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MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise: the 15 tactics, explained

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MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise, currently at v20.1 (v20 published 13 October 2026), organizes adversary behavior into 15 tactics — one more than the long-familiar 14-tactic matrix, after MITRE split Defense Evasion into Stealth and Defense Impairment in its April 2026 release. It is the original and largest ATT&CK matrix, documenting adversary behavior against Windows, macOS, Linux, cloud (IaaS/SaaS), identity provider, network, container and virtualization (ESXi) environments. MITRE's own homepage describes it as "a globally-accessible knowledge base of adversary tactics and techniques based on real-world observations," open to "any person or organization for use at no charge." For the dedicated matrix covering industrial control systems rather than enterprise IT, see our MITRE ATT&CK for ICS guide.

Key takeaways

  • The two tactics in bold above are new.
  • MITRE revises ATT&CK roughly twice a year (April and October), and counts shift every release even when the tactic list is stable.
  • Detection strategies and analytics did.
  • Enterprise is not only a Windows matrix.

Where did ATT&CK come from?

MITRE's own FAQ page states the project "started ATT&CK in 2013" to document "common tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) that advanced persistent threats use against Windows enterprise networks," created for a MITRE research project called FMX that investigated using endpoint telemetry and analytics to improve post-compromise detection. ATT&CK became the shared vocabulary that both the offensive sensors-testing side and the defensive detection side of that project used to describe the same behavior, and that same "why/how/specific-implementation" structure is what the public ATT&CK knowledge base still uses today.

How do tactics, techniques, sub-techniques and procedures fit together?

MITRE's FAQ defines the four levels of the model precisely:

Level MITRE's definition Example
Tactic The adversary's tactical goal — the "why" Credential Access
Technique "How" an adversary achieves that goal Dumping credentials
Sub-technique "A more specific description of the adversarial behavior... at a lower level than a technique" Dumping credentials via LSA Secrets
Procedure "The specific implementation the adversary uses," documented as real, observed behavior A named group using PowerShell to inject into lsass.exe and scrape memory

Sub-techniques categorize behavior; procedures describe specific in-the-wild use of that behavior, and per MITRE's FAQ a single procedure "may include several additional behaviors," spanning more than one technique or sub-technique at once.

What are the 15 Enterprise tactics?

MITRE's own Enterprise tactics page lists these, in this order, each with a stable ID and its own short definition of the adversary's goal:

# ID Tactic The adversary is trying to...
1 TA0043 Reconnaissance gather information to plan future operations
2 TA0042 Resource Development establish resources to support operations
3 TA0001 Initial Access get into your network
4 TA0002 Execution run malicious code or instructions on a system
5 TA0003 Persistence maintain their foothold
6 TA0004 Privilege Escalation gain higher-level permissions
7 TA0005 Stealth hide and conceal their actions, appearing as normal behavior
8 TA0112 Defense Impairment break security mechanisms, pipelines, and tooling so defenders can't see or trust what's happening
9 TA0006 Credential Access steal account names and passwords
10 TA0007 Discovery figure out your environment
11 TA0008 Lateral Movement move through your environment
12 TA0009 Collection gather data of interest to their goal
13 TA0011 Command and Control communicate with compromised systems to control them
14 TA0010 Exfiltration steal data
15 TA0040 Impact manipulate, interrupt, or destroy your systems and data

Why was Defense Evasion split in 2026?

The two tactics in bold above are new. MITRE's own April 2026 (v19) release notes state plainly that "the biggest changes in ATT&CK v19 are the split of the Defense Evasion Tactic in Enterprise ATT&CK into the Stealth and Defense Impairment Tactics." The old Defense Evasion tactic (TA0005) — long one of the best-known names in the framework — was retired as a single category and its techniques redistributed based on adversary intent rather than kept together as one catch-all:

  • Stealth inherited Defense Evasion's old tactic ID (TA0005). MITRE's own Stealth page states the adversary here "is trying to hide and conceal their actions, appearing as normal behavior," through techniques "characterized by concealment behaviors, such as avoiding, obfuscating, or mimicking normal operations, without modifying security controls or compromising collection and monitoring feeds" — defenses stay intact; the adversary is simply not seen.
  • Defense Impairment is a brand-new tactic with a new ID (TA0112). MITRE's own page states the adversary here "is trying to break security mechanisms, pipelines, and tooling so defenders can't see or trust what's happening," through techniques that "degrade, disable, or undermine the effectiveness and trustworthiness of security controls and monitoring mechanisms" — the defenses themselves are the target.

MITRE's release notes note that "a post describing the rationale behind the Defense Evasion split was published to ATT&CK's Blog in March," ahead of the April 2026 release, giving defenders advance notice that detections, reports and coverage maps referencing "Defense Evasion" by name would need to be re-pointed at one or both of the new tactics. MITRE's October 2026 (v20) release left this split unchanged; v20's own changes were elsewhere, mainly expanded campaign and technique coverage rather than further tactic restructuring.

How many techniques are there, and which version is current?

MITRE revises ATT&CK roughly twice a year (April and October), and counts shift every release even when the tactic list is stable. MITRE's version history explains that the releases on its updates pages increment the major version, while minor versions carry "typo and data corrections but not typically new content"; it lists v20.1 as current, effective 13 October 2026. The Enterprise totals from MITRE's own release notes for the last three major releases:

Release Date Enterprise tactics Techniques Sub-techniques Detection strategies Analytics
v18 28 Oct 2025 14 216 475 691 1,739
v19 28 Apr 2026 15 222 475 697 1,758
v20 13 Oct 2026 15 227 479 703 1,770

The v20 notes also list 178 groups, 842 pieces of software, 57 campaigns, 44 mitigations and 106 data components for Enterprise. On the live Enterprise matrix, technique counts per tactic range from 9 (Resource Development, Lateral Movement) up to 34 (Discovery). Among v20's new Enterprise techniques are Direct Prompt Injection, Indirect Prompt Injection and AI-Enabled Exfiltration, part of what MITRE calls "AI-focused and AI-enabled Techniques." Quote counts with the release number attached; they will move again in the next release.

What replaced data sources in ATT&CK?

Detection strategies and analytics did. MITRE's Data Sources page now carries a deprecation warning: "Data sources were deprecated in the ATT&CK v18 release in October 2025," and "no new data sources will be added to the framework." The v18 release notes describe the change: "Detections in techniques have been replaced with Detection Strategies resulting in the addition of Detection Strategies and Analytics, major updates to Data Components, as well as the deprecation of Data Sources."

On a technique page today, the old free-text "Detection" section is replaced by a table of detection strategies (IDs starting DET), each holding one or more analytics (IDs starting AN) written per platform. The page for System Firmware (T1542.001) shows the pattern: detection strategy DET0099 holds AN0275, which looks for "unexpected write operations to BIOS/UEFI firmware regions or EFI boot partitions that do not correlate with legitimate vendor firmware updates," and AN0276, which covers "unauthorized firmware uploads to routers, switches, or firewalls via TFTP/FTP/SCP." Data components still exist (106 in Enterprise v20) and describe what telemetry an analytic needs.

For anyone maintaining a coverage map built on data sources before October 2025, the practical step is to re-key it to detection strategy and analytic IDs, since those are the objects MITRE keeps adding.

Which Enterprise techniques reach a connected device?

Enterprise is not only a Windows matrix. The Enterprise matrix page lists eleven platforms: Windows, macOS, Linux, PRE, Office Suite, Identity Provider, SaaS, IaaS, Network Devices, Containers and ESXi. "Network Devices" and "Linux" are the platforms where routers, gateways, firewalls and many embedded Linux products appear. Five techniques that a device maker meets often, with the tactics, platforms and mitigations MITRE lists on each page:

Technique Tactic(s) Platforms (selection) Mitigations listed by MITRE
T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application Initial Access Linux, Network Devices, Containers, ESXi M1051 Update Software, M1016 Vulnerability Scanning, M1030 Network Segmentation, M1050 Exploit Protection
T1078.001 Valid Accounts: Default Accounts Stealth, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Initial Access Linux, Network Devices, ESXi M1027 Password Policies, M1032 Multi-factor Authentication
T1542.001 Pre-OS Boot: System Firmware Stealth, Persistence Network Devices, Windows M1046 Boot Integrity, M1026 Privileged Account Management, M1051 Update Software
T1601 Modify System Image Defense Impairment Network Devices M1046 Boot Integrity, M1045 Code Signing, M1026 Privileged Account Management
T1495 Firmware Corruption Impact Linux, Network Devices, Windows, macOS M1046 Boot Integrity, M1026 Privileged Account Management, M1051 Update Software

Two things stand out. First, the mitigations are design features a product team owns: signed images, verified boot (see secure boot and hardware root of trust), no shared default credentials (see how to fix hard-coded credentials) and a working update path. Second, T1601 moved to Defense Impairment in the 2026 split, so a product threat model written in 2025 that filed image tampering under Defense Evasion needs its label changed. For threats specific to embedded device internals (bootloaders, debug ports, RTOS), MITRE's separate EMB3D threat model goes deeper than Enterprise does.

How do you get ATT&CK data machine-readably?

MITRE publishes the full dataset in the GitHub repository mitre-attack/attack-stix-data, which "contains the MITRE ATT&CK dataset represented in STIX 2.1 JSON collections." Each domain (Enterprise, Mobile, ICS) has a bundle without version markings that always matches the newest release, plus one file per release such as enterprise-attack-20.1.json. Pin the versioned file in anything you ship or audit, so a later release does not change your mapping silently.

For visual work, the ATT&CK Navigator lets users define layers, which its README calls "custom views of the ATT&CK knowledge base," for example showing only one platform or marking the techniques a product addresses. A layer is a JSON file, so it can sit in version control next to the threat model it illustrates.

How is ATT&CK used, and what is it not?

ATT&CK for Enterprise is a behavior-mapping vocabulary, not a controls checklist or a maturity model. It is typically used, per MITRE's own guidance, for four things: building detection analytics tied to specific techniques, structuring threat-intelligence reporting in a common vocabulary, planning adversary emulation and red-team exercises against named techniques, and assessing security-tooling coverage gaps technique by technique. It complements rather than replaces frameworks that set security requirements — NIST SP 800-53 controls (see NIST's own SP 800-53 catalog), for instance, are the kind of defensive measure that gets mapped against specific ATT&CK techniques to check coverage, and whether those controls work is a question for an SP 800-53A assessment, not for ATT&CK. The KEV/EPSS and SSVC guides cover complementary ways of prioritizing which vulnerabilities actually enable the techniques in a given environment, and MITRE CAPEC describes attack patterns against software weaknesses rather than adversary behavior after access. For industrial control systems specifically, MITRE maintains a separate ATT&CK for ICS matrix with its own 12-tactic structure — see our dedicated guide for how that differs from Enterprise. A PLC or RTU maker usually needs both: Enterprise for the engineering workstation and network gear around the controller, ICS for the controller and process.

Worked example (synthetic): how would a gateway maker map one product?

Synthetic example. "EG-40" is an invented Linux-based edge gateway with a web admin interface, SSH and signed over-the-air updates; it is not a real product or customer.

  1. Fix the scope and versionThe team records "ATT&CK Enterprise v20.1, platforms Linux and Network Devices" at the top of the threat model and downloads the matching STIX file.
  2. List entry pointsWeb admin on TCP 443, SSH on TCP 22, update client. Candidate techniques: T1190 for the web interface, T1078.001 for factory accounts.
  3. List persistence and tampering pathsWritable firmware partition and boot configuration. Candidate techniques: T1542.001, T1601, and T1495 as the destructive variant.
  4. Pair each technique with a product feature and its evidenceT1190 → patched web stack, evidenced by the release's firmware SBOM and a known-CVE match report; T1078.001 → unique per-device credentials set at provisioning, evidenced by a test that the image contains no shared password; T1542.001 / T1601 / T1495 → verified boot and signed images, evidenced by a test that a modified image is refused.
  5. Mark gaps plainlyIf the bootloader does not verify the kernel on one hardware revision, the layer shows T1542.001 as open for that revision rather than covered.
  6. Publish a Navigator layerwith the five techniques colored by status and a comment naming the evidence file for each.

What are the common pitfalls?

  • Citing "Defense Evasion" in 2026 material. The tactic name is gone; use Stealth or Defense Impairment and check which one each technique now sits under.
  • Counting coverage by color. A green cell in a layer means someone decided it was covered. Keep the evidence reference next to each technique.
  • Unpinned versions. Mapping against the unversioned STIX bundle means a later release can change technique names or IDs under you.
  • Treating mitigations as controls. ATT&CK's 44 Enterprise mitigations are short descriptions, not testable requirements; trace them to a requirements framework before an audit.
  • Using Enterprise alone for a controller. Techniques against PLC logic and process I/O live in the ICS matrix.

What is a workable starting point?

  1. Re-point any "Defense Evasion" references firstInternal detections, dashboards or reports that still cite the old 14-tactic model should be updated to Stealth and/or Defense Impairment before they silently go stale.
  2. Use tactics to organize, techniques to actA tactic tells you the adversary's goal; the actionable unit for detection engineering is almost always the technique or sub-technique level.
  3. Treat procedure examples as evidence, not requirementsA technique's documented "Procedure Examples" show how real threat actors have implemented it — useful for prioritizing detections toward observed behavior, not an exhaustive list of every possible implementation.

SoftWSP extracts a CycloneDX 1.6 SBOM from a firmware image, matches its components against NVD, CISA KEV, FIRST EPSS and CISA CSAF ICS advisories, and drafts a cited report for an engineer to review. That report can be the evidence behind a T1190 "patched" claim in step 4 above; SoftWSP does not map findings to ATT&CK techniques, and the mapping stays the engineer's. Open an exported SBOM in the SBOM viewer, or see device & firmware security services.

This guide summarises public MITRE ATT&CK publications current as of the v20.1 release (13 October 2026); it does not constitute security or compliance advice.

Put this guide to work

Frequently asked questions

What is MITRE ATT&CK?

A knowledge base of adversary behavior maintained by the MITRE Corporation. MITRE's own homepage describes it as "a globally-accessible knowledge base of adversary tactics and techniques based on real-world observations," used "as a foundation for the development of specific threat models and methodologies" across the private sector, government and the cybersecurity product community, and states it "is open and available to any person or organization for use at no charge." MITRE's own FAQ page states the project "started ATT&CK in 2013" to document the tactics, techniques and procedures advanced persistent threats used against Windows enterprise networks, originally for a MITRE research project called FMX.

What are the 15 tactics in the current Enterprise matrix?

Per MITRE's own Enterprise tactics page: Reconnaissance, Resource Development, Initial Access, Execution, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Stealth, Defense Impairment, Credential Access, Discovery, Lateral Movement, Collection, Command and Control, Exfiltration, and Impact — 15 in total as of the v20.0 release (13 October 2026) per MITRE's version-history page. This is one more than the long-standing 14-tactic Enterprise matrix most practitioners are familiar with, because of the Stealth/Defense Impairment split described below.

Why does Enterprise now have 15 tactics instead of 14?

MITRE's own April 2026 (v19) release notes state the release's biggest change was splitting the long-standing Defense Evasion tactic into two: "the split of the Defense Evasion Tactic in Enterprise ATT&CK into the Stealth and Defense Impairment Tactics." Stealth kept Defense Evasion's old ID (TA0005) and covers, per MITRE's own tactic page, techniques where "the adversary is trying to hide and conceal their actions, appearing as normal behavior" while leaving security tooling intact; Defense Impairment is a new tactic (TA0112) covering techniques where, per MITRE's page, "the adversary is trying to break security mechanisms, pipelines, and tooling so defenders can't see or trust what's happening." MITRE's release notes state a blog post explaining the rationale was published in March 2026, ahead of the April 2026 release.

What's the difference between a tactic, a technique, a sub-technique and a procedure?

Per MITRE's own FAQ: a tactic is the "why" — the adversary's tactical goal, such as credential access. A technique is "how" an adversary achieves that goal, such as dumping credentials. A sub-technique is "a more specific description of the adversarial behavior," such as dumping credentials specifically by accessing LSA Secrets. A procedure is "the specific implementation the adversary uses," e.g. a named threat actor using PowerShell to inject into lsass.exe and scrape memory to dump credentials — documented on technique pages under "Procedure Examples" as behavior observed in the wild, not a category like sub-techniques are.

Sources

  1. MITRE ATT&CK: homepage (Enterprise matrix, v20)
  2. MITRE ATT&CK: Enterprise Tactics index (15 tactics, with descriptions)
  3. MITRE ATT&CK: Stealth (TA0005)
  4. MITRE ATT&CK: Defense Impairment (TA0112)
  5. MITRE ATT&CK: Updates — April 2026 (v19) release notes, the Defense Evasion split
  6. MITRE ATT&CK: Updates — October 2026 (v20) release notes
  7. MITRE ATT&CK: Version History (release dates)
  8. MITRE ATT&CK: FAQ (tactics/techniques/sub-techniques/procedures, project history)
  9. NIST: SP 800-53 Rev. 5 — Security and Privacy Controls for Information Systems and Organizations (final publication)
  10. MITRE ATT&CK: Updates — October 2025 (v18) release notes, data sources replaced by detection strategies
  11. MITRE ATT&CK: Data Sources (deprecation notice)
  12. MITRE ATT&CK: Enterprise Matrix (platforms, techniques per tactic)
  13. MITRE ATT&CK: T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application
  14. MITRE ATT&CK: T1078.001 Valid Accounts: Default Accounts
  15. MITRE ATT&CK: T1542.001 Pre-OS Boot: System Firmware
  16. MITRE ATT&CK: T1601 Modify System Image
  17. MITRE ATT&CK: T1495 Firmware Corruption
  18. GitHub: mitre-attack/attack-stix-data (ATT&CK in STIX 2.1 collections)
  19. GitHub: mitre-attack/attack-navigator (layers)
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