Threat modeling, per OWASP's own community page and Cheat Sheet Series, reduces to four questions — "What are we working on?", "What can go wrong?", "What are we going to do about it?", and "Did we do a good enough job?" — answered using any of six named methodologies the Cheat Sheet lists side by side: STRIDE, PASTA, Attack Trees, LINDDUN, OCTAVE and VAST. The practice itself is building a model of a system from a security angle, using that model to find the threats specific to it, and deciding what to do about each one — rather than starting from a generic list of known attacks and hoping it happens to fit. OWASP does not publish one single official "OWASP Threat Modeling" standard; instead, its community page and its Cheat Sheet Series' Threat Modeling Cheat Sheet both point to the same external four-question framework and the same handful of named methodologies, which is the shape this guide follows.
Key takeaways
- The OWASP Threat Modeling Cheat Sheet says to "start with STRIDE for a technical design, and select another technique when the scope requires a different view".
- Question one is "what are we working on?", and the cheat sheet's usual answer is a data flow diagram (DFD) that gives "a clear view of trust boundaries, data flows, data stores, processes, and the external entities".
- The cheat sheet pairs each STRIDE category with the security property it violates; Microsoft's Threat Modeling Tool documentation gives the same six definitions.
- Brainstorming with STRIDE finds design flaws.
What are the four questions underneath every methodology?
Both OWASP sources trace threat modeling's core logic to the Threat Modeling Manifesto, published by a working group of 15 practitioners (including Adam Shostack, Zoe Braiterman, Jonathan Marcil, Stephen de Vries and Irene Michlin). Its four questions, quoted directly: "What are we working on?", "What can go wrong?", "What are we going to do about it?", and "Did we do a good enough job?" OWASP's community page restates these as four practical steps — assess scope, identify what can go wrong, identify countermeasures or manage risk, and assess the work — and every named methodology below is really just a different technique for answering question two, "what can go wrong," within that same four-step shape.
Which methodology fits which question?
The OWASP Threat Modeling Cheat Sheet says to "start with STRIDE for a technical design, and select another technique when the scope requires a different view". Its current chooser, condensed:
| Methodology | What it's for |
|---|---|
| STRIDE | Microsoft's six threat categories — Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information Disclosure, Denial of Service, Elevation of Privilege — applied to a system's components, data flows and trust boundaries |
| Attack Trees | Decomposes an attacker's ultimate goal into the alternative or required paths needed to reach it |
| Misuse or abuse cases | Valid workflows performed out of order, repeatedly, concurrently or for an unintended outcome |
| LINDDUN | Privacy-specific threats (Linking, Identifying, Non-repudiation, Detecting, Data disclosure, Unawareness and Unintervenability, Non-compliance), not security threats |
| PASTA | Connects business objectives and technical requirements to application threats; useful for showing direct business impact |
| OCTAVE | Organization-wide risk assessment and security strategy for critical assets |
| VAST | Keeps separate application and operational threat models embedded directly in normal development workflows |
There is no single methodology OWASP presents as universally correct, and the cheat sheet warns: "Do not add techniques only to make the model appear comprehensive." For a device, STRIDE covers the technical design, an attack tree suits one high-value goal (for example "install unsigned firmware"), and LINDDUN is worth adding when the device or its cloud handles personal data.
How do you model a connected device?
Question one is "what are we working on?", and the cheat sheet's usual answer is a data flow diagram (DFD) that gives "a clear view of trust boundaries, data flows, data stores, processes, and the external entities". On a device these elements map to concrete parts:
| DFD element | Typical device example |
|---|---|
| External entity | Installer with a laptop, end user, companion app, cloud backend, update server, field technician |
| Process | Bootloader, firmware update agent, local web server, MQTT client, BLE pairing service |
| Data store | Flash partition holding credentials or certificates, configuration store, log buffer |
| Data flow | HTTPS to the cloud, local admin page over HTTP or HTTPS, BLE provisioning, OTA image download, serial console |
| Trust boundary | Network interface, debug port (UART, JTAG), boundary between a secure element and the main SoC, the enclosure itself if physical access is in scope |
Two device-specific points matter. First, the enclosure is a trust boundary when someone can open it: debug ports and removable flash are entry points, not internal details. Second, the component list inside the firmware is part of "what we are working on". A firmware SBOM shows which open-source web server, TLS library or BusyBox build sits behind each process, and those components carry known vulnerabilities the model has to account for.
What does STRIDE look like on an embedded device?
The cheat sheet pairs each STRIDE category with the security property it violates; Microsoft's Threat Modeling Tool documentation gives the same six definitions. Applied to a typical connected device:
| Category | Property violated | Device threat example | Typical control |
|---|---|---|---|
| Spoofing | Authentication | Attacker impersonates the update server or the cloud | Mutual TLS, pinned server identity, signed commands |
| Tampering | Integrity | Modified firmware image installed over OTA or through the bootloader | Signed images verified by a secure boot chain; see OTA update security |
| Repudiation | Accounting | No record of who changed a setpoint through the local web UI | Authenticated sessions plus tamper-evident logs sent off the device |
| Information disclosure | Confidentiality | Wi-Fi credentials or private keys read from external flash | Keys in a secure element; encrypted storage |
| Denial of service | Availability | Login flood or malformed packets crash the control loop | Rate limiting, input validation, watchdog with safe state |
| Elevation of privilege | Authorization | Command injection in a diagnostics page gives a root shell | Parameterized calls, no shell in request paths, least-privilege services |
Work through each element of the DFD with these six prompts; the cheat sheet asks teams to "record which components, data flows, or trust boundaries they affect."
Where can device-specific threats come from?
Brainstorming with STRIDE finds design flaws. Two catalogues add threats a team may not think of:
- MITRE EMB3D maps device properties (hardware, system software, application software, networking) to threats and mitigations. Its Getting Started page has you "select the applicable properties in the Properties Mapper Tool to generate the list of Threats the device may be exposed to", then review each one for relevance. Our EMB3D guide covers the structure.
- Known vulnerabilities in shipped components. CVE matches against the SBOM, ranked with KEV and EPSS, show which components already have public exploits. They belong in the model as concrete threats against the process that uses the component.
What do you do with each threat once it is found?
Question three needs an explicit answer for every threat. The cheat sheet lists four responses, citing Adam Shostack:
- Mitigate: reduce the likelihood, for example by adding signature checks to the update path.
- Eliminate: remove the feature, for example by disabling telnet in production builds.
- Transfer: allocate responsibility to another party. The cheat sheet stresses that transfer "does not itself reduce the likelihood or harmful consequences of an event"; record who owns the remaining controls.
- Accept: keep the risk because the other options do not fit business constraints, and write down why.
The cheat sheet then asks teams to "turn agreed mitigations into actionable security requirements" and keep the decisions current, citing NIST SP 800-218 practice PW.1.2. For a device's web and API surfaces, OWASP ASVS gives ready-made, testable requirements to cite.
Which tools help, and what do regulators expect?
A whiteboard is enough to start. When the model needs to live in version control:
- OWASP Threat Dragon is "a free, open-source, cross-platform threat modeling application" for drawing diagrams and listing threats per element; it supports STRIDE, CIA and LINDDUN and runs as a desktop or self-hosted web application.
- OWASP pytm describes the system in Python and generates a DFD, a sequence diagram and a list of relevant threats, which suits teams that want the model reviewed like code.
- Microsoft Threat Modeling Tool sorts the threats it generates into the STRIDE categories described in the documentation linked above.
Regulators increasingly expect the output. The Cyber Resilience Act, Article 13(2)–(3), requires manufacturers to carry out a cybersecurity risk assessment, take it into account from planning through maintenance, and keep it "documented and updated as appropriate during a support period". A maintained threat model is the natural core of that file; see CRA Annex I explained. Industrial component makers meet a similar expectation through IEC 62443-4-1.
Why is threat modeling a practice, not a deliverable?
The Cheat Sheet states threat modeling is ideally performed early in the SDLC, particularly at the design phase, and that it "should be ongoing — not a one-time activity." The Threat Modeling Manifesto's own stated values echo this directly, listing "continuous refinement over single delivery" and framing the practice as a "journey of understanding" rather than a single point-in-time snapshot. The Manifesto also names anti-patterns worth avoiding by name: the "hero threat modeler" who tries to do it alone, "admiration for the problem" (endless analysis without deciding what to do about it), and the pursuit of a "perfect representation" of the system instead of a useful-enough one.
Worked example: what does a smart-thermostat threat model look like?
Synthetic example; the product and findings are invented for illustration.
A team building a Wi-Fi thermostat with a phone app and a cloud service runs one 90-minute session.
What are we working on?The DFD shows five external entities (user, app, cloud, update server, installer), four processes (bootloader, firmware, local setup web page, MQTT client), two data stores (credential partition, schedule store) and three trust boundaries (Wi-Fi interface, UART header on the board, the cloud API). What can go wrong?STRIDE per element produces 23 candidate threats. Three stand out: the setup web page stays reachable on the LAN after onboarding (spoofing and elevation of privilege); the OTA agent checks a hash but no signature (tampering); the UART header gives a root console (elevation of privilege). The SBOM shows an old embedded web server with a public CVE. What are we going to do about it?Eliminate: switch the setup page off after onboarding. Mitigate: sign images and verify in the bootloader; disable the UART console in production builds; update the web server. Accept: physical attacks on the secure element, with the reason recorded. Did we do a good enough job?The team checks that each threat has a response, that each mitigation became a ticket with a testable requirement, and schedules a model review for the next hardware revision.
What are the common pitfalls?
- Modelling only the cloud. Device teams often draw the backend and forget the bootloader, debug ports and local interfaces.
- No trust boundary at the enclosure when the product sits in a public or shared space.
- Ignoring third-party components. The firmware's own code may be clean while the bundled web server is not.
- Threats with no response. A list of risks with no decision fails question three.
- A model nobody updates. New radios, new apps and new cloud endpoints change the DFD; review it at each major release.
What is a workable starting point?
Start from the four questions, not from a methodology name"What are we working on, what can go wrong, what are we doing about it, did we do a good enough job" works before a team has picked STRIDE, PASTA or anything else — the methodology is just how question two gets answered systematically. Pick STRIDE by default for a discrete system or data-flow diagram, and add LINDDUN specifically when the system handles personal data and privacy threats are in scope alongside security ones. Treat the output as a living model, not a one-time reportRevisit it when the architecture, a major integration, or the deployment environment changes — a model that is never updated eventually describes a system that no longer exists. Avoid the Manifesto's named anti-patterns: don't let one person own threat modeling alone, don't let analysis replace deciding on mitigations, and don't hold out for a perfect model of the system before acting on what it already shows.
SoftWSP does not draw the threat model for you. It supplies one of its inputs: from a firmware image it extracts a CycloneDX 1.6 SBOM, matches the components against NVD, the CISA KEV catalog, FIRST EPSS and CISA's CSAF ICS advisories, and drafts a cited report for an engineer to review. You can inspect an SBOM in the free SBOM viewer. Our device and firmware security reviews build the asset and data-flow picture from that evidence, so a STRIDE or attack-tree exercise has something real to work from: see device firmware security.
This guide summarises public OWASP community and Cheat Sheet Series pages, the Threat Modeling Manifesto and MITRE EMB3D, as checked on 11 November 2026. OWASP content is used under its CC BY-SA 4.0 licence with attribution; this guide does not constitute security or compliance advice.
Put this guide to work
Frequently asked questions
What is threat modeling, per OWASP?
OWASP's community page defines it as working "to identify, communicate, and understand threats and mitigations within the context of protecting something of value," while the OWASP Cheat Sheet Series' Threat Modeling Cheat Sheet describes it as "a structured, repeatable process used to gain actionable insights into the security characteristics of a particular system." Both sources frame it the same way: start from a model of the system, use that model to find the threats relevant to it, then decide what to do about each one — rather than starting from a generic checklist of attacks.
What are the four key questions of threat modeling?
OWASP's community page and the Cheat Sheet both attribute the same four-question framework to the **Threat Modeling Manifesto**, a set of values and principles published by a working group of 15 practitioners including Adam Shostack, Zoe Braiterman, Jonathan Marcil, Stephen de Vries and Irene Michlin, among others. The four questions, verbatim: "What are we working on?", "What can go wrong?", "What are we going to do about it?", and "Did we do a good enough job?" OWASP's own community page maps these onto four practical steps — assess scope, identify what can go wrong, identify countermeasures or manage risk, and assess the work — and treats the questions as the reusable backbone underneath whichever specific methodology a team picks.
What is STRIDE, and how does it differ from PASTA, Attack Trees and LINDDUN?
The OWASP Cheat Sheet Series' Threat Modeling Cheat Sheet names several methodologies side by side, each suited to a different angle on "what can go wrong." **STRIDE** is a Microsoft-developed framework that sorts threats into six categories — Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information Disclosure, Denial of Service, and Elevation of Privilege — applied systematically to a system's components and data flows. **PASTA** (Process for Attack Simulation and Threat Analysis) "connects business objectives and technical requirements to application threats," useful when a team needs to show direct business impact. **Attack Trees** decompose an attacker's ultimate goal into the alternative or required paths needed to reach it. **LINDDUN** targets privacy-specific concerns instead of security ones (Linking, Identifying, Non-repudiation, Detecting, Data disclosure, Unawareness, Non-compliance). The Cheat Sheet also lists **OCTAVE** (organization-wide risk assessment) and **VAST** (separate application and operational threat models inside normal development workflows) as further options — there is no single methodology OWASP endorses as universally correct; the choice depends on what question a team is actually trying to answer.
When should a team threat model, and is it a one-time activity?
No. The OWASP Cheat Sheet Series states threat modeling is ideally performed early in the SDLC, particularly during the design phase, and that it "should be ongoing — not a one-time activity" as systems evolve. This mirrors the Threat Modeling Manifesto's own values, which include "continuous refinement over single delivery" and frame threat modeling as a "journey of understanding" rather than a one-off security/privacy snapshot. A model built once at design time and never revisited drifts out of sync with the system it describes as features, integrations and deployment environments change.
Sources
- OWASP: Threat Modeling (community page) — definition, four-step process
- OWASP Cheat Sheet Series: Threat Modeling Cheat Sheet — methodologies (STRIDE, PASTA, OCTAVE, Attack Trees, LINDDUN, VAST), when to threat model
- Threat Modeling Manifesto — the four questions, values and principles
- MITRE EMB3D: threat model for embedded devices (home page)
- MITRE EMB3D: Getting Started (Properties Mapper workflow)
- OWASP Threat Dragon project page
- GitHub: OWASP/pytm — a Pythonic framework for threat modeling
- Microsoft Learn: Threat Modeling Tool threats (STRIDE categories)
- EUR-Lex: Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 (Cyber Resilience Act), Article 13 cybersecurity risk assessment
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