Matter certification means a device passed the Connectivity Standards Alliance's security assessment at the level the manufacturer chose — self-assessment or independent testing, under the Product Security 1.1 program released 17 June 2026 — not that the device satisfies any government's product-security law. Matter, the smart-home connectivity standard governed by the CSA with Amazon, Apple, Google and hundreds of other member companies, was built with Public Key Infrastructure-based authentication and encryption as a core design choice rather than an afterthought, and the Alliance's companion Product Security program has just been extended, in its June 2026 1.1 release, to certify whole IoT systems instead of individual devices alone. None of that makes Matter certification equivalent to a legal compliance finding under the CRA, PSTI or the US Cyber Trust Mark.
Key takeaways
- Matter builds identity, encryption and authenticated onboarding into the protocol itself.
- Every certified Matter device holds a Device Attestation Certificate issued by a Product Attestation Intermediate (PAI), which chains to a Product Attestation Authority (PAA) root.
- PASE. The controller and device establish a session from the setup passcode using SPAKE2+, so the passcode never crosses the air.
- Matter defines an OTA Software Update Provider and Requestor cluster pair so a controller or bridge can offer an image to a device.
What security does the Matter protocol actually build in?
Matter builds identity, encryption and authenticated onboarding into the protocol itself. CSA's Matter "security by design" page lists four pillars: a device attestation certificate that "verifies device authenticity during commissioning" and is "anchored in a global PKI managed by the Alliance"; encryption of "all Matter communication" using CASE sessions; "secure onboarding using QR codes, NFC, or BLE"; and "required support for firmware updates." Since Matter 1.6, the full commissioning exchange can also run over NFC before the device is fully powered on.
| Layer | Mechanism | What it proves or protects |
|---|---|---|
| Identity | Device Attestation Certificate (DAC) chained to a PAI and a PAA | The hardware comes from a known vendor and product |
| Certification | Certification Declaration (CD) signed by CSA, record in the Distributed Compliance Ledger | The product model passed certification |
| Onboarding | PASE: a passcode-authenticated session (SPAKE2+) | Only someone holding the setup code can commission |
| Operation | CASE sessions with Node Operational Certificates (NOC), per fabric | Each controller and device authenticate every session |
| Authorization | Access Control cluster entries | Which node may read, write or invoke what |
| Updates | OTA Software Update Provider and Requestor clusters, DCL version records | A defined path to ship and locate fixes |
This PKI-centered design is a deliberate architectural choice — a materially different starting point from legacy OT/IoT protocols such as Modbus, whose base specification has no equivalent security objectives at all. Matter often runs over Thread or Wi-Fi, whose own link security sits underneath.
How does device attestation prove a device is certified?
Every certified Matter device holds a Device Attestation Certificate issued by a Product Attestation Intermediate (PAI), which chains to a Product Attestation Authority (PAA) root. CSA's certification page says Matter products "receive a Certification Declaration (CD) blob file and a certified product record entered in the Distributed Compliance Ledger (DCL)." The DCL is "permissionless for read operations and requires authorized accounts for writing operations", so any controller can look up approved roots and product records. Its PKI rules say a PAA "is not active until sufficient number of Trustees approve it" (two-thirds of Trustees) and that it can only be revoked by its owner or a Trustee quorum.
During commissioning the controller requests the PAI and DAC, asks the device to sign an attestation challenge, and checks the result. The SDK's attestation verifier names the failures a maker will meet in testing: kPaaNotFound, kDacRevoked, kPaiRevoked, kDacVendorIdMismatch, kDacProductIdMismatch, and kCertificationDeclarationInvalidSignature, among others. Vendor ID and Product ID in the DAC must match the CD and the device's Basic Information cluster. A CD signed with a test key passes only on controllers that accept test keys.
What happens during commissioning?
The SDK's commissioning state machine runs the security steps in a fixed order:
PASEThe controller and device establish a session from the setup passcode using SPAKE2+, so the passcode never crosses the air. Fail-safe armedChanges made during commissioning roll back if the process stops. AttestationPAI and DAC certificate requests, the attestation request, verification, and a revocation check of the DAC chain. Operational credentialsThe device generates a key pair and returns a certificate signing request; the controller installs a trusted root and a Node Operational Certificate, which places the device on that controller's fabric. Network setupWi-Fi or Thread credentials are sent and the device joins. CASEThe controller finds the device on the operational network and opens a certificate-authenticated session. Commissioning completeThe fail-safe is disarmed.
The setup passcode is the weak point a maker controls. The SDK's payload validation restricts it to 00000001-99999998 and rejects 11111111 through 88888888, 12345678 and 87654321. A passcode printed identically on every unit passes that check, but defeats the purpose of PASE. Generate one per device at manufacturing.
How are Matter software updates delivered and checked?
Matter defines an OTA Software Update Provider and Requestor cluster pair so a controller or bridge can offer an image to a device. The SDK's OTA image tool writes a header with vendor ID, product ID, version, minimum and maximum applicable versions, a release-notes URL and a payload digest, and warns that a digest "below 256 bits is not recommended". The header carries a digest, not a signature, so verifying the image's origin is the device's job: the bootloader or update chain must check a vendor signature before it runs new code. See the firmware OTA update security guide for that part.
On the ledger side, each software version gets a DCL model version record. If otaUrl is set, then otaFileSize, otaChecksum and otaChecksumType must be set too, with SHA-256 or stronger checksum types, and size and checksum are "immutable after the OTA image is first published." A wrong checksum cannot be quietly fixed later; it needs a new version number.
Which CVEs have hit the Matter SDK?
The open-source SDK, connectedhomeip (Apache-2.0), has had several published CVEs, almost all denial-of-service bugs. Scores come from different sources, so record which one you use.
| CVE | What it does | Affected | CVSS 3.1 (source) |
|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2024-3297 | Replayed CASE Sigma1 messages leave the device unresponsive "until the device is power-cycled" | Matter before 1.1 | 6.5 (Bitdefender and NVD) |
| CVE-2023-42189 | Insecure permissions allow a denial of service | Matter SDK 1.1.0.0 and several retail devices | 7.5 (NVD) |
| CVE-2024-56318 | Zero-length TCP message causes a NULL pointer dereference | Through 1.4.0.0, before commit 27ca6ec | 7.5 (CISA-ADP) |
| CVE-2025-56363 | NULL pointer dereference in ReadRevisionAttribute | Before 1.4.0 | 5.7, adjacent network (NVD) |
Vendor SDK forks inherit these bugs on their own schedule. A maker needs to know which upstream SDK release their vendor fork tracks, and the firmware SBOM should name it.
What is Product Security 1.1, and what does it actually require?
Product Security 1.1, released by CSA on 17 June 2026 alongside Matter 1.6, is the latest version of the Alliance's separate certification program for product security (distinct from Matter protocol conformance itself). The headline change in 1.1 is scope: version 1.0 certified individual devices, while 1.1 certifies complete IoT systems — devices, apps, gateways and remote processes together — reflecting how a real smart-home or connected-device deployment rarely consists of just the device on its own. The program now offers two assurance levels:
| Level | What it requires |
|---|---|
| Level 1 | Supplier self-assessment, reviewed by an Authorized Test Laboratory (ATL) |
| Level 2 | Independent assessment and functional testing conducted directly by an ATL |
The announcement does not list requirements. CSA's Product Security FAQ lists the specification's core requirements: a unique identity for each IoT device, no hard-coded default passwords, secure storage of sensitive data on the device, secure communication of security-relevant information, secure software updates throughout the support period, a secure development process including vulnerability management, and public security documentation including the support period. The same FAQ explains why this is separate from Matter: connectivity protocols "are typically restricted to securing commissioning and data in transit", and "a product with a well-known admin password or backdoor might pass functional and interoperability tests but not product security tests." CSA states that version 1.1 "now covers the cybersecurity requirements for the European Union Radio Equipment Directive (RED) harmonized standards and the Singapore Cyber Security Labeling Scheme."
Does Matter or Product Security certification satisfy the CRA, PSTI or the US Cyber Trust Mark?
Not on its own. CSA's framing is that Product Security 1.1 "helps manufacturers navigate the challenge of diverging global requirements more easily" — a compliance aid, not a substitute for meeting any specific regime directly. The Cyber Resilience Act, the UK's PSTI regime and the voluntary US Cyber Trust Mark (built on NIST IR 8425 and certified through the FCC's own labelling program) each have their own legal scope, enforcing authority, and required evidence, none of which is "holds a Matter Product Security certificate." A manufacturer shipping a Matter-certified product into the EU, UK or US still has to run its own CRA technical documentation, PSTI Schedule 1 compliance statement, or Cyber Trust Mark application separately — Product Security 1.1's overlap with RED harmonized standards such as EN 18031 and Singapore's labelling scheme can reduce duplicate work, but it does not replace the filing.
What changed in Matter 1.6?
Released the same day as Product Security 1.1, Matter 1.6 added: NFC-based commissioning, letting a device be set up by tapping before it is fully powered on (useful for pre-installation configuration of light fixtures or switches); Joint Fabric, a multi-admin capability letting multiple user-authorized controllers jointly administer one shared Matter network — aimed at scenarios like new-construction handovers or households running more than one smart-home ecosystem — while counting as a single fabric allocation on the device; and partitioned Certificate Revocation Lists, splitting revocation data into smaller, independently updatable chunks rather than one large list, to keep certificate-chain checks scalable as the number of certified Matter devices grows. The matching SDK, connectedhomeip v1.6.1.0, shipped in September 2026; product teams usually adopt features through their chip vendor's fork some time after.
What does a release record look like for one Matter product?
Worked example, synthetic and labelled: "Plug-1" is a fictional Wi-Fi smart plug. IDs and versions are invented.
| Field | Value for release 1.3.0 |
|---|---|
| Matter SDK base | Chip-vendor fork tracking connectedhomeip v1.4.2.0 |
| SDK CVE review | CVE-2024-56318 and CVE-2025-56363 checked against the fork's changelog: fixed upstream in the tracked base |
| DCL version record | softwareVersion 13, otaUrl set, otaChecksumType 1 (SHA-256), minApplicableSoftwareVersion 10 |
| Image signing | Vendor signature checked by the bootloader; key held in an HSM |
| Passcode | Unique per unit, written at the factory test station |
| Certification | Matter certified; Product Security Level 1 |
What are the common pitfalls?
- One passcode for every unit. It passes SDK validation and defeats PASE.
- Test certificates in production. A development PAA or test-signed CD fails on strict controllers.
- Treating the OTA digest as a signature. The header digest proves integrity of the download only.
- Tracking the vendor fork, not the upstream release. CVE records name connectedhomeip versions.
- Assuming protocol certification covers the rest of the firmware. CSA's own FAQ says it does not.
What should a device maker building on Matter actually check?
Decide which Product Security level you actually need, not just which is cheaper. Level 1 self-assessment with ATL review may satisfy a baseline retailer requirement; a buyer or regulator asking for independent evidence will want Level 2's direct ATL testing. Don't stop at protocol certificationA Matter or Product Security certificate covers what CSA's program tests — it says nothing about vulnerabilities in the rest of your firmware image, the open-source Matter SDK version you built against, or components unrelated to the Matter stack itself. Track the open-source components your Matter implementation is built on, the same way you would for any other firmware dependency — most commercial and hobbyist Matter devices are built on the open-source connectedhomeip SDK or a vendor fork of it, and that code has its own version history and disclosed issues to track in your SBOM. Map certification evidence to the specific legal regime you're selling into, rather than assuming one certificate travels across CRA, PSTI, Cyber Trust Mark and RED/EN 18031 filings interchangeably. Provision unique passcodes and production DACsat the factory, and test commissioning against a controller that rejects test keys. Sign and verify every OTA imagein the bootloader, and publish each version's checksum to the DCL correctly the first time.
SoftWSP's Device & Firmware Security work extracts a firmware SBOM as CycloneDX 1.6 where the image carries package metadata, as embedded Linux bridges and hubs usually do. Bare-metal Matter end devices built on a chip vendor's SDK often carry none, so a component list naming the SDK release is the input instead. Either way, components are matched against NVD, CISA KEV, FIRST EPSS and CISA ICS advisories, watchlist alerts can follow a CVE ID or a vendor and product, and the cited draft report is reviewed by an engineer before delivery.
Dates, requirement details and quotations above are drawn from the Connectivity Standards Alliance's own Product Security 1.1 and Matter 1.6 announcements, its security-by-design, certification, DCL and Product Security FAQ pages, and the connectedhomeip and DCL source repositories. This guide is general information, not a substitute for the CSA's own certification program documentation or a specific national regulator's current requirements.
Put this guide to work
Frequently asked questions
Does the Matter protocol have security built in, or is it added on top?
Built in, by design. Matter is governed by the Connectivity Standards Alliance (CSA), and when CSA developed the protocol with Amazon, Apple, Google and other members, it selected Public Key Infrastructure as the mechanism for device identity, commissioning and message security rather than treating encryption as an optional add-on. Devices commission onto a Matter network over Bluetooth Low Energy (or, since Matter 1.6, NFC before the device is fully powered on), each device holds a certificate used for mutual authentication, all operational communication has message security enabled by default, and a Distributed Compliance Ledger backs the certification attestation a device presents to prove it is genuinely Matter-certified hardware, not a device merely claiming to be.
What is Product Security 1.1, and how is it different from version 1.0?
Product Security 1.0 certified individual Matter devices against a baseline set of security requirements. Product Security 1.1, released by the Connectivity Standards Alliance on 17 June 2026 alongside Matter 1.6, expands the program to certify complete IoT systems — covering IoT Devices, IoT Apps, IoT Remote Processes and IoT Gateways together, not just the device on its own — and introduces two certification levels: Level 1, a supplier self-assessment reviewed by an Authorized Test Laboratory (ATL), and Level 2, an independent assessment and functional testing conducted directly by an ATL.
What does Product Security 1.1 actually require of a certified product?
Per CSA's Product Security FAQ, requirements include a unique identity for each IoT device, no hard-coded default passwords, secure storage of sensitive data on the device, secure communication of security-relevant information, secure software updates throughout the support period, a secure development process including vulnerability management, and public security documentation including the support period. CSA states that version 1.1 now covers the cybersecurity requirements for the EU Radio Equipment Directive's harmonized standards and the Singapore Cybersecurity Labelling Scheme.
Does Matter or Product Security certification mean a device meets the CRA, PSTI or the US Cyber Trust Mark?
No — certification is evidence a manufacturer can use toward those regimes, not a substitute for meeting them directly. CSA describes Product Security 1.1 as designed to help manufacturers navigate requirements that overlap with the EU RED's harmonized standards and Singapore's labelling scheme, but the Cyber Resilience Act, the UK's PSTI regime and the US Cyber Trust Mark are each a separate legal or certification framework with their own scope, authority and evidence requirements — see this site's guides to the [Cyber Resilience Act](/guides/cyber-resilience-act/), [EN 18031](/guides/en-18031/) and [UK PSTI and the US Cyber Trust Mark](/guides/psti-cyber-trust-mark/). A manufacturer shipping a Matter-certified device into any of those markets still has to confirm its own compliance against that regime's actual legal text, not assume Matter certification already covers it.
What changed in Matter 1.6, released alongside Product Security 1.1?
Matter 1.6, published 17 June 2026, added NFC-based commissioning that lets a device be configured before it is fully powered on; Joint Fabric, a multi-admin feature letting multiple user-authorized controllers co-administer a single shared Matter network (aimed at scenarios like new-construction handovers or households running more than one smart-home platform); and partitioned Certificate Revocation Lists, which split certificate-revocation data into smaller, independently updatable chunks instead of one large list, intended to keep certificate-infrastructure checks scalable as the number of certified devices grows.
Sources
- Connectivity Standards Alliance: Product Security 1.1 — The Next Level of IoT Trust (17 June 2026)
- Connectivity Standards Alliance: Matter 1.6 Enables More Intuitive Setup, Multi-Ecosystem Experiences and Context-Driven Control (17 June 2026)
- Connectivity Standards Alliance: Build With Matter (protocol overview)
- NIST: NISTIR 8425 — Profile of the IoT Core Baseline for Consumer IoT Products
- Connectivity Standards Alliance: Matter security by design (DAC, CASE encryption, authenticated commissioning, OTA)
- Connectivity Standards Alliance: Product Security FAQ (requirement list; protocol vs product security)
- Connectivity Standards Alliance: Why certify (Certification Declaration and DCL record)
- Connectivity Standards Alliance: Distributed Compliance Ledger
- DCL repository: PKI transactions (PAA approval and revocation, revocation points)
- DCL repository: model and model version transactions (otaUrl, otaChecksum, immutability)
- connectedhomeip v1.6.1.0: DeviceAttestationVerifier.h (attestation failure codes)
- connectedhomeip v1.6.1.0: CommissioningDelegate.h (commissioning stages)
- connectedhomeip v1.6.1.0: SetupPayload.cpp (passcode range and invalid passcodes)
- connectedhomeip v1.6.1.0: ota_image_tool.py (OTA image header)
- connectedhomeip release v1.6.1.0
- NVD: CVE-2024-3297 (Matter CASE Sigma1 replay)
- NVD: CVE-2023-42189 (Matter SDK 1.1.0.0 denial of service)
- NVD: CVE-2024-56318 (connectedhomeip TCP NULL pointer dereference)
- NVD: CVE-2025-56363 (connectedhomeip ReadRevisionAttribute NULL pointer dereference)
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