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Firmware vulnerabilities & fixes

OWASP MASVS (Mobile Application Security Verification Standard), explained

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The OWASP Mobile Application Security Verification Standard (MASVS), currently v2.1.0 (published 18 January 2024), is, in OWASP's own words, "a comprehensive security standard" providing "a clear and concise set of guidelines and best practices for assessing and enhancing the security of mobile applications." It is maintained by the OWASP Mobile Application Security (MAS) project and is fully open — unlike some OWASP standards, there is no paywalled edition. OWASP frames it as usable three ways: as a metric for scoring an app's security posture, as guidance during development, and as a baseline for procurement.

Key takeaways

  • Each group breaks down further into individual controls labelled MASVS-XXXXX-Y (for example MASVS-STORAGE-1), which the companion testing guide maps to concrete test procedures.
  • MASVS v2 has 24 controls across the eight groups.
  • MAS-P — a privacy baseline for apps handling user-sensitive data, designed to work alongside L1/L2 rather than stand alone.
  • MASVS states what to verify; it doesn't say how.

What are the eight control categories?

OWASP's "Using the MASVS" page defines eight control groups, each labelled MASVS-XXXXX:

Category What it covers
MASVS-STORAGE Secure storage of sensitive data on a device (data-at-rest)
MASVS-CRYPTO Cryptographic functionality used to protect sensitive data
MASVS-AUTH Authentication and authorization mechanisms used by the mobile app
MASVS-NETWORK Secure network communication between the app and remote endpoints (data-in-transit)
MASVS-PLATFORM Secure interaction with the underlying mobile platform and other installed apps
MASVS-CODE Security best practices for data processing and keeping the app up-to-date
MASVS-RESILIENCE Resilience to reverse engineering and tampering attempts
MASVS-PRIVACY Privacy controls to protect user privacy

Each group breaks down further into individual controls labelled MASVS-XXXXX-Y (for example MASVS-STORAGE-1), which the companion testing guide maps to concrete test procedures.

What are the 24 MASVS controls?

MASVS v2 has 24 controls across the eight groups. The statements below are OWASP's own, from each category page; the right-hand column is our reading for an app that sets up and controls a connected device.

Control OWASP statement What it means for a device companion app
MASVS-STORAGE-1 The app securely stores sensitive data. Wi-Fi credentials, device keys and tokens sit in Keystore / Keychain, not in shared preferences or plain files
MASVS-STORAGE-2 The app prevents leakage of sensitive data. No device secrets in logs, backups, screenshots or crash reports
MASVS-CRYPTO-1 The app employs current strong cryptography and uses it according to industry best practices. Pairing and local-control messages use current algorithms, not a home-made cipher
MASVS-CRYPTO-2 The app performs key management according to industry best practices. No shared key hard-coded in every app build
MASVS-AUTH-1 The app uses secure authentication and authorization protocols and follows the relevant best practices. Standard OAuth flows to the device cloud
MASVS-AUTH-2 The app performs local authentication securely according to the platform best practices. Biometric unlock is tied to a key, not a boolean
MASVS-AUTH-3 The app secures sensitive operations with additional authentication. Re-authenticate before unlock, ownership transfer or factory reset
MASVS-NETWORK-1 The app secures all network traffic according to the current best practices. TLS to the cloud, with no debug trust anchors in release builds
MASVS-NETWORK-2 The app performs identity pinning for all remote endpoints under the developer's control. Pin the vendor's own cloud and update endpoints
MASVS-PLATFORM-1 The app uses IPC mechanisms securely. Exported activities, intents and URL schemes cannot trigger device actions from other apps
MASVS-PLATFORM-2 The app uses WebViews securely. Setup or help screens in a WebView expose no JavaScript bridge to device commands
MASVS-PLATFORM-3 The app uses the user interface securely. Device PINs and guest codes are masked and kept out of notifications
MASVS-CODE-1 The app requires an up-to-date platform version. A minimum OS version set by security, not only by market share
MASVS-CODE-2 The app has a mechanism for enforcing app updates. The back-end can refuse app versions with known flaws
MASVS-CODE-3 The app only uses software components without known vulnerabilities. Track the app's SDKs (BLE, push, analytics) the way firmware components are tracked
MASVS-CODE-4 The app validates and sanitizes all untrusted inputs. Treat data from the device and from QR codes as untrusted input
MASVS-RESILIENCE-1 The app validates the integrity of the platform. Optional; relevant for apps that unlock physical access
MASVS-RESILIENCE-2 The app implements anti-tampering mechanisms. As above
MASVS-RESILIENCE-3 The app implements anti-static analysis mechanisms. As above
MASVS-RESILIENCE-4 The app implements anti-dynamic analysis techniques. As above
MASVS-PRIVACY-1 The app minimizes access to sensitive data and resources. Ask for location or nearby-device permissions only during setup, where possible
MASVS-PRIVACY-2 The app prevents identification of the user. Device telemetry is not keyed to a stable advertising ID
MASVS-PRIVACY-3 The app is transparent about data collection and usage. Say what the device and app send to the cloud
MASVS-PRIVACY-4 The app offers user control over their data. Users can delete device history and unlink a device

What are MAS Profiles L1, L2, R and P?

The project "traditionally provided three verification levels (L1, L2 and R)," which OWASP states were "revisited during the MASVS refactoring in 2023, and the MASWE refactoring in 2026" and reworked into what it now calls MAS Profiles:

  • MAS-L1 — a baseline "for the most fundamental security requirements and best practices that every mobile app should meet," assuming the OS itself can be trusted (device not rooted/jailbroken) and that other apps, not the primary user, are the adversary. Recommended for all mobile apps as a floor.
  • MAS-L2 — adds controls for apps handling highly sensitive data, such as those needing to "demonstrate compliance with standards and regulations such as PCI DSS, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act."
  • MAS-R — anti-tampering and anti-reverse-engineering controls, explicitly meant "to augment and not replace MAS-L1 and MAS-L2," for apps protecting business logic (OWASP's example: competitive games defending against cheating). OWASP states that these controls "cannot assure a 100% effectiveness" since a reverse engineer with full device access will eventually succeed given enough time.
  • MAS-P — a privacy baseline for apps handling user-sensitive data, designed to work alongside L1/L2 rather than stand alone.

OWASP frames profile selection as "a risk-based decision made in consultation with business owners," not a checklist every app must clear in full — the standard explicitly expects apps to adopt only the profiles that match their actual threat model.

How do MASTG and MASWE fit alongside it?

MASVS states what to verify; it doesn't say how. Two companion resources fill that in: the OWASP Mobile Application Security Testing Guide (MASTG) "describes the technical processes for verifying the controls listed in the MASVS," with separate Android and iOS test procedures per control (see our OWASP MASTG guide), and MASWE (Mobile Application Security Weaknesses) is a parallel enumeration of specific weaknesses (for example, MASWE-0001, "Sensitive Data Stored Unencrypted in Private Storage") mapped back to the MASVS control they violate. OWASP is explicit that the MASVS only covers the mobile app's client side — testing a backend endpoint the app talks to falls to the OWASP ASVS instead.

The current release is v2.1.0, published 18 January 2024 on the OWASP/masvs GitHub repository, which added the MASVS-PRIVACY category. The named authors are Sven Schleier, Carlos Holguera, Jeroen Beckers, Bernhard Mueller, and Jeroen Willemsen; OWASP licenses the work under Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0. OWASP is also explicit about one limit on the standard's authority: it "does not certify any vendors, verifiers or software" — a third party claiming "MASVS-certified" status is making its own claim, not an OWASP-issued one.

What does MASVS leave out for a device's companion app?

It leaves out the device and the cloud. The "Using the MASVS" Assumptions section states that the standard "assumes that you've followed the relevant standards of your industry and country for all elements of your app's ecosystem, such as backend servers, IoT, and other companion devices." A companion app review that passes MAS-L1 says nothing about whether the cloud API checks device ownership or whether the device accepts unsigned firmware.

For a connected product that leaves three gaps to assign to someone:

  1. The device itselfFirmware, debug ports, the local radio protocol and the update path. The OWASP ISVS (IoT Security Verification Standard) is the OWASP counterpart for this side.
  2. The cloud APIDevice binding, pairing codes and admin functions. Use the OWASP API Security Top 10 to frame the risks and the ASVS for testable requirements.
  3. The local link between app and deviceMASVS-NETWORK is written around secure channels to remote endpoints, typically TLS. A Bluetooth Low Energy or soft-AP provisioning channel needs its own design: how the app authenticates the device, how Wi-Fi credentials are protected in transit, and what a nearby attacker sees during setup. That design sits between the MASVS and the device-side standard, and it is the part most often left unowned.

Which platform features map to the controls that matter most?

For most companion apps, the network, authentication and platform controls depend on a handful of OS features. Getting these right covers much of MAS-L1 for the connected-device case.

Control Android iOS / iPadOS Note
MASVS-NETWORK-1 / -2 Network security configuration: declarative trust anchors, cleartext opt-out, pin sets App Transport Security (NSAppTransportSecurity) Review every exception entry; debug overrides should not ship in release builds
MASVS-AUTH-1 Custom Tabs / system browser ASWebAuthenticationSession RFC 8252 (BCP 212) says native apps should make OAuth requests in an external user-agent "rather than an embedded user-agent (such as one implemented with web-views)"
MASVS-PRIVACY-1 Companion device pairing (CompanionDeviceManager, Android 8.0 / API 26 and higher) AccessorySetupKit (iOS / iPadOS 18.0 and higher) System-mediated discovery lets the user pick one device; Apple describes AccessorySetupKit as "privacy-preserving discovery and configuration of accessories"
MASVS-STORAGE-1 Android Keystore Keychain Keep device keys and cloud tokens here

Android's documentation notes that companion device pairing "doesn't create connections on its own nor enable continuous scanning"; the app still opens the Bluetooth or Wi-Fi connection itself, so the security of that channel remains the app and firmware team's job.

Worked example: how would you scope a review of a smart-plug app?

Synthetic example. The product and findings are invented for illustration and do not describe any real vendor.

A maker of Wi-Fi smart plugs ships an Android and iOS app that provisions the plug over a temporary soft-AP, then controls it through the vendor cloud. The product team scopes a pre-release review:

  1. Pick profilesThe app handles no payment or health data, so MAS-L1 plus MAS-P. MAS-R is left out because the app gates no physical access.
  2. Walk the 24 controlsThe team finds the cloud token in plain shared preferences (MASVS-STORAGE-1), a debug trust anchor left in the release network config (MASVS-NETWORK-1), and an exported deep link plug://toggle?id= that any app can fire (MASVS-PLATFORM-1).
  3. Check componentsAn outdated BLE SDK is still linked although the product no longer uses Bluetooth (MASVS-CODE-3). It is removed.
  4. Assign the gapsThe soft-AP step sends the home Wi-Fi password to the plug over plain HTTP. That is outside MASVS, so it goes to the firmware team with a design change. The cloud's /plugs/{id} ownership check goes to the API owner.
  5. Re-testwith MASTG procedures for the fixed controls before release.

What are the common pitfalls?

  • Calling a MASVS pass a product pass. By its own assumptions MASVS does not cover the device or the back-end.
  • Pinning without a rotation plan. MASVS-NETWORK-2 pins endpoints under your control; plan pin updates before certificates rotate, or old app versions lose contact with the cloud.
  • Doing OAuth in a WebView. RFC 8252 explains the drawback: the host app can copy user credentials and cookies.
  • Requesting broad location and Bluetooth permissions for the app's whole life when only setup needs them.
  • Tracking firmware components but not app SDKs. MASVS-CODE-3 asks for the same known-vulnerability discipline on the app side.

Where does this fit for device makers?

A growing share of IoT and industrial products ship with a companion mobile app for setup, monitoring, or firmware updates — and that app is frequently the weakest link in an otherwise hardened device, since it's built on a separate codebase and release cycle from the firmware itself. Teams already assessing firmware against frameworks like IEC 62443-4-2 or scanning for CWE Top 25 weaknesses in embedded code can use MASVS as the matching baseline for the app side: MAS-L1 as a minimum bar for any companion app, MAS-L2 if it handles payment or health data, and MAS-R if the app enforces licensing or anti-cheat logic worth protecting.

SoftWSP does not test mobile apps. Its part is the device side. It extracts a software bill of materials from a firmware image as CycloneDX 1.6 JSON. It matches the components against NVD, the CISA KEV catalogue, FIRST EPSS scores and CISA ICS advisories, and drafts a cited report for an engineer to review. That is the firmware counterpart of MASVS-CODE-3. See the firmware SBOM guide, the free SBOM viewer, or device & firmware security services.

This guide summarises a public OWASP publication; it does not constitute legal or compliance advice.

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Frequently asked questions

What is the OWASP MASVS?

The Mobile Application Security Verification Standard (MASVS) is, per OWASP's own description, "a comprehensive security standard developed by the Open Worldwide Application Security Project (OWASP)" that provides "a clear and concise set of guidelines and best practices for assessing and enhancing the security of mobile applications." OWASP states it is "designed to be used as a metric, guidance, and baseline for mobile app security verification," covering storage, cryptography, authentication and authorization, network communication, platform interaction, code quality, and resilience against reverse engineering and tampering. Unlike some OWASP standards, the MASVS itself is fully open and free to read online — there is no paywalled text.

What are the eight MASVS control categories?

OWASP's "Using the MASVS" page defines eight control groups, each labelled MASVS-XXXXX: MASVS-STORAGE ("Secure storage of sensitive data on a device (data-at-rest)"), MASVS-CRYPTO ("Cryptographic functionality used to protect sensitive data"), MASVS-AUTH ("Authentication and authorization mechanisms used by the mobile app"), MASVS-NETWORK ("Secure network communication between the mobile app and remote endpoints (data-in-transit)"), MASVS-PLATFORM ("Secure interaction with the underlying mobile platform and other installed apps"), MASVS-CODE ("Security best practices for data processing and keeping the app up-to-date"), MASVS-RESILIENCE ("Resilience to reverse engineering and tampering attempts"), and MASVS-PRIVACY ("Privacy controls to protect user privacy"). Each group breaks down into individual controls labelled MASVS-XXXXX-Y.

What are MAS Profiles (L1, L2, R, P), and how do they differ?

OWASP's MASVS page states the project "traditionally provided three verification levels (L1, L2 and R)" which were "revisited during the MASVS refactoring in 2023, and the MASWE refactoring in 2026" and reworked into what OWASP now calls "MAS Profiles." Per OWASP's own profile pages: MAS-L1 "provides a baseline for the most fundamental security requirements... that every mobile app should meet," recommended for all apps as a baseline. MAS-L2 adds controls for apps handling highly sensitive data, such as those needing to "demonstrate compliance with standards and regulations such as PCI DSS, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act." MAS-R is explicitly described as meant "to augment and not replace MAS-L1 and MAS-L2" — anti-tampering and anti-reverse-engineering controls for apps protecting their own business logic, which OWASP notes "cannot assure a 100% effectiveness" since a determined reverse engineer retains full device access. MAS-P provides "a baseline for user privacy protection," recommended for all apps handling user-sensitive data, and is designed to work alongside L1/L2 rather than stand alone. OWASP is explicit that profile selection should be a risk-based decision made with business owners, not a checklist to clear in full.

How does MASVS relate to MASTG and MASWE, and who maintains it?

MASVS is maintained by the OWASP Mobile Application Security (MAS) project. Per OWASP's own description, the companion OWASP Mobile Application Security Testing Guide (MASTG) "describes the technical processes for verifying the controls listed in the MASVS" with per-platform (Android/iOS) test cases, while MASWE (Mobile Application Security Weaknesses) is a separate enumeration of specific weaknesses mapped back to MASVS controls. The current MASVS release is v2.1.0, published by the OWASP/masvs GitHub repository on 18 January 2024, which added the MASVS-PRIVACY category with four controls covering data minimization, user-identification prevention, transparency, and user control over data. The standard's named authors are Sven Schleier, Carlos Holguera, Jeroen Beckers, Bernhard Mueller, and Jeroen Willemsen; OWASP states the work "is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License." OWASP is explicit it "does not certify any vendors, verifiers or software" against the MASVS — any third-party MASVS certification claim is not officially vetted by OWASP.

Sources

  1. OWASP Mobile Application Security: MASVS landing page
  2. OWASP MASVS: Using the MASVS — control groups, assumptions, applicability
  3. OWASP MASVS: Frontispiece — authors, changelog, license
  4. OWASP MASVS: Assessment and Certification — OWASP's stance on third-party certification
  5. OWASP MAS: MAS-L1 Profile
  6. OWASP MAS: MAS-L2 Profile
  7. OWASP MAS: MAS-R Profile
  8. OWASP MAS: MAS-P Profile
  9. GitHub: OWASP/masvs release v2.1.0 (18 January 2024) — MASVS-PRIVACY introduced
  10. OWASP MASVS: MASVS-STORAGE controls
  11. OWASP MASVS: MASVS-CRYPTO controls
  12. OWASP MASVS: MASVS-AUTH controls
  13. OWASP MASVS: MASVS-NETWORK controls
  14. OWASP MASVS: MASVS-PLATFORM controls
  15. OWASP MASVS: MASVS-CODE controls
  16. OWASP MASVS: MASVS-RESILIENCE controls
  17. OWASP MASVS: MASVS-PRIVACY controls
  18. IETF RFC 8252: OAuth 2.0 for Native Apps (BCP 212, October 2017)
  19. Android Developers: Network security configuration
  20. Android Developers: Companion device pairing
  21. Apple Developer: NSAppTransportSecurity
  22. Apple Developer: AccessorySetupKit
  23. Apple Developer: ASWebAuthenticationSession
  24. Chrome for Developers: Custom Tabs on Android
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OWASP MASVS (Mobile Application Security Verification Standard), explained