device security duties exist independently of, and in addition to, any CCPA privacy obligations the same manufacturer might also owe.
- The law defines a connected device broadly: any device or other physical object capable of connecting to the internet, directly or indirectly, and assigned an Internet Protocol address or Bluetooth address.
- Designed to protect the device and any information on it from unauthorized access, destruction, use, modification, or disclosure.
Where did SB-327 come from, and when does it apply?
Originally drafted as the "Teddy Bear and Toaster Act" and substantially revised before passage, SB-327 was signed by Governor Jerry Brown on 28 September 2018 as Chapter 886 of the Statutes of 2018 and took effect 1 January 2020 — the same date as the unrelated but much broader California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA). Per King & Spalding's summary, manufacturers and retailers opposed the original draft, and the amendments removed duties to notify consumers directly and to patch after a breach. The final bill was tied to an identical Assembly bill: section 2 makes SB-327 operative only if AB 1906 of the same session was also enacted.
The two statutes are separate: SB-327's connected-device security duties exist independently of, and in addition to, any CCPA privacy obligations the same manufacturer might also owe. Section 1798.91.06(f) says so directly — the duties are "cumulative with any other duties or obligations imposed under other law."
Which products and which companies does it cover?
The law defines a connected device broadly: any device or other physical object capable of connecting to the internet, directly or indirectly, and assigned an Internet Protocol address or Bluetooth address. That sweeps in smartphones, wearables, smart speakers, connected TVs, thermostats and doorbells. The definition has no "consumer product" limit, though "unauthorized" access is measured against what "the consumer" authorized, so the law reads most naturally on products a consumer controls.
The duty falls on the manufacturer, defined in section 1798.91.05(c) as the person who manufactures connected devices sold or offered for sale in California, "or contracts with another person to manufacture on the person's behalf." Three cases follow from that text:
- A brand that designs a product and has an ODM or contract manufacturer build it is a manufacturer: it contracted for manufacture on its behalf.
- A company that only purchases a finished device, or only purchases and brands it, is excluded by the same subsection. A retailer's private label on an off-the-shelf product is the textbook case.
- The factory itself is also a manufacturer if it makes devices that are sold or offered for sale in California, wherever it is located.
What does the "reasonable security feature" standard require?
SB-327's central requirement, in section 1798.91.04(a), is that a connected device be equipped with a reasonable security feature or features that are all of the following:
Appropriate to the nature and function of the device; Appropriate to the information it may collect, contain, or transmit; and Designed to protect the device and any information on it from unauthorized access, destruction, use, modification, or disclosure
The statute doesn't define a technical checklist for what satisfies this, and no California agency has published SB-327 guidance. Commentators such as Kelley Drye describe "reasonable security" as a flexible, process-oriented idea borrowed from FTC and NIST practice. The nearest official California reference sits in another statute: the Attorney General's February 2016 Data Breach Report said that failing to implement the applicable CIS Controls "constitutes a lack of reasonable security" for businesses holding personal information. That report predates SB-327 and is not about devices, but it is the clearest sign of how the same office reads the word "reasonable." For a device program, a named baseline — ETSI EN 303 645, NIST's IoT core baseline or the CIS Critical Security Controls for the back end — is the most defensible way to show what "reasonable" meant for your product.
What is the one concrete rule — unique or first-use passwords?
Where the general standard is open-ended, SB-327 gives one specific, unambiguous requirement. Under section 1798.91.04(b), if a connected device is equipped with a means for authentication outside a local area network, it is deemed a reasonable security feature if either:
- (1) the preprogrammed password is unique to each device manufactured, or
- (2) the device requires the user to generate a new means of authentication before being granted access for the first time.
The subsection opens with "Subject to all of the requirements of subdivision (a)," so the password rule is a safe harbour inside the general duty, not a replacement for it. A device with unique passwords and an unauthenticated debug service on the internet still fails the general standard.
The same baseline was later echoed in the UK's PSTI default-password rule, in force since 29 April 2024, and in NIST's IoT device cybersecurity requirements. SB-327 predates both, which made it an early mover on a requirement that has since become close to an international norm for consumer connected devices.
Which interfaces count as authentication outside a LAN?
Any login path that a person or system can reach from beyond the local network counts. The statute speaks of "a means for authentication", and a typical device has several. Errata Security's 2018 critique made exactly this point: a web management login, a Telnet or SSH service backed by /etc/passwd, and other systems may each have their own credentials, and the law does not say which one it means. The safe reading is all of them.
| Interface | Reachable outside the LAN? | What to check |
|---|---|---|
| Cloud account and mobile app login | Yes, by design | Account created by the user at setup; no shared vendor default |
| Web admin UI with port forwarding or UPnP | Often | Per-unit password on the label, or forced change at first login |
| Telnet, SSH or serial-over-IP shell | Sometimes left on | Disabled in production builds, or per-unit credentials |
| Remote support or OTA service account | Yes | No identical credential across the fleet |
| Local-only Bluetooth pairing | Usually no | Still covered by the general standard in section 1798.91.04(a) |
Table: SoftWSP reading of Civil Code § 1798.91.04(b), 12 November 2026; not a court interpretation.
What does SB-327 exempt, and who enforces it?
Section 1798.91.06 holds nine subsections of carve-outs and clarifications. The ones that change engineering or legal work are:
| Provision | What it says | Practical effect |
|---|---|---|
| (a) Third-party software | No duty for "unaffiliated third-party software or applications that a user chooses to add" | Your own preinstalled apps and firmware are still covered |
| (b) App stores | No duty on an electronic store or marketplace to review or enforce compliance | Retail platforms are not SB-327 gatekeepers |
| (c) User control | No duty to stop a user modifying the software or firmware | Locking the bootloader is not required by this law |
| (d) Federal rules | Does not apply where the device's functionality is subject to federal security requirements | Narrow: needs a federal security rule that covers the function |
| (e) Enforcement | No private right of action; AG, city attorney, county counsel or district attorney enforce | Consumers cannot sue under SB-327 itself |
| (h) Health laws | HIPAA and California CMIA entities are exempt "with respect to any activity regulated by those acts" | Not a blanket exemption for every product a health company sells |
Source: SB-327 chaptered text, Civil Code § 1798.91.06, read 12 November 2026.
The title sets no penalty amount. Kelley Drye notes the bill "does not address (either directly or by implication) any specific penalties or remedies," and expects the reasonable-security duty to be raised alongside other claims. As of November 2026, no publicly reported enforcement action under SB-327 has been identified since it took effect in 2020.
How does Oregon's law differ from California's?
Oregon's HB 2395, codified as ORS 646A.813, took effect the same day and copies the password rule, but differs in four places that matter to a device maker:
| Point | California SB-327 | Oregon ORS 646A.813 |
|---|---|---|
| Device scope | Any internet-capable object with an IP or Bluetooth address | Used "primarily for personal, family or household purposes" |
| Manufacturer | Includes contracting another to manufacture; excludes purchase-and-brand | "A person that makes a connected device and sells or offers to sell" it in Oregon |
| Federal route | Federal rules take the device out of scope | Compliance with federal security requirements is itself a reasonable security feature |
| Penalty route | None specified; public enforcers only | A violation is an unlawful trade practice under ORS 646.607 |
Oregon also excludes FDA-regulated medical devices by name and drops protection where a consumer installs unapproved software that disables the manufacturer's security features. The National Law Review described California as joining Oregon as one of two states with such a law.
Why does the brevity matter for a device maker?
Because SB-327 doesn't mandate specific technical controls beyond the password rule — no required encryption, no mandated patching cadence, no vulnerability-disclosure duty — a manufacturer can be technically compliant with the letter of the law while still shipping a device with weak security in every area the statute doesn't name. Errata Security's critique argued the bill was based on "adding security features" when the real fix is removing insecure ones, such as listening ports and injection flaws in web management.
For a manufacturer building an actual security program, the password rule is a floor, not a target. The EU's Cyber Resilience Act has applied its vulnerability-reporting duties since 11 September 2026, and its Annex I requirements cover secure defaults, updates and vulnerability handling. The UK's PSTI adds a vulnerability disclosure policy and a stated support period. The FCC's voluntary U.S. Cyber Trust Mark builds on the NIST IR 8425 baseline. A product designed to those baselines will meet SB-327 as a side effect; the reverse is not true.
Worked example: does a cloud-connected camera meet SB-327?
Synthetic example for illustration, not a customer product. A company in Taiwan designs a Wi-Fi camera and has a contract manufacturer build it. A US brand sells it in California under its own name.
Who is the manufacturer?The Taiwanese designer contracted for manufacture on its behalf, so it is one. The US brand only buys and brands the camera, so it falls outside the definition, though retail contracts usually push the obligation back onto the designer anyway. Which logins are reachable outside the LAN?The cloud app login, and a remote support account used by the call centre. The local web UI is LAN-only unless the user enables port forwarding, which the product allows. Password ruleThe app forces account creation at setup (option 2). The web UI ships with admin/adminon every unit, which fails both options once port forwarding is on. The fix is a per-unit password printed on the label, or a forced change at first login. The remote support account uses one shared credential across the fleet and must move to per-device keys.General standardA firmware SBOM shows a BusyBox build with known CVEs and a Telnet daemon left enabled. Neither is named in SB-327, but both bear on whether the security features are "appropriate to the nature and function of the device." Evidence kept:the credential design note, the test showing first-login enforcement, the SBOM, and the vulnerability triage record.
How should a manufacturer start?
Treat the password rule as a hard floor, not a complete programList every authentication path reachable outside a LAN and make each one unique per unit or forced at first use. Decide whether you are the manufacturerIf you contract for manufacture, you are; if you only buy and brand, check what your supplier contract says. Document your reasonable-security rationale against a named standardSince the general standard isn't self-defining, being able to point to ETSI EN 303 645, the NIST core baseline or another named framework gives a concrete answer if a retailer or regulator asks. Check Oregon and other markets in the same passOregon's consumer-only scope and trade-practice penalty differ; the UK PSTI, the EU CRA and NIST's IoT baseline all go further than SB-327's password-only floor. Read the exemptions narrowlyThe federal and health carve-outs depend on the activity and the rule that covers it, not on the industry you sell into.
Can AI document "reasonable security"?
Not on its own — SB-327's reasonable-security standard isn't self-defining, and deciding what satisfies it for a given device is a judgment call a manufacturer and, ultimately, a regulator make. What SoftWSP's platform contributes is evidence for the parts of that judgment it can see. It reads a device's SBOM, matches each component and version against NVD, CISA KEV, EPSS and vendor CSAF advisories, and, from a packet capture, lists the management services (SSH, Telnet, RDP, VNC) that are reached across a network boundary. AI drafts a plain-language summary of those findings, tied to the component or session each claim came from. SoftWSP does not test whether a password is unique or forced at first use; that stays the manufacturer's own test record, and an engineer reviews every finding before anyone calls a device SB-327-compliant.
SoftWSP's device and firmware security assessments can document the component and update evidence that SB-327's reasonable-security standard, and the fuller baselines beyond it, both expect: see Device & Firmware Security.
This guide summarizes California's SB-327 statutory text, Oregon's ORS 646A.813 and independent secondary legal analysis current as of this guide's last-updated date. This is general information, not legal advice — confirm current statutory text and any enforcement developments directly before relying on it for a compliance decision.
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Frequently asked questions
What is California SB-327, and when did it take effect?
SB-327 (Information Privacy: Connected Devices), originally nicknamed the 'Teddy Bear and Toaster Act' during drafting, was signed into law by Governor Jerry Brown on 28 September 2018 and took effect 1 January 2020 — the same day as the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA), though SB-327 is a separate and much narrower statute. It added Title 1.81.26 to the California Civil Code and was the first US state law to set minimum cybersecurity requirements for internet-connected consumer products.
What counts as a 'connected device' under the law, and who must comply?
A connected device is any device or physical object capable of connecting to the internet, directly or indirectly, and assigned an Internet Protocol address or Bluetooth address — covering smartphones, wearables, smart speakers, connected TVs, thermostats and doorbells, among others. The definition itself does not limit the law to consumer products. The duty falls on manufacturers of connected devices sold or offered for sale in California, regardless of where the manufacturer itself is based; a company that only buys a device, or only buys and brands it, is not a manufacturer under the statute.
What does the 'reasonable security feature' requirement actually mean?
The law requires a connected device to have security features appropriate to the device's nature and function, appropriate to the information it may collect, contain or transmit, and designed to protect the device and any information on it from unauthorized access, destruction, use, modification or disclosure. The statute itself doesn't define a technical checklist, and no California regulator has issued SB-327 guidance. The closest official reference is the Attorney General's February 2016 Data Breach Report, which said, for personal-information security under a different statute, that failing to implement the applicable CIS Critical Security Controls constitutes a lack of reasonable security.
What is the specific password rule, and what are the law's main exemptions and enforcement limits?
For a device that can be authenticated outside a local area network, a security feature is deemed reasonable if either the preprogrammed password is unique to each individual device manufactured, or the device requires a user to generate a new means of authentication before first-time access is granted — this is the law's one concrete, unambiguous technical requirement. SB-327 imposes no duty on manufacturers for unaffiliated third-party software or applications a user adds, does not apply to devices whose functionality is subject to federal security requirements, and does not apply to HIPAA or California CMIA entities for activities those acts regulate. Enforcement is reserved exclusively to the California Attorney General, city attorneys, county counsel and district attorneys; there is no private right of action, and no publicly reported enforcement action has been identified as of November 2026.
Sources
- SB-327 Information Privacy: Connected Devices, chaptered bill text (Chapter 886, Statutes of 2018), PDF copy
- Oregon Revised Statutes 646A.813: Security requirements for Internet-connected devices (Oregon HB 2395, 2019 c.193)
- California Attorney General: California Data Breach Report, February 2016 (CIS Controls as the floor for reasonable security of personal information)
- Kelley Drye: California Passes Bill Requiring Reasonable Security Features for Connected Devices
- King & Spalding (khlaw.com): California Enacts First IoT Cybersecurity Law
- Errata Security: California's bad IoT law (critique of SB-327, 10 September 2018)
- National Law Review: California's IoT Devices' Security Law — what manufacturers need to know
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