Security Advisory

CVE-2023-45866: BlueZ Fake Keyboard Injection

Last updated:
  • CVE-2023-45866

CVE-2023-45866 is an authentication flaw in BlueZ's Bluetooth HID host: before 5.71, a nearby attacker can connect an emulated keyboard to a discoverable, connectable Linux device without any user action and type commands into it. NVD scores it 6.3. BlueZ 5.71 fixes it by making ClassicBondedOnly default to true.

Vulnerability summary

CVSS base score

6.3

Medium severity

EPSS score (FIRST)

7.9%

Probability of exploitation in the wild in the next 30 days

CISA KEV catalog

No

Not listed

Published

Vulnerability ID: CVE-2023-45866 · Source: NVD

Affected components

ComponentCPEVersion range
BlueZ (bluetoothd input plugin, Classic HID)—before 5.71 with default settings; fixed by commit 25a471a (ClassicBondedOnly defaults to true), first in 5.71; NVD lists operating system CPEs only
OpenWrt packages feed, openwrt-23.05 branch: bluez-daemon—5.66 (PKG_RELEASE 1), installs upstream input.conf with ClassicBondedOnly commented out, no CVE-2023-45866 patch (package Makefile read 2026-11-16); openwrt-24.10 ships 5.72

What does this mean for affected devices?

CVE-2023-45866 lets an unauthenticated Bluetooth device pose as a keyboard. NVD's description says BlueZ HID hosts "may permit an unauthenticated Peripheral role HID Device to initiate and establish an encrypted connection, and accept HID keyboard reports" with no user interaction, names bluez 5.64-0ubuntu1 in Ubuntu 22.04 LTS as an example, and scores it 6.3 (medium) with vector CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L, weakness CWE-287 (NVD). NVD's configuration lists operating systems (Android, Ubuntu, Debian, Fedora, Apple) and no BlueZ product, so a version match on the BlueZ package will not find it.

Marc Newlin's write-up states that Linux with BlueZ is exploitable when Bluetooth is discoverable and connectable, that the attack runs from a Linux computer with a standard Bluetooth adapter, and that Ubuntu 18.04, 20.04, 22.04 and 23.10 tested vulnerable. He explains that the Linux issue "was fixed in 2020 (CVE-2020-0556), but the fix was left disabled by default". That 2020 fix is the ClassicBondedOnly option described on our CVE-2020-0556 page. The upstream fix, commit 25a471a dated 2023-10-10, changes two lines so the option defaults to true, citing the HID profile's requirement for Security Mode 4. It first shipped in BlueZ 5.71, whose tarball on kernel.org is dated 2023-12-13.

The firmware angle is the OpenWrt package. On 2026-11-16 the OpenWrt packages Makefile for the openwrt-23.05 branch builds BlueZ 5.66, leaves the HID and HoG plugins enabled, installs the upstream input.conf to /etc/bluetooth/input.conf, and carries no patch for this CVE. The 5.66 input.conf has #ClassicBondedOnly=true commented out under "Defaults to false to maximize device compatibility", so an OpenWrt 23.05 image with bluez-daemon runs with the vulnerable default. The openwrt-24.10 branch ships 5.72, which includes the fix.

Distributions backported the change without new upstream numbers: Ubuntu lists fixes such as 5.64-0ubuntu1.1 for 22.04 and 5.53-0ubuntu3.7 for 20.04, and the Debian tracker lists 5.66-1+deb12u1 for bookworm and 5.55-3.1+deb11u1 for bullseye (DSA-5584-1). Ubuntu's mitigation is to set ClassicBondedOnly=true in /etc/bluetooth/input.conf and restart the Bluetooth service, noting that false re-enables legacy devices such as the PS3 controller and the vulnerability.

The CVE is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of 2026-11-16 (catalog version 2026.11.13), and FIRST EPSS gives it 0.0788, the 95th percentile, in the 2026-11-15 dataset (CISA KEV, FIRST EPSS).

The risk on a device depends on what typed input can reach: an HMI, kiosk or infotainment unit with a shell or browser is exposed in a way a headless gateway is not. Device makers should ship BlueZ 5.71 or later or backport 25a471a, set ClassicBondedOnly=true explicitly in the image's own input.conf, and keep the adapter non-discoverable outside a user-started pairing window. Our BlueZ and Linux Bluetooth vulnerabilities in embedded devices guide gives a hardened main.conf baseline, and our authentication bypass fix guide covers this weakness class.

How to fix this class of issueThis advisory's weakness class is Authentication bypass. Our practical guide covers how to detect, fix, verify and disclose it: How to fix authentication bypass in embedded firmware.

Evidence

  • Unauthenticated HID device can connect and send keyboard reports with no user interaction; NVD CVSS v3.1 6.3 (CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L), CWE-287; OS CPEs only. — NVD
  • Linux/BlueZ exploitable when discoverable and connectable; Ubuntu 18.04 to 23.10 tested vulnerable; the 2020 fix (CVE-2020-0556) was left disabled by default. — Marc Newlin, CVE-2023-45866 write-up
  • Commit 25a471a (2023-10-10) changes the ClassicBondedOnly default to true, citing HID Security Mode 4. — BlueZ commit 25a471a
  • bluez-5.71.tar.xz dated 2023-12-13 on kernel.org. — kernel.org BlueZ release directory
  • openwrt-23.05 bluez package: PKG_VERSION 5.66, installs upstream input.conf, no CVE-2023-45866 patch; openwrt-24.10 ships 5.72. — OpenWrt packages (openwrt-23.05, openwrt-24.10)
  • BlueZ 5.66 input.conf: ClassicBondedOnly commented out, 'Defaults to false to maximize device compatibility'. — BlueZ input.conf at tag 5.66
  • Ubuntu fixed 22.04 in 5.64-0ubuntu1.1 and 20.04 in 5.53-0ubuntu3.7; mitigation ClassicBondedOnly=true. — Ubuntu Security
  • Debian fixed bookworm in 5.66-1+deb12u1 and bullseye in 5.55-3.1+deb11u1 (DSA-5584-1). — Debian Security Tracker
  • Not in the CISA KEV catalog as of 2026-11-16 (catalog version 2026.11.13). — CISA KEV
  • EPSS 0.07879 (95th percentile), dataset 2026-11-15, read 2026-11-16. — FIRST EPSS

Related advisories

Sources

  1. NVD
  2. Marc Newlin (SkySafe): CVE-2023-45866 write-up
  3. BlueZ commit 25a471a: input.conf: Change default of ClassicBondedOnly
  4. BlueZ input.conf at tag 5.66
  5. kernel.org: BlueZ release tarballs
  6. OpenWrt packages: bluez Makefile (openwrt-23.05)
  7. OpenWrt packages: bluez Makefile (openwrt-24.10)
  8. Ubuntu Security: CVE-2023-45866
  9. Debian Security Tracker
  10. CISA KEV
  11. FIRST EPSS

Frequently asked questions

Which BlueZ setting closes CVE-2023-45866?

ClassicBondedOnly=true in the [General] section of /etc/bluetooth/input.conf, followed by a restart of the Bluetooth service. It is the default from BlueZ 5.71; setting it to false re-enables legacy devices and the vulnerability (per the BlueZ commit and Ubuntu).

Does OpenWrt ship a BlueZ affected by CVE-2023-45866?

On 2026-11-16 the openwrt-23.05 packages branch builds BlueZ 5.66 with the upstream input.conf, where ClassicBondedOnly is commented out, and no fix patch; openwrt-24.10 ships 5.72 (per the OpenWrt packages repository).

Why does a version scan miss CVE-2023-45866 on BlueZ packages?

NVD's record lists operating systems such as Ubuntu, Debian and Android but no BlueZ product CPE, so tools that match the BlueZ package version against NVD find nothing. Distributions also fixed it without changing the upstream number (per NVD, Ubuntu and Debian).

Is CVE-2023-45866 in the CISA KEV catalog?

No, not as of 2026-11-16 (catalog version 2026.11.13). FIRST EPSS gives it 0.0788, the 95th percentile, in the 2026-11-15 dataset (per CISA KEV and FIRST EPSS).