Security Advisory

CVE-2024-4008: ABB KNX Secure Display FDSK Leak

Last updated:
  • CVE-2024-4008

CVE-2024-4008 is an FDSK leak in ABB/Busch-Jaeger KNX Secure devices: displays and RoomTouch panels on firmware 1.00 and BCU KNX units on 1.3.0.33 reveal their Factory Default Setup Key, so an attacker on the KNX bus who also records commissioning can extract the device's keys and send telegrams in its name. NVD scores it 8.8; ABB fixed it in 1.02 and 1.3.1_63.

Vulnerability summary

CVSS base score

8.8

High severity

EPSS score (FIRST)

0.3%

Probability of exploitation in the wild in the next 30 days

CISA KEV catalog

No

Not listed

Published

Vulnerability ID: CVE-2024-4008 · Source: NVD

Affected components

ComponentCPEVersion range
ABB/Busch-Jaeger KNX Secure 2,4" Display 55 (2TMA310010B0001, 2TMA310011B0001)cpe:2.3:o:abb:2tma310010b0001_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*1.00 affected; fixed in 1.02 and newer (ABB 9AKK108464A0803; NVD: before 1.02)
ABB/Busch-Jaeger KNX Secure 2,4" Display 63 (2TMA310011B0002, 2TMA310010B0003)cpe:2.3:o:abb:2tma310011b0002_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*1.00 affected; fixed in 1.02 and newer (ABB 9AKK108464A0803; NVD: before 1.02)
ABB/Busch-Jaeger KNX Secure RoomTouch 4" (2TMA310011B0003, 2TMA310010B0004, 2TMA310010W0001, 2TMA310011W0001)cpe:2.3:o:abb:2tma310011b0003_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*1.00 affected; fixed in 1.02 and newer (ABB 9AKK108464A0803; NVD CPE covers 2TMA310011B0003 only)
ABB/Busch-Jaeger KNX Secure 2,4" Display 70 (2TMA310010B0006, 2TMA310011B0004)—1.00 affected; fixed in 1.02 and newer (ABB 9AKK108464A0803; no NVD CPE)
ABB/Busch-Jaeger BCU KNX bus coupling unit (2CKA006120A0079, 2CKA006120A0080, 2CKA006120A0081)—1.3.0.33 affected; fixed in 1.3.1_63 and newer (ABB 9AKK108464A0803; no NVD CPE)

What does this mean for affected devices?

NVD's description: "FDSK Leak in ABB, Busch-Jaeger, FTS Display (version 1.00) and BCU (version 1.3.0.33) allows attacker to take control via access to local KNX Bus-System." NVD's Primary score is CVSS v3.1 8.8 (high), vector CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H. ABB, as CNA, scores it 9.6 in CVSS v3.1 (AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:H/A:H) and 7.3 in CVSS v4.0, with CWE-497 (exposure of sensitive system information). NVD's CPE configuration covers only five display product IDs before firmware 1.02 (NVD, CVE record).

Which ABB and Busch-Jaeger devices are affected?

ABB's advisory 9AKK108464A0803 "KNX Secure Devices: FDSK Leak and replay attack" (revision A of 2024-06-05, revision C of 2024-06-14) lists thirteen product IDs, more than NVD's CPE list: 2,4" Display 55, Display 63 and Display 70 and RoomTouch 4" panels (2TMA31… IDs) on firmware 1.00, and the BCU KNX bus coupling unit (2CKA006120A0079, A0080, A0081) on 1.3.0.33. It covers the same products for the replay flaw CVE-2024-4009. Only installations using KNX Data Secure are affected; classic KNX in plain mode is not (ABB advisory).

How does the FDSK leak work?

The FDSK protects the transfer of the tool key during commissioning, and the tool key secures the link between a KNX Secure device and ETS. ABB states the precondition: the device must not be running in KNX Secure mode, which is the state before or during commissioning. A specially crafted message makes the device reveal its FDSK; the attacker must then capture every telegram exchanged between the device and ETS and decrypt them with the FDSK to obtain all communication keys. After that they can send KNX Secure telegrams on behalf of the device, but only for the group addresses it uses. ABB notes physical access to the KNX network at the right time is required, that this can mean switching lights, moving blinds, changing temperatures or unlocking doors, and that it found the flaw itself with no known exploitation when it published.

What should installers do?

ABB's fix is firmware 1.02 or newer for all ten displays and 1.3.1_63 or newer for the three BCU KNX product IDs. Its recommended sequence matters as much as the update: connect the device point-to-point to the ETS PC (or through the KNX Data Secure network if you can reasonably assume it is secure), renew all symmetric keys including the device's tool key by switching the device once to plain mode and back to KNX Secure in the ETS project, update the firmware with the standard KNX Secure update mechanism, then configure it from the ETS project. If you have reason to think a device's FDSK became known, repeat the process whenever the device is reset to factory defaults, because the update cannot make a leaked FDSK secret again. Where this cannot be done, ABB says not to let these devices control sensitive functions such as access control to hotel rooms or other protected areas. Our KNX protocol security guide explains KNX Data Secure commissioning, and the weak cryptography fix guide covers key handling in device firmware. FDSKs and tool keys are also what leaks from the ETS5 project store in CVE-2021-36799.

CVE-2024-4008 is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of 2026-11-18 (catalog version 2026.11.13). FIRST EPSS gives it 0.0027, the 20th percentile, in the 2026-11-17 dataset (CISA KEV, FIRST EPSS).

How to fix this class of issueNo dedicated SoftWSP guide covers this weakness class; the fix is usually the vendor patch or firmware update referenced above. Our related guide explains how to plan and verify it: NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4: enterprise patch management planning, explained.

Evidence

  • NVD description as quoted; NVD Primary CVSS 3.1 8.8 AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H; ABB CNA CVSS 3.1 9.6 and 4.0 7.3, CWE-497; CPE five abb 2tma3100… firmware before 1.02; published 2024-06-05. — NVD
  • 9AKK108464A0803 rev A 2024-06-05, rev C 2024-06-14: 13 product IDs (displays/RoomTouch 1.00, BCU KNX 1.3.0.33); fixed 1.02 and 1.3.1_63; only KNX Data Secure systems; precondition device not in KNX Secure mode; crafted message reveals FDSK, attacker must capture ETS commissioning traffic; telegrams only for the device's group addresses; physical access needed; recommended actions P2P commissioning, key renewal, firmware update; avoid sensitive functions such as hotel room access control; found internally, no exploitation known at publication. — ABB Cyber Security Advisory 9AKK108464A0803
  • CVE record from ABB as CNA: title 'FDSK Leak in KNX Secure Devices', vendor ABB, Busch-Jaeger, affected display and RoomTouch products version 1.00. — CVE record
  • Not in the CISA KEV catalog, version 2026.11.13, checked 2026-11-18. — CISA KEV
  • EPSS 0.00274, percentile 0.20071, dataset 2026-11-17. — FIRST EPSS

Related advisories

Sources

  1. NVD
  2. CVE record CVE-2024-4008 (ABB as CNA)
  3. ABB Cyber Security Advisory 9AKK108464A0803: KNX Secure Devices FDSK Leak and replay attack
  4. CISA KEV
  5. FIRST EPSS

Frequently asked questions

Which firmware fixes CVE-2024-4008?

Firmware 1.02 or newer for the ABB/Busch-Jaeger 2,4" Display 55, 63, 70 and RoomTouch 4" product IDs, and 1.3.1_63 or newer for the BCU KNX (2CKA006120A0079/80/81), per ABB advisory 9AKK108464A0803.

Are classic KNX installations affected by CVE-2024-4008?

No. ABB says the flaw concerns only systems using KNX Data Secure; installations running classic KNX in plain mode are not affected.

Does updating the firmware fully fix a leaked FDSK?

No. ABB states an FDSK already known to an untrusted party stays known, so renew all keys during commissioning as ABB describes and repeat that after any factory reset.

Is CVE-2024-4008 in the CISA KEV catalog?

No, not as of 2026-11-18 (catalog version 2026.11.13). FIRST EPSS gives it 0.0027, the 20th percentile, in the 2026-11-17 dataset (per CISA KEV and FIRST EPSS).