The Cyber Resilience Act does not treat every organisation that touches open-source code as a "manufacturer." Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, Article 24 creates a separate, deliberately lighter category — the open-source software steward — for the foundations and similar bodies that keep widely used free and open-source components alive, as distinct from the companies that build and sell products with digital elements using that code. A device maker shipping firmware built on an open-source TLS library, RTOS or protocol stack needs to know which side of that line its own suppliers and its own open-source contributions sit on.
Key takeaways
- ensures the viability of those products.
- Article 24 contains no duty to cooperate with manufacturers or to give them documentation.
- Article 14(1), reporting actively exploited vulnerabilities, applies "to the extent that they are involved in the development" of the software.
- Due diligence on every component (Article 13(5)).
Who counts as a steward, and who doesn't?
Article 3(14) of Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 defines an "open-source software steward" as a legal person other than a manufacturer that:
- has the purpose or objective of systematically providing support on a sustained basis for the development of specific products with digital elements qualifying as free and open-source software,
- where that software is intended for commercial activities, and
- ensures the viability of those products.
Recital 19 says stewards "include certain foundations as well as entities that develop and publish free and open-source software in a business context, including not-for-profit entities". Sustained support includes hosting and managing collaboration platforms, hosting source code, governing or managing the project, and steering its development. "Intended for commercial activities" covers software meant for integration into commercial services or monetised products, including where the manufacturers that integrate it contribute regularly or fund it.
Two groups fall outside the CRA entirely, not just outside Article 24:
- Individual maintainers and volunteer contributors acting outside a commercial activity. Recital 18 says the CRA does not apply to people who contribute source code to free and open-source software that is not under their responsibility.
- Free and open-source software developed or supplied purely outside a commercial context — the CRA's recitals carve this out so individual hobby and non-commercial projects are not swept into product-liability-style obligations never designed for them.
The steward test is applied project by project. The Commission's guidance on applying the CRA (C(2026) 5252, section 3.3) says the same legal person can be a steward for one project and a manufacturer for another, and its examples show that companies can be stewards too:
| Publisher situation | CRA role for that software | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Company sells the software or a paid version of it | Manufacturer (Article 13), for the monetised version | Guidance paras 72–76 |
| Company publishes an unmonetised library it also builds into its own products | Steward to the library | Guidance example 25 |
| OS vendor publishes free reference libraries for its platform | Steward to the libraries | Guidance example 26 |
| Not-for-profit that monetises software but spends all earnings after costs on not-for-profit objectives | Steward | Recital 18; guidance para 77, example 24 |
| Foundation that offers sustained support to a project intended for commercial use | Steward to that project | Guidance para 78 |
| Same foundation, project it only hosts without systematic support | No CRA obligations for that project | Guidance para 78 |
| Volunteer maintainer, no commercial activity | Outside the CRA | Recital 18 |
A device maker that integrates open-source components into firmware it sells is the manufacturer of that firmware, with the full Annex I obligations. Integrating someone else's project never makes the maker a steward of it. Recital 20 adds that merely hosting code on open repositories or package managers is not making it available on the market.
What does Article 24 actually ask for?
Article 24 has three paragraphs, each lighter than the matching manufacturer duty:
| Article 24 | What the steward must do | Manufacturer duty it replaces |
|---|---|---|
| Paragraph 1 | Put in place and document in a verifiable manner a cybersecurity policy that fosters secure development and effective vulnerability handling by the project's developers, fosters voluntary reporting under Article 15, covers documenting, addressing and remediating vulnerabilities, and promotes sharing of vulnerability information in the open-source community | Annex I essential requirements and Article 31 technical documentation |
| Paragraph 2 | Cooperate with market surveillance authorities at their request to mitigate the software's cybersecurity risks, and on a reasoned request provide the policy in a language the authority understands | Full market surveillance and corrective-action regime under Articles 52-55 |
| Paragraph 3 | Report under Article 14 only to the extent set out below | Article 14 in full |
Article 24 contains no duty to cooperate with manufacturers or to give them documentation. The policy has to foster information sharing within the community, and the Commission's guidance (para 80) expects a steward that learns of an actively exploited vulnerability to pass it to the project's maintainers under that policy. Getting what you need from upstream remains your job as the integrator.
A steward does not have to: meet the Annex I essential cybersecurity requirements itself, run a conformity assessment procedure, affix CE marking, or issue an EU declaration of conformity. Recital 19 says stewards may not affix CE marking to the software whose development they support. Article 64(10)(b) says the CRA's administrative fines do not apply to "any infringement of this Regulation by open-source software stewards", and recital 120 asks Member States not to impose other financial penalties on them either.
Which stewards have to report, and what?
Article 24(3) applies two parts of Article 14 to stewards, each with its own trigger:
- Article 14(1), reporting actively exploited vulnerabilities, applies "to the extent that they are involved in the development" of the software.
- Article 14(3) and (8), reporting severe incidents and informing users, apply to the extent that severe incidents affect "network and information systems provided by the open-source software stewards for the development" of the software.
The Commission's guidance (paras 79–82) turns this into three support types:
| What the steward provides | Must notify actively exploited vulnerabilities (Art. 14(1))? | Must notify severe incidents on its own systems (Art. 14(3)) and inform users (Art. 14(8))? |
|---|---|---|
| Non-technical support only: branding, governance rules, events, donations | No; shares what it learns with maintainers and may report voluntarily under Article 15 | No |
| IT infrastructure: source repositories, version control, signing keys | No; same voluntary route | Yes, for severe incidents affecting that infrastructure; users informed where appropriate |
| Engineering resources: employed developers, code review, release management, vulnerability handling | Yes; users informed where appropriate | Yes, where it also provides the development systems |
So a foundation that hosts the repositories and signing keys of a project it stewards does have a reporting duty, for incidents on that infrastructure. The Commission FAQ (version 1.4, FAQ 5.5) confirms that Article 24(3) applies from 11 December 2027 under Article 71(2), even though manufacturers' own Article 14 reporting starts on 11 September 2026. Device makers already building a CRA 24-hour/72-hour reporting process for their own products should not expect stewards to report on the same timetable.
What stays on the device maker's side?
Most of the work around stewarded code falls on the manufacturer that ships it:
Due diligence on every component (Article 13(5))Exercise due diligence so third-party components do not compromise the product's cybersecurity, "including when integrating components of free and open-source software" that were not made available on the market. The FAQ (4.4.4) says the level depends on the component's risk, and that stewarded or out-of-scope components can be integrated. Report upstream (Article 13(6))When you find a vulnerability in an integrated component, including an open-source one, report it to the person or entity maintaining it, and fix it under Annex I Part II. If you write a patch, share the code or documentation with the maintainer, in machine-readable form where appropriate. Report to authorities (Article 14)From 11 September 2026, an actively exploited vulnerability in your product triggers your own 24-hour early warning, whether the flaw sits in your code or in a stewarded library. Keep the inventory currentAnnex I Part II expects an SBOM of at least the top-level dependencies; see firmware SBOM. Watch for attestations (Article 25)The Commission may adopt delegated acts setting up voluntary security attestation programmes for open-source software. Where they exist, the FAQ says they would make due diligence easier.
Worked example: a gateway maker's four upstreams
Hypothetical example for illustration: an industrial gateway maker with four open-source dependencies. Projects and organisations are unnamed and invented.
| Upstream component | Who sustains it | Likely CRA role upstream | What the gateway maker does |
|---|---|---|---|
| TLS library | Foundation employs maintainers and runs releases and security response | Steward with engineering support: Article 24(1), (2) and the Article 14(1) duty, from 11 Dec 2027 | Subscribes to the foundation's advisories; reports findings to its security contact under Article 13(6) |
| Embedded web server | Foundation hosts the repository and signing keys; volunteers write the code | Steward with infrastructure support: incident reporting for its systems only | Treats a signing-key incident notice as a supply-chain trigger; monitors CVEs itself |
| Protocol parser | One volunteer maintainer, no organisation | Outside the CRA | Highest due-diligence effort: pins versions, reviews changes, budgets for its own fixes and shares patches upstream |
| Board support package libraries | Chip vendor publishes them free, unmonetised | Steward (guidance example 26) | Asks the vendor for its Article 24 policy and support commitment; reviews BSP updates |
In all four rows the gateway maker's own duties are the same: due diligence, upstream reporting, Article 14 reporting for its product and an SBOM. What changes is how much it can rely on upstream for early warning.
What are the common pitfalls?
- Expecting a steward to supply compliance documents. Article 24 does not oblige stewards to support your technical file; ask early, and plan for no answer.
- Assuming "foundation" means "steward". The test applies per project, and a hosted project with no systematic support carries no CRA duties at all.
- Assuming a company cannot be a steward. A chip or OS vendor's free libraries can be stewarded software.
- Reading the steward dates as your dates. Steward reporting starts on 11 December 2027; your own reporting started on 11 September 2026.
- Fixing an upstream bug quietly. Article 13(6) requires you to report it to the maintainer and share your fix.
- Treating volunteer-maintained code as lower risk because nobody upstream has CRA duties. It is the reverse: your due diligence has to cover the gap.
What device makers and foundations should do now
Classify your own open-source dependencies' upstream organisations, not just the components. A library maintained by an individual volunteer, a company-backed open-source project, and a foundation-stewarded project each sit differently relative to the CRA; use the role table above project by project. Don't assume a steward's cybersecurity policy substitutes for your own technical documentationArticle 24 does not require a steward to meet Annex I; a manufacturer integrating stewarded software still owns its own Annex I compliance for the product it ships. If your company funds or governs an open-source foundation, or publishes free libraries of its own, work out separately for each project whether you or the foundation are its steward, and whether your own product-shipping activity keeps you a manufacturer under Article 13 — the guidance confirms one legal person can hold both roles for different software. Build your own vulnerability-monitoring plan to not depend on upstream steward reporting, since stewards with only non-technical or infrastructure support have no Article 14(1) duty, and none has one before 11 December 2027. A CVD process and KEV and EPSS prioritisation help here. See the CRA checklist for device makers for the manufacturer-side obligations this steward regime sits alongside, and CRA obligations for importers and distributors for how the same chain-of-responsibility logic works for resellers. Keep the Commission's reading in viewThe FAQ and guidance state that they are not authoritative interpretations; only the Court of Justice can give one. See the CRA pillar guide and the Commission's CRA summary.
Where AI fits: mapping dependency risk, not steward status
Working out which upstream open-source dependencies carry an Article 24 steward's own reporting duty, versus which fall on the integrating manufacturer's own vulnerability-monitoring plan, starts from an accurate component inventory. SoftWSP's firmware scan extracts that SBOM from the firmware image as CycloneDX 1.6 and matches each component against NVD, CISA KEV, FIRST EPSS and CISA's ICS advisories; AI drafts a cited report of the matched vulnerabilities for an engineer to review, and watchlist alerts flag new CVEs by CVE ID or vendor and product. SoftWSP does not record who stewards a project or how it is governed; adding that column to the SBOM, and deciding whether an organisation meets Article 24's steward definition, stays a human judgment call.
SoftWSP's firmware security work gives your CRA risk assessment the component list and the matched vulnerabilities it starts from: see Device & Firmware Security.
This guide is general information, not legal advice. It is based on Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 and the Commission's FAQ (version 1.4) and guidance C(2026) 5252.
Put this guide to work
Frequently asked questions
What is an 'open-source software steward' under the Cyber Resilience Act?
The CRA, Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, defines an open-source software steward as a legal person, other than a manufacturer, that provides sustained support for the development of specific free and open-source software intended for commercial activities and that ensures the viability of that software. Foundations such as the Apache Software Foundation, the Eclipse Foundation and the Python Software Foundation are the kind of organisation this category is built around; an individual volunteer maintainer or a purely non-commercial project is not caught by the CRA at all.
Does Article 24 impose the same duties as Article 13 on manufacturers?
No. Per widely corroborated secondary legal analysis of the regulation (EUR-Lex's own site served a bot-protection challenge page rather than article text when this guide was researched; the official text at EUR-Lex remains the authoritative source for article-level wording), Article 24 is explicitly described in the CRA's recitals as a 'light-touch and tailor-made regulatory regime.' Stewards are not required to meet the Annex I essential requirements, do not affix CE marking, do not run a conformity assessment, and are not subject to the administrative fines that apply to manufacturers under Article 64.
What does Article 24 actually require from a steward?
Under Article 24(1) and (2), a steward must put in place and document in a verifiable manner a cybersecurity policy that fosters secure development and effective vulnerability handling by the developers of the software it stewards, and cooperate with market surveillance authorities on request. Article 24 contains no separate duty to cooperate with manufacturers. It does not have to produce the Article 31 technical documentation a manufacturer owes.
Do CRA vulnerability-reporting deadlines apply to open-source software stewards?
Only in a scoped way. Article 24(3) applies Article 14(1), reporting actively exploited vulnerabilities, to a steward only to the extent that it is involved in developing the software, and Article 14(3) and (8), on severe incidents, only where those incidents affect network and information systems the steward provides for that development — not to a foundation that gives only non-technical support. Confirm the exact trigger against the regulation's own Article 14 and Article 24 text before relying on it.
When do the open-source software steward obligations start applying?
The CRA's general application date for Chapter II obligations, which includes Article 24, is 11 December 2027, the same date manufacturers' Annex I essential requirements and most of their Article 13 duties start applying; see [the CRA vulnerability-reporting guide](/guides/cra-vulnerability-reporting-24h/) for the separate, earlier 11 September 2026 date that governs Article 14 reporting specifically. This guide's dates come from the Regulation's Article 71 staggered application schedule already used elsewhere on this site; confirm the current text on EUR-Lex before treating a specific date as final for a steward-specific question.
Sources
- Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 (Cyber Resilience Act), EUR-Lex
- European Commission: CRA summary of the legal text
- European Commission: CRA reporting obligations
- European Commission: FAQs on the Cyber Resilience Act (version 1.4, 4 September 2026)
- European Commission: guidance on the application of Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, C(2026) 5252 annex (27 July 2026), section 3.3 on open-source software stewards
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