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SBOM

Cryptographic Bill of Materials (CBOM), explained

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A Cryptographic Bill of Materials (CBOM) is a structured, machine-readable inventory of the specific cryptographic algorithms, key sizes, certificates, protocols and key material a software or firmware product actually uses — detail a regular SBOM's component-and-version list does not capture. It stopped being a nice-to-have in June 2026: Executive Order 14412 now directs CISA and NIST to publish guidance on the minimum elements of a CBOM on a fixed deadline, inside a federal post-quantum migration timeline that runs through 2035 and, per secondary reporting on the order, reaches federal contractors directly through FAR rulemaking.

Key takeaways

  • A CBOM records which algorithms, keys, certificates and protocols a product uses and where, while an SBOM stops at components and versions.
  • The fragment below is a synthetic example, invented for illustration: one gateway firmware image, one crypto library, two algorithms and one protocol.
  • EO 14412 and M-26-15 put dates on the federal post-quantum migration and named the CBOM as its inventory format.
  • Two FAR rules in the order and NIST's transition schedule reach companies that sell to the US government.

What does a CBOM capture that a software SBOM doesn't?

A CBOM records which algorithms, keys, certificates and protocols a product uses and where, while an SBOM stops at components and versions. A regular SBOM, in CycloneDX or SPDX, answers "what does this product contain?" — see CycloneDX vs. SPDX: SBOM formats. In the CycloneDX 1.6 schema, each cryptographic item is a component of type cryptographic-asset with a cryptoProperties object. The schema explains why the detail matters: knowing "the algorithm family (e.g. AES)" is not the same as knowing "the specific variant or instantiation (e.g. AES-128-GCM)". Its assetType field takes one of four values:

assetType Detail object Main fields Firmware example
algorithm algorithmProperties primitive, parameterSetIdentifier, curve, mode, cryptoFunctions, executionEnvironment, nistQuantumSecurityLevel RSA-2048 signature check in the bootloader
certificate certificateProperties subjectName, issuerName, notValidAfter, signatureAlgorithmRef Device identity certificate in flash
related-crypto-material relatedCryptoMaterialProperties type (for example private-key, public-key, secret-key), size, state, algorithmRef, securedBy Firmware-update public key
protocol protocolProperties type (tls, ssh, ipsec, ike, wpa …), version, cipherSuites TLS 1.2 client to the cloud backend

Two fields carry the migration signal. classicalSecurityLevel gives the classical strength in bits, and nistQuantumSecurityLevel gives the NIST post-quantum category from 0 to 6, where 0 means "none of the categories are met". The dependencies section links a library to the assets it implements through provides, which is how a CBOM ties "OpenSSL 3.0.2" to "RSA-2048 key exchange in module X". CycloneDX 1.7 keeps the same four asset types and adds algorithmFamily and ellipticCurve.

What does a CBOM entry look like for a firmware image?

The fragment below is a synthetic example, invented for illustration: one gateway firmware image, one crypto library, two algorithms and one protocol. It validates against the CycloneDX 1.6 JSON schema.

{
  "bomFormat": "CycloneDX", "specVersion": "1.6", "version": 1,
  "metadata": { "component": { "type": "firmware", "bom-ref": "fw", "name": "example-gateway-fw", "version": "2.4.0" } },
  "components": [
    { "type": "library", "bom-ref": "lib-mbedtls", "name": "mbedtls", "version": "3.6.2" },
    { "type": "cryptographic-asset", "bom-ref": "alg-rsa2048", "name": "RSA-2048",
      "cryptoProperties": { "assetType": "algorithm",
        "algorithmProperties": { "primitive": "signature", "parameterSetIdentifier": "2048",
          "executionEnvironment": "software-plain-ram", "implementationPlatform": "armv7-m",
          "cryptoFunctions": ["verify"], "classicalSecurityLevel": 112, "nistQuantumSecurityLevel": 0 } } },
    { "type": "cryptographic-asset", "bom-ref": "alg-ecdh-p256", "name": "ECDH-P256",
      "cryptoProperties": { "assetType": "algorithm",
        "algorithmProperties": { "primitive": "key-agree", "curve": "secp256r1", "executionEnvironment": "hardware",
          "cryptoFunctions": ["keygen"], "classicalSecurityLevel": 128, "nistQuantumSecurityLevel": 0 } } },
    { "type": "cryptographic-asset", "bom-ref": "proto-tls12", "name": "TLS 1.2",
      "cryptoProperties": { "assetType": "protocol",
        "protocolProperties": { "type": "tls", "version": "1.2",
          "cipherSuites": [ { "name": "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", "algorithms": ["alg-ecdh-p256"] } ] } } }
  ],
  "dependencies": [ { "ref": "lib-mbedtls", "provides": ["alg-rsa2048", "alg-ecdh-p256", "proto-tls12"] } ]
}

Read as a migration team would: both asymmetric algorithms score nistQuantumSecurityLevel 0, the ECDH key pair is generated in a hardware block (so a library update alone will not replace it), and the RSA check sits in the boot chain, where a change also touches secure boot and the root of trust. Algorithm names can follow the patterns in the CycloneDX Cryptography Registry.

What did EO 14412 and OMB M-26-15 change in June 2026?

EO 14412 and M-26-15 put dates on the federal post-quantum migration and named the CBOM as its inventory format. US policy on cryptographic inventories did not start in 2026: OMB Memorandum M-23-02 (18 November 2022) first directed agencies to inventory quantum-vulnerable systems. The text of Executive Order 14412, signed 22 June 2026, adds three things:

  • Sec. 4(b): OMB guidance requiring agencies to move all high value assets and high impact systems to PQC for key establishment by 31 December 2030 and for digital signatures by 31 December 2031. National Security Systems are excluded from this guidance; NSA reports on them separately (Sec. 5(c)).
  • Sec. 5(d): within 270 days (by about 19 March 2027), CISA with NIST releases public guidance on "the minimum elements for a cryptographic bill of materials", elements that "shall enable the automated assessment of the cryptographic assets utilized by a hardware or software element."
  • Sec. 6: procurement, including the two FAR rules covered in the next section.

OMB M-26-15, dated 24 June 2026, requires each agency to submit a PQC Migration Plan within 120 days and sets five phases:

Phase Period Focus (M-26-15 wording, shortened)
1 Strategy, Planning, and Discovery 2026–2027 Inventory (including HVAs and high impact systems), assessment, governance
2 Pilots and Early Migration 2027–2028 Pilots and early migration of prioritized systems
3 Prioritized Migration 2028–2030 PQC key establishment for HVAs, high impact and highly sensitive systems
4 Signature Migration 2031 PQC digital signatures for the same systems
5 Full Migration 2035 Remaining systems, by risk and commercial availability

The memo's automation appendix is where the CBOM appears: the inventory should be built with software composition analysis of SBOMs, static and dynamic application testing "to find cryptographic functions in code", and network scanners for protocols and cipher suites, and "should populate a central Cryptographic Bill of Materials (CBOM)". It also sets TLS 1.3 support "not later than January 2, 2030" and tells agencies to make sure product requirements in CISA's PQC product categories "include PQC integration". Agencies are building inventories before the Sec. 5(d) guidance exists, so expect to map today's fields to it once published.

Which deadlines reach suppliers and contractors?

Two FAR rules in the order and NIST's transition schedule reach companies that sell to the US government. The rest of the order binds agencies.

Date Source What it means for a device maker
~19 Dec 2026 (180 days) EO 14412 Sec. 6(c) FAR Council proposes a rule requiring covered contractors to comply with NIST FIPS, including PQC FIPS, by 31 December 2030
~19 Mar 2027 (270 days) EO 14412 Sec. 5(d), 6(d) CBOM minimum-elements guidance; FAR rule requiring contractor VDPs to take reports of cryptographic vulnerabilities, "including testing for lack of encryption and the use of non-FIPS approved algorithms"
2 Jan 2030 OMB M-26-15 Agencies must support TLS 1.3 or later, so products they buy need it
After 2030 / after 2035 NIST IR 8547 (final) ECDSA, EdDSA, RSA signatures and RSA, DH and ECDH key establishment are deprecated after 2030 and disallowed after 2035

The final NIST IR 8547, published October 2026, applies the same "deprecated after 2030, disallowed after 2035" rule to every quantum-vulnerable signature and key-establishment scheme at 112 bits or more. It notes that for systems prioritized under M-26-15, the earlier EO 14412 deadlines apply. A device shipped in 2027 with a 10-year service life will outlive both dates, which is why the CBOM is worth building now. The replacement algorithms are covered in FIPS 203/204/205.

How do you build a CBOM for a firmware image?

Start from the component SBOM and add the cryptography each component actually uses; no single scan finds all of it.

  1. List the crypto librariesThe firmware SBOM already names OpenSSL, mbed TLS, wolfSSL or a vendor SDK with versions. Each becomes a library component that will provide assets.
  2. Find what is called, not what is compiledA library supports dozens of algorithms; build configuration (for example mbedtls_config.h), linked symbols and call sites show which ones the product uses. M-26-15 names SAST for this step.
  3. Read the protocol settingsTLS, SSH, IPsec and Wi-Fi configuration files give versions and cipher suites; a network scan of a running device confirms what it negotiates.
  4. Pull certificates and keys from the imageRecord each certificate's algorithm, issuer and expiry, and each key's type and size. Do not put private key values in the CBOM.
  5. Add hardwareSecure elements, TPMs and SoC crypto engines get executionEnvironment = hardware; these are the assets a firmware update cannot change.
  6. Score and linkFill in classicalSecurityLevel and nistQuantumSecurityLevel, link assets to libraries with provides, and tag the boot chain and update path, since those signatures migrate last and hardest.
  7. Regenerate per releaseA CBOM, like an SBOM, is per firmware version; see SBOM minimum elements for the baseline fields.

Who maintains the format, and which tools support it?

CycloneDX, an OWASP project standardized at Ecma International, maintains the CBOM format, which IBM Research created. The CycloneDX 1.6 release announcement of 9 April 2024 describes the CBOM as "developed by researchers and software engineers at IBM". ECMA-424 1st edition (June 2024) is CycloneDX 1.6, and the 2nd edition (December 2025) is CycloneDX 1.7. CBOMkit, open-sourced by IBM under Apache-2.0, generates CBOMs from source repositories and visualizes them.

Few SBOM generators fill cryptoProperties. Dependency resolution finds the library; finding the algorithm, key size and execution environment needs code, configuration and binary analysis, and for firmware that mixes vendored libraries and silicon crypto engines, often an engineer's review.

Which mistakes make a CBOM useless for migration?

Most weak CBOMs stop at the algorithm family.

  • "RSA" without parameters. Without parameterSetIdentifier or curve, a migration team cannot tell a 1024-bit legacy key from a 3072-bit one.
  • Library list passed off as a CBOM. "mbed TLS 3.6.2" is an SBOM entry; the CBOM needs the assets it provides.
  • Hardware left out. Keys generated in a secure element or a fused root-of-trust hash are the slowest things to change and need the earliest plan.
  • Boot chain missing. Signature verification in ROM or the first-stage bootloader is often fixed in silicon.
  • One CBOM for the product line. Releases differ; tie each CBOM to a firmware version.
  • Secrets in the file. relatedCryptoMaterialProperties has a value field; record type, size and state, not key material.
  • Waiting for the Sec. 5(d) guidance. The CycloneDX fields exist today. Building now and mapping later costs less than starting in 2027. For key handling around the change, see NIST SP 800-57: key management.

Which part can a firmware SBOM tool automate?

A firmware SBOM tool covers the first build step, and SoftWSP stops there. Its firmware analysis extracts a CycloneDX 1.6 component SBOM from a firmware image, which names the crypto libraries and their versions, and matches every component against NVD, CISA KEV, FIRST EPSS and CISA CSAF ICS advisories; AI drafts a cited report that an engineer reviews. It does not fill cryptoProperties, detect algorithms, keys or certificates, or choose post-quantum replacements. Library CVEs, such as those in the OpenSSL firmware guide, show up in the match list. You can open the resulting SBOM in the free SBOM viewer; see device firmware security.

Sources: the Federal Register text of Executive Order 14412, the OMB M-26-15 and M-23-02 PDFs, NIST IR 8547 (final), and CycloneDX's schema and pages. This guide is not legal advice.

Put this guide to work

Frequently asked questions

What is a CBOM and how is it different from a regular SBOM?

A Software Bill of Materials inventories components and their versions — libraries, packages, dependencies. A Cryptographic Bill of Materials inventories something a regular SBOM does not: the specific cryptographic algorithms, key sizes, certificates, protocols and related cryptographic material a product actually uses, and where each one lives. CycloneDX's own published schema (bom-1.6.schema.json) models this as a component of type `cryptographic-asset` with a dedicated `cryptoProperties` structure, which the schema introduces with "Cryptographic assets have properties that uniquely define them and that make them actionable for further reasoning," and an `assetType` field whose values are `algorithm`, `certificate`, `protocol` and `related-crypto-material`. The practical difference: a regular SBOM can tell you a product bundles OpenSSL 1.1.1; a CBOM can tell you that specific build negotiates RSA-2048 for key exchange in one code path and ECDSA P-256 for signing in another — the level of detail needed to know which of a product's cryptographic choices a quantum computer would actually break.

Is a CBOM actually a legal requirement now, or still just best practice?

As of June 2026, it is a dated federal requirement, not just best practice. Executive Order 14412, "Securing the Nation Against Advanced Cryptographic Attacks" (signed 22 June 2026, published in the Federal Register on 25 June 2026 at 91 FR 38483), directs CISA and NIST to publish the minimum elements for a Cryptographic Bill of Materials within 270 days of the order — placing that specification at roughly Q1 2027 — so that agencies and, per secondary legal analysis of the order, eventually their contractors can produce a standard CBOM that will "enable the automated assessment of the cryptographic assets utilized by a hardware or software element." OMB Memorandum M-26-15, "Execution of the Migration to Post-Quantum Cryptography" (issued 24 June 2026, two days after the order), operationalizes this into a five-phase agency migration timeline running from 2026 strategy-and-discovery work through full migration by 2035, with agency PQC Migration Plans due to OMB and the National Cyber Director by roughly 22 October 2026 (120 days from the memo).

What are the hard compliance dates device makers and contractors should actually track?

Per secondary legal and technical analysis of Executive Order 14412, the order sets 31 December 2030 as the deadline for federal agencies to migrate key establishment on their most sensitive systems to NIST-approved post-quantum algorithms, and 31 December 2031 for digital signatures. The same reporting describes the order directing the Federal Acquisition Regulatory (FAR) Council to propose, within 180 days, a rule requiring covered federal contractors to comply with NIST's post-quantum FIPS standards by the same 31 December 2030 date — which is the detail that turns this from a government-internal IT project into a supply-chain requirement for any vendor, including device and firmware makers, selling into the US federal government. A separate FAR rule, per the same reporting, is to require contractors to maintain vulnerability disclosure policies covering cryptographic weaknesses specifically, within 270 days.

Who maintains the CBOM data format, and what does a usable entry actually need to capture?

CBOM as a schema was originally developed by IBM Research as a standalone extension of CycloneDX, then upstreamed into the core CycloneDX specification in version 1.6, released 9 April 2024; CycloneDX's own release announcement credits the Cryptographic Bill of Materials as "developed by researchers and software engineers at IBM," and CycloneDX 1.6 has since been adopted as Ecma International standard Ecma-424. Per CycloneDX's published schema, a cryptographic asset's `algorithmProperties` block is where migration-relevant detail lives: `primitive` (for example `signature`, `kem`, `key-agree`, `hash`), `parameterSetIdentifier`, `curve`, `mode`, `padding`, `cryptoFunctions`, `executionEnvironment`, `implementationPlatform`, `certificationLevel`, `classicalSecurityLevel` and `nistQuantumSecurityLevel`. A CBOM entry that only says "RSA" without a key size, or "AES" without a mode, does not tell a migration team whether that specific usage is quantum-vulnerable (classical RSA and elliptic-curve key exchange and signatures are, regardless of key size) — which is also exactly the gap EO 14412's CISA/NIST minimum-elements specification exists to close with a common, government-wide baseline rather than leaving every agency and vendor to define its own fields.

Sources

  1. Executive Order 14412, Securing the Nation Against Advanced Cryptographic Attacks (signed 22 June 2026; published 25 June 2026, 91 FR 38483, document 2026-12909)
  2. OMB Memorandum M-26-15, Execution of the Migration to Post-Quantum Cryptography (24 June 2026)
  3. OMB Memorandum M-23-02, Migrating to Post-Quantum Cryptography (18 November 2022) — the original federal cryptographic-inventory directive that M-26-15 builds on
  4. CycloneDX: CycloneDX v1.6 Released (9 April 2024) — CBOM developed by IBM Research, and CycloneDX Attestations (CDXA)
  5. CycloneDX: Cryptography Bill of Materials (CBOM) capability overview
  6. CycloneDX bom-1.6 JSON schema (GitHub, CycloneDX/specification, branch 1.6) — cryptoProperties, assetType and algorithmProperties definitions
  7. Federal Register: Executive Order 14412 full text (Sec. 4(b), 5(d), 6(c), 6(d))
  8. NIST IR 8547, Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards (final, October 2026)
  9. CycloneDX Cryptography Registry (algorithm naming patterns for CBOM entries)
  10. Ecma International: ECMA-424 CycloneDX Bill of materials specification (1st edition June 2024 = CycloneDX 1.6; 2nd edition December 2025 = CycloneDX 1.7)
  11. CBOMkit (CBOM generation, viewer and compliance toolset, open-sourced by IBM)
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Cryptographic Bill of Materials (CBOM), explained