CVE-2018-3968 is a verified boot bypass in the U-Boot bootloader: versions 2013.07-rc1 to 2014.07-rc2 accept an unsigned kernel in the legacy image format even when the device requires signed FIT images. NVD scores it 7.0, and Cisco Talos found it on the CUJO Smart Firewall, firmware 7003, built on the Cavium OCTEON SDK.
Vulnerability summary
CVSS base score
7
High severity
EPSS score (FIRST)
0.3%
Probability of exploitation in the wild in the next 30 days
CISA KEV catalog
No
Not listed
Published
Vulnerability ID: CVE-2018-3968 · Source: NVD
Affected components
| Component | CPE | Version range |
|---|---|---|
| Das U-Boot bootloader, verified boot with the legacy image format (bootm) | cpe:2.3:a:denx:u-boot:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* | 2013.07-rc1 to 2014.07-rc2 (NVD); CONFIG_IMAGE_FORMAT_LEGACY added by commit 21d29f7f; Debian fixed in 2014.07+dfsg1-1 |
| Cavium OCTEON-SDK (U-Boot) | — | 3.1.2 to 5.1, tested versions (Cisco Talos TALOS-2018-0633) |
| CUJO Smart Firewall | — | firmware version 7003, tested version (Cisco Talos TALOS-2018-0633) |
What does this mean for affected devices?
CVE-2018-3968 is a verified boot bypass in the U-Boot bootloader. NVD's description says U-Boot from 2013.07-rc1 to 2014.07-rc2 lacks "proper FIT signature enforcement, which allows an attacker to bypass U-Boot's verified boot and execute an unsigned kernel, embedded in a legacy image format", and that "a local attacker needs to be able to supply the image to boot" (NVD). NVD scores it 7.0 with vector CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H and weakness CWE-347, improper verification of a cryptographic signature. Cisco Talos, the CNA, scores it 8.2.
Claudio Bozzato and Yves Younan of Cisco Talos published the details as TALOS-2018-0633 on 2019-03-19, after disclosing it to the vendor on 2018-07-19. U-Boot can boot two image formats: the Flat Image Tree (FIT), which supports signatures, and the older legacy format, which has none. In the affected versions FIT support could be switched off with a build option, but the legacy format could not, so "signed FIT images couldn't be enforced, since the bootloader allowed for booting both signed and unsigned (called legacy) image formats". An attacker who can replace the boot image gives bootm a legacy image instead of the signed FIT, and the kernel in it runs with no check.
The device angle comes from that report. Talos lists the CUJO Smart Firewall, firmware version 7003, and the Cavium OCTEON-SDK 3.1.2 to 5.1 as tested. On the CUJO device the boot chain is OCTEON's eMMC bootloader followed by two U-Boot stages; the third stage decrypts a FIT image whose configuration is signed with RSA-4096, and bootm boots the kernel only if that signature verifies. The legacy format sidesteps the whole check. Talos rates the CUJO case at 7.5 because exploitation there needs "either physical access to the device, or local access through a previously exploited vulnerability".
The fix is upstream commit 21d29f7f of 2014-05-28, "bootm: make use of legacy image format configurable". It adds CONFIG_IMAGE_FORMAT_LEGACY and turns the legacy format off by default when CONFIG_FIT_SIGNATURE is set, because "when relying on signed FIT images with required signature check the legacy image format should be disabled". U-Boot's current FIT signature documentation carries the same warning under the newer option name CONFIG_LEGACY_IMAGE_FORMAT. The Debian security tracker records the fix in its 2014.07+dfsg1-1 u-boot package.
The CVE is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of 2026-11-17 (catalog version 2026.11.13). FIRST EPSS gives it 0.0028, the 20.2nd percentile, in the 2026-11-16 dataset (CISA KEV, FIRST EPSS).
A version check is only half the answer for this flaw. A later U-Boot still boots unsigned legacy images if a board configuration enables the legacy format next to FIT signing, so check the build configuration of any device that claims verified boot. Our U-Boot security guide uses this CVE to explain why the legacy format must be disabled, and our secure boot guide covers the chain of trust around it. Two later FIT signature bypasses are CVE-2020-10648 and CVE-2026-46728.
Evidence
- U-Boot 2013.07-rc1 to 2014.07-rc2 lacks FIT signature enforcement; unsigned legacy-format kernel boots; local attacker must supply the image. NVD CVSS v3.1 7.0 (AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H), Talos 8.2; CWE-347. — NVD
- TALOS-2018-0633 (public 2019-03-19, vendor disclosure 2018-07-19), Claudio Bozzato and Yves Younan: tested CUJO Smart Firewall firmware 7003 and OCTEON-SDK 3.1.2 to 5.1; CUJO boot chain and RSA-4096 signed FIT configuration; CUJO score 7.5. — Cisco Talos TALOS-2018-0633
- Commit 21d29f7f (2014-05-28) adds CONFIG_IMAGE_FORMAT_LEGACY and disables the legacy format by default when CONFIG_FIT_SIGNATURE is set. — U-Boot commit 21d29f7f
- Current U-Boot FIT signature documentation warns that the legacy image format is disabled by not defining CONFIG_LEGACY_IMAGE_FORMAT when relying on signed FIT images (checked 2026-11-17). — U-Boot documentation
- Debian: fixed in u-boot 2014.07+dfsg1-1 (unstable). — Debian security tracker
- Not in the CISA KEV catalog as of 2026-11-17 (catalog version 2026.11.13). — CISA KEV
- EPSS 0.00276 (20.2nd percentile), dataset 2026-11-16, read 2026-11-17. — FIRST EPSS

Related advisories
Sources
Frequently asked questions
Which U-Boot versions are affected by CVE-2018-3968?
NVD lists Das U-Boot 2013.07-rc1 to 2014.07-rc2. Commit 21d29f7f of 2014-05-28 made the legacy image format configurable and off by default with FIT signing, and Debian records the fix in its 2014.07+dfsg1-1 package (per NVD, the U-Boot commit and the Debian security tracker).
Which devices did Cisco Talos test for CVE-2018-3968?
The CUJO Smart Firewall with firmware version 7003, and the Cavium OCTEON-SDK 3.1.2 to 5.1, whose U-Boot code the CUJO device uses (per Cisco Talos TALOS-2018-0633).
Is a device on a newer U-Boot automatically safe from this bypass?
Not automatically. The fix makes the legacy image format a build option that is off by default with FIT signing; a board configuration that turns it back on reopens the same path. U-Boot's FIT signature documentation still warns about it (per the U-Boot commit and documentation, checked 2026-11-17).
Is CVE-2018-3968 exploited?
It is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of 2026-11-17 (catalog version 2026.11.13). FIRST EPSS gives it 0.0028, the 20.2nd percentile, in the 2026-11-16 dataset (per CISA KEV and FIRST EPSS).
Questions about this page?