BSIMM (Building Security In Maturity Model) is not a checklist of recommended practices but a data-driven study: its current edition, BSIMM16 (2026), documents 128 real-world security activities — grouped into 12 practices across 4 domains — observed across a data pool of 111 participating firms, with each activity's maturity level set by how often it is actually seen in practice rather than by design. First published in 2008 as BSIMM1, the project is explicitly framed by its own report as "a descriptive model" of what effective software security initiatives actually do, not a prescriptive standard of what they should do, and it is updated and republished annually by Black Duck.
Key takeaways
- Most security frameworks start from first principles and tell an organisation what it should implement.
- BSIMM organises everything into a Software Security Framework (SSF): four domains, each containing three named practices, for twelve practices total, which in turn group the model's activities.
- By measured frequency across the data pool, which is the model's defining methodological choice.
- The framework itself stayed the same.
What problem does BSIMM solve, and how is it different from a standard?
Most security frameworks start from first principles and tell an organisation what it should implement. BSIMM instead starts from observation: structured, in-person-style assessments of real organisations' software security initiatives (SSIs), rolled up into a shared vocabulary and activity catalogue. The report's own history section explains the origin directly: in 2008, researchers "set out to gather data on the different paths that organizations take to address the challenges of securing software," interviewing firms "known to be highly effective in software security initiatives," to "gather details about their efforts, analyze the data, and publish their findings to help others." The result is a benchmark built from what a large, real sample of firms is actually doing this year — which is also why BSIMM is re-issued annually rather than published once and left static.
How is the BSIMM framework structured?
BSIMM organises everything into a Software Security Framework (SSF): four domains, each containing three named practices, for twelve practices total, which in turn group the model's activities. BSIMM16 confirms this structure directly, stating that "within the SSF, the 128 activities are organized into 12 BSIMM practices, which are held within four domains."
| Domain | Practices |
|---|---|
| Governance | Strategy & Metrics (SM) · Compliance & Policy (CP) · Training (T) |
| Intelligence | Attack Models (AM) · Security Features & Design (SFD) · Standards & Requirements (SR) |
| SSDL Touchpoints | Architecture Analysis (AA) · Code Review (CR) · Security Testing (ST) |
| Deployment | Penetration Testing (PT) · Software Environment (SE) · Configuration Management & Vulnerability Management (CMVM) |
Per the report's own terminology section, a domain is "one of the four categories the framework is divided into," a practice is "a grouping of BSIMM activities," and an activity is an "action or effort carried out or facilitated by the SSG [software security group] as part of a practice." Each activity also carries a short code — e.g. CMVM1.1, SM1.4 — combining its practice and assigned level.
How does BSIMM decide which level an activity belongs to?
By measured frequency across the data pool, which is the model's defining methodological choice. BSIMM16 states plainly: "we divide activities into levels per practice based on the frequency with which they're observed in our participants." Level 1 activities are "often straightforward and universally applicable" and "most observed" across BSIMM16's 111-firm data pool; level 2 activities are "less frequently observed" and "often more difficult to implement"; level 3 activities are "more rarely observed" and "usually more difficult to implement and not always applicable." A brand-new activity, with no observation history yet, is added directly at level 3 by convention — the report notes "new activities are added at level 3 because we don't yet know how common they are, so they start with zero observations."
What changed in BSIMM16, and what stayed the same?
The framework itself stayed the same. The BSIMM16 report (dated January 2026) says that "for the first time, there have been no changes to the BSIMM framework this year": no activity moved level and no activity was added, because the growth it saw was not strong enough to justify moves. The data pool did change. Black Duck added 16 firms and dropped 26 whose data had not been refreshed, leaving 111 participants with about 3,700 SSG members and 6,500 security champions; the average SSI is 5.6 years old. Since 2008 the team has assessed 283 firms in total, added 19 activities and dropped one duplicate, which is how the model reached 128.
The activities with the largest growth in observation count over the year (the report's Table 2):
| Activity | Growth in firms observed |
|---|---|
| [CMVM2.4] Streamline incoming responsible vulnerability disclosure | +15 |
| [SE3.9] Protect integrity of development toolchains | +12 |
| [T2.12] Provide expertise via open collaboration channels | +10 |
| [CMVM3.3] Simulate software crises | +9 |
| [PT2.3] Schedule periodic penetration tests for application coverage | +9 |
| [SE3.6] Create bills of materials for deployed software | +8 |
| [CMVM3.5] Automate verification of operational infrastructure security | +8 |
The report ties the vulnerability-disclosure growth (over 40% since BSIMM15) to vendors responding better to reports from customers, researchers and governments, and expects more design-review and risk-assessment activity "as firms seek to meet compliance requirements within the EU CRA."
What does BSIMM16's 2026 data actually show about AI and software security?
That AI's effect on real security programs is now measurable, not speculative — one of the clearest examples this guide found of a framework reporting on AI from its own live data rather than a vendor claim. BSIMM16 states "AI continued to be a major area of focus for all organizations in the last year," pointing to growth in [SR3.5] "Create standards controlling and guiding the adoption of new technologies" (an activity BSIMM15 introduced, where "AI is a major part of that for every firm where it was observed") and a 10% year-over-year increase in [AM1.5] "Gather and use attack intelligence." Separately, the report ties a 30% increase in [SE3.6] "Create bills of materials for deployed software" and an increase of more than 40% in [SE2.4] "Protect code integrity" to US federal self-attestation requirements around software bills of materials — a regulatory, not an AI, driver, which the report is careful to distinguish. It also notes a 10% rise in [CR2.6] custom rules for automated code review "as firms adapt to the quirks present in LLM-generated code."
What does BSIMM16 say about IoT and device makers?
IoT is one of the named verticals in the BSIMM16 data pool, next to Cloud, Financial Services, FinTech, Healthcare, ISVs, Insurance and Technology. Two findings matter for hardware companies:
- Device makers prioritise like software vendors. The report compares practice score distributions for Tech, IoT and ISV firms, all of which ship products into a customer's environment, and finds them "remarkably similar," with median scores across all 12 practices "very close."
- Penetration testing of devices is harder. [PT1.1] "Use external penetration testers to find problems" is in the overall top 10 but not in the Tech or IoT top 10 lists (it does make their top 20). The report's explanation: testing devices "is a different skillset that often requires more time than a basic web application penetration test."
For a firmware team, the second point is a reason to budget device-specific testing time rather than reuse a web-app pentest scope; the OWASP Firmware Security Testing Methodology is a free starting scope.
Which BSIMM activities map to firmware security work?
BSIMM activity names are written for software organisations in general, but several map directly onto what a connected-device maker already does or is asked for by customers and regulators. All names below are from the BSIMM16 activity list.
| BSIMM16 activity | Firmware and device equivalent |
|---|---|
| [SR1.5] Identify open source | Inventory of BusyBox, OpenSSL, kernel and SDK packages in each image |
| [SE3.6] Create bills of materials for deployed software | A per-release firmware SBOM shipped or available to customers |
| [SE2.4] Protect code integrity | Signed firmware images, verified at boot and at update |
| [SE3.9] Protect integrity of development toolchains | Locked-down build servers, SDK provenance, signing-key custody |
| [CMVM2.3] Develop an operations software inventory | Mapping which firmware version runs on which deployed product line |
| [CMVM1.1] Create or interface with incident response | A PSIRT that can reach engineering when a CVE lands |
| [CMVM2.4] Streamline incoming responsible vulnerability disclosure | security.txt, a disclosure policy and a triage owner; see PSIRT setup |
| [ST1.1] Perform edge/boundary value condition testing during QA | Fuzzing parsers on network, USB and radio interfaces |
| [PT1.1] Use external penetration testers to find problems | Hardware-aware device testing, not only the companion app |
How does BSIMM line up with NIST SSDF?
NIST SP 800-218, the Secure Software Development Framework (SSDF) v1.1, cites BSIMM as a reference for many of its 42 tasks; BSIMM16 calls itself the second most referenced framework in the SSDF after Executive Order 14028. The catch is version drift. The SSDF references BSIMM12 activity codes, and because activities move level as observation rates change, some codes no longer exist: the report's example is SE2.6, which is now SE1.3. BSIMM16 counts 13 activities that have moved since the SSDF was released, affecting 16 SSDF tasks, and publishes an updated mapping table for them. If you answer customer questionnaires in SSDF terms (see our SSDF guide), check codes against that table before citing a BSIMM activity.
How does BSIMM compare with OWASP SAMM?
| BSIMM | OWASP SAMM | |
|---|---|---|
| Basis | Observed data from 111 real firms (BSIMM16) | Prescriptive, self-scored practice levels |
| Access | Framework skeleton published free annually; formal assessment is a paid service | Fully free, open, self-service |
| Level meaning | "How commonly is this observed" | "How sophisticated is this objective" |
| Best used for | Benchmarking against real industry peers | Tracking your own program's maturity over time |
See OWASP SAMM: the Software Assurance Maturity Model, explained for the companion, fully self-service model — the two are not mutually exclusive, and a firm can read BSIMM's published activity list as a free benchmark checklist while still using SAMM (or BSIMM's own paid assessment) for a scored self-evaluation. Teams that think in pipelines may also compare the OWASP DevSecOps Maturity Model.
How should a device or firmware team use BSIMM without commissioning a formal assessment?
BSIMM16's Part 5 describes the scorecard as a management tool to assess maturity, communicate posture "to customers, partners, executives, and regulators," and compare against field data. A team can build a rough version itself:
Read the published activity skeleton as a gap list, not a scorecardBSIMM16's level-1 activities (e.g. "ensure host and network security basics are in place," "use automated code review tools") describe what the large majority of the 111 observed firms already do — a reasonable floor for any team shipping connected products. Mark each of the 128 activities as done or not done, counting an activity only when it covers the whole product portfolio, not one pilot team. The report notes that assessors give credit only for activities with sufficient coverage, formality and depth. Pay attention to the Deployment domain specifically if you ship firmwareSoftware Environment and CMVM activities — hardening, bills of materials, code integrity, incident response hooks — map directly onto firmware and device operational security. Compare with the most common activity in each practiceBSIMM16's example scorecard highlights where a firm skips the most-observed activity of a practice and asks whether that gap is deliberate. The report also says there is "no inherent reason to adopt all activities in each practice." Treat the AI-related growth activities as a signal, not a checkbox, and re-check the published skeleton annually, since BSIMM is "adjusted annually to keep it current."
What does a self-built scorecard look like for a small device maker?
Synthetic example, not a real company or a BSIMM assessment result. A 45-person maker of a Linux-based industrial gateway runs the exercise above in one afternoon with its firmware lead, QA lead and product manager. An extract of their Deployment and Intelligence rows:
| Activity | Status | Note |
|---|---|---|
| [SE1.2] Ensure host and network security basics are in place | Done | Default services reviewed per release |
| [SE2.4] Protect code integrity | Partial | Images signed, but the bootloader does not verify them |
| [SR1.5] Identify open source | Done | Package list from the build system |
| [SE3.6] Create bills of materials for deployed software | Not done | No SBOM kept per shipped version |
| [CMVM1.1] Create or interface with incident response | Partial | Shared support mailbox, no named owner |
| [CMVM2.4] Streamline incoming responsible vulnerability disclosure | Not done | No published disclosure policy |
The gaps line up with the BSIMM16 growth list: the two "not done" rows are among the activities other firms adopted fastest last year. The team's plan for the next two quarters is a per-release SBOM, a named PSIRT owner with a disclosure policy, and bootloader signature verification, with the scorecard repeated after each release cycle. None of this produces a BSIMM score comparable to a formal assessment; it produces an ordered backlog.
What are the common pitfalls when teams use BSIMM?
- Reading levels as quality. Level 3 means rarely observed, not better. A level-3 activity such as running a bug bounty may be a poor first investment for a 20-person firmware team.
- Quoting stale activity codes. Codes move with observation rates; the SSDF mapping issue above shows how a BSIMM12 code can point to the wrong activity today.
- Scoring a pilot as the whole program. Credit goes to activities that cover the organisation's software, so one product line with an SBOM does not make SE3.6 "done."
- Using web-app pentest scopes for devices. BSIMM16's own IoT finding says device testing needs a different skillset and more time.
- Presenting a self-scorecard as a BSIMM assessment. Formal assessments are a Black Duck service; a self-built scorecard is internal planning material.
SoftWSP supports a narrow part of this picture: it extracts a CycloneDX SBOM from a firmware image, matches the components against NVD, CISA KEV, FIRST EPSS and CISA CSAF ICS advisories, and drafts a cited report that an engineer reviews before it reaches you. That is evidence for SR1.5, SE3.6 and CMVM triage work; it is not a BSIMM assessment. See device firmware security.
This guide is based on a direct read of the BSIMM16 Report 2026 PDF (Black Duck), extracted and quoted from the source document rather than a secondary summary, supplemented by Black Duck's public BSIMM overview and service pages. BSIMM activity names, percentages and growth figures are as published in the BSIMM16 report and will be superseded by future annual editions; this guide is general information, not a substitute for reading the full report or commissioning a formal BSIMM assessment.
Put this guide to work
Frequently asked questions
What is BSIMM?
The Building Security In Maturity Model, a data-driven study of real-world software security practices first published in 2008. Per the BSIMM16 report's own framing, in 2008 "application security, research, and analysis experts set out to gather data on the different paths that organizations take to address the challenges of securing software," conducting in-person interviews with organisations known for effective security programs. The result, BSIMM1, is explicitly described as "a descriptive model" — it documents what real software security initiatives actually do, rather than prescribing what they should do. The current edition, BSIMM16, was published in 2026 and is maintained and distributed by Black Duck.
How is BSIMM structured, and what does BSIMM16 say about its own scale?
Around a Software Security Framework (SSF) organised into four domains — Governance, Intelligence, SSDL Touchpoints, and Deployment — each split into three named practices, for twelve practices total, per the BSIMM16 report's own terminology section. The twelve practices are: Strategy & Metrics, Compliance & Policy, Training (Governance); Attack Models, Security Features & Design, Standards & Requirements (Intelligence); Architecture Analysis, Code Review, Security Testing (SSDL Touchpoints); and Penetration Testing, Software Environment, Configuration Management & Vulnerability Management (Deployment). The report states that "within the SSF, the 128 activities are organized into 12 BSIMM practices, which are held within four domains," and that BSIMM16's data pool draws on 111 participating firms.
How are BSIMM's maturity levels assigned to each activity?
By observed frequency, not by design intent — a key difference from a prescriptive model. BSIMM16's own text states: "We divide activities into levels per practice based on the frequency with which they're observed in our participants, ... Level 1 activities (often straightforward and universally applicable) are those that are most observed across the data pool of 111 firms, level 2 activities ... are less frequently observed, and level 3 activities (usually more difficult to implement and not always applicable) are more rarely observed." New activities are added directly at level 3, since the model has no observation history for them yet.
What does BSIMM16 (2026) actually say about AI's effect on software security programs?
That AI adoption is a measurable, growing part of real firms' security activity, not a speculative trend. The report states "AI continued to be a major area of focus for all organizations in the last year," citing [SR3.5] "Create standards controlling and guiding the adoption of new technologies" (introduced in BSIMM15, with AI as "a major part of that for every firm where it was observed") and a 10% year-over-year growth in [AM1.5] "Gather and use attack intelligence." Separately, the report notes a 30% increase in [SE3.6] "Create bills of materials for deployed software" and over 40% growth in a related software-bill-of-materials activity, tied explicitly to US federal self-attestation and SBOM requirements rather than to AI.
How does BSIMM differ from a framework like OWASP SAMM?
BSIMM is observational and BSIMM16 notes a 111-firm data pool built from paid, structured assessments conducted against real organisations; BSIMM's own report describes it as reflecting "current software security efforts" that the model is "adjusted annually to keep it current." See [OWASP SAMM: the Software Assurance Maturity Model, explained](/guides/owasp-samm/) for the contrasting model — SAMM is free, open and explicitly designed for self-assessment against a fixed set of defined practice levels, with no underlying observational data pool behind the level definitions. A firm can use BSIMM's published skeleton and activity descriptions (freely available in the annual report) as a benchmark checklist without commissioning a formal assessment, but the levels themselves are calibrated from the real assessment data, not from a theoretical ideal.
What were BSIMM16's most commonly observed activities?
Per the report's own Table 1 ("Top Activities by Observation Percentage"), the most frequently observed activity across the 111-firm data pool was [CMVM1.1] "Create or interface with incident response" at 87.6%, followed by [SM1.4] "Implement security checkpoints and associated governance" at 82.6%, [SE1.2] "Ensure host and network security basics are in place" at 79.3%, and [CR1.4] "Use automated code review tools" and [PT1.1] "Use external penetration testers to find problems," tied at 78.5%. The report notes this year's list has 12 entries rather than 10 "due to observation rate ties."
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