Security Advisory

CVE-2013-4786: IPMI 2.0 RAKP Password Hash Leak

Last updated:
  • CVE-2013-4786

CVE-2013-4786 is a design flaw in the IPMI 2.0 specification (CWE-255): any client can ask a BMC for RAKP message 2, which contains an HMAC of the user's password, and crack it offline. NVD scores it 7.5. Supermicro, Dell and a Lenovo server support tip state no patch exists, so disable IPMI over LAN, isolate UDP port 623 and use long unique passwords.

Vulnerability summary

CVSS base score

7.5

High severity

EPSS score (FIRST)

98.4%

Probability of exploitation in the wild in the next 30 days

CISA KEV catalog

No

Not listed

Published

Vulnerability ID: CVE-2013-4786 · Source: NVD

Affected components

ComponentCPEVersion range
IPMI 2.0 specification (RMCP+ RAKP authentication), any BMC with IPMI over LAN enabledcpe:2.3:a:intel:intelligent_platform_management_interface:2.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*IPMI 2.0; no protocol fix, mitigate in configuration (NVD CPE, Supermicro FAQ 39134, Dell KB 000222162)
Oracle Fujitsu M10-1, M10-4, M10-4S Servers XCP firmwarecpe:2.3:o:oracle:fujitsu_m10_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*XCP prior to XCP2290 per Oracle Critical Patch Update April 2016; NVD CPE lists up to and including 2290
Lenovo System x, Flex System and NeXtScale servers with IMM2—All IMM2 versions; no fix, workaround by configuration (IBM Support tip for Lenovo x86 servers); not in NVD's CPE configuration
Dell Data Domain (iDRAC IPMI over LAN)—No patch; disable IPMI over LAN in iDRAC (Dell KB 000222162); not in NVD's CPE configuration
Supermicro BMC (IPMI)—No patch because it is the IPMI design specification; mitigations only (Supermicro FAQ 39134); not in NVD's CPE configuration

What does this mean for affected devices?

NVD describes CVE-2013-4786 as a property of the protocol itself: "The IPMI 2.0 specification supports RMCP+ Authenticated Key-Exchange Protocol (RAKP) authentication, which allows remote attackers to obtain password hashes and conduct offline password guessing attacks by obtaining the HMAC from a RAKP message 2 response from a BMC." NVD's Primary score is CVSS v3.0 7.5 (CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N) and the weakness is CWE-255 (credentials management errors). MITRE assigned the record, published on 2013-07-08, with no vendor or product in the CNA data (NVD, CVE record).

How does the RAKP hash leak work?

Dan Farmer's write-up on cracking IPMI passwords remotely shows the exchange: a client opens an RMCP+ session, sends RAKP message 1 with a user name, and the BMC answers with RAKP message 2, which carries an HMAC-SHA1 keyed with that user's password. The client may supply a wrong password; it never needs to finish the handshake. Everything else that goes into the HMAC (session IDs, both random numbers, the BMC GUID, the privilege level and the user name) is in the exchange, so the attacker tries password guesses offline until the HMAC matches. The response also tells the attacker whether the account name exists. In his scan of a bit over 1,000 internet-reachable BMCs, a bit over 5% still had vendor default passwords and another 5-10% fell to a modest dictionary. His advice: keep BMCs behind firewalls and block UDP port 623.

Which devices are affected, and is there a fix?

Any baseboard management controller that offers IPMI 2.0 over LAN. NVD's CPE configuration is narrow: Intel's IPMI 2.0 specification and Oracle Fujitsu M10 firmware up to 2290. Oracle's April 2016 Critical Patch Update lists Fujitsu M10-1, M10-4 and M10-4S XCP firmware "prior to XCP2290" at 7.5, so the NVD range also flags 2290 itself. Other BMC vendors answer that no patch exists:

  • Supermicro's FAQ 39134: "Because it is IPMI design specification, there are no patches for this vulnerability." It recommends disabling IPMI over LAN if unneeded, strong passwords, and ACLs or isolated networks.
  • Dell's knowledge base article 000222162 for Data Domain calls it an inherent problem of the IPMI v2.0 specification and disables IPMI over LAN in iDRAC, in the web interface or with racadm set iDRAC.IPMILan.Enable 0.
  • An IBM Support tip for Lenovo x86 servers with IMM2 covers Lenovo System x, Flex System and NeXtScale servers with all IMM2 versions: "there is currently no fix". It changes the default account, removes IPMI network access per user with ipmitool channel setaccess 1 <user_slot> privilege=15, and asks for passwords of at least 16 characters.

CISA's alert TA13-207A (released 2013-07-26, revised 2016-10-07) gives the network side: restrict IPMI, typically UDP port 623, to a separate management LAN, use unique strong passwords, enable encrypted IPMI traffic and disable cipher 0.

How should a device maker handle CVE-2013-4786?

Treat it as a configuration finding, because a firmware version will not close it. Ship IPMI over LAN disabled unless the product needs it, never expose UDP port 623 outside a management network, and give each unit a long random password instead of a fixed default. Our BMC, IPMI and Redfish vulnerabilities guide walks through identifying the BMC stack and turning off unused interfaces, and the KEV-listed Redfish bypass on the same controllers is CVE-2024-54085. Default and shared passwords are the reason the offline guessing succeeds; CVE-2021-34565 shows the hard-coded variant on an industrial gateway.

CVE-2013-4786 is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of 2026-11-19 (catalog version 2026.11.18, 1,786 entries). FIRST EPSS gives it 0.98385, the 99.9th percentile, in the 2026-11-18 dataset, and our KEV and EPSS prioritisation guide explains why such a score and a KEV listing are different signals (CISA KEV, FIRST EPSS).

How to fix this class of issueNo dedicated SoftWSP guide covers this weakness class; the fix is usually the vendor patch or firmware update referenced above. Our related guide explains how to plan and verify it: NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4: enterprise patch management planning, explained.

Evidence

  • NVD: IPMI 2.0 RAKP authentication lets remote attackers obtain password hashes and guess offline via the HMAC in a RAKP message 2 response from a BMC; NVD Primary CVSS v3.0 7.5 AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N; CWE-255; CPE Oracle Fujitsu M10 firmware up to and including 2290 and Intel IPMI 2.0; published 2013-07-08; status Modified; no CISA ADP CVSS metric. — NVD
  • Supermicro FAQ 39134 (CVE-2013-4786 and CVE-2013-4037): RAKP in the IPMI standard; 'Because it is IPMI design specification, there are no patches for this vulnerability'; mitigations disable IPMI over LAN, strong passwords, ACLs or isolated networks. — Supermicro
  • Dell KB 000222162 'Data Domain: IPMI v2.0 Password Hash Disclosure' (last modified 2025-08-05): inherent problem of the IPMI v2.0 specification; disable IPMI over LAN in iDRAC web UI or with racadm set iDRAC.IPMILan.Enable 0; otherwise strong passwords, ACLs, isolated networks. — Dell
  • IBM Support tip for Lenovo x86 servers 'Risk of using IPMI on IMM reported by Nessus': RAKP vulnerable, no fix; affects Lenovo Flex System, NeXtScale and System x servers, all IMM2 versions; workaround change default account, ipmitool channel setaccess 1 <user_slot> privilege=15, passwords of at least 16 characters. — IBM Support (Lenovo x86 servers)
  • Oracle Critical Patch Update April 2016, Sun Systems Products Suite risk matrix: CVE-2013-4786, Fujitsu M10-1, M10-4, M10-4S Servers XCP Firmware, protocol IPMI, remote without authentication, CVSS 3.0 7.5, affected XCP prior to XCP2290. — Oracle
  • CISA alert TA13-207A 'Risks of Using the Intelligent Platform Management Interface (IPMI)' (released 2013-07-26, revised 2016-10-07): restrict IPMI (typically UDP 623) to management VLANs, strong unique passwords, enable encryption, disable cipher 0; references Dan Farmer's write-up. — CISA
  • Dan Farmer, Cracking IPMI Passwords Remotely: RAKP message 2 carries an HMAC usable for offline cracking with an invalid password; reveals whether account names exist; scan of a bit over 1,000 hosts, a bit over 5% default passwords and 5-10% easily crackable; block UDP port 623. — fish2.com
  • CVE record: state PUBLISHED, assigner MITRE, published 2013-07-08, vendor and product n/a; CISA ADP Vulnrichment container present. — CVE.org
  • Not in the CISA KEV catalog version 2026.11.18 (1,786 entries), checked 2026-11-19. — CISA KEV
  • EPSS 0.98385, percentile 0.99919, dataset 2026-11-18, read 2026-11-19. — FIRST EPSS

Related advisories

Sources

  1. NVD
  2. Supermicro FAQ 39134: BMC vulnerabilities CVE-2013-4786 and CVE-2013-4037
  3. Dell KB 000222162: Data Domain IPMI v2.0 Password Hash Disclosure
  4. IBM Support: Risk of using IPMI on IMM reported by Nessus (Lenovo x86 servers)
  5. Oracle Critical Patch Update April 2016 (Sun Systems Products Suite risk matrix)
  6. CISA alert TA13-207A: Risks of Using the Intelligent Platform Management Interface (IPMI)
  7. Dan Farmer: Cracking IPMI Passwords Remotely
  8. CVE.org record CVE-2013-4786
  9. CISA KEV
  10. FIRST EPSS

Frequently asked questions

Is there a firmware patch for CVE-2013-4786?

No protocol fix exists, because RAKP is part of the IPMI 2.0 specification. Supermicro, Dell and Lenovo state there is no patch. Oracle lists Fujitsu M10 XCP firmware prior to XCP2290 as affected (per Supermicro FAQ 39134, Dell KB 000222162, the IBM Support tip for Lenovo IMM2 servers and Oracle's April 2016 CPU).

How do I mitigate CVE-2013-4786 on a BMC?

Disable IPMI over LAN when it is not needed (on iDRAC: racadm set iDRAC.IPMILan.Enable 0), keep UDP port 623 on an isolated management network with ACLs, disable cipher 0, change default accounts and use long unique passwords (per Dell, Supermicro, Lenovo and CISA TA13-207A).

Does an attacker need a valid password to get the hash?

No. The attacker needs only network access to the BMC and a user name; the client can send a wrong password and still receive the HMAC in RAKP message 2, and the reply reveals whether the user name exists (per NVD and Dan Farmer's write-up).

Is CVE-2013-4786 exploited in the wild?

It is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of 2026-11-19 (catalog version 2026.11.18). FIRST EPSS gives it 0.98385, the 99.9th percentile, in the 2026-11-18 dataset.